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This project explores the coordination of everyday eating in the aftermath of Tokyo 
Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO’s) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
disaster. With the onset of the nuclear disaster in March 2011, imperceptible 
radionuclides re-emerged as objects of concern for many people living throughout the 
archipelago of Japan. Falling over homes, farmlands, forests, waterways and oceans, 
TEPCO’s radionuclides became unwelcomed actors within Japan’s agrifood 
assemblage, challenging the governance of food safety in Japan and around the world. 
To ensure the ‘safety’ of food circulating within its agrifood assemblage, the Japanese 
government initiated an effort to coordinate the activities of human actors in the 
turbulence of the radiological overflow.  
 
Beginning with the troubling experiences of konran (disorder) shared by forty-three 
people living and eating in Japan’s Kansai region in 2016, this thesis borrows 
sensibilities from the field of institutional ethnography to explore how everyday eating 
is hooked up within textually-mediated ruling relations that have emerged since the 
onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. At the same time, sensibilities form material 
semiotics are used to attend to myriad other sociomaterial entanglements people find 
themselves entwined within in the aftermath of the nuclear disaster, particularly their 
entanglements with imperceptible radionuclides. I refer to this method of inquiry as a 
‘vital institutional ethnography.’  
 
With the goal of producing knowledge that will be of use to my participants in situating 
their own experiences of konran within greater ruling relations, I follow strings from 
their experiences into various institutional complexes to both explicate ruling relations 
and explore the monstrous and ghostly sociomaterial entanglements of humans and 
more-than-humans they relate with in their everyday lives. Beginning with an 
exploration of historical cases of industrial ruination and the current case of TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster, I discover that ruling texts and discourses are enacted in ways to erase 
or obfuscate the material presence of industrial pollutants.  Through explicating the 
various ruling relations my participants are embedded and participate within following 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, I argue that the Japanese government’s coordination effort 
attempts to establish a single, ‘correct’ way for humans to understand and relate with 
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radionuclides possibly present in the food and water they ingest. This ‘single reality’ is 
born out of what I refer to as the ‘transnational nuclear assemblage’—an assemblage of 
commissions, governments, committees, scientific associations and many other 
organizations which produce ruling texts that are designed to manage and contain 
radiological overflows within a vast and ever-expanding textual complex. In exploring 
the ruling relations involved in the enactment of ‘safe food,’ I discover that while 
single-reality-wielding coordination efforts may be efficient for maintaining the pace of 
commerce and in paving the textual-path forward for military and industrial projects, 
tensions arise when they enter and interfere with the messy, multiple realities of my 
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In this thesis, Japanese names appear in the Japanese order: family name followed by 
first name. As a rule, all Japanese language words are italicized throughout the 
document, except for commonly known place-names that are regularly used in English 
(for example, Tokyo and Kyoto). Macrons are also used to signal Japanese long 
vowels, except in commonly known place-names as mentioned above.  
 
All interviews and focus groups for this thesis were conducted in Japanese by the 
author in 2016. Study participants were given pseudonyms which will appear with their 
statements. Quotations from study participants were translated by the author and have 
been reviewed by a Japanese-English speaker to ensure their accuracy. Bracketed text 
is included within participant quotes to either point out the original Japanese term or 
phrase used, or to provide important contextual information missing from participants’ 
statements. 
 
Because this thesis was written with a Japanese audience in mind, I use American 
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In June, 2010 Ito Kahoru (pseudonym), traveled with a friend to the site of Tokyo 
Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO’s) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The 
then governor of Fukushima Prefecture, Sato Yuhei, had opened up discussions about 
using mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel—a mixture of uranium and plutonium—in the plant’s 
reactors.1 Kahoru was part of a group trying to stop this measure from passing; 
plutonium is, of course, considered to be “the world’s most dangerous element.”2 
Before giving birth to her daughter and moving to Fukushima City, Kahoru was a nurse 
in Shizoka Prefecture, home of the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant. It was during that 
period of her life that she first began learning about nuclear power: 
At that time, Shizuoka’s Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant was 
probably the most concerning nuclear power plant. It was said to be 
the riskiest nuclear power plant in the world.3 The combination of 
nuclear power and earthquakes. At that time, I became truly aware of 
the real possibility of the onset of a combined earthquake and 
nuclear power plant disaster. 
From her home in Fukushima City, Kahoru and her friend traveled three hours by car 
on mountain roads until they arrived at a spot near TEPCO’s nuclear power plant.  
If you got down and stood there, it was a sprawling peaceful 
landscape. Nearby there were small children playing alongside their 
                                                
1 Unlike usual nuclear fuel rods which contain uranium oxide, MOX fuel rods contain a blend 
of plutonium and uranium oxide. The use of MOX fuel is an important part of Japan’s goal of 
creating a closed nuclear fuel cycle, known as the ‘Pluthermal Program’ (W. D. Turner, 2003b). 
That is, Japan’s nuclear power program is based on an ambitious never-before-attained plan to 
generate a large percentage of the country’s power using plutonium. MOX fuel was loaded into 
TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant’s reactor 3 in August 2010, one of the 
reactors that would explode and suffer a full meltdown in March 2011 (International Panel on 
Fissile Materials, 2010). 
2 See Bernstein (2007). 
3 McNeill (2011) explains that the label of ‘world’s most dangerous’ nuclear power plant 
comes from seismologists: the five nuclear reactors at the Hamaoka plant sits atop “two major 
subterranean faults,” a location where predictions show there is an 87 percent chance of a 
powerful earthquake to strike. At that time, there were plans for one more reactor to be built at 
the site. 
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young mothers. I was filled with complex feelings. In any event, at the 
site of a nuclear power plant, nearby it’s more than usual that 
radioactivity is regularly leaking. […] If it was me, I wouldn’t bring 
my children there. […] Immediately after having those complex 
feelings, “GOOOOOOON!” there was a rumble in the ground. It was 
extremely frightening. 
At 2:46 pm on March 11, 2011, Kahoru felt another earthquake, this one much bigger 
than the one she felt in June the previous year. By around 4pm, she had received news 
of the power outage at the nuclear power plant she had stood before just eight months 
earlier. Her husband was away, and she took refuge at a friend’s house approximately 
80 kilometers from the site of what would soon be a full-fledged nuclear disaster. She 
had seen images of the tsunami and considered evacuating in case the nuclear reactors 
were in trouble, even though the Japanese government was not recommending it at the 
time.4 At 11pm, she read a fax written by the Disaster Response Headquarters 
explaining that the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant would suffer a 
meltdown if electricity was not restored. She kept checking for updates. There was still 
no power at the nuclear power plant. 
 
In the middle of a blackout, Kahoru finally decided to evacuate. With only the clothes 
on their backs and a small backpack, she, her then four-year-old daughter and her 
female friend—whose husband was a doctor, so decided to stay behind as not to evade 
his work duties—made their way to Aizuwakamatsu in western Fukushima. Kahoru 
again found herself driving through Fukushima Prefecture’s beautiful mountain roads, 
but this time in almost complete darkness as aftershocks large and small rumbled 
beneath her. There they met Kahoru’s husband, and her family traveled to Niigata in a 
rental car. They were lucky enough to get the last two seats on a flight to Osaka after 
two cancellations were made. But this luck led them to leave the rental car behind, an 
act they would later pay for through a hefty fee. From Osaka, they took the bullet train 
to Hiroshima, then traveled to her husband’s hometown where they stayed for a month. 
After a month together, her husband needed to return to work which would reopen as 
                                                
4 The Japanese government would eventually ask people within a 30 kilometer radius to 
evacuate due to the nuclear disaster. The United States (US) recommended any US citizens 
within 80 kilometers evacuate (Kubota & Reuters Staff, 2011).  
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‘normal’ in April. For both Kahoru and her husband, however, these did not feel like 
‘normal’ times. As her husband moved back to Fukushima City, Kahoru and her 
daughter relocated to the island of Kyushu.  
 
From her previous work, Kahoru had already known about the dangers of internal 
radiation, especially regarding iodine-131 and thyroid glands, and even became active 
in a campaign to measure breast milk for radiation after iodine-131 was found in water 
in areas as far away as Tokyo.5 At the same time that she had begun traveling around 
the country to support various initiatives, Kahoru felt some discord in her new home in 
Kyushu when it came to food and the issue of internal radiation exposure. On the one 
hand, she was connected with a number of anti-nuclear activists there and even though 
they cared about ending Japan’s dependency on nuclear power, she explained that most 
of them were a bit older and did not seem to have many concerns about issues of food 
or internal exposure to radiation. On the other hand, there were mothers at her 
daughter’s new school who were very concerned about internal radiation from food. 
There were also people setting up a citizen radiation measuring station (CRMS) to test 
food for radionuclides. While she appreciated all of their efforts, as someone who had 
left Fukushima and was active on the national scale, her entanglement within these very 
different ways of ‘doing food’ was troubling, involving so much more effort and 
attention then she had to offer at that time. 
Everyone was in anguish as they were choosing foods. And, also, in 
relation with moms who might have very different information [about 
radiation]. Everyone anguished trying to figure out how it will be 
possible to share. I just left it to those people.  
Eventually Kahoru and her husband moved to the Kansai region where I met her in 
2016. They are both plaintiffs in one the many country-wide court cases demanding 
TEPCO and the Japanese government acknowledge losses suffered not only by 
officially recognized ‘evacuees’—those people who were living within the mandatory 
evacuation zone at the time of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster—but all people who have 
sought refuge from TEPCO’s radionuclides. Because they lived in Fukushima City and 
not in a mandatory evacuation zone, Kahoru and her family are categorized as 
                                                
5 See, for example, Jolly and Grady (2011). 
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‘voluntary’ or ‘independent evacuees’ (jishu hinansha,⾃主避難者) and have received 
no compensation for the disorder TEPCO’s nuclear disaster has wreaked on their 
everyday lives. 
 
Sakayama Akane (pseudonym) was living in Tomioka-mura, less than ten kilometers 
from TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and less than four kilometers 
from TEPCO’s Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant in March 2011.6 Her family had 
moved to Tomioka-mura in 1986, the same year as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. 
Though she remembers questioning the safety of nuclear power as an adolescent back 
in 1986, she recalls how people around her seemed to view nuclear power in a positive 
light. Some of her relatives and neighbors had worked at restaurants, coffee shops or 
bento shops whose main customers were workers at TEPCO’s nuclear power plants. 
She recalls how in calligraphy class at her new school in Tomioka-mura, she and her 
classmates would delicately paint the four characters that spell out ‘nuclear future’ 
(genpatsu mirai, 原発未来) . Nuclear power offered a bright future to people in her 
community, if only because it brought capital and business to those struggling to make 
a living in a small, rural town. 
There were many people who supported nuclear power. There was 
the Energy Hall7 with a replica of Madam Curie’s house. 
Needless to say, Akane’s post-2011 experience has not been the bright nuclear future 
she had learned to expect as a young girl growing up within 10 kilometers of eight of 
TEPCO’s nuclear reactors.  
 
                                                
6 Daiichi means “number 1” in Japanese, while daini means “number 2.” 
7 The Energy Hall, referred to as a “public relations hall,” is an over 10,000 square meter 
building built and owned by TEPCO (Yusuke Noda, 2017). Another of TEPCO’s PR facilities 
is the J-Village national soccer training center located about 20 kilometers south of TEPCO’s 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, about 11 kilometers from Akane’s now demolished 
house—her house was so overrun by wild animals and their excrement after being abandoned 
following the nuclear disaster that it was uninhabitable, even if she wanted to move back 
following the lifting of the evacuation order in April 2017 (Kyodo News, 2017). After 
undergoing “revitalization,” J-Village will be used to host both men’s and women’s soccer 
training camps for the 2020 Olympics (Kyodo News, 2016a). 
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On March 11, 2011 a magnitude six earthquake shook Akane’s house, knocking over 
teacups and furniture. She heard evacuation orders come from a loudspeaker outside, 
warning people to escape the impending tsunami. Bringing only a blanket, underwear, 
her cellphone, charger, wallet and bankbook, Akane drove with her father to a 
designated evacuation shelter.  
It was a concert hall. It was also built with money from the nuclear 
power plant. 
They received canned food and bread, no water. The next day they heard about trouble 
at TEPCO’s nuclear power plant, so needed to evacuate further as the concert hall was 
less than 10 kilometers from the troubled reactors.  At 7am on March 12th, Akane’s 
father drove them west—a trip which would usually take 45 minutes, but took almost 
seven hours because of the congested traffic. They stayed at a closed-down elementary 
school for about five days, sleeping on an aluminum sheet and receiving very little 
food: some bread, a very small cup of miso soup, and one saltless rice ball. This time 
there was a water wagon provided. She saw the nuclear reactors explode on a television 
screen in the hallway. She was 45 kilometers away.  
 
After about four days, Akane and her father drove to Aizuwakamatsu, approximately 
100 kilometers from TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. Most of the evacuation shelters were 
performing screening tests on people, making sure they did not have high levels of 
radiation on their bodies before they entered. Akane had already thrown away the 
clothing she was wearing at the time of the explosions by the time she arrived. While 
the food was better at the new evacuation center—including hearty miso soup and 
curry—Akane was still sleeping on a cardboard box on a gym floor and suffering due 
to a chronic illness. All the futons were kindly offered to the elderly and she wanted to 
move to her friend’s house in Tokyo, but her family angrily objected. 
I said I don't want to worry [about my exposure to radiation] when I 
have kids. But because I don’t even have a boyfriend, my relatives 
said it’s like worrying about rebounding on a diet when you don’t 
even go on a diet in the first place. 
Akane was eventually allowed to leave, but only because her prescription could not be 
filled due to the high pressure people in the evacuation centers had put on local 
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pharmacies. After receiving her family’s blessings, she quickly hopped on a bus to 
Tokyo. She stayed with a friend for a few days and then moved to Chiba to stay with 
another friend for about a week. She then moved to Yokohama where she stayed with 
family until April 7th when she moved to Niko with her father—he had been at the 
elementary school the entire time. While in Niko, she heard news about spinach being 
‘over the limit.’ As food was provided, she could not check the origin of the 
ingredients. She wasn’t sure about what to eat, but stopped drinking milk and cut back 
on seafood after learning about their susceptibility to radionuclide contamination. What 
was once a delicious and hearty bowl of miso soup became a brew of potentially 
health-damaging ingredients. In August 2011, Akane moved alone to the Kansai region 
where I met her in 2016. Once in Kansai, she became a member of a cooperative that 
tests foods for radioactive cesium-137 and cesium-134 at levels lower than the 
government standards. She also mournfully stopped eating mushrooms after learning 
they easily absorb radioactive cesium, and reminisced about the days she and her 
family would go foraging in the mountains of Fukushima Prefecture.  
Fukushima is a place of abundant nature, so I would go foraging for 
edible wild plants with my dad, gather walnuts with my aunt. Being 
robbed of such natural blessings, that’s the worst part [of the 
disaster]. 
A plaintiff in one of the lawsuits against the Japanese government and TEPCO, Akane 
continues to attend meetings and events about TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. However, she 
is not able to discuss her concerns with her family who all moved back to Fukushima 
Prefecture. “They tell me I worry too much,” she said.  
 
Kondo Tomohisa (pseudonym) grew up in Koriyama City, Fukushima Prefecture, 
located approximately 60 kilometers from both TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi and 
Fukushima Daini nuclear power plants. He had been living with his wife and children 
in the Kansai region for ten years prior to March 2011, and was there watching from 
afar, trying to get in touch with his many family members still in Koriyama at the time 
of the nuclear disaster. When I met him in 2016, he and his wife had a two year-old and 
a newborn child. Like Akane, and many of my other participants, he has felt pressure to 
keep quiet regarding his concerns about radiation, especially when he goes home to 
visit his family in Fukushima Prefecture.  
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Of course, people in Koriyama don’t directly say it to my face, but 
there is a general atmosphere that it is not okay to talk [about 
radiation]. Once you start thinking about it, you will probably start 
thinking too much about it. It would be too much for your heart to 
bear. […] In any case, I want to show them their grandchildren, so I 
go home. But it comes with incredible discord [kattō]. My wife is 
from Kansai and of course she doesn’t want to go home with me. […] 
But I really want to show them. I want to show them their 
grandchildren. I want to show people in the neighborhood. When I 
say I want to go home, every time [my wife and I] argue. It’s really 
heart-wrenching.  
When we spoke about food, Tomohisa explained that while in Kansai, he cares a lot 
about the food he and his family eats. Soon after the onset of the nuclear disaster, he 
and his wife began researching about radiation and how far it had spread across the 
country.8 Through their research, they set their own ‘standard’ (kijun) for food, and 
decided not to purchase foods grown in the Tōhoku or Kantō regions because of their 
concerns about contamination with TEPCO’s radionuclides. 
We’ve stopped eating seafood. Even [some food] from Kyushu. There 
was talk about foods grown in Fukushima being counterfeit as 
coming from Kyushu. […] Even things like mushrooms. […] Well, it 
may seem to be an assumption, but we came to the conclusion that it 
would be better not to eat much [food possibly contaminated with 
radiation]. 
But when he goes back to Koriyama and his family prepares meals for him, there is not 
much he can say. The discomfort of openly discussing radiation sometimes makes it 
impossible for him to protect his own family’s ‘standards.’  
It’s really difficult. Hmm. You know, I care about [food]. But [when I 
go to Koriyama], there are times that I just close my eyes.  
  
                                                
8 See Figure 1 for a map of radiological fallout produced by Professor Hayakawa Yukio of 
Gunma University. 
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Figure 1 Radiation contour map (eighth edition) created by Professor Hayakawa Yukio (2013) 
of Gunma University. Measurements as of September 2011, taken one meter above turf or 
grassland.9 
                                                
9 Permission to reprint this map is provided to those who follow the “reprinting rules” (updated 
January 22, 2014) stipulated on Professor Hayakawa’s website: 
http://kipuka.blog70.fc2.com/blog-category-20.html. Reproduction of this specific map requires 
clearly crediting Professor Hayakawa Yukio for its production. 
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Figure 2 Map of the nineteen locations housing Japan’s fifty-four nuclear power plants and two 
nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, with a 260 kilometer radius around TEPCO’s damaged 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. 10 
  
                                                
10 Data on the location of Japan’s nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities 















Figure 5 Location of study participants during fieldwork in 2016. They were all located within 







                                                
11 The concept for this map came from Koide and Nishio (2014). 
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It was not only people in or with connections to Fukushima Prefecture whose lives 
were turned upside-down following the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. According 
to maps of radioactive fallout produced by both the Japanese government and other 
independent sources, fallout from TEPCO’s nuclear disaster reached areas over 260 
kilometers from the site of the meltdowns, with some of the heaviest fallout 
concentrated in areas 160 kilometers from the damaged nuclear reactors (Figures 1 and 
2). While all of my study’s participants were living in the Kansai region during 
fieldwork for this thesis in 2016 (Figure 4), seventeen of them had been living within 
260 kilometers of TEPCO’s damaged reactors in March 2011 (Figure 3). However, the 
country’s fifty remaining nuclear reactors and two plutonium reprocessing facilities 
ensured that true refuge would be difficult to come by, as almost every location in 
Japan is within 160 kilometers of a nuclear power plant (Figure 5). Thus, far from 
being a problem solely for people in Fukushima Prefecture, the patchy deposition of 
TEPCO’s radionuclides throughout large areas of north-eastern Japan and into the 
Pacific Ocean caused disruption in the everyday lives of people throughout the 
country.12 And not only for those people forced to live their everyday lives surrounded 
by TEPCO’s radionuclides, but also people throughout the country ingesting foods 
possibly containing these imperceptible materials.  
 
My introduction to my own entanglement with TEPCO’s nuclear disaster came from 
questions I had regarding food and radionuclides. While I had lived in the Kansai 
region of Japan for almost two years prior to the onset of the nuclear disaster, in March 
2011 I was studying toward my MSc in agroecology in Vienna, Austria. However, my 
partner was still living in the Kansai region at that time and I wanted to know how the 
nuclear disaster would affect his everyday life. I attended my soil science class a day or 
two after seeing clips of the explosions at TEPCO’s nuclear power plant. The professor, 
who was set to retire that year, told us about his experiences remediating farmlands 
following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. We spent the entire class discussing 
the issue. While it was clear that nuclear disasters are able to contaminate areas used for 
farming and fishing, I was still very vague as to what this meant for people and other 
                                                
12 Radionuclides from TEPCO’s nuclear disaster were transported throughout the globe. Some 
scientists have estimated that approximately 18% of the fallout was on land in Japan, 1.9% on 
land in other areas throughout the world, while the remaining amounts fell into the Pacific 
Ocean (see Stohl et al., 2012: 2314). 
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non-humans eating food possibly contaminated with radionuclides. I asked for some 
clarification from a friend’s partner who was a nuclear engineer. In responding to my 
questions, he advised that people should be more concerned about consuming 
bananas—as they contain potassium-40, a naturally occurring radioactive isotope—
than any food possibly containing TEPCO’s radionuclides. I was not convinced this 
was a good enough reason to stop asking questions. Around the same time, some of my 
friends in Japan started telling me about tap water and foods being found ‘over the 
limit’ announced on the news, and that they had stopped drinking milk based on the 
experiences of people following the Chernobyl disaster—strontium-90 mimics calcium, 
so is often found in milk and other dairy products following a nuclear disaster.13 It 
became apparent that there would be no clear or simple answers regarding everyday 
eating following the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster.  
 
Another study participant, Ōra Mai (pseudonym), was living in Tokyo in 2011, but was 
in Osaka in the Kansai region at the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. Though she 
prolonged her stay in Osaka, she eventually returned to Tokyo where she faced a shock 
at the supermarket. 
When I returned, it was really horrible. There was nothing for me to 
buy at the supermarket. You know, I would have to look at the back of 
everything, and until that point cooking involved me preparing the 
food I wanted to eat. […] It was a feeling of hopelessness, at that 
time. I remember questioning why every time I had so much stress 
when having to go to the supermarket. […] In Osaka, basically, foods 
from around the area are found in the supermarket. And in Tokyo, as 
expected, Gunma and Ibaraki, foods from around that area and even 
from Fukushima. […] It was really scary. I didn’t know to what 
extent everything was contaminated. I avoided it all. 
Mai went on to explain how a small book on radiation and food published by Crayon 
House in August 2011 was one of her only comforts during those turbulent days 
(Yasuda, 2011). “How do you describe those times?” I asked, searching for a word able 
to encapsulate the multiple chaotic and disordered experiences I was hearing from her 
                                                
13 See Hirano et al. (2016). 
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and all of my other participants. Her response was swift and definitive: “Konran. It was 
konran.” 
 
Konran is a compound word that combines the kanji characters14 of kon (‘mix,’ 混) and 
ran (‘disordered,’ 乱). In its noun form, it can refer to ‘disorder,’ ‘chaos,’ ‘a mess,’ ‘a 
jumble,’ ‘a maelstrom.’ As a verb, it becomes the act of being ‘thrown into disorder,’ or 
‘getting mixed up’ or ‘muddled.’15 In this thesis, I explore people’s experiences of 
konran following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, with a particular focus on experiences of 
konran related to eating. Having moved back to the Kansai region in 2012, it was clear 
that TEPCO’s nuclear disaster was far from over, and that food was playing a special 
role in drawing people throughout the country into the ongoing controversy. The “rush 
of troubled stories” (Tsing, 2015: 34) I shared at the outset of this chapter were to draw 
you, the reader, into some of my participants’ messy and disordered experiences of 
konran in the aftermath of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. It is from these multiple 
experiences of konran that this thesis emerges. 
 
1.1 The	structure	of	this	thesis	
The purpose of this thesis is to explore how myself and my study’s participants came to 
experience konran related to everyday eating following the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster. While my study’s guiding problematic—How is everyday eating being 
coordinated following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster? (see Section 3.3.2.2.)—initially 
emerged from my own particular experience of konran related to everyday eating 
following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, it was clear that I was not the only person 
grappling with these questions. As the experiences of my participants illustrate, food 
possibly containing TEPCO’s radionuclides erupted as a major concern for people 
throughout Japan, intimately connecting those living both near and far from TEPCO’s 
damaged nuclear reactors to the ongoing disaster and its management. In this thesis I 
                                                
14 Kanji characters are the Chinese characters used as logograms in Japanese writing. 
15 All Japanese definitions used in this thesis were retrieved from either ALC’s (2006) Kanji 
Power Handbook, a CASIO Ex-world Dadaplus-4 portable electronic dictionary (model XD-
GF9800), or the online Japanese-English dictionaries Jim Breen’s WWWJDIC 
(http://nihongo.monash.edu/cgi-bin/wwwjdic?1C) or Jisho (http://jisho.org), as well as from a 
combination of these sources. 
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study the multiple and emergent experiences of konran related to everyday eating 
shared by my study’s participants by turning away from epistemological debates 
trapped within modernist ontological frames which participate in obfuscating people’s 
experiences, categorizing them as either ‘rational’ or ‘irrational,’ ‘correct’ or 
‘incorrect.’ Instead, I borrow sensibilities from the fields of institutional ethnography 
and material semiotics to explore the various sociomaterial entanglements that 
participate in enacting these disordered and chaotic experiences.  
 
In Chapter 2, I situate my study within various bodies of literature that offer 
opportunities for exploring experiences of konran related to eating following a nuclear 
disaster. Designed to take readers on an ontological odyssey, my review begins with 
Ulrich Beck’s (1992) risk society thesis, before moving to Beck and colleagues’ (2005; 
2003; 1994) work on reflexive modernization, and Michel Foucault’s (2006; 2008) 
conceptualizations of governmentality and biopolitics. It is at this point that I advocate 
for engaging in “ontological politics” (Mol, 1999; 2002) and identify both institutional 
ethnography (for example, D. E. Smith, 1987; 1990b; 1990a; 1999) and material 
semiotics (for example, Haraway, 2016; Law, 2002; Mol, 2002; Tsing, 2015; Tsing et 
al., 2017) as offering promising insights for seriously attending to relational materiality 
and explicating the ruling relations that participate in enacting the experiences of 
konran I explored with my participants. 
 
In Chapter 3, I situate institutional ethnography within the field of material semiotics, 
and demonstrate how using sensibilities from both of these fields can serve as a method 
of inquiry for exploring complex, multiple experiences of konran in a way that takes 
into consideration the heterogeneous sociomaterial relations involved in the emergence 
of such experiences. While institutional ethnography provides tools and sensibilities for 
explicating the textually-mediated ruling relations that my participants, and myself, are 
acting and being enacted within, material-semiotic sensibilities are also invaluable for 
attending to the other human and more-than-human16 actors involved in enacting these 
                                                
16 While many scholars use the term ‘non-human’ to refer to animals or materials, in this thesis 
I would like to follow Sarah Whatmore (2002; 2014) and others (for example, Carolan, 2016; 
Tsing, 2013) in using the term ‘more-than-human’ as I agree it helps to keep alive debates over 
what it is to be human and to “avoid the implication that we are beyond those troubles we have 
been grappling with for centuries” (Carolan, 2016: 236). 
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experiences of konran. I refer to this blending of sensibilities as a methodological 
approach founded in ‘a vital institutional ethnography.’ 
 
In Chapter 4, I go back in time to explore historical cases of industrial pollution in 
Japan in search of insights that might be of use in better understanding my participants’ 
experiences of konran following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. Using my approach of 
‘vital institutional ethnography,’ I retell stories of industrial pollution in ways that 
attends to people’s sociomaterial entanglements within ruling texts and industrial 
toxins. It becomes clear that as people become more and more entangled in industrial 
toxins with the expansion of industrial ruins, they simultaneously become entangled 
with textually-mediated ruling relations which are blind to these very real, and often 
very vicious, entanglements.  I then turn to a reflection on how to attend to monstrous 
entanglements and the need to notice the vital and vicious sociomaterial entanglements 
often ignored or obfuscated in ruling discourses and texts. 
 
The history chapter is followed by three entangled analysis chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 
7). In Chapter 5, I explore the multiple, ghostly absences behind the single presence of 
Japan’s numerical standards for radiation protection. Specifically, I explore how since 
the dropping of the atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
the vast textual complex of what I term the ‘transnational nuclear assemblage’ and its 
numerical recommendations have been attempting to enact one, ‘correct’ way of 
knowing and enacting the relationship between active human bodies and unstable 
radionuclides. Through traversing the institutional complex of the transnational nuclear 
assemblage, I discover how a textually established and stabilized ‘uncertainty’ about 
the embodied effects of low-level exposure to ionizing radiation prevents scientists and 
governments from attending to and taking seriously the heterogeneity implicit in these 
effects—low-level exposures are difficult to measure and do not easily fit into linear 
statistical models. I also explore how radiation protection standards recommended by 
organizations active within the transnational nuclear assemblage are translated into 
numerical standards intended to coordinate activities within Japan’s agrifood 
assemblage. My analysis reveals that the mutable meaning of the term ‘safe’ as well as 




In Chapter 6, I take a step further to explore how numerical reference limits used to 
coordinate activities within the agrifood assemblage participate in enacting a single, 
‘correct’ way for my participants to understand and relate with radionuclides. In 
explicating the prescribed institutional processes for ensuring and producing ‘safe food’ 
using insights from institutional ethnography, I also use sensibilities from material 
semiotics to explore government certified ‘safe food’ as multiple. In particular, I follow 
Mol (2013) in using ontonorms as a tool for exploring the different valuations active in 
not only enacting government certified ‘safe foods,’ but the bodies of those people 
intended to ingest them. My analysis reveals the different activities involved in 
stabilizing the multiple enactments of ‘safe food,’ and how experiences of konran may 
emerge from the tensions and inconsistencies produced when these multiple versions of 
‘safe food’ clash in practice.  
 
In my final analysis chapter (Chapter 7), I explore the enactive quality of the embodied 
experiences of konran (disorder) and kattō (entangled discord). Throughout the chapter, 
I highlight the various ways my participants worked through feelings of disorder and 
discomfort, finding or curating places of refuge where they felt comfortable sharing 
their concerns and discovering opportunities to hear about the suffering of others. The 
analysis uncovers the ways in which working through their own experiences of konran 
and kattō, some of my participants were able to discover how their seemingly 
individual experiences were actually hooked into greater ruling relations and collective 
suffering—something that may not have emerged had they completely ignored or 
suppressed these feelings. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 8, I offer a reflection on my findings and my chosen method of 
inquiry, providing suggestions on further possibilities of using sensibilities from both 
institutional ethnography and material semiotics for destabilizing modernist ontological 
framings and grappling with some of the biggest challenges we face in these troubling 





In this chapter I will locate both the theoretical framework and empirical themes of this 
thesis within the scholarly literature. However, instead of being a review that solely 
lays out the theoretical concepts used in this thesis, in the spirit of institutional 
ethnography and material semiotics (relational materiality)—which provide the guiding 
conceptual and methodological framework for this project—my review is designed to 
take readers on an ontological odyssey17 into the diaspora of theoretical concepts that 
can be used for understanding post-nuclear disaster food encounters and experiences. 
That is, I have written the review as a way to provoke ontological reflection among 
readers, bringing you along on the journey I myself took on my quest to find a 
theoretical framework and method of inquiry robust enough to study the multiple 
experiences of konran embodied by my study’s participants. As an ontological odyssey, 
this journey through the literature will not only include ontological reflections 
concerning the theoretical concepts themselves, but regarding research ethics and 
researcher positionality. And while some of the following theoretical concepts and their 
frameworks will ultimately be left behind in the performance of this thesis, the 
reflections made on this journey have been fundamental to the evolution of this project, 
providing meaningful insights into why I ultimately turned to the fields of institutional 
ethnography and material semiotics to enact this particular project.  
 
I begin the odyssey with an overview and review of Ulrich Beck’s risk society thesis 
where I will illustrate the theory’s contribution in highlighting the imperceptible and 
mischievous materiality of radionuclides, the potentially disruptive agency of toxic 
foodstuff—and thus the possibility of food to serve as a tool for rethinking the 
nature/society binary—and the limits to rational risk assessment approaches. My major 
critique of the thesis can be found in the language of the word ‘risk’ and the grand 
                                                
17 The framing of my literature review as an ‘ontological odyssey’ was inspired by Campbell 
and Rosin’s (2011) concept of an “ontological expedition.” The authors’ framing of their paper 
as an ‘ontological expedition’ allowed them not only to reflect on the performativity of research 
and the need to recognize “researcher ontologies”—here they draw on Law and Urry (2004)—
but how their own ontological frameworks had evolved through their years of researching 
organic agriculture in New Zealand. I use the term ‘odyssey’ to prepare readers for the long, 
but hopefully not too arduous, journey through my literature review. 
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narrative style of theorization, both of which serve as a smokescreen to mask the 
relations that contribute to the emergent experiences of konran at focus in this thesis.   
 
I next move to Beck’s theory of reflexive modernization to see how it can contribute to 
understanding the emergent experiences of konran. I argue that the theory provides 
many insights for conceptualizing how the once seemingly stable ontologies and 
institutions of first modernity are not only being destabilized—represented by the ills of 
the risk society—but require re-stabilization. The theory is based on Beck’s hope that 
this necessary re-stabilization will come from a sub-political uprising of people 
awakened by the presence of new risks in their everyday lives. However, I follow 
Latour (2003b) and Wynne (1996) in critiquing the language of ‘reflexivity,’ the 
theory’s grand narrative style of theorization, and the irony that the theory—based on a 
hope that everyday people will break free from the grasp of modernist ontologies—is 
both trapped within and reproduces modernist ontological frameworks. 
 
Subsequently, I turn to the Foucauldian concepts of governmentality and biopolitics to 
explore how they can assist in painting a more nuanced picture of how experiences of 
konran emerge and are managed within society’s power structures. I find that both 
concepts are valuable in exemplifying the interplay between people and ruling elites 
following a nuclear disaster—biopolitics in particular being useful in connecting the 
experiences of suffering people to the dispositifs (apparatuses) deployed to manage the 
post-disaster social milieu. While I find great merit in both approaches, I ultimately 
agree that they confine research participants to act within constrained 
conceptualizations of the social milieu which leaves little room for studying the 
experiences of konran as emergent and contingent, imbued simultaneously with 
precariousness and possibility. 
 
For the remainder of the chapter, I explore the concept of ‘ontological politics’ (Mol, 
1999; 2002) which turns my attention to the field of material semiotics. I explore how 
material-semiotic sensibilities attune researchers to studying the experiences of konran, 
not as one-off events, but as “happening”18 that emerges from heterogeneous bundles of 
                                                
18 I borrow Tsing’s (2015: 23) use of the term “happenings,” which she uses to refer to 
gatherings of humans and more-than-humans which sometimes become “greater than the sum 
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sociomaterial relations. I ultimately agree with scholars in the field of material 
semiotics that alternative ontologies that take seriously human embeddedness within 
heterogeneous assemblages of human and more-than-human actors is a necessary 
prerequisite for critically engaging with precarious realities and experiences, such as 
my participants’ experiences of konran.  
 
2.2 Are	we	living	in	a	risk	society?	
I began my literature review where many sociologists studying nuclear issues do: with 
the writings of German sociologist Ulrich Beck. The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster 
was the only other nuclear disaster prior to 2011 that was designated a ‘Level 7’ on the 
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES).19 It was in that same year 
that Beck (1992: 22-3) published his German version of the book Risk Society: 
Towards a New Modernity where he argued that nuclear disasters are both propagators 
of the unintended side effects of industrial society—what Beck calls “new risks”—and 
thus also symbols of society’s transition to the risk society. Beck (1992: 22-3, original 
emphasis) describes the term new risks as referring to:  
above all radioactivity, which completely evades human perceptive 
abilities, but also toxins and pollutants in the air, the water and 
foodstuffs, together with the accompanying short- and long-term 
effects on plants, animals and people. They induce systematic and 
often irreversible harm, generally remain invisible, are based on 
causal interpretations, and thus initially only exist in terms of the 
(scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them.  
The theory of risk society emerged out of theoretical debates about modernization 
taking place in the 1970s and 1980s.20 Although Beck’s conceptualizations of risks and 
                                                
of their parts.” She points to ‘contamination’ as one way gatherings are transformed into 
‘happenings’ (Tsing, 2015: 27-34). Also see Section 2.6.4. 
19 See Kermisch (2011) for a discussion on the limits of the INES scale. 
20 In fact, this theory could be seen as a response to Yair Aharoni’s 1981 book The No-Risk 
Society which outlines modern society’s focus on creating a sense of security among people 
living in industrial societies. That is, modern society must focus on employing technologies, 
such as insurance, to provide a sense of security against the calculated risks (or side effects) of 
industrial production (see Aharoni, 1981; Sørensen & Christiansen, 2012). 
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hazards are similar in some ways to other sociologists such as Niklas Luhmann21 and 
Anthony Giddens,22 he emphasizes what he sees as a similarity between hazards and 
new risks: both occur at unforeseeable times and pose a threat to humanity. To clarify 
his definition of risk, Beck explains it within the context of three epochs, each with its 
own characteristic types of hazards and ways of managing uncertainties: pre-modern 
society, early industrial society and risk society. The hazards in pre-modern society are 
portrayed as being naturally or supra-naturally produced by non-human forces which 
affect human society, but for which no human could take responsibility or could 
prevent. These hazards (for example, epidemics and natural disasters) instilled a sense 
of uncertainty in people, but were unavoidable and, therefore, not politicized (Zinn, 
2008). 
 
Beck (1995) explains that with the dawn of early industrial society, the uncertainties of 
pre-modernity were transformed into calculable risks which were seen as controllable 
and containable, and could be regulated and compensated for through the technology of 
insurance.23 Thus, while anthropological hazards existed in society, they were believed 
to be transparently known through scientific enquiry, and people could not only avoid 
these calculated risks, but could insure themselves against them.24  
 
As society enters the risk society, Beck (1995) argues, a feeling of uncertainty returns 
once again to human civilization though the form of new risks.  However, unlike 
                                                
21 Luhmann (1993) highlights clear differences between risks and hazards. He views risks as 
uncertainties that are predictable and insurable through statistical calculation which require a 
decision on whether or not to engage in the risky activity. He distinguishes them from hazards 
which he sees as resulting from external causes out of one’s control, which originate in nature 
or result from the decisions of others. 
22 Giddens (2000: 22) focuses on risk as a category necessary to the design and maintenance of 
a future-oriented modern society. He explains: “Traditional cultures didn’t have a concept of 
risk because they didn’t need one. Risk isn’t the same as hazard or danger. Risk refers to 
hazards that are actively assessed in relation to future possibilities. It comes into wide usage 
only in a society that is future oriented – which sees the future precisely as a territory to be 
conquered or colonized. Risk presumes a society that actively tries to break away from its 
past—the prime characteristic, indeed, of modern industrial civilization.”  
23 Francois Ewald (1991) argues that a defining feature of modern society is the use of 
insurance as the basis for creating a sense of security and to ensure a social contract. 
24 Beck (1995: 78, original emphasis) argued that risks were calculated and therefore limited to 
“only specific demographic groups of people in specific places at specific times.” 
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previous forms of uncertainty which were seen as being beyond human control, new 
risks reveal themselves in a time where risks are assumed to be manageable, 
controllable and insurable. As Beck (2009) focuses on the materiality of hazards and 
their variability throughout the three epochs—arguing they are both materially novel 
and socially constructed25—he distinguishes himself from scholars following a purely 
constructivist approach to hazards and risks.26  
 
What’s more, Beck does not believe that the risks and hazards that define each of the 
three epochs disappear in the transition to the risk society.  Instead, he argues that 
humans are still vulnerable to traditional hazards such as tsunamis, earthquakes and 
epidemics, but in the risk society these seemingly natural disasters can be compounded 
with anthropogenic hazards that have escaped into the wider environment. Beck 
elucidated this argument in a 2011 interview with The Asahi News following TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster:  
I think industries try to define it as something which has been done 
by nature. But they don’t realize that we are living in an age where 
the decision making is the primary background for these kinds of 
catastrophes. I think it’s very important to realize this because 
modernity, or even what you could say is the victory of modernity, 
produces more and more uncontrollable consequences. […] We have 
a system of organized irresponsibility, and this system has to be 
changed. (Ohno, 2011) 
This ‘organized irresponsibility’ can be understood as what Wynne (1996: 49) 
describes as “systematic denial of responsibility for creating modern risks.” That is, 
experts and institutions responsible for the release of new risks obscure their own role 
or agency in producing them. This leaves everyday people in a strange predicament: the 
                                                
25 Environmental sociologists have distinguished between ‘realists’ who question the 
materiality or “material truth” of environmental pollution and ‘constructionists’ who focus on 
the creation of meaning (for example the meaning of ‘risk or ‘environmental problem’) which 
emerges through social processes (see Bell, 2012: 4). Thus, Beck’s theory of risk society can be 
seen as combining both ‘realist’ and ‘constructionist’ thinking. 
26 For example, Mary Douglas and Aarond Wildavsky (1982) advocate a cultural theory of risk, 
arguing that hazards remain the same throughout history, only society’s interpretation of them 
have changed. 
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experts and institutions with the responsibility for protecting them from new risks not 
only produce information necessary to understand the risks (and thus have a role in 
shaping the social construction of that risk), but also simultaneously deny any 
responsibility of their own role in sociotechnical controversies.  
 
2.2.1 The	limits	of	rational	risk	models	
In Beck’s (1999) view, new risks (such as nuclear fallout and global warming) not only 
evade human senses and pose a threat to future generations, but are no longer easily 
calculated through existing rational risk models and are, therefore, not readily 
compensated through insurance and the welfare state.27 To Beck (1999), this gestures to 
a great irony of modernity: it was modern society’s own attempt to overcome 
uncertainty through scientific rationality and the control of nature that led to the 
creation of the unintended consequences which are no longer easily insured or 
understood through rational risk assessments.  
 
2.2.2 Dependency	on	experts	and	technology	
According to Beck (1992), although people with accumulated material wealth may 
have more resources to deal with the consequences of new risks, they are not immune 
to their effects. However, even if people with higher education and monetary wealth do 
have the resources to gather information on the risks they face, they also find 
themselves in the predicament of being “dependent on external knowledge” and are, 
thus, “becoming incompetent in matters of their own affliction” (Beck, 1992: 53, 
original emphasis). To illustrate this point, Beck turns to an example of toxic food, 
highlighting how the imperceptible nature of many pollutants make it impossible for 
people to identify their presence or conceptualize possible negative effects of 
consuming them within their everyday lives. He writes: 
People who find out that their daily tea contains DDT and their newly 
bought cake formaldehyde, are in a quite different situation [from 
                                                
27 In Beck’s (1999: 76-7, original emphasis) words, society enters into the risk society “when 
the hazards which are now decided and consequently produced by society undermine and/or 
cancel the established safety systems of the welfare state’s existing risk calculations. In contrast 
to early industrial risks, nuclear, chemical, ecological and genetic engineering risks (a) can be 
limited in terms of neither time nor place, (b) are not accountable according to the established 
rules of causality, blame and liability, and (c) cannot be compensated for or insured against.” 
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someone who is at the risk of losing his job]. Their victimization is 
non determinable by their own cognitive means and potential 
experiences. Whether DDT is contained in the tea or formaldehyde in 
the cake, and in what dose, remains outside the reach of their own 
knowledge just as much as does the question of whether and in what 
concentrations these substances have a long- or short-term deleterious 
effect. (Beck, 1992: 53, original emphasis) 
Thus, while the wealthy may have more access to knowledge, Beck (1992) argues they 
often cannot access enough to feel at ease. As a result, all members of society may be 
equally plagued with anxiety due to their inability to gather adequate information on 




Finally, in Beck’s (1992) view, the project of industrialization was undertaken with the 
virtuous ambitions of getting people out of poverty and providing a way for them to 
meet their own material needs. However, the project of industrialization did not come 
without unintended side effects; it has created new risks which threaten human 
existence. Beck (1992: 23) argues these ‘side effects’ not only threaten people’s health, 
but also create a cascade of additional consequences relating to economic profit, private 
property, and the legitimization of positions of power, among others. These secondary 
side effects are also referred to as “the side effects of side effects” (Beck, 2009: 38). 
This ability for new risks to travel and affect the everyday lives of people around the 




In a 2007 article, Boudia and Jas (2007: 5) translated Bruno Latour’s (2003a) preface to 
the second French edition of Risk Society (La Société du Risque): “when Risk Society 
first appeared, the cloud from Chernobyl was spreading over Europe; when this French 
translation appeared, catastrophe had just struck in Toulouse and in New York. Who 
still needs proof that we have well and truly entered the risk society?” I agree with 
Latour that it is difficult to deny that we are in fact living in very precarious times. 
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Thus, a number of questions arise: What is useful and what is potentially less-helpful 
about Beck’s theorization of the risk society? How can it be used in understanding 
experiences of konran following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster? 
 
I would argue that the risk society thesis provides a useful starting point to begin 
reflecting upon konran as a side-effect of a nuclear disaster. Through his theorization, 
Beck created a language for discussing and grappling with what happens when 
pollutants spill out of industrial processes and into people’s everyday lives. He 
importantly points to the imperceptible and persistent nature of these pollutants—what 
Carolan (2006: 234) refers to as “epistemologically distant objects”—which make it 
difficult for people to understand or identify these materials without scientific tools and 
expertise. The inability to act based on one’s own senses can cause turbulence, not only 
in the performance of everyday life, but in how one understands and enacts reality. For 
instance, the realization of the existence of radionuclides—especially their possible 
presence in materials that humans put into their bodies—may cause people to question 
their own ontological groundings and the trajectory of society as a whole.  
 
Additionally, Beck’s theory of the risk society importantly highlights the limits of 
rational risk assessments in dealing with the complex aftermath of nuclear disasters. 
Rational risk assessments are based on rational choice theory which classifies people as 
individual, liberal, autonomous actors who make rational decisions based on what is in 
their best interest. Bell (2012: 231, original emphasis) explains how “the rational 
assessment perspective believes not only that risks can be evaluated independent of 
political, social, or cultural context, but that they should be.” He goes on to describe 
that because the findings of risk assessments provide simple answers based on precepts 
of scientific rationality, they are often used to inform policy.28   
 
Following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, there have been a number of studies published on 
risk perceptions, risk assessments and risk communication that relate, in some way, to 
the disaster (for example, Ito & Kuriyama, 2016; N. H. Kim et al., 2015; Murakami, 
                                                
28 Carlo Jaeger (2001) also offers interesting insights into the limits and social construction of 
the modernist rational actor paradigm, which is foundational to the rational risk assessment 
approach. 
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Nakatani, & Oki, 2016; Orita et al., 2015; Perko, 2016; Sawada, Aizaki, & Sato, 2014; 
Svendsen, Yamaguchi, Tsuda, Guimaraes, & Tondel, 2016). While most studies do not 
discuss the ontological positioning of the rational risk paradigm, Hagmann (2012: 812) 
provides an overview of the limits to rational risk assessments following TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster, arguing such assessments “are quite limited in their analytical 
orientation, their empirical circumscription, and the truth claims that they empower.” 
He instead calls for a more democratic discussion which allows for questioning current 
government protocols of managing all uncertainty using this single, narrow approach. 
Using a feminist political ecology perspective to study the experiences of organic 
farmers in Fukushima following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, Kimura (2015) also 
discusses how risk perception research often neglects the complex and pertinent role 
gender plays in the disaster and its aftermath. Here and in her other work on TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster, Kimura and colleagues explicitly argues there is a need to interrogate 
the official tendency to denounce and chastise people’s concerns about food safety as 
being ‘emotional’ and ‘irrational,’ an inherently feminine disorder of ‘hysteric’ women 
(Kimura, 2016a; 2016b; Kimura & Katano, 2014).29 In fact, my own masters research 
on people’s perceptions and behaviors regarding food safety following TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster was conducted within this theoretical context (Burch, 2012). While the 
study’s intention was to grasp the multidimensionality of people’s experiences and 
challenge the assumptions of the information deficit model,30 the structured nature of 
survey research meant I was only able to brush the surface in understanding the 
complexity of my participants’ experiences.  
 
The information deficit model of risk communication also stems from the rational risk 
approach pointing to a belief that the uncertainty people experience following a 
sociotechnical disaster is due to their lack of adequate rational and scientific knowledge 
on the subject. An understanding of this model, and the rational risk assessment model 
in general, helps with understanding why it is often the case that scientific experts 
explain people’s concerns following sociotechnical disasters as “excessive, or 
unwarranted, or irrational” (Hansen et al., 2003: 111). Within the rational risk model, 
                                                
29 Also see Seager (1996) for a discussion on ‘hysteria’ and the gender dimension of 
environmental protest. 
30 This model is also referred to as the ‘knowledge deficit model’ (see Bidwell, 2016; Hansen et 
al., 2003). 
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risk communication becomes the strategy used to transfer ‘correct’ scientific 
understanding of the risks involved in sociotechnical disasters from ‘rational-minded 
and knowledgeable’ experts to an ‘irrational and ignorant’ public. As an example, one 
study on risk communication following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster went as far as to call 
the public’s risk perceptions “bipolar” (Orita et al., 2015), while another purports sales 
in wakame seaweed declined due to “irrational reputation damage” (Miyata & 
Wakamatsu, 2015). Additionally, studies within this rational risk paradigm have tried to 
explain the emergence of people’s concerns through connecting them to hazard 
characteristics assigned to specific risks—for example, explaining that nuclear disasters 
are usually related to characteristics of severity of possible health effects, low 
controllability and unfamiliarity (Slovic, 1987).    
 
Rational risk assessment is deeply guided by modernist ontologies, including adherence 
to a nature/society divide, the authority of scientific rationality, and a belief in an 
autonomous liberal subjectivity. It is a perspective that not only removes humans from 
their embeddedness in a natural, messy, material environment—referred to as ‘human 
exemptionalism’ (Murdoch, 2001)—but completely removes the concept of the social 
construction of risk from the discussion. I follow Bell (2012: 233) in arguing that one 
of this perspective’s major blind spots is the way it ignores the “inherently social 
character of risk.” Rational-choice models are often applied to society, where people’s 
experiences such as konran can be explained away as the ‘lay public’s’ irrational 
misunderstanding of fact-based science—a method that completely disregards the 
knowledge people use to conduct their everyday lives (see Wynne, 1996). It leaves 
people experiencing konran trapped within an ontological framing that is unable to 
recognize their experiences an anything other than ‘irrational.’  
 
While there are many good things to be said about the risk society thesis, there are also 
some aspects that must be challenged. The first pertains to language. Some have argued 
that the term ‘risk society’ does not encapsulate the current era, and that terms such as 
‘hazard society’ or ‘self-jeopardy society’ (Sørensen & Christiansen, 2012: 14) may be 
more effective in grasping Beck’s (1995: 77) point that new risks are no longer 
“determinable, calculable uncertainties.” In addition, Fressoz (2007) warns of the 
danger of referring to the experiences of people in the risk society as being novel. In his 
article, Fressoz provides a genealogy of risk society where he points to the precarious 
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situations faced by people in the 19th century who were forced to negotiate and 
understand their new relationship with polluting technologies and their effluents. He 
makes the important observation that it was the activity of people voicing their 
concerns about technologies that led to the construction of much ‘safer technologies’ 
than what had previously existed. To Fressoz, the significance of these activities falls 
out of sight and out of historical imagining in the theorization of the risk society; he 
instead encourages the uncovering of richer historical accounts that include interactions 
among heterogeneous actors, human and more-than-human.  
 
Other critics warn that Beck’s (1992) argument regarding the equalizing nature of 
risks—that people will be more interested in avoiding ‘bads’ over accumulating 
material ‘goods’—is dangerous in that it allows one to overlook the very real 
inequalities that exist in society (for example, Bell & Mayerfeld, 1998). Bell and 
Mayerfeld (1998: 2) also point out their concern with “the language of risk” and its 
power to thwart democratic processes. They point out that the word ‘risk’ itself is a 
concept used to discuss uncertainty through very rationalistic means and explain that 
such “rationalism is problematic because it can easily become rationalization. Risk 
explains uncertainty, and it also explains it away. It gives control and it takes control, 
and therefore we often feel trapped in an iron cage of risk” (Bell & Mayerfeld, 1998: 
1). Instead of using risk as the center of a conceptual argument, the authors encourage 
scholars to continue problematizing it and continue engaging with it as “a tool and not a 
smoke screen […] for dealing with the unknown” (Bell & Mayerfeld, 1998: 11). I agree 
with Bell and Mayerfeld that an uncritical use of the word ‘risk’ has the potential to 
cover up or ignore the everyday realities embedded within the sociotechnical material 
matrix mentioned by Fressoz (2007), of which new risks—in this case TEPCO’s 
radionuclides—become an additional actor. If misused, the word itself may become an 
abstract, universal blanket statement that could be easily borrowed by elites to deter 
democratic discussion—as may be the case when governing through rational risk 
assessments. In short, while the theory of risk society may point to a hope that the 
realization of new risks will inspire new ways of thinking, acting and political 
engagement, the language of risk may itself be a tool to impede democratic debate.  
 
What options are there for getting out of the “iron cage of risk”? Boudia and Jas (2007: 
4) recommend a “historization and a denaturalization of risk” as a way to understand 
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the concept as a tool and not a universal. According to Giddens, the concept of risk is 
an essential feature of capitalism. He explains how the term first came to be used in the 
16th century by Portuguese or Spanish explorers “where it was used to refer to sailing 
into uncharted waters” (Giddens, 1999). Seafaring was also a space where insurance 
was used as a way to provide security for the sailors and their cargo. In this case, risk 
served as “a way of regulating the future, of normalising it and bringing it under our 
dominion” (Giddens, 1999). Giddens (1999) goes on to describe how this concept of 
stabilizing the future became an essential feature of modern capitalism which “embeds 
itself into the future by calculating future profit and loss, and therefore risk, as a 
continuous process.” I agree that understanding ‘risk’ as a historical tool for managing 
uncertainty—as opposed to the name describing the current epoch or a group of 
polluting materials—can open up different ways of thinking about the particular role 
the term plays in the aftermath of sociotechnical disasters. The same is true for other 
rational-risk-paradigm-related terms such as ‘safety’ or ‘control.’ 
 
Another major drawback to using the risk society thesis as a guiding framework for this 
thesis is its master narrative style of theorization. Latour (2003b: 40), whose own 
scholarship was greatly influenced by ethnomethodology and its focus on situated, 
empirical research, describes Beck “as an unreconstructed social theorist, roaming 
freely through the ‘whole’ of society without showing the least interest in the practical 
and local conditions making this ‘whole’ visible.” Therefore, while the risk society 
thesis offers many insights into how to conceptualize the aftermath of a nuclear 
disaster, its grand narrative style of explaining reality is expected to be of little help in 
understanding the situated, emergent qualities that make up the multiple experiences of 
konran that are the focus of this thesis.   
 
In fact, Beck (1994: 9) himself questions the limits of thinking only through the 
concept of risk, explaining how “[s]omeone who depicts the world as risk will 
ultimately become incapable of action.” To release people from the confinement within 
the ‘iron cage of risk,’ he and others developed the theory of reflexive modernization to 
describe how new risks might “become the motor of the self-politicization of modernity 
in industrial society” (Beck, 1992: 183, original emphasis). The theory opens up the 
opportunity to trace emergent possibilities of sociotechnical disasters. That is, it is 
imbued with hope that the anxiety resulting from the awareness of new risks may be 
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transformed into a positive political movement where people work together to define 
and enact a better world—a task that will result in an “opening up [of] the political” 
(Beck, 1992: Chapter 8). In the next section, I will describe the theory of reflexive 
modernization and explore how it may be useful in understanding the konran 
experienced by my study’s participants. 
  
2.3 Searching	for	signs	of	reflexive	modernization	
As with risk society, the theory of reflexive modernization is situated within larger 
debates on modernity that describes society’s transformation from a first (simple) 
modernity to a second (reflexive) modernity. The theory argues that we are not in 
modernity as it once was, nor has modernity ended completely.31 Instead, modernity is 
in transition: some aspects of it remain the same, while others disappear (see Beck & 
Lau, 2005). To Beck, first modernity is characterized as an industrial society, while 
second (reflexive) modernity is characterized as risk society. The risk society remains 




According to the theory, the historical period of first modernity dates back to the 
Enlightenment of the early 18th century whose ideological foundations are expected to 
have driven the uptake of industrialization in the 19th century. In a 2003 journal article, 
Beck and colleagues (2003) outline six ‘premises’33 that characterize and provide the 
ontological, epistemological and structural foundations of first modernity.  
                                                
31 See Beck and Lau (2005: 525-6) for a discussion of the authors’ dissatisfaction with the 
concept of post-modernity.  
32 To express the transformation of modernity, Beck’s theory of reflexive modernization 
separates modernity into three periods of social change—pre-modernity, first (simple-linear) 
modernity, and second (reflexive) modernity—which are associated with the previously 
mentioned epochs—pre-modern society, early industrial society, and risk society (see Beck et 
al., 2003).   
33 The use of the word ‘premise’ points to the project of first modernity as a theoretical 
construct of 18th century Enlightenment, not a set of absolute truths. The authors define them as 
“foundations of [first modernity’s] self-description: the explicit or implicit assumptions 
expressed in the actions and self-understanding of citizens, the goals of politics and the routines 
of social institutions” (Beck et al., 2003: 4). The authors admit that six premises are an 
oversimplification, but are useful for discussion.   
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According to Beck and colleagues (2003), the premises of the Enlightenment are 
normalized into basic principles34—its ontological and epistemological foundations—
that guide people’s activities and provide the basis for institutional order in first 
modernity. The three premises behind these basic principles are: (1) a nature/society 
divide;35 (2) the authority of scientific rationality and conceptualizations of progress 
(“scientization”);36 and (3) the “principle of functional differentiation” (the use of 
classification, specialization and standardization to manage complexity)37 (Beck et al., 
2003: 4-5, original emphasis). 
 
Similarly, basic institutions refer to the institutions created in first modernity that are 
designed to manage and organize society based on the basic principles (Beck & Lau, 
2005). The premises that created the groundwork for the establishment of first 
modernity’s basic institutions include: (4) a “nation-state” society “defined by 
territorial boundaries;” (5) a society of “programmatic individualization” (that is, a 
society of atomized, individual liberal subjects); 38 and (6) a “gainful employment” 
society (or a full employment society for male members of society)39 (Beck et al., 2003: 
4, original emphasis). 
 
                                                
34 These basic principles as were later described as “cognitive–normative problems and 
minimum requirements of the ‘project of modernity’, which represent its ‘driving force’ and 
thereby keep its developmental dynamic going” (Beck & Lau, 2005: 532-3). 
35 Under the first premise, nature is considered a “neutral resource” to be exploited by humans 
and which “can and must be made available without limitation” (Beck et al., 2003: 4-5). 
36 The second premise puts an emphasis on human’s “instrumental control” over nature and 
belief that scientific progress as “a process of demystification that can continue without limits” 
where humans will eventually “perfect the control of nature” (Beck et al., 2003: 4-5). 
37 Under the third premise, specialization is encouraged and the complexity of reality is neatly 
organized into social subsystems (for example, politics, science, culture and economy) which 
create fractures in society’s understanding of the world (Beck et al., 2003: 4-5, original 
emphasis). 
38 Under the fifth premise, people are viewed as ‘individuals’ who are encouraged to be free, 
while simultaneously being bound to collective social structures (such as the nuclear family) 
similar to those in pre-modernity. 
39 The sixth premise points to one of the underlying promises of first modernity: that all (male) 
members of society could expect to participate in an economy with very low rates of 
unemployment in which “status, consumption and social security all flow from participation in 
the economy” (Beck et al., 2003: 4). 
 33 
Beck’s theory of reflexive modernization argues that while the basic principles of first 
modernity live on through second modernity, first modernity’s basic institutions are 
forced to transform. This transformation of the basic institutions of first modernity is 




To Beck (1994: 5-6, original emphasis), reflexive modernization is not so much a “self-
reflection” as it is a “self-confrontation.” He argues that in an industrial society that 
cannot avoid producing new risks, people’s awareness of these new risks will be 
unavoidable. New risks, therefore, play an important role in Beck’s reflexive 
modernization: they awaken people to the incongruity of using modernist 
Enlightenment ontologies for understanding and dealing with the complex realities of 
the risk society.41 Food, in particular, plays a major role in pointing out the peculiarity 
of conceptualizing humans as being separate from nature. Pollutants enter not only 
environments, but human bodies, providing an embodied experience of the 
inseparability of nature and society.42 In short, Beck points out that regardless of how 
intensely institutions of modernity work toward normalizing and legitimizing the basic 
principles of first modernity, the growing societal awareness of the existence of new 
                                                
40 Beck and Lau (2005: 526, original emphasis) describe this process: “collective patterns of 
life, progress and controllability, full employment and exploitation of nature that were typical 
of this first modernity have now been undermined by certain interlinked processes: 
globalization, individualization, the gender revolution, underemployment and global risks (such 
as the ecological crisis, the crash of global financial markets and the threat of transnational 
terrorist attacks). The real theoretical and political challenge of second modernity is the fact 
that society must respond to all these challenges simultaneously.” 
41 Both Beck and Giddens were exploring the concept of reflective modernization in the 1990s. 
While both theorists seemed to agree that reflexive modernization involves the ‘disembedding’ 
of people from traditional structures without a ‘reembedding,’ Beck does not view this as the 
only driving force behind the transformation to a reflexive modernity (see Beck, 1994; Beck & 
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: xxi-ii). Instead he sees the public’s awareness of new risks as 
propelling the transition to a more reflexive modernity. 
42 In Beck’s (1992: 81, original emphasis) words: “The industrially transformed ‘domestic 
nature’ of the cultural world must frankly be understood as an exemplary non-environment, as 
an inner environment, in the face of which all of our highly bred possibilities of distancing and 
excluding ourselves fail. At the end of the twentieth century nature is society and society is also 
‘nature’. Anyone who continues to speak of nature as non-society is speaking in terms from a 
different century, which no longer capture our reality.” 
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According to Beck (1992: 183), people’s awareness of new risks can provide an 
opportunity for the politicization of issues that were once considered non-political. 
Therefore, in a reflexive modernity, people are expected to be proactive, critically 
engaging democratically with questions of rationality, technology and science that 
define modernity (Beck, 1994). However, the transition to a reflexive modernity is not 
without its own internal contradictions: while people are embedded within relations of 
ruling that expect them to act individually, they in fact experience problems 
collectively (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 7; 2002: xxii).43  
 
2.3.4 Sub-politics	to	destabilize	modernist	ontologies	
Finally, Beck’s (1992: 135) concept of “sub-politics” seeks to offer a solution for 
people who want to create change “from below” (Beck, 1994: 22-3, original 
emphasis).44 According to Beck (1994: 23) politicization of issues brought about by 
people’s awareness of new risks starts to interfere with institutional processes, creating 
a space for new voices to enter democratic discussions about technology and science. 
While including more voices within political processes sounds promising, Beck (1994: 
23) also points to the “back side of sub-political activation” which he describes as the 
eruption of conflict among many people and groups, resulting in a “relative paralysis.” 
However, this very “congestion”—the “‘instrument of power’ in sub-politics”—is 
exactly what Beck (1994: 23) sees as necessary for reforming the rationalities and logic 
                                                
43 Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002: xxii, original emphasis) point out that there is an 
“institutionalized imbalance between the disembedded individual and global problems in a 
global risk society. The Western type of individualized society tells us to seek biographical 
solutions to systemic contradictions.” In addition, the authors argue that people experience 
“pressure to conform to internalized demands, on the one hand being responsible for yourself 
and on the other being dependent on conditions which completely elude your grasp” (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 7).  
44 Beck (1994: 22-3, original emphasis) explains that sub-politics “means shaping society from 
below. [Sub-politicization] thus implies a decrease of the central rule approach; it means that 
processes which had heretofore always run friction-free fizzle out in the resistance of 
contradictory objectives.” 
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that structure current institutional processes.45 Thus, the very messiness of sub-political 
engagement should disrupt the activities of modern institutions. 
 
2.3.5 Reflexive	modernization	and	konran	
The theory of reflexive modernization provides important insights for the ontological 
framing of debates about nuclear disasters, as well as for examining how premises of 
the modernist paradigm no longer adequately cope with complex experiences such as 
konran that emerge in the aftermath of a nuclear disaster. That is, modern ontologies 
and institutions are no longer able to account for the complex material and social 
realities brought to the forefront in the risk society.  I appreciate the theory’s focus on 
the processes of stabilization (through first modernity’s premises), destabilization (due 
to the recognition of new risks) and an attempt at re-stabilization (both by first 
modernity’s institutions and, as Beck hopes, through the political awakening of 
everyday people). In particular, the notion of food as a material participating in 
disrupting modernist principles—most notably the nature/society divide—provides a 
powerful insight for the overall narrative of this thesis.46 
 
Overall, reflexive modernization seems to provide a positive path forward for those 
who feel trapped within the risk society.47 Not only has the theory been praised for its 
hopeful description of how people might collectively overcome the precarious 
existence faced in the risk society (see Blowers, 1999), but for turning our focus away 
from mainstream narratives “to the discrepancies, cracks, failures and side-effects” of 
the project of modernity (Latour, 2003b: 46). I agree with the praises of both Blowers 
and Latour while, like them, also being wary of some of the underlying assumptions of 
the theory. 
 
                                                
45 As Beck (1994: 23) puts it, “the very fizzling out of the implementation process of 
industrialization, which used to be so well lubricated by consensus, which now produces losers 
on all levels, can slow the process, and can be a precursor of an unregulated anarchic self-
limitation and self-control. Perhaps ‘anything goes’ means ‘rien ne va plus’, nothing goes any 
more?” 
46 This will be discussed further in Section 2.6.  
47 That is, the insidious, imperceptible materials that imbue people with a sense of 
precariousness could play a positive role in triggering them to take political initiative to re-
design society’s institutions (Beck, 1994). 
 36 
While the language of risk may impede democratic discussion, reflexive modernization 
seems to leave space for the hope that alternate ontologies might emerge. However, as 
with the risk society thesis, language has also been brought into question with the 
theory of reflexive modernization. In a paper discussing Beck’s theory of reflexive 
modernization, Latour (2003b: 36) refuses to even use the word reflexive arguing:  
‘reflexive’ does not signal an increase in mastery and consciousness, 
but only a heightened awareness that mastery is impossible and that 
control over actions is now seen as a complete modernist fiction. In 
second modernity, we become conscious that consciousness does not 
mean full control.  
Latour (1993) is famous for arguing “we have never been modern,” pointing to how 
modern society’s self-description as dominant and disentangled from ‘nature’ was, and 
remains, a fantasy never to be achieved. As a result, he prefers to use the term “re-
modernization” in his argument. In a 2003 paper, Latour (2003b: 36, original emphasis) 
problematizes the meaning of the word ‘risk,’ arguing that it does not signal a novel 
form of hazard, but the realization that “we are now entangled.” Drawing on concepts 
and sensibilities from actor-network theory (discussed later in this chapter), Latour 
(2003b: 36, original emphasis) describes people’s realization of their susceptibility to 
new risks as discovering: 
a network […] referring to whatever deviates from the straight path 
of reason and of control to trace a labyrinth, a maze of unexpected 
associations between heterogeneous elements, each of which acts as a 
mediator and no longer as a mere compliant intermediary.  
Such thinking opens up opportunities to view the possible material presence of 
radionuclides in food not as an individual, isolated experience, but as linked to a 
complex network of diverse actors (human and more-than-human) and their 
relationality. Such realization does not come easily to members of a modern society 
built with the ultimate goals of disentangling humans from the grasp of complex 
uncertainty through the application of tools—such as risk assessments—which bring a 
sense of control over the future and over a perceived external ‘nature.’ Latour (2003b: 
38, original emphasis) points out what he sees as the ultimate irony of modern thinking: 
“It is only if you are absolutely convinced that science and society do not mix that you 
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can mix them so thoroughly as to produce the mess in which we are stewing today.” He 
identifies first the atomic bomb and now climate change as most blatantly 
demonstrating this irony.  
 
Both risk society and reflexive modernization highlight how attempts to stabilize 
uncertainty, for example through rational risk calculations, requires abstraction or 
externalization of certain elements considered to be irrelevant to the project at hand.48 
Latour (2003b: 37, original emphasis) points out that “second modernity is first 
modernity plus its externalities: everything that had been externalized as irrelevant or 
impossible to calculate is back in—with a vengeance.” That is, the perceived 
disentanglement of humans from their environment involves a great deal of ideological 
and calculative work that is undone in destabilizing events, such as a nuclear disaster. 
Therefore, while Beck’s new risks point to a symptom or side effect of modernity, 
Latour’s arguments opens up new ways for empirically illuminating and tracing the 
different relations that produce and manage the specific types of materials that Beck 
terms new risks.  
 
Wynne’s (1996) research points to another concern with the theory of reflexive 
modernization: researchers using the theory expect a ‘concerned public’ to both 
identify and engage politically in order to overcome first-modernity’s premises and 
rebuild its failing institutions, while scholars themselves may not be reflecting on their 
own ontological grounding. According to Wynne (1996), research in reflexive 
modernization does not challenge, and in fact often reproduces, modernist premises.49 
He goes on to criticize the theory for being “unduly influenced by rational-choice 
models of the social” in expecting people to automatically and logically engage in the 
politics of reflexive modernization once they realize the existence of new risks (Wynne, 
1996: 45). Wynne (1996) also argues that such thinking perpetuates the expert-lay 
knowledge divide, and tends to overlook the importance of non-expert knowledge in 
overcoming the troubles of the risk society. What’s more, while Beck (1994) speaks of 
                                                
48 See Callon (1998) for an interesting discussion on economic externalities and how “framing” 
projects work to contain “overflowing” heterogeneity. 
49 Wynne (1996: 44) argues that the thesis of reflexive modernization “implicitly reproduces 
just those fundamental dichotomies which are key parts of the problem of modernity: natural 
knowledge versus ‘social’ knowledge, nature versus society, expert versus lay knowledge.” 
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the potential for the politics of reflexive modernization to destabilize science’s 
stronghold over many aspects of life in the risk society, Wynne (1996) argues that the 
theory does not explicitly recognize science itself as a social construction.50 This leads 
to a situation in which locally situated, tacit knowledge becomes “systematically 
suppressed” (Wynne, 1996: 45).51 Wynne’s (1992) empirical study on the experiences 
of Cumbrian sheep farmers following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 
demonstrated what happens when scientists are unreflexive in their views of knowledge 
and science: the situated knowledge sheep farmers had about raising sheep went 
ignored by scientific experts who unreflexively, and incorrectly, assumed they could 
control and predict the activity of radionuclides in the environment. His later work on 
genetically-modified organisms also points out that researchers need to understand that 
the alienation of those categorized as ‘lay-people’ and ‘experts’ is socially organized 
(Wynne, 2001). That is, researchers who do not reflexively engage with such questions 
may actually be enacting the very systems of power they critique in their own work. 
 
Given Wynne’s insights, I am inclined to argue that the reflexivity Beck and colleagues 
hope will be performed by an abstractly conceptualized ‘society’ or ‘public’ could also 
be usefully applied to researchers themselves. Surely questioning one’s own 
ontological underpinnings should be a prerequisite for any researcher examining 
whether or not people actively entangled with toxic materials in their everyday lives 
have been able to break free of the ontological bindings of first modernity and 
creatively design society anew? I will go on to argue that institutional ethnography, one 
of my chosen methods of inquiry, is positioned to help researchers in trying to 
accomplish just this. In discussing the potential (and his critique) of institutional 
ethnography, Walby (2007: 1016) makes this point: “Reflexivity draws attention to the 
importance of researcher social location in interpreting participant accounts but also, 
more important, requires of us the examination of the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of our frameworks for data analysis.” Not only should researchers be more 
                                                
50 See Latour and Woolgar (1979) for a discussion on the social construction of science. Also 
see Law (2008: 634-5) for an insightful discussion on the difference between the concepts of 
‘social construction’ and ‘performativity.’ 
51 Wynne (1996: 45) explains: “alternative, more culturally rooted and legitimate forms of 
collective, public knowledge—and of corresponding public order—which could arise from the 
informal non-expert public domain are inadvertently but still systematically suppressed.”  
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reflexive themselves, but if it is true that people in the risk society are experiencing 
problems collectively while being expected to act individually, could not researchers 
play a role in conducting research to support the people struggling to grapple with their 
embeddedness within complex hybrid entanglements?  
 
As with the risk society thesis, another concern about the theory of reflexive 
modernization is its grand narrative style of theorization and lack of empirical 
grounding (Latour, 2003b). Such theorization sends researchers to look for traces of 
reflexive modernization, which may or may not be found, instead of being attuned to 
what else may be emerging beyond the confines of the theory. Howell (2012: 193) 
points out that while the risk society thesis may be useful in diagnosing problems that 
arise in socio-ecological disasters, he questions “the logic of reflexive modernization as 
a useful corrective, especially given the power disparities between anti-reflexive forces 
like government and utility institutions and the weaker ‘concerned public.’” Such a 
statement begs the question: if the theory of reflexive modernization overlooks power 
structures which enable and constrain activities of actors, can it really be considered the 
only possible way to overcome the problems resulting from a nuclear disaster? Such 
insights are similar to Wynne’s (1996: 46) concern that Beck’s “neglect of the 
cultural/hermeneutic character of modern knowledge, specifically of modern scientific 
knowledge itself, seriously constrains the imagination of new forms of order and of 
how their social legitimation may be better found.”  
 
Ultimately, the theorization of reflexive modernization may not only ignore disparities 
in power relations, but its own embeddedness in modernist ways of thinking may 
prevent researchers from discovering different, emergent possibilities for overcoming 
problems of industrial pollution. I agree with Michael Bell (2011: 193) who explains 
the major drawback to grand narratives: “If you have all the answers, you don’t have all 
the questions.” Therefore, instead of asking whether or not reflexive modernization 
exists following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, I instead turn to postmodern theories to see 
if they might assist in painting a more nuanced picture of my participants’ experiences 
of konran in a way that focuses less on structural-oriented questions of what is 
happening, and more on questions of how: How did my participants come to experience 




Postmodernism52 and poststructuralism grew out of debates about modernity dating 
back to the work of Frederich Nietzsche in the late 1800s (see Trifonas, 2004). 
Postmodern theories question grand narratives and “the modernist belief in the 
possibility of describing the determinate rules and systems of reality” (Trifonas, 2004: 
151). According to Donna Haraway (1991d: 140), unlike modernist theories which tend 
to offer rationalist, structural descriptions of reality, postmodern approaches view 
reality as “complex open fields of criss-crossing plays of domination, privilege, and 
difference.” That is, instead of society being structured by one master narrative, 
postmodern thinking recognizes heterogeneity and relationality, and works to uncover 
the complex ways in which power and knowledge structure social spaces to direct 
activity. Latour’s (2003b: 42) definition of postmodernism points to this form of 
organization: “Postmodernity has many definitions but it offers, at its core, a theory of 
the way time flows and how connections are established between heterogeneous 
phenomena.” When it comes to ‘risk,’ postmodernists have taken up the task of 
explaining not only how the concept of risk is socially constructed, but how the concept 
itself could be used to organize society (for example, Hardy & Maguire, 2015; Lim, 
2012). In particular, the concepts of governmentality and biopolitics have been used to 
illustrate how awareness of ‘risks’ enter the political realm and are managed within 
society’s complex power structures. 
 
2.4.1 Managing	heterogeneity	through	conducting	conduct	
Governmentality is a concept developed by French philosopher Michel Foucault to 
describe a new type of government that first appeared in Western Europe in the 
sixteenth century (Dean, 1999: 209-10). The term can be defined generally as the ways 
in which “we think about governing others and ourselves in a wide variety of contexts” 
(Dean, 1999: 209). The notion helps to highlight how government, defined as the 
“conduct of conduct,” is accomplished (Foucault, 2007: 389). This definition of 
government generally refers to the deliberate direction of human behavior. More 
specifically, government can be defined as: 
                                                
52 See Featherstone (2007) for a discussion on the many connotations of the term 
‘postmodernism.’  
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any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a 
multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of 
techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by 
working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for 
definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively 
unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes. (Dean, 1999: 11, 
emphasis removed)  
According to this definition, people’s conduct can be shaped by others or the self, and 
necessarily presupposes freedom to act by both the governing and the governed.  
 
Foucault (2007: 108) himself defines governmentality as: 
the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this 
very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as 
its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and 
apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.  
This definition highlights some of the major characteristics that mark the “era of 
‘governmentality’” (Foucault, 2006: 142). First, the object of the modern form of 
government is the ‘population,’ which is viewed as a resource “to be fostered, to be 
used and to be optimized” (Dean, 1999: 20). Optimizing the population involves taking 
into consideration the “health, welfare, prosperity and happiness” of members of 
society (Dean, 1999: 19). Successful government, therefore, implies ensuring a 
population’s prosperity “through a particular register, that of the economy” (Dean, 
1999: 19, original emphasis). Here Foucault points to the important role the economy 
plays in both organizing and providing for the wellbeing of the population, making 
unobstructed circulation of the economy a central feature of successful government. 
Foster et al. (2014: 233) point out how welfare narratives are used to target populations 
and “construct subjects who make effective workforces and consumers, while 
marginalising and excluding those who do not.” Thus, successful government involves 
providing (or at least providing narratives of) welfare for a population who will, then, 




Another characteristic of governmentality is that it necessarily involves the 
establishment and maintenance of ‘apparatuses of security’ (or dispositifs) as a means 
of optimizing the welfare of a population (see Braun, 2014; Deleuze, 1992; Foucault, 
2007). Foucault (1980: 194) describes what he means by the term dispositif:  
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly 
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. 
Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the 
system of relations that can be established between these elements. 
Dispositifs are not created anew, but deployed within the social milieu—the 
heterogeneous elements making up the social environment—as a way to direct activity. 
In fact, according to Foucault, dispositifs are historically specific formations that arise 
in “responding to an urgent need” (Foucault, 1980: 195, original emphasis). They are 
not planned, but an afterthought, strategically deployed as a reaction to events which 
may destabilize attempts of government. Explained by Foucault (2008: 260), within 
dispositifs “action is brought to bear on the rules of the game rather than the players.” 
Braun (2014: 51-2, original emphasis) also provides a convincing description of this 
phenomena:  
apparatuses emerge in relation to a perceived problem; their elements 
have no common dimension other than the urgency to which they 
respond, and the network established between them. Thus, 
government not only exists as a shifting and uneven diagram of 
power […]; it comes into being as a kind of afterthought. First and 
foremost reactive in the face of crises of various kinds, it seeks to 
take hold of relations of force that already exist, ‘manipulating’ and 
‘intervening’ in them, ‘developing’ them in particular directions, 
‘blocking’ them, ‘stabilizing’ them, and ‘utilizing’ them. 
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Gilles Deleuze (1992: 159, original emphasis) describes dispositifs not as a structured 
form of government where a single rationality guides ruling activity, but as “a tangle, a 
multilinear ensemble. It is composed of lines, each having a different nature. […] Each 
line is broken and subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked, and subject to 
drifting.” While the complex tangles work to direct activity in some way, the agency of 
actors make exact prediction of outcomes difficult. It is, therefore, no surprise that 
dispositifs encompass “all the practices and institutions that ensure the optimal and 
proper functioning of the economic, vital and social processes that are found to exist 
within that population and would thus also include health, welfare and education 
systems” (Dean, 2010a: 29). In addition, because unobstructed circulation of the 
economy is a major goal of government, dispositifs are not often used for “establishing 
limits and frontiers, or fixing locations” but for “making possible, guaranteeing, and 
ensuring circulations: the circulation of people, merchandise, and air, etcetera” 
(Foucault, 2007: 29). In the era of governmentality, dispositifs can, thus, be understood 
as historically specific attempts to organize heterogeneous elements of the social milieu 
in ways that promote free circulation of the economy. 
 
According to de Larrinaga and Doucet (2010: 100), the dispositif was a central concept 
used for “constituting the liberal order” in so far as it is organized by rationalities “to 
foster ‘good’ circulation by negating what are perceived to be its negative elements, 
and to do so within the context of a social order marked by freedom.” While many 
consider liberalism to represent a historical period, or the philosophical concepts 
describing a reality in which people are bestowed with freedom, liberty and inalienable 
rights, Foucault considers liberalism to be “more like an ethos of government” (Barry, 
Osborne, & Rose, 1996: 8). In other words, liberalism can be viewed as more of a 
practice, or a way of enacting reality rather than a philosophy. Within the era of 
governmentality “the market plays a privileged domain in testing the limits of 
government and the effects of its excesses” (Dean, 2010b: 41) where dispositifs “enable 
the circulations that define the personal and commercial ‘freedoms’ of liberal-
democratic life” (Anderson, 2012: 34, original emphasis). Thus, liberalism could also 
be understood as a mentality or regime of practice used to protect against an over-




Ian Hacking (1990: 1) begins his book The Taming of Chance with an interesting 
observation: “The most decisive conceptual event of twentieth century physics has been 
the discovery that the world is not deterministic. […] A space was cleared for chance.” 
From this insight, he points to a paradox he recognized within scientific disciplines: 
“the more indeterminism, the more control. […] Quantum physics takes for granted that 
nature is at bottom irreducibly stochastic” (1990: 2). In the social realm he observed 
something similar: statistical data was being “developed for purposes of social control” 
which seemed to be based on “the notion that one can improve—control—a deviant 
subpopulation by enumeration and classification” (1990: 3-6). Hacking explains that 
through the process of taming populations, people were being “regarded as social atoms 
subject to social laws [which] turn out to be statistical in character” (1990: 15). What he 
is describing here is what Foucault has termed ‘biopolitics.’ 
 
Biopolitics, according to Foucault (2008: 317), is “the attempt, starting from the 
eighteenth century, to rationalize problems posed to governmental practice by 
phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, 
hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, race.” Thus, it involves the management of life and 
social relations within the social milieu. Foucault (2003: 245) also describes biopolitics 
as referring to:  
control over relations between the human race, or human beings 
insofar as they are a species, insofar as they are living beings, and 
their environment, the milieu in which they live. This includes the 
direct effects of the geographical, climatic, or hydrographic 
environment: the problem, for instance, of swamps, and of epidemics 
linked to the existence of swamps throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century. And also the problem of the environment to the 
extent that it is not a natural environment, that it has been created by 
the population and therefore has effects on that population.  
In this definition, the social milieu is expanded to refer not only to humans, but all 
living things and their environments. Biopolitics, then, entails not only managing 
relations among humans, but the relations humans have with other living beings and 
with both the built and the biophysical environment.   
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Though the term biopolitics refers to administration over the lives and relations of 
political subjects, biopower (sometimes used interchangeably) tends to refer to the use 
of biopolitics and disciplinary techniques to master individual bodies (Mills, 2013: 
85).53  Foucault (2007: 1) describes biopower as: 
the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of 
the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a 
general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 
eighteenth century, modern western societies took on board the 
fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species.  
Biopower, then, is a “new regime of power” (Mills, 2013: 86) which uses the technique 
of “normalization” (Foucault, 2007: 63) to manage and optimize human bodies through 
discipline and self-discipline.54 With this understanding, biopolitics might be 
understood as the artful application of biopower to administer life.  
 
2.4.4 The	role	of	statistics	and	norms	to	manage	a	population	
What is meant by ‘the technique of normalization’? Turning back to Hacking (1990: 5), 
we hear a story about how “the world itself became numerical” which in turn led to the 
uptake and subsequent hegemony of positivist science and the “imperialism of 
probabilities.” Statistics became a tool not only to explain the tendencies of a ‘human 
                                                
53 Prior to his work on governmentality, Foucault focused his attention on two other forms of 
power which remain relevant within modern governmentality: sovereign power and 
disciplinary power. First, sovereign power is “characterized as theory and practice of royal 
administrative rule beginning with the actuality of feudal monarchy, as an element in the 
contests over the limits and strength of royal power, and as later providing an alternative model 
of parliamentary democracy;” its “characteristic mechanisms are constitutions, laws and 
parliaments” and it is “exercised through the juridical and executive arms of the state. It is 
exercised over subjects” (Dean, 2010a: 29). Discipline, on the other hand, “concerns the 
exercise of power over and through the individual, the body and its forces and capacities, and 
the composition of aggregates of human individuals (school classes, armies, etc.). The 
expansion and intensification of regimes of discipline in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, in schools, hospitals, workhouses, manufactories, armies and so on, is roughly 
correlative with the development of the bureaucratic and the administrative apparatus of the 
state” (Dean, 2010a: 29). 
54 Put another way, while discipline and self-discipline can be seen as forms of power used to 
create an efficient workforce, biopower is used to maintain a workforce, or at least a large 
percentage of the workforce, that is healthy (enough) to work productively and maintain the 
smooth circulation of the economy (see Foucault, 2003: 239-64). 
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population,’ but the probability of future happenings, both enjoyable and terrifying. 
Hacking (1990: 4-5) describes how probabilities are used to explain “chances of 
meltdowns, cancers, muggings, earthquakes, nuclear winters, AIDS, global 
greenhouses, what next? There is nothing to fear (it may seem) but the probabilities 
themselves.” He goes on to detail that “the professional lust for precision and 
measurement” not only made the standardization of industrial processes possible, but 
created the concept of “a norm” or standard (Hacking, 1990: 5).55 Eventually, in the 
ways that average work day, lunch break, salary, or pocket size were used as norms to 
standardize factory work, norms for living and conducting one’s life were used to 
describe, optimize and manage the lives of people in a population.  
 
It is important to reemphasize that having a population as the target of government is a 
central aspect of the project of biopolitics: it involves the governing of a population of 
living people whose idiosyncrasies and heterogeneity is represented statistically 
through objective, often numerical, values. Dean (1999: 107) describes how what we 
have come to know as ‘a population’ was a social construction developed over time 
through statistics, epidemiological studies, and the systematic collection of 
demographic and census data. That is, the ‘population’ of a state is made knowable to 
ruling elites through abstract descriptions based on objectifying statistical data. 
Essentially, almost any aspects of the social milieu could be the object of government 
manipulation; statistics and probabilities are essential to the task of creating, optimizing 
and attempting to stabilize the future and the entities of the social milieu (Dean, 1999: 
99).56 
 
It is also important to understand that while probability statistics are used to optimize 
wellbeing, they can never guarantee it. Instead, optimization will always result in there 
being some winners and some losers, some healthy and some suffering (see Foucault, 
2007; 2008). That is, the use of statistical norms in biopolitics bestows ruling elites 
                                                
55 See Busch (2011) for more on standards. 
56 Dean (1999: 99) describes how biopolitics concerns, “the social, cultural, environmental, 
economic and geographic conditions under which humans live, procreate, become ill, maintain 
health or become healthy, and die. From this perspective bio-politics is concerned with the 
family, with housing, living and working conditions, with what we call ‘lifestyle’, with public 
health issues, patterns of migration, levels of economic growth and the standards of living. It is 
also concerned with the bio-sphere in which humans dwell.”  
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with “a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault, 1978: 138, 
original emphasis).57 What is ‘normal’ for a population becomes ‘normal’ for its 
members. But what is one to do if they do not want to follow the norm?   
 
Foucault (2007: 202) describes people’s freedom to conduct themselves in ways 
different from government through engaging in “counter-conducts.” That is, people 
may act in ways to strive for a “different form of conduct” or to be “conducted 
differently” (Foucault, 2007: 194).58 While acting through counter-conducts may be 
useful in opposing disciplinary power, trying to subvert biopower’s administration may 
be much more challenging given its reach into the most intimate and mundane aspects 
of life. 
 
Foucault (2007: 63) explains that both biopolitics and dispositifs are essential for 
setting norms.59 Experts also play a key role as actors who shape how people should 
conduct their everyday lives and maintain their health in line with the calculated norm. 
Rose (1999: 74-5) elucidates: 
it is experts—first doctors but later a host of others—who can specify 
ways of conducting one’s private affairs that are desirable, not 
because they are required by a moral code dictated by God or the 
Prince, but because they are rational and true. [...] The notion of 
normality, the invention of the norm, is the linchpin of this 
mechanism.  
                                                
57 Foucault (2007: 62) also describes the process of how “normal” death rates are established: 
“It takes all who are sick and all who are not as a whole, that is to say, in short, the population, 
and it identifies the coefficient of probable morbidity, or probable mortality, in this population, 
that is to say the normal expectation in the population of being affected by the disease and 
death linked to the disease.”  
58 As Dean (2010a: 21) explains, this type of protest fundamentally differs from “revolts against 
state sovereignty and economic exploitation however much they are at work in them” and 
instead include “[c]oncerns like opposition to war or the eating of animal products [that] are 
aligned with counter-conducts of conscientious objection and vegetarianism.” 
59 In Foucault’s (2007: 63) words: “plotting of the normal and the abnormal, of different curves 
of normality, and the operation of normalization consists in establishing an interplay between 
these different distributions of normality and [in] acting to bring the most unfavorable into line 
with the most favorable.” 
 48 
Thus, scientist and expert derived ‘truths’ play a critical political role in government. 
‘Rational’—and thus ‘truthful’ and ‘trustworthy’—expert-calculated statistical norms 
about human health and behavior are distributed to members of the population in a way 
that delineates the difference between what, and who, is normal or abnormal.  
 
2.4.5 Neoliberalism	and	the	prospects	of	uncertainty	
To reiterate, governmentality is a “historically specific version” of governing (Dean, 
1999: 16) which “focuses on the rationality of rule, not in terms of a transcendental 
reason but in those of specific forms of reasoning around which the exercise of power 
is articulated” (Pellizzoni & Ylonen, 2012: 50). For government directed by liberal 
forms of rationality, its object is the liberal subject—a subjectivity often referred to as 
homo economicus based on the assumption that people are calculative, rational and 
economically-minded beings.60 These liberal subjects are considered to be free to act 
within the economic sphere, and their “rationality and responsibility entails a future 
neither totally fixed nor totally random” (Pellizzoni & Ylonen, 2012: 51). Similar to the 
observations of Hacking (1990), Pellizzoni and Ylonen (2012: 51) describe the 
interplay between calculable and non-calculable phenomena in a liberal society: while 
calculations of risk and probability were essential tools to help liberal subjects plan 
their activities, uncertainty (or the incalculable) freed subjects from a life of 
determinacy. 
 
Neoliberalism is the term used to describe the historically specific form of government 
rationality that has been on the rise in some societies since the 1980s.61 It has been 
described as a “social ontology and epistemology” (Winnubst, 2012: 83) or the now 
                                                
60 See Read (2009) for a discussion of the term homo economicus. Also see Brown (2015), 
especially Chapter 3. 
61 The term neoliberalism is critiqued in the literature as being “omnipresent” and 
“promiscuous” (J. Clarke, 2008: 135) and for being abused by scholars who employ it as used 
as “contextual wallpaper” (Venugopal, 2015: 169) or a “constant master category that can be 
used both to understand and to explain all manner of political programs across a wide variety of 
settings” (N. Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006: 97). Also see Ferguson (2010) and Venugopal 
(2015) for a discussion of the different uses of the term. While I agree with many of these 
critiques, in this section I am merely trying to explain how the term fits into the 
conceptualization of governmentality and how other scholars may be using it to understand 
current forms of government. 
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“commonsense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world” (Harvey, 
2007: 23). Lemke (2001: 203) defines neoliberalism as: 
a political rationality that tries to render the social domain economic 
and to link a reduction in (welfare) state services and security 
systems to the increasing call for ‘personal responsibility’ and ‘self-
care’.  
Differing from liberal subjects who were slowly molded and conducted over time 
through government manipulation of the social milieu, the neoliberal homo economicus 
has been described by Foucault (2008: 270) as someone who “accepts reality or who 
responds systematically to modifications in the variables in the environment” and 
therefore “appears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds 
systematically to systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment.”  
 
Similar to Beck’s (1994; 1999) observation of the decline of the welfare state and the 
rise of individualization,62 neoliberalism describes an era where collective forms of 
welfare slip away. As economic rationality expands from markets to permeate all 
aspects of life, responsibility for managing risk transfers from the state to neoliberal 
subjects.63 Under the rationality of neoliberalism, instead of the government being 
responsible for protecting the public from risks through welfare and insurance, “[r]isk-
centered arrangements are merely tools for governing the incidental and collateral 
harms (such as industrial accidents, consumer injuries or exposure to crime) generated 
by the core enterprising activities” (O'Malley, 2004: 5, original emphasis). At the same 
time, uncertainty becomes opportunity or, in O’Malley’s (2004: 4-5) terms, “the 
technique of entrepreneurial creativity […] the fluid art of the possible.” While Beck 
                                                
62 Beck (1994: 14) describes ‘individualization’ as “a compulsion, but a compulsion for the 
manufacture, self-design and self-staging of not just one’s own biography but also its 
commitments and networks as preferences and life phases change, but, of course, under the 
overall conditions and models of the welfare state, such as the educational system (acquiring 
certificates), the labour market, labour and social law, the housing market and so on. Even the 
traditions of marriage and family are becoming dependent on decision-making, and with all 
their contradictions must be experienced as personal risks.”  
63 Pellizzoni and Ylonen (2012: 51) explain how under neoliberal rationalities “government 
operates more on interests, desires, and aspirations than through rights and obligations. […] 
People are oriented in an increasingly indirect and pervasive way towards their self-fulfillment 
or enhancement.” 
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(1992) sees risk and uncertainty as a destabilizing force, he does observe that attending 
to secondary side effects can be potentially more profitable than attending to primary 
sources of pollution. This observation fits well with O’Malley’s description of how 
neoliberal governance turns uncertainty into something positive: the prospect of 
accumulating capital in unexpected ways.  
 
2.4.6 Governmentality,	biopolitics	and	konran	
This idea of governmentality is very useful, and points to the ways in which 
government is currently performed and can help in understanding how the 
consequences of a nuclear disaster, including emergent experiences of konran, are 
managed within the social milieu. Though the concept’s theoretical roots are based 
upon European experiences, it has also been successfully used in a Japanese context to 
explore the governing of food security (Barclay & Epstein, 2013), food reforms 
(Kimura, 2011), the phenomenon of karoshi (death from overwork) (Y. Shibata, 2012), 
and government planning strategies (K. Shibata, 2008), to name a few. Of particular 
interest is Mori’s (2008) use of biopower to describe the aftermath of a historical case 
of extreme environmental pollution in Yokkaichi City beginning in the 1950s. In that 
paper, Mori describes how the onset of a number of environmental pollution cases 
signaled a change in how the Japanese government conducted biopolitics: transitioning 
from a more historical focus on managing hygiene (eisei)—a problem that needed to be 
addressed in early industrial times—to managing the environment (kankyo) which 
became officially recognized as a major source of disease in the 1960s. 
 
When it comes to nuclear disasters, some scholars have used the concept of biopower 
to understand the governing and suffering of victims exposed to radiation (for example, 
Petryna, 2002; Piotukh, 2015). In her book on the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear 
disaster, Petryna (2002) provides a noteworthy ethnographic account of the diverse 
ways biopower was disseminated to manage the lives and livelihoods of people, or as 
the title of her book terms “biological citizens,” exposed to radioactive pollution. In her 
depiction, she reveals the multilayered ways biopolitics and neoliberal forms of 
governmentality are at work: not only do people suffer from exposure to radiation, but 
industries providing service to the unwell are able to profit off the disaster, while 
people able to gain access to government support could possibly gain some financial 
security (though proving one’s exposure is not always easy). Petryna’s description 
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paints a picture in which it is not always the actual radioactive contamination and 
exposure to radionuclides that matters, but how these issues are negotiated among 
human actors within the social milieu that counts. 
 
Following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, there have been a number of scholars examining 
the role of neoliberal rationality in post-disaster governing (for example, Kimura, 
2016a; Nadesan, 2013). The concept of biopolitics has also been used by those trying to 
connect the suffering of people exposed to radionuclides to greater social organization. 
Davis and Hayes-Conroy (2017) provide a particularly useful analysis that offers an 
empirical investigation into the disjuncture between government policies and people’s 
actual experiences and needs following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. The authors 
combine Steinberg and Peters’ (2015) concept of “wet ontologies”— highlighting the 
biophysical presence of unstable and fluid-moving radionuclides as being part of the 
social milieu—with the concepts of governmentality and biopolitics to explore post-
disaster governing in contaminated spaces. Through an empirical inquiry into the 
experiences of people living in Fukushima Prefecture, the authors trace the dispositifs 
deployed after the disaster to organize the social milieu in ways which reestablish 
government control and promote smooth circulation of the economy. The neoliberal-
rationality-infused dispositifs create a situation where risks are individualized and 
people’s concerns about future consequences to health and reproduction “are often 
pitted against economic concerns” (Davis & Hayes-Conroy, 2017: 16). Reemphasizing 
points made by both Kimura (2016a) and Slater et al. (2014), the authors highlight the 
very gendered dimension to the aftermath of the disaster: “Through state policies and 
masculine imperatives that focus on economic factors, the concerns of women and 
others who would like to advocate for a more extensive clean-up are ignored, 
constrained, and even pathologized as hysteria” (Davis & Hayes-Conroy, 2017: 18). 
Thus, people become trapped within post-disaster dispositifs where it becomes easier, 
and more profitable, to follow mainstream forms of adaptation in line with neoliberal 
economic logic than it is to challenge these forces (see Grove, 2014: 252).  
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Davis and Hayes-Conroy’s (2017: 17-8, original emphasis) analysis additionally 
uncovers “an acceptable ‘bandwidth’ of tolerable64 suffering” describing how “the 
suffering of individuals is an expected consequence of modern governance, not an 
anomaly.” The suffering of victims of environmental pollution has also been a major 
focus of Japanese environmental sociologists (Funabashi, 2006; Iijima, 1992). Similar 
to Beck and Lau’s (2005) description of anti-reflexive forces that sweep in to maintain 
modern institutions,65 dispositifs deployed after TEPCO’s nuclear disaster try to 
conduct government subjects in a way to keep the status quo moving forward, 
regardless of the presence of TEPCO’s radionuclides in the social milieu. Given the 
results of their analysis, Davis and Hayes-Conroy (2017: 18) conclude by arguing: 
“contemporary forms of governance are ill-equipped to handle the consequences of an 
accident without sacrificing people, families, and communities.”  
 
The concepts of governmentality and biopolitics are useful in their ability to describe 
the interplay between government and its subjects, illustrating how government works 
to stabilize post-disaster social milieu and how government subjects position 
themselves and navigate within these often complex dispositifs of knowledge and 
power.  Such an analysis might depict the experience of konran as stemming from an 
incompatibility of rationalities and experiences as the logic of post-disaster dispositifs 
may not match the logics people have been using to conduct their lives until that point. 
Thinking with governmentality could also help in analyzing the government’s 
increasing of the allowable limit of radionuclides in food as a dispositif for managing 
the social milieu. It would present a story of how the government sets the rules of the 
game and how people negotiate, and sometimes disrupt government attempts, within 
the social milieu. But would this be enough to critically study the experiences of 
konran I heard from my study’s participants? Or would such an analysis confine my 
                                                
64 In Risk Society, Beck (1992: 19) also ponders the concept of ‘tolerable’ limits to the side 
effects of new risks: “Where [new risks] do finally see the light of day in the shape of ‘latent 
side effects’, how can they be limited and distributed away so that they neither hamper the 
modernization process nor exceed the limits of that which is ‘tolerable’—ecologically, 
medically, psychologically and socially?”  
65 According to Beck and Lau (2005: 532-33), the transition to a reflexive modernity does not 
come without resistance: “the basic principles of modernity do not lose any of their normative 
validity; on the contrary, their claim to validity becomes greater in the course of reflexive 
modernization.” 
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participants and their experiences within a conceptualization of the social milieu unable 
to grapple with the materiality of TEPCO’s radionuclides? 
 
In his paper problematizing the use of the term ‘neoliberalism,’ Ferguson (2010) writes: 
In thinking about the rapidly expanding literature on neoliberalism, I 
am struck by how much of the critical scholarship on [the] topic 
arrives in the end at the very same conclusion—a conclusion that 
might be expressed in its simplest form as: “neoliberalism is bad for 
poor and working people, therefore we must oppose it.” It is not that I 
disagree with this conclusion. On the contrary. But I sometimes 
wonder why I should bother to read one after another extended 
scholarly analysis only to reach, again and again, such an 
unsurprising conclusion.  
I would add that much of the literature on biopolitics leaves me with a similar feeling, 
possibly expressed as: ‘though people have some agency, they are ultimately trapped 
within the government-managed social milieu which will determine their fate; this is 
unfortunate.’ I find myself in agreement with sociologist and feminist scholar Dorothy 
E. Smith (1999: 98) who praises postmodern theories for challenging sociology’s 
tradition of grand narrative theorization—something Beck himself is guilty of—while 
also questioning the ways in which their analysis confines research subjects “to a 
phenomenal world in which nothing ever happens.” She explains: “post-
structuralism/postmodernism transfers the function of the subject to language or 
discourse, reinforcing the traditional separation of the bases of consciousness from the 
local historical activities of people’s everyday lives. Once this step has been taken, the 
inquirer cannot find her way back to a world in which people are active and in which 
we are constantly bringing what we do into relation to others” (D. E. Smith, 1999: 
98).66 Smith designed institutional ethnography as a way out of this predicament.  
 
                                                
66 Law (2004: 163) also describes how poststructural approaches tend to limit the agency of 
subjects: “particular enacted versions of reality set limits to what they are able to know or 
create. Terms such as ‘discourse,’ ‘deferral’ or ‘episteme’ point to such limits.” See Campbell 
(2003) for more on Smith’s critique of postmodern theories. 
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In a paper comparing institutional ethnography and governmentality, Katherine 
Teghtsoonian (2015) explains that while both approaches are used to uncover ruling 
relations of people’s everyday lives, they have very different ways of engaging with the 
research setting. That is, institutional ethnography has very practical, process-oriented, 
performative and pragmatist67 orientation based on a strong commitment to social 
justice where researchers play a role in creating “knowledge for action” (Teghtsoonian, 
2015: 10). Therefore, unlike in the theory of reflexive modernization where everyday 
people are expected rebuild modern institutions, in institutional ethnography research is 
conducted with the goal of helping people understand their own embeddedness within 
ruling relations. That is, research is designed from participants’ own experiences and 
any results are given back to them so that they can understand more about how their 
everyday lives are being organized—information which may help them in “making 
change from below” (D. E. Smith, 2007). The goal of an institutional ethnographer is to 
identify “how power is inserted into (enacted in, actually) the experiential setting, often 
in silent and mysterious ways” (M. L. Campbell, 2003: 13). The focus, then, is not only 
on discourse, but on everyday practice.68 Instead, she advocates for an empirical inquiry 
into everyday practice where she was able to discover something different: a ‘logic of 
care’ being enacted by people in local settings. Scholarship using the governmentality 
approach, Teghtsoonian goes on to argue, does not tend to have the same commitment 
to social justice as institutional ethnography, nor does it focus much on practices of 
resistance.69   
 
Latour (2003b: 44) points out that, like the theories of risk society and reflexive 
modernization, postmodernism is “above all a different way of recording the succession 
                                                
67 See Seigfried (1996) for a discussion of pragmatism and the pragmatist nature of institutional 
ethnography. 
68 A similar critique of governmentality comes from Annemarie Mol (2008b) who sees the 
limits of focusing one’s analysis on describing ‘patient choice’ as a product of neoliberal 
discourse. 
69 Teghtsoonian (2015: 114) explains: “precisely because the analysis highlights the discursive 
practices through which extra-local interests and goals subordinate those of individuals in local 
sites, it arguably results in a depiction of ruling as secure, solidified and effective, rather than 
vulnerable. This may make it more difficult for the researcher to convey a sense that real 
possibilities for change exist […] with the unintended effect of reinforcing the durability of 
things-as-they-are, rather than opening them up for change as institutional ethnography 
intends.” 
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of epochs.” With this in mind, both he and the sociologist John Law question whether 
or not postmodern approaches have actually freed themselves from the constraint of 
modernist ontologies. Law (2008: 636) explains:  
for all his radicalism, Foucault proposed that the modern episteme 
started spreading through and organising practices, realities and 
knowledges in the eighteenth century, and that we are still utterly in 
its productive grip. […] Foucault is telling us that we’re all playing 
from more or less the same modern score. So the standard answer is 
that heterotopic spaces are far distant. 
Heterotopic spaces refer to those places in the margins, where hegemonic forms of 
ordering are absent.70 While Foucault argues that heterotopic spaces tend to be 
marginalized or distant from the rest of society, Law (2008) points out how the work of 
scholars following a material-semiotic approach, explored in more detail later in this 
chapter, dispute such a claim as the approach attunes researchers to see heterotopic 
spaces as existing in the everyday.  
 
Given that this thesis aspires to study experiences of post-nuclear disaster konran as 
emergent, the governmentality approach and its tendency to confine research subjects 
does not seem fit for purpose. However, it appears that the work of unshackling the 
subjects, and scholars, of governmentality from the grips of modernist ontologies might 
be accomplished by revising the concept of the social milieu. Davis and Hayes-Conroy 
(2017) took an important move in this direction by incorporating radionuclides into the 
social milieu through the concept of ‘wet ontologies.’ This may also be accomplished 
by taking Foucault’s (1984: 50) own advice in calling for a “critical ontology of 
ourselves.” That is, scholars must examine their own ontological groundings in order to 
                                                
70 The concept was developed by Foucault—translated by Miskowiec—(1986: 25) who refers 
to both “heterotopias of crisis” and “heterotopias of deviations.” ‘Heterotopias of crisis’ refer to 
“privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to 
society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis: adolescents, 
menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly, etc.” He argues that, in modern societies, 
the crisis forms are being replaced by ‘heterotopias of deviation,’ defined as spaces “in which 
individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed [such 




prevent replicating the social constructs they critique. In the next section I will describe 
some useful ontological discussions that can aid in disrupting common ways of 
performing scholarship, a process which may open up the possibility of thinking 




Feminist and science studies scholar and philosopher Annemarie Mol (2002: 183) ends 
the sub-text of her book The Body Multiple with an intriguing quote from Foucault 
(1984: 50):  
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, 
as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge 
that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and 
the same the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us 
and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. 
Foucault’s call for a ‘critical ontology of ourselves’ sparked my attention. What were 
these ‘limits that are imposed upon us’ and what were the ways of experimenting ‘with 
the possibility of going beyond them’? Mol’s (2002) clever engagement with the 
literature helped to clarify this. Though she ended her book with a quote from Foucault, 
throughout the sub-text she explains her reason for borrowing from, but ultimately 
abandoning him. She tells us how Foucault helped her to understand ‘medicine’ as not 
only an encounter between a patient and a doctor, but as a social construct. That is, 
Foucault taught her how to explore ‘medicine’ as an enactment of myriad social 
processes, and to view it as a form of knowledge and practice which takes on material 
form as a discourse capable of organizing society. Her abandonment of Foucault comes 
in her search for ways of understanding the complex multiplicity of experiences 
wrapped up in the disease termed ‘atherosclerosis.’ Describing her study as “empirical 
philosophy,” Mol (2002: vii-1) argues that choosing to focus on “enactment rather than 
knowledge has an important effect: what we think of as a single object may appear to 
be more than one.” Mol (2002: viii, original emphasis) makes clear that the purpose of 
her book is not to place judgement on medicine, but to open up what we have come to 
know as ‘medicine’ by contributing to the theorization of its “ontological politics” 
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which, in the case of medicine, refers to “a politics that has to do with the way in which 
problems are framed, bodies are shaped, and lives are pushed and pulled into one shape 
or another.” She describes the concept in more detail:  
Ontological politics is a composite term. It talks of ontology—which 
in standard philosophical parlance defines what belongs to the real, 
the conditions of possibility we live with. If the term 'ontology' is 
combined with that of 'politics' then this suggests that the conditions 
of possibility are not given. That reality does not precede the 
mundane practices in which we interact with it, but is rather shaped 
within these practices. So the term politics works to underline this 
active mode, this process of shaping, and the fact that its character is 
both open and contested. (Mol, 1999: 74-5, original emphasis) 
Mol (2002: 182, original emphasis) discusses how her act of studying ontology through 
a localized empirical study went against the normal philosophical theories which are 
traditionally “universal: valid everywhere—and rooted nowhere in particular […] What 
was right in theory was supposed to be transportable anywhere—so easily that no 
attention was paid to what it might mean to transport ‘rightness.’” Empirical 
investigations destabilize such notions of wholesale universality.71 
 
Mol’s call for empirical inquiry is reminiscent of Marx and Engels’ (Marx & Engels, 
1998: 36-7) argument for beginning sociological inquiries empirically through focusing 
on people’s everyday activities. In The German Ideology they write: 
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not 
dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made 
in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the 
material conditions of their life, both those which they find already 
existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can 
thus be verified in a purely empirical way.  
Marx and Engels’ distinction between people’s everyday activities and the ideologies 
extracted from them and used to categorize and explain these experiences was also one 
                                                
71 See Law (2015) and Tsing (2005) for critical discussions of universals. 
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of the inspirations72 that led Dorothy E. Smith (1987; 1990a; 1990b; 1999) to design 
institutional ethnography as a method of inquiry that strives to avoid the 
objectification73 of people’s lived experiences. To overcome what she has termed “the 
dominance of theory,” Smith proposes an “ontology of the social” based on the premise 
that all knowledge in society is socially organized, and argues that an understanding of 
this organization can only be grasped through empirical investigations into people’s 
everyday experiences (D. E. Smith, 2005: 49-52). Instead of subscribing to grand 
narratives where ‘facts’ are gathered and fit into pre-formed categories, Smith 
recommends researchers instead follow a “botanizing ideology” where scholars first go 
to local settings and see what is happening; there they may find specimens of interest 
(in material, not ideological form) which can be brought back with them to be analyzed 
(see Eastwood, 2005: 59-61). 
 
In line with Mol’s concept of ontological politics, speculative feminist, speculative 
fabulator, humusities scholar and compostist74 Donna Haraway (2014) relays a lesson 
she learned from Marilyn Strathern and others concerning the importance of reflecting 
upon, playing with and disrupting one’s own ontological stance.75 She shares:  
that it matters what stories tell stories, it matters what thoughts think 
thoughts, it matters what worlds world worlds. That we need to take 
seriously the acquisition of that kind of skill, emotional, intellectual, 
material skill, to destabilize our own stories, to retell them with other 
stories, and vice versa. A kind of serious denormalization of that 
                                                
72 Smith (1990b: 36) notes both the benefits and limits to Marx’s work: “His theory […] fails to 
embrace patriarchal forms of oppression. Nonetheless, his ontology offers us a radical break 
with the types of social and sociological theory that begin with assumptions about human 
nature assigning agency, reason, creativity, and the recognition of rights to men and 
subordination, passivity, and a being ruled by body and feeling to women.”  
73 Mueller (1995: 100) explains this process of objectification by researchers as 
‘transposition’—specifically, she refers to the process of “transposing the actualities of 
people’s living into policy categories which activate further bureaucratic procedures.” 
Eastwood (2005: 55) describes this as “a process through which the actual experiences of 
identifiable individuals are rendered invisible for their particularities, yet sociologically visible 
in the form of categories, facts, or statistics.” Also see Kristeva (1986: 111) for a discussion on 
transposition, intertextuality, multiplicity and plurality—referred to as “semiotic polyvalence.” 
74 These are all Haraway’s neologisms. See Haraway (2016: 31-2; 2017: M45). 
75 Also see Haraway (2016: 35). 
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which is normally held still, in order to do that which one thinks one 
is doing. It matters to destabilize worlds of thinking with other worlds 
of thinking. 
 Similar to Mol, Haraway (1991a; 2006) argues that reality is not singular: multiple and 
messy realities are enacted by human and more-than-humans alike. The difference is 
that some realities are esteemed more highly and given more prominence than others.  
 
For many years, feminist scholars have been criticizing academics who do not reflect 
on their own standpoint and positionality in the field and, as a result, end up 
reproducing the power structures they set out to critique (Harding, 1986; H. Rose, 
1983; D. E. Smith, 1992; 1997). Even scholars in the critical field of social studies of 
science and technology (STS)—where it is acknowledged that science “is just politics 
by other means” (Latour, 1988: 229)—have been accused of unreflexively ignoring 
their own political position in the research process (Haraway, 1992). Hilary Rose 
(1996: 72) describes the difficulty some scholars find in seeing the inequalities in social 
relations as “quite an achievement.” That is, learning to ignore such structures of 
inequality is a form of ideological work that has been accomplished through practice 
over time.  
 
As Haraway’s abovementioned quote illustrates, recognizing one’s political position 
and ideological strongholds requires ontological destabilization. Through her work, 
Haraway (1991b; 2008) poses questions on the ethics of research and human and more-
than-human relations, proposing categories, such as ‘companion species’ or ‘cyborgs,’76 
to help in thinking through incoherent, hybrid77 relations and realities. Such hybrid 
thinking exposes entanglements among and within a multitude of human and more-
than-human actors, and allows us to see interconnectivity and incoherence usually 
obscured by dominant, simplified ways of seeing.  
 
                                                
76 Haraway (1991a: 149) describes a cyborg as “a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and 
organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is lived social 
relations, our most important political construction, a world-changing fiction.” The cyborg 
provides a metaphor for thinking of the hybrid nature of reality and relations; disperse realities 
come together in practice and are all performed simultaneously in enacting the cyborg. 
77 See Latour (1993) for discussions of hybrids in the context of actor-network theory. 
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Another scholar interested in disrupting ontological strongholds is anthropologist Anna 
Lowenhaupt Tsing. However, instead of using the term ‘ontology,’ Tsing (2015: 21) 
refers to the process of “world making.” Tsing (2015) puts the concept of ‘world 
making’ to use in her book The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility 
of Life in Capitalist Ruins, where she conducts ethnographic research to examine global 
commodity chains—and the heterotopic, self-organized spaces within them—from the 
perspective of the matsutake mushroom. She explains that world making may share 
with alternative ontologies an interest in “interrupting common sense […and revealing] 
that other words are possible” (Tsing, 2015: 292, n7).  
 
The concept focuses scholars away from universal grand narratives, to everyday 
activities and encounters. Whereas many ontological debates focus on how humans 
conceive of the rest of the (non-human) world, ‘world making’ points to the idea that 
nonhumans also have their own ontologies. Additionally, Tsing (2015: 292, n7) points 
out how “world-making projects overlap. […] While most scholars use ontology to 
segregate perspectives, one at a time, thinking through world making allows layering 
and historically consequential friction.” Friction is the title of Tsing’s 2005 book where 
she uses the concept as a metaphor for exploring how the abstract, universal concept of 
‘globalization’ does not exist as an entity onto itself, but is enacted through everyday 
activities. For Tsing (2005: 13), friction is “the awkward, unequal, unstable, and 
creative qualities of interconnection across difference.” She explains its role in 
fostering ontological destabilization and play: “[a]s a metaphorical image, friction 
reminds us that heterogeneous and unequal encounters can lead to new arrangements of 
culture and power” (Tsing, 2005: 19). Tsing’s work and ontological grounding makes 
her attuned to discovering messy, unorganized, heterogeneous, and heterotopic spaces 
from which new possibilities might emerge. Her research is able to capture such 
possibilities through empirical investigations into local, embodied practices. 
 
In discussing ontological politics, John Law (2008: 673) outlines what he sees as the 
call to action put forward by both Mol and Haraway (and I would argue Smith and 
Tsing): “To deal with the materialities of specific practices. To discover difference. 
And then to intervene in ways that might make a difference to those differences.” Put 
another way, instead of trying to understand the world through master narratives, 
practicing ontological politics requires researchers to accept that reality is neither 
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singular nor given. Instead it must be understood as heterogeneous, multiple and 
produced through everyday practice. It requires taking to heart the idea that the present 
does not dictate the future. Or, as Law (1991: 6, original emphasis) puts it, practicing 
ontological politics requires scholars to maintain a “sense that what is seemingly so 
‘natural’ could have been otherwise.” That is, happenings, such as experiences of 
konran, do not begin and end in an instant, but emerge from heterogeneous relations 
among myriad actors, human and more-than-human. In the next section I will discuss 
some of the insights that have emerged from the field of material semiotics (or 
relational materiality) which help in attuning my research to grasp the heterogeneous 
sociomaterial relations that participated in enacting my participants’ multiple 
experiences of konran. 
 
2.6 Material-semiotic	sensibilities	for	studying	messy,	emergent	realities	
Mol’s work on multiplicity and ontological politics emerged through her engagement 
with STS and actor-network theory. Materialized through the work of scholars 
including Michel Callon, Bruno Latour and John Law, actor-network theory has 
evolved through the critique and contributions of myriad scholars including Haraway 
and Mol. The ‘theory’ has evolved greatly over time.78 Thus, I take the advice of Law 
(2009: 142) who recommends talking about material semiotics, rather than focusing 
purely only on actor-network theory, as it “better catches the openness, uncertainty, 
revisability, and diversity of the most interesting work” in the field. In this section, I 
will discuss some of the major theoretical insights from this field of scholarship that 




Though actor-network theory has been labeled a ‘theory,’ it offers no overarching 
theoretical framework (Mol, 2010a: 261). It is therefore more useful to think of it as a 
“sensibility” or method for exploring heterogeneous, material-semiotic networks of 
relations (Law, 2009: 142). As put by Mol (2010a: 262), actor-network theory “helps to 
                                                
78 See Law (2009) for an overview of some of actor-network theory’s origins and 
transformations. 
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train researchers’ perceptions and perceptiveness, senses and sensitivity.” Law (2009: 
141) defines the material-semiotic version of actor-network theory as: 
a disparate family of material-semiotic tools, sensibilities, and 
methods of analysis that treat everything in the social and natural 
worlds as a continuously generated effect of the webs of relations 
within which they are located. It assumes that nothing has reality or 
form outside the enactment of those relations. Its studies explore and 
characterize the webs and the practices that carry them. Like other 
material-semiotic approaches, the actor network approach thus 
describes the enactment of materially and discursively heterogeneous 
relations that produce and reshuffle all kinds of actors including 
objects, subjects, human beings, machines, animals, ‘nature,’ ideas, 
organizations, inequalities, scale and sizes, and geographical 
arrangements. 
As the definition suggests, instead of being a theory explaining why things happen, 
actor-network theory is better seen as a set of tools or sensibilities for telling interesting 
stories about how heterogeneous relations lead to enactments or happenings. As Law 
(2009: 151, original emphasis) describes, actor-network theory is not about studying 
stable social constructions, but “enactment or performance.” Thus, instead of social 
‘construction,’ actor-network theory helps researchers to explore social ‘enactment’ or 
‘emergence.’79 Law (2009: 151) explains how researchers engaging with actor-network 
theory deal with a number of heterogeneous elements that “assemble and together enact 
a set of practices that make a more or less precarious reality.” Expanding 
governmentality’s conceptualization of the social milieu, actor-network theory allows 
for the existence of all possible actors whether they be human and more-than human—
animal, material or otherwise. The method is based on a belief that though 
heterogeneous networks have always existed, we as humans and researchers have been 
trained over time to ignore them.  
 
One of the first recognized contributions to actor-network theory was Callon’s (1980) 
attempt to describe the heterogeneous network from which electric vehicles were being 
                                                
79 See Law (2008: 634-5) for a discussion on social construction versus performativity. 
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engineered and (unsuccessfully) deployed. Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) ethnographic 
inquiry into the production of scientific knowledge within a laboratory setting also 
contributed to the development of actor-network theory. As mentioned in the review of 
risk society, Latour (1993) argues that modernity is a mode of thinking—not an 
accomplishment as argued by Beck—based on dualisms that conceal the heterogeneous 
entanglements through which reality is enacted.80 He points out that the nature/society 
divide in particular creates cognitive distinctions between active, human agents and 
what are imagined to be passive, natural objects. These distinct categories of nature and 
society became mixed and boundaries blurred following destabilizing events—
including nuclear disasters or other hybrid enactments such as global warming or 
clouds of acid rain (Latour, 1993). According to actor-network theory, hybrid 
enactments are the result of a complex mix of relations among humans and more-than-
humans. However, modernist ontologies have trained us over time to overlook the 
heterogeneity and view the world in dualisms and binaries. Thus, acknowledging 
heterogeneity requires attunement; noticing hybrid entanglements requires material-
semiotic sensibilities. Law (2009: 154) describes the situation: “Goods (or bads), 
knowledges, and realities, all are being enacted together: this is one of the ways the 
material-semiotic sensibility leads us into the diaspora.” Thinking of material-semiotic 
approaches not as theories, but ‘sensibilities’ or “arts of noticing” (Tsing, 2015: 17) 
helps scholars to recognize the contingent nature of reality and reminds “us that we live 
in a world that is materially diverse and heterogeneous” (Law & Singleton, 2014: 382, 
original emphasis).81 
 
So what exactly are the ‘material-semiotic sensibilities’ that attune researchers to the 
heterogeneity, the diaspora, the obscure networks from which Beck’s new risks 
emerge? Semiotics has been defined as “the dimension of meaning. It studies the 
structure of symbols and signs and their associated meanings” (Mazzola et al., 2016: 
59). Material semiotics adds materials into the equation, helping to attune researchers to 
the heterogeneous relations at the focus of actor-network theory. Mol (2010a: 257) 
compares de Saussure’s version of semiotics to that of actor-network theory: according 
                                                
80 Latour (2003b) explains that his early work was inspired by blending Griemas’s view of non-
humans and Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology for humans. See Latour (2003b: 40) for a 
discussion on his early theoretical and methodological inspirations. 
81 Also see Mol (2010a). 
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to the field of semiotics “words do not point directly to a referent, but form part of a 
network of words. […] In [actor-network theory] this semiotic understanding of 
relatedness has been shifted on from language to the rest of reality.” In an example 
using fish (both in their symbolic linguistic and material representations), Mol explains 
that semiotics reveals how the word fish gains meaning through its relation with other 
words—its contrast with the word ‘meat,’ the way it associates with the word ‘scales,’ 
or the way it evocates other words such as ‘water.’ Likewise, material semiotics views 
the fish itself as being the product of a set of heterogeneous relations. Mol (2010a: 258) 
explains how a “fish depends on, is constituted by, the water it swims in, the plankton 
or little fish that it eats, the right temperature and pH, and so on. Fish relate to meat as 
well—if only because they compete in food markets.” While these relations may appear 
to be causal, she explains how material-semiotic sensibilities reveal the fish itself to be 
an actor which not only participates in enacting reality, but is itself enacted through 
relations it is embedded within.82 Law’s (1994) appeal for “a pragmatic and relationally 
materialist sociology" may help in understanding what material semiotics has to offer. 
 
Poststructuralism also shares an interest in material semiotics, highlighting the 
heterogeneous nature of the social milieu. In fact, Law (2009: 146) has described actor-
network theory “as a particular empirical translation of poststructuralism.” However, as 
previously mentioned, to poststructuralists agency does not tend to be extended as 
widely as it does in actor-network theory. In addition, actor-network theory provides 
historical, empirically based accounts of the emergent effects of heterogeneous 
relations, while poststructural approaches—such as governmentality—tend to explain 
activity based on epistemological constraints of a historical moment. Or as Law (2009: 
147) describes, actor-network theory offers “an historical account of particular 
translations through time rather than a diagnosis of an epochal epistemic syntax.”  
 
2.6.2 Thinking	through	messiness	with	the	assemblage	approach	
Similar to actor-network theory, the assemblage approach emerged from the field of 
material semiotics as a conceptual and methodological tool for tracing procedures and 
practices, unified across difference, that emerge as happenings in the world. The 
understanding of assemblage I find of most interest descends from Deleuze and 
                                                
82 Also see Law and Mol (2008) for a creative discussion on acting and enactment. 
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Guattari’s translation of the French term agencement which Law (2004: 41-2) translates 
as “an uncertain and unfolding process […] a tentative and hesitant unfolding, that is at 
most only very partially under any form of deliberate control. It needs to be understood 
as a verb as well as a noun.” While some scholars understand assemblage to resemble 
Foucauldian dispositifs, the meaning stemming from agencement differs in its 
conceptualization of agents, agency and determinism of activity. As Tsing (2015: 292-
3, n8) describes, Foucauldian “‘assemblages’ expand across space and conquer place; 
they are not constituted through indeterminacy.” While there are not great differences 
between the theoretical underpinnings of agencement and ‘actor-network’ (see Law, 
2004; 2009), there are some important distinction in each concept’s ability to manage 
messiness. Tsing (2015: 292-3) clarifies what she sees as the difference between her 
use of the term ‘assemblage’ and the concept of ‘network’ in actor-network theory: “A 
network is a chain of associations that structures further associations; my assemblages 
gather ways of being without assuming that interactional structure.” That is, while the 
term ‘network’ might connote forms of association and interaction among various 
human and more-than-human actors, ‘assemblage’ denotes a sense of fluidity, open-
endedness and ‘intra-action.’83 
 
Tsing’s description of networks might fit with Law’s own critiques of actor-network 
theory—noted in a paper within which he and Singleton attempted to map the network 
and trajectory of relations that results in the experience of alcoholic liver disease (Law 
& Singleton, 2005). Their findings show actor-network theory’s limitations, being more 
poised to describe existing networks, but not being able to grapple much with the 
messiness—in their case otherness or shifts between presence and absence—that appear 
within the network. Tsing’s distinction may, therefore, be useful in pointing out the 
promise of assemblage thinking: while actor-network theory and the assemblage 
approach (or “method assemblage”) (Law, 2004: 13) both explore the precarious 
relations among myriad heterogeneous actors, assemblage thinking allows for 
conceptualization of messier, overlapping, “absent presence” (Law & Singleton, 2005: 
                                                
83 Barad (2007: 33, original emphasis) describes intra-activity as signifying “the mutual 
constitution of entangled agencies. That is, in contrast to the usual ‘interaction,’ which assumes 
that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-
action recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-
action.” Also see Barad (Barad, 2017: G111). 
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343-4) and multiple processes of engagement and entanglements that emerge in local 
settings. 
 
Tsing (2015: 23) characterizes her conceptualization of assemblages as “open-ended 
gatherings. They allow us to ask about communal effects without assuming them. They 
show us potential histories in the making.” Human geographers McFarlane and 
Anderson (2011: 162) describe assemblages as both a concept and “an ethos of 
engagement attuned to the possibilities of socio-spatial formations to be otherwise 
within various constraints and historical trajectories.” Both of these portrayals point to 
the potential of engaging with assemblage thinking: it provides a method for 
conceptualizing and tracing how seemingly-stable bundles of relations among 
heterogeneous and often disparate actors are precariously held together. The 
recognition of the precarious stability of these bundles of relations can attune 
researchers to unexpected, emergent happenings, while also helping them to trace 
unexpected happenings to their precarious beginnings. Thus, assemblages can be seen 
as coexisting bundles of relations that are always in tension (Mol, 2010a). Put 
differently, an important aspect of assemblage thinking is its ability to recognize both 




If reality is a precarious mess of heterogeneous relations, how is it that we have come 
to think of anything as being stable? Law (1994: 101, original emphasis) explains how 
actor-network theory “treats the social world as a set of more or less related bits and 
pieces. There is no social order. Rather, there are endless attempts at ordering.” The 
focus on the unfinished process of social ordering or social ‘co-ordination’84 creates an 
image of ‘the social’ not as a static, steady, knowable entity (as is portrayed in 
statistical data), but “the recursive but incomplete performance of an unknowable 
number of intertwined orderings” (Law, 1994: 101). Actor-network and assemblage 
scholars see attempts at social co-ordination as emerging through the process of 
translation. Law (1994: 103) explains: 
                                                
84 Mol (2010a: 264) prefers to use the term ‘co-ordination’ as it “suggests continuing effort. 
Tensions live on and gaps must be bridged, hence the need for ‘co-ordination.’”  
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Translation, then, is to do with verbs, but one could say that its object 
is to try to convert verbs into nouns. Of course, this is impossible. 
Verbs are verbs are verbs. To think otherwise is to cleave to the 
modernist dream of pure order. Nevertheless, some verbs may end up 
acting for longer than others. Some may even look like nouns for a 
while. So translation is a play to achieve relative durability, to make 
verbs behave as if they were nouns. This is where relational 
materialism comes into the picture. 
According to Law and other scholars in the field of material semiotics, translations, and 
any orderings they may invoke, are necessarily contingent. Material-semiotic attuned 
approaches illuminate how materials play an important role in attempts to coordinate 
and stabilize social relations. Or, as Mol (2010a: 263) clearly explains: “[t]hings are 
crucial to the ordering work at hand.” According to these approaches, any ‘thing’—
from a discourse, to a text, to a nuclear power plant—are translations. One of the main 
differences among ‘things’ rests in their durability: while a spoken word may disappear 
after it is enunciated, the textual representation of those words can be made into 
replicable copies and distributed to coordinate activities across far distances (Law, 
1994: 102). That is, a sense of stability is achieved because “some materials last better 
than others. And some travel better than others” (Law, 1994: 102). Materials that can 
travel from site to site without losing their shape are what Latour (1986: 8) has termed 
“immutable mobiles.” 
 
The process of translation can be found in the production of immutable mobiles, but 
also in encounters actors have when relating to these materials. The process of 
translation that produces an immutable mobile is sometimes referred to as inscription. 
Law (1994: 103) points out it is “sociotechnical innovations that generate new forms of 
immutable mobiles: writing; print; paper; money; a postal system; cartography; 
navigation; ocean-going vessels; cannons; gunpowder; telephony.” Immutable mobiles 
do not create situations of technical determinism, but are sociotechnical in the sense 
that they are formed through and interact within heterogeneous relational materiality.85 
                                                
85 Law (2009: 147-8, original emphasis) explains: “We have seen that the social and the 
technical are embedded in each other. This means that it simply isn’t possible to explore the 
social without at the same time studying the hows of relational materiality.”  
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Put differently, they represent material forms that emerge from a specific set of 
intentions and relations, and are deployed as actors in an attempt to order further 
relations—though the participation of other humans and more-than-humans means the 
result of ordering attempts are never predictable.  
 
Callon (1991) provides an example. In discussing the functioning of techno-economic 
networks, Callon distinguishes between actors and intermediaries that interact within an 
actor-network. Texts, food products, technical instruments, forms of knowledge or 
skills known by a human or machine, and currency are all examples of intermediaries. 
Intermediaries are produced through the process of inscription. Therefore, though they 
are exchanged through external networks, each intermediary has its own network from 
which it emerges, each imbued with its own political and economic values. Thus 
intermediaries may be created with the potential to replicate the values of the network 
from which it emerges. This replication, however, is never guaranteed as the 
relationship among actors and intermediaries is always contingent, never 
determinable.86 Callon (1991) also describes how intermediaries define the 
relationships among actors who exchange them, for example networks designed to 
circulate food are defined as ‘food systems.’ Because intermediaries are not confined to 
one network, they are able to travel to numerous other networks to be exchanged by 
actors there. Intermediaries, therefore, also play the role of actor when involved in 
coordinating or instigating activity among other actors in a techno-economic network, 
though the character of these interactions are not always predictable. Callon (1991: 
141-2) uses an example of nuclear power plants as both intermediary and actor to 
describe this point:  
The plant is often seen as a simple link in a chain which extends from 
the user to the generating company, and perhaps beyond to the 
terrible nucleocrats who conceived and planned it. In this case the 
actors are taken to pass through the plant without stopping. […] 
Others treat it as a dignified actor that may introduce unexpected and 
unprogrammed sequences and associations. […] When the clouds 
from Chernobyl spread over Europe to contaminate Lapp reindeer 
                                                
86 See Legun (2015) for an intriguing empirical example of apple dwarfing technologies as 
assemblage intermediaries and actors. 
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and Welsh sheep, the plant became an actor rather than an 
intermediary. 
Attuning to messy, heterogeneous sociomaterial entanglements using material-semiotic 
sensibilities allows for practicing ontological politics, opening up opportunities to 
explore both intermediaries and actors as fluid in their identities. 
 
Law’s (1986; 2012) work on Portuguese imperial expansion and trade in the 15th and 
16th centuries also points to the critical role immutable mobiles played in the country’s 
long-distance and large-scale ordering projects. He illustrates some of the processes of 
translation used by the Portuguese empire in maintaining control over their ships: the 
knowledge of astronomers was inscribed into astronomical tables that were used by 
disciplined navigators to direct ships to far-off places of interest to the empire (Law, 
1986).  Law (1986: 234) ultimately argues that “long-distance control depends upon the 
creation of a network of passive agents (human and more-than-human) which makes it 
possible for emissaries to circulate from the centre to the periphery in a way that 
maintains their durability, forcefulness and fidelity.” In this case, networks of passive 
agents including “documents, devices and drilled people”87 were shaped and exploited 
by the Portuguese ruling elites to co-ordinate their imperialist projects (Law, 1986: 
234).  
 
In the same volume, Callon (1986) uses an empirical example with scallops to describe 
the creation of a network of passive agents. The study outlines a four-step process of 
translation used in establishing a network of actors—marine biologists, fishermen and 
scallops—who will work together to prevent devastating declines in scallop populations 
in the St. Brieuc Bay in Brittany, France. The study illustrates the contingent nature of 
translation and the precariousness of ordering projects since ‘betrayals’ of actors—in 
this case “silent mutinies of scallops and fishermen”—and identity-shifting 
controversies are always possible and have the power to disrupt and reconfigure 
seemingly-stable translations and coordinations (Callon, 1986: 219-21).  
 
                                                
87 Here Law borrows the concept of ‘docile bodies’ from Foucault (1977). Haraway (1994: 65) 
has also described how these voyagers are expected to “pronounce ‘land ho!’ and forever pose 
as the ventriloquist (representor) to the way the world really is.” 
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Focusing on attempts at ordering through translation can help in pointing to the 
contingent nature of ordering projects, providing a constant reminder that “what is 
seemingly so ‘natural’ could be otherwise” (Law, 1991: 6, original emphasis; 1994)}. 
Or, in Haraway’s terms, “the established disorder isn’t necessary” (Gane, 2016: 136). 
Tsing’s (1997) work on translation also reveals how viewing historical transformations 
as open-ended, never complete processes of translation can sensitize researchers to 
glimpse the heterogeneous relations and encounters that have been left out of dominant 
Western histories, but nonetheless contribute to historical happenings.88 Ultimately, 
material-semiotic sensibilities seem to be useful in training researchers to identify “the 
glue that holds the social world more or less precariously together” (Law, 1991: 7). 
Attempts at ordering or coordinating can, thus, be seen as continuous efforts, always 
imbued with tension, where there is no certainty as to how things will play out within 




Callon and colleagues (2009: 28) use the term “overflow” to refer to instances where 
something ordinarily kept within a technical space (for example, radionuclides within a 
nuclear power plant) are released from their confinement into the “big world.” The 
technical space can be both physical (as in the release of radionuclides from within the 
containment of a nuclear power plant) or philosophical (as in the discovery of gaps in 
modernist ontologies).  Here Latour’s (2003b: 36) aforementioned definition of risk 
helps explain the philosophical implications of the term ‘overflow’: it reveals people’s 
entanglements with myriad heterogeneous elements that they once thought were 
separate, or at least separable, from themselves. Callon et al. (2009: 28-36) refer to this 
realization as recognizing one is ‘concerned’ with the overflow.89 That is, people 
realize they are somehow implicated in the outcome of the overflow. Such realizations 
                                                
88 Also see Satsuka (2015) for an interesting ethnographic account of how human knowledge of 
nature is produced through the process of translation.   
89 It is interesting to differentiate between being ‘concerned with’ and ‘concerned about’ an 
overflow. The first points to people who realize they are entangled with an overflow. 
‘Concerned about’ connotes that people might be interested in taking action to negotiate the 
new relationships and entanglements they find themselves within. While people may be 
‘concerned with’ a situation, it does not mean they are necessarily ‘concerned about’ it. That is, 
they could ignore their entanglements and/or allow others to manage the situation for them. 
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lead to controversy in the social sphere (or ‘socio-activity’), meaning overflows are 
neither purely social or technical, but sociotechnical (Callon et al., 2009: 109). 
 
Callon et al. (2009: 48-70) go on to detail three stages of translation essential to the 
production and application of seemingly stabilized forms of scientific knowledge which 
can be disrupted by the controversy of an overflow. Translation 1—“from the 
macrocosm to the microcosm”—illustrates the process of reducing parts of the “big 
world” to be studied objectively within the isolated and controlled microcosm (or 
“small world”) of the laboratory. Translation 2—“the research collective at work”—is 
the process of discussing simplified, objective findings from the laboratory within a 
research collective of actors with shared language (terminology), knowledge and skills. 
Finally, translation 3—“return to the big world”—describes the process of how the 
knowledge produced in the laboratory and discussed within the research collective is 
transported and applied back to the complex real world from which it originated. As 
with the example of the scallops, however, the stabilization of these translations can 
also be difficult to maintain in the face of controversy, as they are open to interpretation 
from a variety of new actors who discover they are concerned with the controversy at 
hand. 
 
Similar to Latour’s (1993) conceptualization of hybrids, Law and Singleton (2014: 383) 
describe how modernist divisions between nature and society become blurred in 
instances of controversy or overflow: “‘nature’ cannot be easily distinguished from ‘the 
social.’ Instead of being separate domains, they are all raveled up together. ‘Society’ 
and ‘nature’ are being generated—and then perhaps separated—in practice.” According 
to Callon et al. (2009: 99), the realization of one’s concern or entanglement leads to a 
state of uncertainty90 as the knowledge necessary to control the technical materials 
                                                
90 Like Beck (Section 2.2), Callon et al. (2009: 19-21) and his colleagues distinguish between 
calculable risk and uncertainty. They define risk as “a well-identifiable danger associated with 
a perfectly describable event or series of events," and uncertainty as situations where "we 
cannot anticipate the consequences of the decisions that are likely to be made; we do not have a 
sufficiently precise knowledge of the conceivable options, the description of the constitution of 
the possible worlds comes up against resistant cores of ignorance, and the behavior and 
interactions of the entities making them up remain enigmatic." 
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within secluded spaces may not be fit for dealing with the materials once they escape 
into “the wild.”91  
 
Another concept that emerges out of sociotechnical disasters is ‘contamination.’ While 
the term usually has a negative connotation, material-semiotic thinking helps to attend 
to contamination as an event that emerges from the heterogeneous relations among 
actors, human and more-than-human (see Mol, 2010a: 261). Tsing’s (2015: 28-9) 
description of contamination as “transformation through encounter” is useful for 
conceptualizing contamination as relations among heterogeneous elements, whose 
entanglements produce “diversity.”92  
 
Material-semiotic approaches allow researchers to view contamination not in terms of 
binaries—pure/contaminated, polluted/non-polluted, clean/dirty,93 safe/unsafe—but as 
messy, historically situated sets of relations among humans and more-than-humans 
which cannot easily fit into simplified, designated categories. In a positive light, 
contamination produces diversity. More negatively, contamination can produce 
disorder, disease and death. However, as with assemblages, both possibility and 
precariousness are simultaneously present in the process of contamination, and material 
semiotics requires researchers to take all sides into consideration. Bell (2016: 193, 
original emphasis) voices his concern that agrifood scholars adopting material-semiotic 
approaches tend to focus on the positive possibilities offered by connections among 
heterogeneous actors, imploring them to instead “focus more on two other con- words: 
consequence and context.” He explains:  
                                                
91 For an empirical example concerning the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and contaminated 
farmland see Wynne (1992) and Callon et al. (2009: 90-4). 
92 Tsing (2015: 34) explains: “Contaminated diversity is not only particular and historical, ever 
changing, but also relational. It has no self-contained units; its units are encounter-based 
collaborations. Without self-contained units, it is impossible to compute costs and benefits, or 
functionality, to any ‘one’ involved. No self-contained individuals or groups assure their self-
interests oblivious to the encounter. Without algorithms based on self-containment, scholars 
and policymakers might have to learn something about the cultural and natural histories at 
stake. That takes time, and too much time, perhaps, for those who dream of grasping the whole 
in an equation.” 
93 See Phillips (2002) for a fascinating ethnographic inquiry into how people living in Kyiv, 
Ukraine discussed contaminated food following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, often using the 
word ‘dirty’ to refer to foods contaminated with radionuclides. 
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We should not confuse the importance of recognizing consequence 
with proclaiming metaphors of connection. […] [C]onnections that 
you thought were there often weren’t, just as disconnections you 
though were there weren’t. Help doesn’t come and listeria gets into 
the food. So a large measure of humility and openness to the 
unexpected is always in order, and thus always in disorder. We open 
ourselves to a deeper appreciation of consequence when we start to 
think not in terms of the dream of universal fellow-feeling among 
non-hierarchical equals but in terms of context, with all its difference, 
dynamism, and disconnection—as well as connection. (Bell, 2016: 
194)  
Thus, contamination, connection, consequence and context are not simple, universal or 
singular in their form and logic, but must be understood as ‘multilogics’ (Bell & 
Goetting, 2011), forms of ‘multiplicity’ (Mol, 2002), or ‘versions’ of reality (Mol, 
2012). Mol’s (2010a: 260) multiple works on multiplicity point to how the enactment 
of what seems to be the same activity or object varies depending on the site (context) 
where it emerges. Similarly, she describes ‘versions’ as being:  
neither physical nor social, but both at the same time. Stronger still: 
the particular substance of which they are made is not the issue. 
Versions of the body do not occupy a layer in a spatial pile. Rather, 
they are events in time. They emerge in different circumstances. They 
happen in different situations. Think of a play that is being staged in a 
theatre. Versions of the body are performed, orchestrated, enacted. 
They are done in practices. (Mol, 2012: 120-1, original emphasis) 
Mol (2012: 120, original emphasis) goes on to explain how the concept of ‘layering’—
that is, “a physical layer underlying a social layer that is situated on top of it”—can be 
useful in understanding historical transformations and overlapping realities, while 
‘versions’ help us to conceptualize the complex and multiple realities and experience 
that emerge at a specific point in time. 
 
Alongside the concepts of multiplicity and versions fits the concept of fluidity and fluid 
technology. De Laet and Mol’s (2000) work on the Zimbabwe bush pump provides an 
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empirical example of a fluid technology which, designed and assembled in Zimbabwe’s 
capital city, acts and is enacted in multifarious local village settings around the country. 
The technology is fluid, as opposed to rigid, because it is translated differently within 
each local setting. It has many identities—“a hydraulic system […] a health promoter 
and a nation-building apparatus”— (de Laet & Mol, 2000: 252). As Law (2009: 153) 
describes, the pump is a “mutable mobile,” as opposed to an ‘immutable mobile,’ as it 
is malleable in its shape and success—its parts can be ‘tinkered with’94 and replaced, 
and while it sometimes produces healthful water, it can also produce water filled with 
health-threatening actors such as E.coli. The fluidity of the object means that the bush 
pump itself cannot be considered universally good or bad, but its identity is always 
fluid—shifting depending on the heterogeneous relations enacting it within a specific 
time and local setting. 
 
2.6.5 The	ethics	of	situated	knowledge	
Donna Haraway’s work has been referred to as a form of ‘feminist material semiotics’ 
or ‘political material semiotics,’ political because of its overt enunciation of the role 
and standpoint of the researcher in the research process (see Law, 2009). Law (2004: 
68, original emphasis) describes how taking Haraway’s material-semiotic stance 
illuminated how: 
We are caught up […] in a dense material–semiotic network. That is, 
we are caught up in sets of relations that simultaneously have to do 
with meanings and with materials. We are entangled in our flesh, in 
our versions of vision, and in relations of power that pass through and 
are articulated by us. So detachment is impossible. At best a self-
delusion, more often it is also a form of irresponsibility. 
This description points out two important aspects of conducting research using a 
material-semiotic approach: first, researchers must learn to see the world as a 
heterogeneous mix of entangled relations among humans and more-than-humans; 
second, researchers must acknowledge that they themselves are embedded and active 
within these relations. 
                                                
94 Mol et al. (2010a: 13) argue that the verb “tinkering” best describes how realities emerge 
through practice, not through a form of verbal or cranial ‘negotiation’ of what is good or bad, 
but through trying things out in practice.  
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As mentioned, Haraway is one of a number of feminist scholars who has expressed the 
importance of not only recognizing, but articulating the particular standpoint and role 
of the researcher in the research process. She argues that most researchers are trained to 
conduct their research using the “god trick,” which involves a false pretention that one 
is able to see “everything from nowhere” (Haraway, 1991c: 189). Material semiotics 
points out the flaw, and danger, in such un-reflexive research practices: researchers are 
embodied beings who are, in fact, situated somewhere and their position influences 
how they conduct research and how they see the world. Haraway argues it is essential 
that scholars acknowledge the situated nature of knowledge and knowledge production. 
This includes the necessity of reflecting on their own embedded standpoints and 
positions of power which are created and recreated through their work.95  
 
Mol (2002) makes a similar observation about ethics in her book The Body Multiple. 
According to Mol (Mol, 2002: 177), once researchers recognize their own 
embeddedness, they are faced with the very political question of “what to do?” She 
explains: “The term politics resonates openness, indeterminacy. It helps to underline 
that the question ‘what to do’ can be closed neither by facts nor arguments. That it will 
forever come with tensions—or doubt” (Mol, 2002: 177, original emphasis). She goes 
on to explain how the answer to ‘what to do?’ cannot be determined through discourse 
or theory, but is performative, enacted only through the act of doing. Thus, researchers 
must confront their own role as embedded performers and enactors within local 
research settings and the contingent and limited nature of their findings.  
 
Furthermore, Haraway (1991c) describes how understanding the situated nature of 
knowledge leads to another important observation: that knowledge from one, situated 
standpoint is necessarily partial. To Haraway and other STS scholars (for example, 
Latour & Woolgar, 1979), objective knowledge is one form of situated, locally-
produced knowledge, and though it may be an important form of knowledge, it also 
necessarily offers only a partial vision of reality. She elucidates here point that:  
only partial perspective promises objective vision. This is an 
objective vision that initiates, rather than closes off, the problem of 
                                                
95 As previously mentioned, Haraway’s critiques have been important in the development of 
actor-network theory and other material-semiotic attuned methods (see Law, 2009). 
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responsibility for the generativity of all visual practices. Partial 
perspective can be held accountable for both its promising and its 
destructive monsters. (Haraway, 1991c: 190) 
To Haraway, responsibly and ethically conducting research requires self-reflexivity on 
the researcher’s own embeddedness and the limits (or partialness) of the perspectives 
they offer. This goes for scholars working with material-semiotic approaches and those 
in the field of nuclear physics or biology.96 As in Haraway’s metaphor of a cyborg, 
partial perspectives of multiple realities mix, mingle and interfere with each other in 
everyday, situated activities where “partial connections”97 are created across difference 
and exist both within and without (Haraway, 1991a: 181).  
 
2.6.6 Material	semiotics	and	konran	
Material semiotics provides many insights that will be useful in studying experiences of 
konran following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. First, the approach opens up opportunities 
to conceptualize TEPCO’s nuclear disaster as a hybrid, emergent happening that takes 
into consideration the participation of humans and more-than-humans. Taking the 
example of Wynne’s (1992) research on post-Chernobyl nuclear fallout, material-
semiotic thinking helps to recognize how sheep, radionuclides, technical instruments, 
texts, farmers, rain, scientists, the Sellafield nuclear fuel reprocessing complex, and 
numerous other humans and more-than-humans are simultaneously acting, interacting 
and being enacted in multitude ways that emerge as the complex happenings at the 
center of his study. Material-semiotic sensibilities not only bring the mess of human 
and more-than-human sociomaterial entanglement and relationality into view, but also 
provide tools for conceptualizing how more-than-humans are integral to attempts at 
social ordering (see Callon, 1991; Law, 1986).  
 
Material-semiotic approaches have not only successfully been used in the study of 
sociotechnical disasters, but also in the field of agrifood studies. In the late 1990s, 
Whatmore and Thorne (1997: 289) argued that concepts from actor-network theory 
                                                
96 See Gilbert and Epel (2015) for an interesting and open discussion on the philosophical 
concerns pertinent to the field of ecological developmental biology. 
97 The concepts of ‘partial connections’ and ontological multiplicity are also explored by 
anthropologist Marilyn Strathern (2004). 
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could be used to uncover realities invisible in traditional political economy approaches 
in ways that “elaborate an understanding of global networks as performative orderings 
(always in the making), rather than as systemic entities (always already constituted).” 
Since then, a number of agrifood scholars have begun conducting research using 
material-semiotic sensibilities as an alternative to the structural logic offered by 
political economy approaches (see Le Heron et al., 2016; Murdoch et al., 2000). These 
sensibilities allow researchers to conceptualized once seemingly closed and 
controllable agrifood systems as open-ended agrifood assemblages, where the agency 
of myriad more-than-humans—often treated as passive agents in political economy 
approaches—could be recognized within and contribute to research. From butterflies 
and bees, to microbes of all sorts (for example, Bingham, 2016; Paxson, 2008), the 
literature in agrifood studies have begun noticing heterogeneous actors relating within 
newly conceptualized agrifood assemblages (see Forney et al., forthcoming). 
 
The ethical dimensions of material semiotics also allow agrifood researchers to 
recognize and reconcile with their own embeddedness and agency within various 
assemblages. That is, as researchers realize their embeddedness within bundles of 
relations, research itself is being recognized as being performed within these relations 
(see Carolan, 2013; Law & Urry, 2004). Agrifood scholars Campbell and Rosin (2011) 
provide an interesting reflection of how their research project on audit systems assisted 
in not only enacting an audit system, but also influencing how people began perceiving 
themselves as subjects of the audit process. Other studies have been conducted on the 
performativity of more-than-humans in agrifood assemblages. Busch (2007; 2011) in 
particular has shared many interesting insights on standards as intermediaries and 
actors.  Similarly, Carolan (2015; 2008; 2011; 2013) has highlighted the embodied 
nature of food and food politics, as well as the important role embodied experiences 
play in enacting positive futures within agrifood assemblages. 
 
Food—as a material, sociomaterial, taste, concept, subject, object, multispecies 
engagement, and ontonormative enactment—has also become an exciting topic being 
explored by scholars using material-semiotic sensibilities (see Bennett, 2010; Haraway, 
2008; Harbers, Mol, & Stollmeyer, 2002; Mol, 2008a; 2009; 2012; 2013). Of particular 
interest is Mol’s (2013) use of ‘ontonorms’ in studying food and diet. In an article 
entitled “Mind Your Plate! The Ontonorms of Dutch Dieting,” Mol introduces and uses 
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ontonorms98 as a tool for noticing and exploring the ways in which different dietary 
advices enact very different types of foods and bodies, paying particular attention to the 
normativities that participate in these enactments. In investigating the topic, Mol (2013: 
381) asks:  
What are goods and bads relevant to different ways of enacting food, 
and of affording food with particular possibilities to act? What 
becomes of bodies in Dutch dieting; how are they being valued; and 
what about their own, bodily, engagements in valuing?  
Through her analysis, she describes how different forms of dieting advice—much 
which ascribe to the message ‘Mind your plate!’—enact bodies as untamed, pleasure-
seeking entities which must be restrained through rational control. 
 
Noticing food as a potential agent of disruption following a nuclear disaster is also of 
particular interest in this thesis. Historian Brett Walker (2010: 7)99 illustrates his 
conceptualization of the ethical and embodied aspects regarding this issue: 
People, and I include most scholars, too, tend to view themselves as 
outside or beyond nature, even while eating and digesting other living 
things. […] Presenting food as culture rather than as nature is done 
through obscuring the histories of different foods, which includes 
their exposure to deadly toxins or heavy metals or dangerous 
pesticides. But our inseparable, and quite natural relationship to the 
‘biological’ in these biotechnologies, such as engineered farm 
animals and grains, become apparent when we experience pain. 
Within his book Toxic Archipelago, Walker draws on actor-network theory to retell 
fascinating and terrifying histories of pollution incidences in Japan. He describes how 
the experience of pain can be one embodied experience capable of attuning humans to 
their embeddedness within heterogeneous assemblages humans and more-than-humans, 
including imperceptible industrial pollutants. From the introduction of pesticides, to 
                                                
98 Following Mol’s (2013: 390) request, I will not attempt to define ontonorms, but explore 
how the concept can serve as a tool for deepening onto-political reflections and interfering with 
stories of singularity and control. 
99 Walker draws on Michael Pollan (2006) in his conceptualizations on food. 
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copper mining, to cadmium and methylmercury poisoning in Japan, Walker (2010: 16-
20) paints captivating and intricate portraits of the heterogeneous actors, human and 
more-than-human, that contributed to what he terms events of “hybrid causation.”  
 
Like Walker, a number of other scholars have begun using material-semiotic 
sensibilities to re-tell histories. Of particular relevance to this thesis are the material-
semiotic infused historical accounts of overflow and contamination in Japan. Pritchard 
(2012: 223) interestingly borrows Perrow’s (1999) concepts of ‘normal accidents’ and 
‘eco-system accidents’ as well as Hughes’ (1983) work on technical networks to retell, 
or reinterpret, the story of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster through the concept of 
“envirotechnical systems”—a term that “encapsulates and specifically foregrounds [the] 
dynamic imbrication of natural and technological systems.” According to Perrow 
(1999), nuclear power plants are designed as complex and tightly coupled systems in 
order to manage and contain the very unstable nature of radionuclides they harbor 
inside. Though such rigid systems may be necessary for containing unstable 
radionuclides, they are very difficult to manage in the event of even a minor disruption 
or disturbance. Thus, even though some ‘unexpected’ relational encounter may cause a 
catastrophic breakdown, the event cannot be termed a surprise or an ‘accident.’ Instead, 
Perrow (1999) terms disasters at nuclear power plants “normal accidents” as the 
particular design of nuclear reactors guarantees the technology may not easily cope 
with even small, predictable disruptions.  
 
Similar to the notion of the fluid Zimbabwe bush pump which is embedded within the 
active ground and water table of a local village setting (de Laet & Mol, 2000), Perrow’s 
(1999: 296) notion of an “eco-system accident” is used to highlight how nuclear power 
plants are also embedded within active, natural environments. Resembling the notion of 
sociotechnical ‘overflow’ (Callon et al., 2009), Perrow (1999: 296) explains how “eco-
system accidents illustrate the tight coupling between human-made systems and natural 
systems. There are few or no deliberate buffers inserted between the two systems 
because the designers never expected them to be connected.” Seen this way, a nuclear 
power plant is not an isolated technology, but a sociotechnical—or socio-
envirotechnical—actor that is necessarily ‘intra-acting’ with a multitude of other 
humans and more-than-humans. Importantly, however, while the bush pump is 
materially fluid, simple and loosely coupled, nuclear power plants are materially rigid, 
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complex and tightly coupled and, thus, less able to cope with relational disturbances. 
Hughes’ (1983) historical account of the development of electricity networks also share 
some common ground with material-semiotic approaches, particularly in the way he 
discusses these networks as a form of sociotechnical order.100  
 
Ultimately, Pritchard’s (2012: 233) retelling of the TEPCO disaster using material-
semiotic sensibilities highlights how histories that include “the complex, dynamic, 
porous, and inextricable configurations of nature, technology, and politics” help readers 
to understand the disaster not as an uncomplicated event that can be described through 
simple categorizations, but as a hybrid happening. However, she does not overlook 
ethical questions involved in noticing the agency of more-than-human actors. The 
author points out how some critics “fear that multicausal accounts reflecting complex 
understandings of historical agency that decenter people as primary causal agents 
threaten to diffuse, if not undermine, the responsibility and ultimate culpability of 
powerful groups” (Pritchard, 2012: 230). Similar critiques have targeted actor-network 
theory as being “agnostic” toward power relations and politics (Marsden, 2000: 21). 
Here Mol’s (2002) question of ‘what to do?’ confronts researchers.  
 
Agrifood scholar Michael Carolan (2016: 236) also grapples with the question of what 
it means to move away from the “humanist tradition” of social science. He 
acknowledges the concern that expanding the focus of research to include more-than-
humans may appear to disregard the suffering of human beings. However, Carolan 
(2016: 236) ultimately argues that material-semiotic approaches can help in 
illuminating “that suffering is a product of us not caring fully for everyone involved.”101 
Sarah Whatmore (1997) has also argued that the perspective of connectivity and 
embeddedness offered by material-semiotic sensibilities actually has the potential to 
enhance ethical engagement among actors. In a similar vein, Carolan (2016: 236) goes 
on to argue that ignoring more-than-human actors and relations may actually make 
“suffering more acute.” Instead he advocates that scholars openly engage with the 
ethics of discussing or denying human and more-than-human relations.  Thus, material-
                                                
100 See Law (1991) for a discussion on Hughes’ (1983) work from the perspective of actor-
network theory. 
101 Also see Carolan (2015) and Latour (2003b: 38). 
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semiotic approaches that honestly and proactively engage in ‘ontological politics’ (Mol, 
2002) and adhere to the ethics of ‘situated knowledge’ (Haraway, 1991c) have the 
potential to tell stories that add to our understanding of how human suffering is enacted 
through relations among myriad heterogeneous actors, as opposed to some singular, 
individual experience that is easily labeled as ‘irrational’ or ‘unscientific.’ Though 
humans and their relations with ruling texts will be at focus in this thesis, I take very 
seriously the ethical responsibilities necessitated in the field of material semiotics and 
expect that engagement with these ethical considerations will enrich my analysis. 
 
Material-semiotic thinking also helps to reconsider how we think of epochal time. 
Carolan (2013) provides an interesting discussion on the difference between the 
absolute, objectified form of time conceptualized by classical physics and the concept 
of epochal time. He explains: “An epochal view of time […] directs attention to the 
process itself, the network, the assemblage. Rather than giving a priori existence to 
individuals, things, or emergent identities an epochal view of time understands that 
becoming precedes being” (Carolan, 2013: 420, original emphasis). Risk society, 
reflexive modernization and governmentality all provide epochal views of history. 
Another epochal view of time that is very pertinent to discussions on nuclear disasters 
is the notion of the Anthropocene. The transition to the Anthropocene signifies a shift 
in geological time from a more stable Holocene with its “refugia”102 supporting 
biological life and lifeways, to an era where human manipulation of the planet is 
creating instability in planetary systems (Chakrabarty, 2009; Steffen, Crutzen, & 
McNeil, 2007; Zalasiewicz et al., 2008). While the onset of the Anthropocene is still 
under discussion, recently geologists have argued that the presence of radionuclides, 
specifically plutonium-239, in stratigraphic samples dating back to nuclear weapons 
testing in the 1950s could serve as a geological indicator for the epoch (Waters et al., 
2015; 2016). From a material-semiotic perspective, the names and stories behind both 
the Anthropocene and risk society may be problematic as they are “premised on a 
dualistic ‘social driver plus environmental consequence’ model” (Moore, 2015: 175). 
Thus, instead of highlighting the heterogeneous relations that have contributed to the 
                                                
102 Tsing (2017a: 54) offers a discussion of the Anthropocene as a time when places of refuge 
(or “refugia”)—areas necessary for resurgence and cultivating livability on this planet which 
were abundant during the Holocene—are being rapidly destroyed. 
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socioecological or sociotechnical troubles we face today—and therefore point toward 
possible solutions for overcoming them—the consequence model focuses attention on 
abstract social groups that are to blame for the problems (for example, abstract modern 
institutions that produce Beck’s new risks, or an abstract conceptualization of humanity 
as a whole). Put differenty, within the Anthropocene, socioecological and 
sociotechnical controversies become trapped within modernist ontologies of “human 
exemptionalism” (Dunlap:1994wf; Murdoch, 2001).  
 
The term “Capitalocene” has been offered as a different way of conceptualizing the 
attempts at coordination that, since the 1400s, have been organizing humans and more-
than-humans in ways that have led to the sociotechnical and socioecological 
controversies we are experiencing today (Moore, 2015; 2014). Jason Moore (2014: 1) 
explains how the concept helps in reconceiving capitalism as “a world-ecology, joining 
the accumulation of capital, the pursuit of power, and the co-production of nature in 
dialectical unity.” He goes on to explain how this new way of thinking “opens up the 
possibility of moving from the ‘environmental’ consequences of ‘social’ processes to 
the socio-ecological constitution of Anthropogenic drivers themselves” (Moore, 2014: 
8).103  
 
While the term ‘Capitalocene’ can help to focus people’s attention on the economic 
processes and modernist ontologies that need modification, it alone is not big enough to 
conceptualize all the troubles threatening human and more-than-human livability on 
planet Earth. The term “Plantationocene” has also been offered as a way to 
conceptualize the processes of uprooting humans and more-than-humans and relocating 
them into systems organized for capitalist extraction and mass production (Haraway, 
2015; Haraway et al., 2016). Slave-labor-powered sugar plantations, modern feedlots, 
and perhaps even nuclear power plants are examples of these forms of organization 
(Haraway et al., 2016; Tsing, 2012).  
 
                                                
103 The title of this 2014 essay by Moore, which was uploaded onto his website, later became 
the title of a journal article (Moore, 2017). The quotation borrowed from the 2014 version is 
not included in the 2017 paper, but encapsulates many of his arguments also found in his 2015 
book (Moore, 2015). 
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Haraway (2015; 2016) has also offered the term “Chthulucene”104 to help in re-attuning 
to and re-engaging with the complex multispecies assemblages we as humans are 
entangled within, but have been trained to ignore through decades of ideological work. 
The Chthulucene provides an invitation for scholars to attune to sociomaterial 
entanglements which are both vital and vicious, to ‘stay with the trouble’ that these 
messy entanglements enact—even though it may be monstrous and uncomfortable 
(Haraway, 2016). What is important to grasp in these various stories is that a single, 
master narrative style of explaining the world is no longer useful for finding solutions 
for what may be a “boundary event,” or time of planetary transition similar to previous 
extinction events (Haraway, 2015: 160; Haraway et al., 2016: 540-1; Zalasiewicz et al., 
2015). Thus, there is a need for the ‘Anthropos’ to understand their own embeddedness 
within heterogeneous relations of humans and more-than-humans; it is only from an 
attunement to sociomaterial entanglement that ways of disrupting deleterious relations 
can be discovered without reproducing the same relations that got us into these troubles 
in the first place (see Latour, 2013). I would argue that material semiotics can offer 
insights for researchers and research participants learning how to better engage with 
and carefully tinker within105 the heterogeneous more-than-human relations within 
which we are all entangled. 
 
                                                
104 Haraway (2015: 160) describes how the Chthulucene is a term that scholars can use to attune 
to “the dynamic ongoing sym-chthonic forces and powers of which people are a part, within 
which ongoingness is at stake. […] These real and possible timespaces are not named after SF 
writer H.P. Lovecraft’s misogynist racial-nightmare monster Cthulhu (note spelling difference), 
but rather after the diverse earth-wide tentacular powers and forces and collected things with 
names like Naga, Gaia, Tangaroa (burst from water-full Papa), Terra, Haniyasu-hime, Spider 
Woman, Pachamama, Oya, Gorgo, Raven, A'akuluujjusi, and many many more. ‘My’ 
Chthulucene, even burdened with its problematic Greek-ish tendrils, entangles myriad 
temporalities and spatialities and myriad intra-active entities-in-assemblages—including the 
more-than-human, other-than-human, inhuman, and human-as-humus.” 
105 The concept of “care” has been used by Annemarie Mol and colleagues (see Mol, 2008b; 
Mol et al., 2010b) to point to the locally situated, messy processes of “tinkering” performed by 
people embedded within heterogeneous material relations. This distinction helps to highlight 
how ‘care’ is in tension with concepts such as ‘choice’ or ‘control’ which assume people to be 
autonomous individuals, a cognitive maneuver which involves overlooking one’s 
embeddedness within messy material relations (Heuts & Mol, 2013; Mol, 2010b). 
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2.7 Moving	forward	
In this chapter I have attempted to locate the empirical themes of this thesis within the 
scholarly literature, guiding readers on an ontological odyssey through a vast terrain of 
theoretical frameworks and concepts that allow for grappling with experiences of 
konran related to everyday eating in the aftermath of a nuclear disaster. Through the 
process of traversing this particular theoretical terrain and reflecting on questions of 
ontology, it soon became evident that there are many limits to studying the emergent 
experiences of konran using theoretical frameworks that are either trapped within 
modernist ontologies (Latour, 1993)—the risk society thesis and the theory of reflexive 
modernization—or which confine research participants and their experiences “to a 
phenomenal world in which nothing ever happens” (D. E. Smith, 1999: 98)—
governmentality and biopolitics. Instead, this particular odyssey revealed that 
theoretical frameworks and concepts that allow researchers to engage in ontological 
politics are necessary when dealing with messy and ontologically destabilizing 
materials, such as imperceptible and unstable radionuclides.  
 
Ultimately, while each stop on my journey through this particular theoretical terrain 
was quintessential to the evolution of this project—each encounter providing invaluable 
insights and concepts that guided me to my next destination—in the performance of 
this thesis, I will leave behind the theoretical frameworks presented by the risk society 
thesis, the theory of reflexive modernization, governmentality and biopolitics. Instead, I 
will take an empirically-based approach guided by sensibilities from the fields of 
material semiotics and institutional ethnography that will allow for my participants’ 
experiences of konran to be understood as emerging from interactions among 
heterogeneous assemblages of humans and more-than-humans. Moving forward, in the 
following chapter I will elaborate a particular methodology that can situate institutional 
ethnography within the burgeoning field of material semiotics, describing how I will 
apply sensibilities from both fields of scholarship in exploring my participants’ 






This thesis began with my interest in studying the konran experienced by myself and 
others living in the Kansai region relating to everyday eating following TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster, not as a singular experience of a bounded, rational, autonomous 
individual, but as an experience that is not only multiple and partial, but reveals how 
people’s everyday practices are connected within greater relations of ruling. As my 
literature review illustrates, I traversed the literature in search of theoretical insights 
positioned to attend both ethically and ethnographically to the embodied experiences 
and practices of my study’s participants. Having lived in the Kansai region for about 
five years106 before undertaking my PhD study, my own embeddedness in these 
relations was impossible to deny. Yet, being so thoroughly embedded, I often felt 
confined in my attempts to critically explore and discuss the topics of food and food 
safety following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. What I required was a method for both 
recognizing and breaking through these limitations.  
 
I discovered institutional ethnography at the end of 2015 and designed my ethnographic 
fieldwork based on its principles. It appeared to be a method of inquiry that could 
creatively and ethically address the experiences of konran in a way that was attentive 
not only to the situated actualities of myself and my study’s participants, but how we 
are acting and being enacted within complex, often invisible, textually-mediated 
relations of ruling. I especially appreciated the method’s commitment to producing 
insights that would be of interest to my participants, engaging them as collaborators in 
the research process with the goal of producing information that could help them better 
conceptualize their own embeddedness within relations of ruling. At the same time, 
however, I wondered whether or not institutional ethnography was analytically suited to 
the challenge of attending to myriad other non-textual actors contributing to the 
experiences of konran, including, of course, radionuclides. In the way that Davis and 
Hayes-Conroy (2017) used Steinberg and Peters’(2015) concept of “wet ontologies” to 
highlight the biophysical presence of unstable and fluid-moving radionuclides within 
the social milieu, I wondered how I could keep the relations among humans and more-
                                                
106 Approximately two years prior to and three years following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
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than-humans—radionuclides and others—vibrant in my research. Though I was first 
exposed to the field of material semiotics in 2015, I did not quite understand its 
application to my project until late 2016, after the completion of my fieldwork.107 Once 
thoroughly exposed to scholarship in the field, I was sure that many of its insights and 
sensibilities could contribute greatly to my analysis, providing tools for attuning to the 
heterogeneous actors that participate in the enactment of konran. In my struggle to 
decide on how to proceed, Annemarie Mol’s (2002: 177)  question of “what to do?” 
rang through. What was the best way to proceed in my particular project? What could 
emerge from blending aspects of these two methods in practice?  
 
Editors of the recently published Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet: Ghosts and 
Monsters of the Anthropocene (Tsing et al., 2017) seemed to be in a similar position in 
regards to the ‘what to do?’ question. In the book’s introduction to the section on the 
ghostly hauntings of the Anthropocene, they pose an important query about the purpose 
of their collective work: “How can we best use our research to stem the tide of 
ruination?” Their answer?   
[B]y showing readers how to pay better attention to overlaid 
arrangements of human and nonhuman living spaces [in hope] that 
such attention will allow us to stand up to the constant barrage of 
messages asking us to forget—that is, to allow a few private owners 
and public officials with their eyes focused on short-term gains to 
pretend that environmental devastation does not exist. (Gan et al., 
2017: G1, original emphasis) 
The response of these scholars—their attentiveness to tracing and explicating the 
messy, situated, historically embedded, yet historically contingent human and more-
than-human material-semiotic relations in a way that attunes readers to the art of 
noticing these relations—provided an important example of how material-semiotic 
                                                
107 I would like to thank Annemarie Mol who visited the University of Otago’s Centre for 
Sustainability in late 2015 and encouraged me to look beyond governmentality. I am also 
thoroughly indebted to my supervisors, Katharine Legun and Hugh Campbell, who encouraged 
me to use material-semiotic sensibilities in analyzing my thesis topic in a book chapter we co-
authored (see Burch, Legun, & Campbell, forthcoming). I have to admit that since I began 
attuning to my project using material-semiotic sensibilities, I have found it difficult, if not 
impossible, to ignore or switch them off. 
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sensibilities could enhance my analysis. Not only could I use my research to explicate 
ruling relations in a way that was useful for my participants, but I could also provide a 
space for myself and my participants to engage in onto-political play, which begins 
with noticing our own embeddedness within heterogeneous material-semiotic relations. 
As mentioned, openly discussing radiation and food following TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster in a way that acknowledges the multiplicity of people’s experiences has been 
challenging in a political climate trying to contain the ‘overflow’108 of radionuclides—
expressly epitomized in Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s (2013) monumental 
assurance to the International Olympic Committee, and the world, that “the situation is 
under control.” This challenge of vocalizing that which should not be spoken exists for 
both myself as a researcher trying to problematize these issues, as well as my study’s 
participants who were asked to openly discuss their experiences. So, what exactly was I 
doing studying this topic five years after the onset of the nuclear disaster, during a 
period when everything was “under control”? Would ontological play and the 
explication of ruling relations be creating turbulence? Or would it be attuning to 
tensions already permeating people’s everyday experiences? This is where I turned to 
Donna Haraway (2016) for insights into “staying with the trouble.”  
 
In her 2016 book of that title, Haraway (2016: 1) explains: “staying with the trouble 
requires learning to be truly present, not as a vanishing pivot between awful or edenic 
pasts and apocalyptic or salvific futures, but as mortal critters entwined in myriad 
unfinished configurations of places, times, matters, meanings.” She argues that it is 
through staying with the trouble and thinking together across all our differences that we 
may “become capable, with each other in all of our bumptious kinds, of response,” that 
we may become ‘response-able’ in turbulent times in which not only the usual pace of 
life, but also the potential for mutual survival, is disrupted or destroyed (Haraway, 
2016: 1). According to Haraway (2016: 38), it is only through being attentive to our 
messy entanglements that “response-ability” can be cultivated, which in turn may lead 
to the collective cultivation of  “conditions for ongoingness.” This form of collective 
paying-attention and cultivation of the conditions necessary for the ongoingness of life 
on this planet requires sensibilities for recognizing ruling relations—the pulsating 
                                                
108 Callon et al. (2009). See Section 2.6.4. 
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drumbeat of modern Progress109 with its fervent calls for simplicity and the smoothing 
over of multiplicity and difference—along with the situated messiness of sociomaterial 
entanglements from which anything we might recognize as ‘the social’ emerges. 
Material-semiotic sensibilities and collaborative forms of onto-political play seemed 
essential to my project, especially because the realities I explore involve attuning and 
attending to relations among myriad heterogeneous actors—including unstable, 
imperceptible and ontologically destabilizing radionuclides.110 
 
In the field of material semiotics, there have been discussions on how to best attend to 
heterogeneous relationality among humans and more-than-humans, while remaining 
staunchly attentive to the unevenness of the world,111 and the often invisible and 
geopolitically infused power relations that contribute to the emergence of locally 
situated practices.112 Encouraged by these projects, in this thesis I would like to 
contribute to this discussion by exploring how insights from institutional ethnography, 
infused with material-semiotic sensibilities, help me to attend to both textually-
mediated ruling relations and wider sociomaterial entanglements. Thus, in this thesis I 
adopt insights from institutional ethnography to trace textually-mediated attempts to 
coordinate everyday practice, as well as sensibilities from the field of material 
semiotics to attend to difference, multiplicity and other human and more-than-human 
relations that contribute to the enactment of local realities. I refer to this as ‘a vital 
institutional ethnography.’113 
                                                
109 I borrow the metaphor of a drumbeat from Anna Tsing (2015) who uses it to describe the 
rhythm that coordinates unified advancement toward the universal Progress promised by 
promoters of modernist projects. ‘Progress’ is capitalized because of its universal character and 
its disconnection from situated sociomaterial entanglements. Tsing (2015: 23-4) compares the 
“single perspective” offered by drumbeat modulated rock-and-roll from the twentieth century, 
to polyphony where there are multiple melodies and rhythms existing at the same time, with no 
central unifying beat. The latter is much closer to the conceptualizations of assemblage she 
bases her work on (see Section 2.6.2). 
110 See Barad (2017) for a captivating description of the ontologically destabilizing force of 
radionuclides. 
111 The term “uneven world” was used by Swanson (2013) who borrowed it from 
Radhakrishnan (2003). 
112 See, for example, Swanson (2013) and Tsing (2005; 2015). 
113 According to an online etymology dictionary, the word ‘vital’ comes from the Latin term 
vitalis which refers to “of or belonging to life” and was later used to refer to something of 
necessity or importance in the sense that something was “essential to life” (see 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/vital). The Online Oxford English Dictionary describes the 
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3.2 Finding	common	ground:	Institutional	ethnography	and	material	semiotics	
 When Canadian sociologist Dorothy E. Smith (1987: 2) first developed institutional 
ethnography, she was focused on creating an “alternative” sociology able to account for 
the particular experiences of women in their everyday lives. Noticing that the 
experiences of women were not adequately accounted for within traditional sociology, 
Smith was looking for a method to uncover and illustrate the ways in which women’s 
everyday embodied experiences were being coordinated by decisions made extra-
locally. However, it soon became clear that what was initially intended to serve as a 
‘sociology for women,’ was also an approach useful for investigating the everyday 
experiences of any people embedded within ruling relations (M. Campbell & Manicom, 
1995: 7-12). Since its inception, institutional ethnography has been used to explore the 
social organization of a vast array of topics spanning health care (M. L. Campbell, 
1998; McCoy, 2005; Mykhalovskiy, 2001; Mykhalovskiy & McCoy, 2002; Rankin, 
2001; 2014; Rankin & Campbell, 2009), the everyday experiences of women and 
mothers (Griffith & Smith, 1987; 2005; D. E. Smith, 1978), the work of feeding a 
family (DeVault, 1994), activism (G. W. Smith, 1990c), education (Manicom, 1995; 
McCoy, 1999; Rankin et al., 2010), the criminal justice system (Pence, 2001), social 
work (De Montigny, 2014), environmental policies (Eastwood, 2005; 2011; S. M. 
Turner, 2002; 2003a), disaster recovery (A. Williams & Rankin, 2015), international 
development regimes (Mueller, 1995), nutrition (Travers, 1996), organic farming 
regulations (Wagner, 2014), and youth homelessness (Nichols, 2014), to name just a 
few. Institutional ethnography has also been discussed in the Japanese literature 
(Uetani, 2009), notably used as a method of inquiry to explicate the social organization 
of middle class family life in Japan (Ueda, 1995). There have additionally been some 
scholars who have combined insights from both institutional ethnography and actor-
network theory in their inquiries (Thompson & Pinsent-Johnson, 2011; Tummons, 
                                                
word ‘vital’ is an adjective referring to something of ‘absolute necessity’ or “indispensable to 
the continuance of life,” something “full of energy,” or even something “fatal”—as in a vital 
wound (see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/vital). I see a ‘vital institutional 
ethnography’ as encompassing all of these aspects in the ways it can attune to myriad actors 
and activities that have been ignored or silenced within the ruling relations of the Capitalocene 
and Anthropocene—both the actors and activities that are life-giving and life-taking, what I 
refer to as the vital and the vicious. The vital (essential) nature of an inquiry that attunes to both 
ruling texts and other humans and more-than-human sociomaterial relationality will be touched 
on throughout the thesis and addressed directly in the conclusion (Chapter 8). 
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2010). Similar to these authors, I find many similarities and opportunities for exchange 
between institutional ethnography and material-semiotic attuned approaches, and will 
outline them in this section.114  
 
To begin, institutional ethnography is similar to other material-semiotic attuned 
methods in its rejection of grand narrative theory.115 Additionally, as with material-
semiotic attuned methods, institutional ethnography is not considered a methodology 
with specific prescribed ways of conducting research. Instead, it is referred to as a 
‘method of inquiry’ which directs researchers on how to go about uncovering the ways 
in which people participate in the enactment of ruling relations—how their everyday 
activities are coordinated by material texts and discourses produced in extra-local 
settings and established through trans-local material relations.116 
 
Given institutional ethnography’s focus on explicating the material coordination of 
social organization, the method of inquiry finds most common ground with studies and 
                                                
114 I have just recently become aware of cautions against the blending of institutional 
ethnography with actor-network theory and other material-semiotic attuned methods, including 
the work of Mol (2002). The cautions came from Janet Rankin (2017), an institutional 
ethnographer I highly respect, whose comments arise from concerns that blending these 
methods distract from the analytical project of institutional ethnography. Although in this thesis 
I attempt to infuse institutional ethnographic attunements with those from material semiotics, I 
do take these concerns seriously and will address them in the conclusion (Chapter 8). 
115 In fact, institutional ethnography’s classification as an ‘alternative sociology’ is partially 
based on its rejection of “the dominance of theory” (D. E. Smith, 2005: 49-50) in traditional 
sociological inquiries—that is, the tendency for traditional sociological inquiries to strip 
autonomy from people’s everyday realities in favor of accounts of an abstract ‘social’ 
represented in theoretical concepts. In describing her early work in studying the women’s 
movement, Smith (2005: 28, original emphasis) explains that she noticed how the implantation 
of sociological theory onto people’s activities prevented more interesting, and potentially 
useful, insights from surfacing out of research participants’ own lived experiences: “Once the 
sociological frame was committed, inquiry and discovery from within the women's movement 
was precluded.”  
116 McCoy (1999) distinguishes between Smith’s use of the term ‘extra-local’ and her use of the 
term ‘trans-local,’ arguing that while ‘extra-local’ points to something happening beyond the 
local setting, ‘trans-local’ helps to focus on happenings and coordination across space and time. 
She argues that the term ‘trans-local’ “reminds us always to see local moments as constituents 
of extended relations. The term ‘extra-local’ is appropriately used to describe textual forms of 
knowledge that are not based in the (local, embodied) experience of the knower” (1999: 249-
50 , n.4). In this thesis, I will use McCoy’s distinction in referring to the location of ruling 
institutions as ‘extra-local,’ but the active coordination of ruling relations as ‘trans-local.’ 
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conversations in the field of material semiotics focusing on processes of coordination 
across difference (Mol, 2002; 2010a; Swanson, 2013; Tsing, 2005; 2015) and the ways 
in which ‘“endless attempts at ordering” (Law, 1994: 101, original emphasis) are 
actualized—or not—through situated practices (Callon, 1986; 1991; Law, 1986; 2012). 
This shared focus on the material coordination of situated, embodied activity reflects 
institutional ethnography’s own form of ontological politics: its grounding in the 
“ontology of the social” (D. E. Smith, 2005: 51-4).117 
 
The ‘ontology of the social’ is intended to guide researchers to view ‘the social’ not as 
an entity in itself, but as an enactment of a number of locally situated, extra-locally 
coordinated activities. In Smith’s (2005: 50) words, “[c]ommitment to learning from 
actualities as they are experienced and spoken or written by those actively involved in 
them is essential to the project.” She goes on to explain:  
In working through the design of an ontology for institutional 
ethnography, we confront, as a problem, the strange disappearance of 
people from mainstream sociological discourse and the strange 
detachment from actualities to which sociology’s discursive practices 
commit its practitioners. Institutional ethnography’s design, by 
contrast, must ensure that people remain the subjects, the knowers, or 
potential knowers of what institutional ethnography discovers. (D. E. 
Smith, 2005: 52-3) 
As Smith’s quote makes explicit, in institutional ethnographies the lived, embodied 
experiences of participants do not disappear into abstract categories used to explain ‘the 
social,’ nor is ‘the social’ considered to be located entirely within discourse as in many 
postmodern conceptualizations (see DeVault, 1999: 50). Instead, ‘the social’ is enacted 
through the activities of situated people whose experiences and realities are necessarily 
                                                
117 While the ontology of the social was inspired by Marx’s social ontology, institutional 
ethnography differs in its way of viewing “the everyday world as reflexively, recursively 
organized. In particular, [institutional ethnographers] insist that investigation being from inside 
an actual world with the intention of making sense of it in its own terms” (G. W. Smith, 1995: 
26). Thus, institutional ethnography allows for broader investigation into the vast array of 
ruling relations involved in social organizing beyond economic organization and ruling 
relations directly involving capital and production. 
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multiple and partial.118 Institutional ethnography’s conceptualization aligns well with 
Latour’s (2005: 7) decision to “define the social not as a special domain, a specific 
realm, or a particular sort of thing, but only as a very peculiar movement of re-
association and reassembling.” Law (1994: 2, original emphasis) similarly describes 
‘the social’ as a hybrid enactment: “what we call the social is materially 
heterogeneous: talk, bodies, texts, machines, architectures, all of these and many more 
are implicated in and perform ‘the social’.” Thus, it seems that Smith, Latour and Law 
are in general agreement that simplified, abstract categorizations of ‘the social’ conceal 
the real messiness, contingency and heterogeneous actors involved in enacting locally-
situated realities. 
 
In addition, Smith (2001: 161, original emphasis) explains her desire “to create a 
sociology for rather than of people” which “draws on people’s own good knowledge of 
their everyday/everynight119 worlds and does not substitute the expert’s ‘reality’ for 
what people know in the doing.” It is within people’s local, embodied experiences that 
institutional ethnographers collect clues in a ‘botanizing fashion’ (Eastwood, 2005: 59-
61) on the material relations that contribute to the emergence of everyday activities, 
paying specific attention to instances in which people’s personal lived experiences 
seem to be at odds with how these experiences are being referred to officially (usually 
in objectified and generalizing ways). These unsettling experiences, or disjunctures,120 
direct researchers to the problematic that guides the study’s analysis (M. L. Campbell 
                                                
118 DeVault (1999: 50) describes institutional ethnography’s take on multiplicity and 
partialness: “[Institutional ethnography] refuses any single view or narrative; the world ‘out 
there’ looks quite different from different locations. Multiple views can be connected because 
of the places and interactions that bring people together from their different locations. Here, I 
do not mean ‘bring together’ in a feeling sense, but very literally—as when a social worker 
travels to her job at a Headstart program in a poor neighborhood, when a waitress serves a 
business lunch in a downtown restaurant, or when a middle-aged male employee comes into my 
university office to empty the trash. The concreteness of these examples—the particularity they 
suggest—is meant to work as a kind of touchstone: this specificity is essential to the analysis 
and must remain in view in the institutional ethnographer’s account.” 
119 Smith (1987: 90) describes the everyday/everynight world as “that world we experience 
directly. It is the world in which we are located physically and socially. […] It is necessarily 
local—because that is how we must be—and necessarily historical.” 
120 While disjunctures are usually referred to in the singular form, I sometimes use the plural 
form to represent the multiplicity of these experiences. 
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& Gregor, 2004: 48). In this thesis, both my own and my participants’ experiences of 
konran attuned me to the study’s problematic.  
 
Borrowing Marx’s method of historical materialism, institutional ethnographers share 
with the field of material semiotics an understanding of the contingency and 
indeterminacy of history and the material relations that participate in enacting ‘social 
order.’121 Institutional ethnography takes seriously not only the contingency of social 
ordering and the agency of research participants in enacting ruling relations, but also 
participants’ ability to comprehend their own embeddedness within these relations. 
Thus, the method is referred to as a “reflexive-materialist methodology” (G. W. Smith, 
1995: 24). That is, its goal is not only to serve as an academic exercise of tracing or 
mapping ruling relations, but to produce knowledge for participants about their own 
embeddedness within these relations, giving them the opportunity to use this 
information to enhance their own understandings of their experiences of disjuncture.122  
 
Therefore, institutional ethnography addresses issues of social and environmental 
justice, not through normative arguments about what is right or wrong, good or bad, but 
by producing research for study participants—the ones experiencing disjunctures in 
their everyday lives. That is, institutional ethnographic research results should be 
designed for participants, providing them with information so they might better 
understand their own embeddedness within trans-locally coordinated material semiotic 
relations.123   
                                                
121 As mentioned in the literature review, Law’s (1986: 234) early work on the materially-
mediated organization of Portuguese imperial expansion in the 15th and 16th centuries revealed 
that forms of ‘social order’ are possible if humans and more-than-humans act, or are enacted, as 
docile and passive. At the same time, the field of material semiotics has been successful in 
demonstrating how, given the indeterminate agency of human and more-than-human actors, 
such orderings are actually quite precarious, though sometimes manage to “hang together” long 
enough to appear stable (Mol, 2002: 5). What we realize is that ‘the social’ is not a static, 
certain and completely knowable entity, but “the recursive but incomplete performance of an 
unknowable number of intertwined orderings” (Law, 1994: 101). 
122 Smith (2005: 29, original emphasis) explains: “The aim of the sociology we call 
‘institutional ethnography’ is to re-organize the social relations of knowledge of the social so 
that people can take that knowledge up as an extension of our ordinary knowledge of the local 
actualities of our lives.”  
123 Some scholars in the field of material semiotics also share the sentiment to connect with 
audiences and intervene in ways that might improve how multiplicity and difference is handled 
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While institutional ethnography’s ontological grounding and research goals seem to 
position it as a method of inquiry trapped solely within the social science’s ‘humanist 
tradition,’124 confined to the paradigm of human exceptionalism, or “human 
exemptionalism” (Dunlap:1994wf; Murdoch, 2001), the method’s focus on materially-
mediated coordination requires researchers to recognize the agency of humans and 
more-than-humans. That is, institutional ethnography “assumes an actual, material 
world” (DeVault, 1999: 50), where people are embedded within sociomaterial 
relations—some visible and some invisible to them—which contribute to the enactment 
of their everyday lives. The shared commitment to acknowledging and tracing material-
semiotic relations in a way that recognizes the participation of humans and more-than-
humans in enacting realities is where I see the real potential for work in institutional 
ethnography and material semiotics to link up. Both methods are grounded in strong 
ethical commitments, institutional ethnography offering a robust method of tracing 
trans-local ruling relations and attending to the agency of participants in the research 
process, and material-semiotic sensibilities providing guidance on engaging with 
ontological politics and noticing heterogeneous relations among humans and (more-
than-textual forms of) more-than-humans—as well as the tensions permeating these 
relations—that contribute to everyday, situated happenings. 
 
Given institutional ethnography’s commitment to producing research that contributes to 
the onto-political play of human actors,125 I see this thesis as an attempt to bring the 
method of inquiry into conversations on the ethics of recognizing more-than-human 
agency as discussed by Carolan (2016).126 While institutional ethnographers usually 
                                                
in practice. For example, as previously mentioned, some scholars attempt to engage readers by 
showing them “how to pay better attention to overlaid arrangements of human and nonhuman 
living spaces” (Gan et al., 2017: G1). In addition, Mol (2002: 116) describes her call for 
empirical scholarship as “a plea for attending to the various ways in which differences are 
handled in various sites and situations—and a way of wondering when and where we might do 
better.” 
124 See Carolan (2016: 236) and Section 2.6.6. 
125 As previously mentioned, one of the goals in institutional ethnography is to help study 
participants to understand ‘the social’ through a different ontological lens, that of ‘the ontology 
of the social’ (see D. E. Smith, 2005: 29). 
126 As described in Section 2.6.6, Carolan (2016: 236) ponders: Does focusing attention on 
more-than-humans disregard the suffering of human beings? Or is suffering “a product of us 
not caring fully for everyone involved”? 
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limit their engagement with more-than-humans to material texts that participate in 
coordinating relations and activities across space and time, in this thesis I will follow 
this tendency while also using sensibilities from the field of material semiotics in order 
to remain attentive to myriad other heterogeneous humans and more-than-humans 
participating in everyday enactments. I will explicitly adopt Latour’s (1999: 288) 
definition of action which refers not simply to “what people do,” but “what is 
accomplished along with others”—human or more-than-human. This definition also fits 
well with Mol’s (2002: 44, original emphasis) efforts to disrupt commonly held 
definitions and assumptions about active (human) subjects and passive (natural) 
objects, framing them instead “as parts of events that occur and plays that are staged. If 
an object is real this is because it is part of a practice. It is a reality enacted.” Both of 
these conceptualizations became very useful in sensitizing my analysis to explore 
experiences of konran, and even food, as multiple, hybrid enactments (see Latour, 
1993)—as opposed to the result of ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ ‘choices’ made by 
‘autonomous,’ ‘liberal,’ ‘individual’ actors.127  
 
Law (1994: 95) has argued that inquiries concerned with “ordering and inequalities” 
need to be handled “within a pragmatic and relationally materialist sociology.” As in 
material-semiotic attuned methods, institutional ethnographers depend on ‘immutable 
mobiles,’128 specifically texts, to provide clues to these, often invisible, attempts at 
ordering. In this thesis, I will be guided by insights from both the fields of institutional 
ethnography and material semiotics, a collaboration which emerges as a vital 
institutional ethnography—a relational-materialist-reflexive (and hopefully 
diffractive129) method of inquiry for tracing ruling relations while remaining attentive to 
                                                
127 See Callon and Law (1995), Mol (2010a; 2010b), and Abrahamsson et al. (2015) for 
interesting insights into how the field of material semiotics views the contradictions inherent in 
concepts of ‘autonomy’ and ‘choice.’ Also see Haraway (1994: 64-6, original emphasis) for a 
discussion on the potential troubles stemming from unreflective use of the terms “actors, 
agencies and actants” and how these troubles might be addressed. In this thesis, my use of the 
term ‘actor’ does not imply independent autonomy. An actor is just one of many humans or 
more-than-humans entangled and ‘intra-acting’ (Barad, 2007: 33) within dense material-
semiotic assemblages. See Section 3.3.2.3 for more on Barad’s (2007) concept of ‘intra-action.’  
128 See Latour (1986) and Section 2.6.3. 
129 Haraway (1994: 63) refers to diffraction as her “favorite optical metaphor,” describing it as 
“the noninnocent, complexly erotic practice of making a difference in the world, rather than 
displacing the same elsewhere.” Also see Barad (2014). 
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the reflexive capacity and subjectivity of study participants, as well as the participation 
of more-than-humans in their textual and non-textual forms.  
 
3.3 Piecing	together	a	vital	institutional	ethnography	
Similar to other studies in institutional ethnography, I structured my thesis to engage in 
two different types of investigations: an entry level, ethnographic investigation 
beginning with the everyday activities and lived experiences of human actors 
experiencing konran; and a secondary level analytical investigation tracing how these 
experiences have emerged through situated entanglements with textually-mediated 
ruling relations. However, the analysis does not end with attention to explicating ruling 
relations. Instead, I expand my analysis, adopting sensibilities from the field of material 
semiotics to notice other participants—human and more-than-human—contributing to 
the enactment of konran. Thus, my analysis not only traces material ruling relations 
contributing to these experiences but, following Mol (2002: 26), works to “unravel” 
these experiences in ways that attend to “[a]n endless list of heterogeneous elements 
that can either be highlighted or left in the background, depending on the character and 
purpose of the description.” By welcoming both textual and non-textual more-than-
human materiality into the analysis, my goal is to engage in ontological play in a way 
that guides my participants to notice their embeddedness within a messy, heterogeneous 
and precarious “established disorder”130—a conceptual space where the singular and the 
multiple, as well as the tensions, coherences and incoherencies among them, are able to 
coexist across space and time. 
 
Expanding my analysis to explicate how ruling relations are enacted within the 
contingent ‘established disorder,’ I will adopt the “logic of oscillation” presented by 
Law (2002: 9) as way of attuning to the wavering between the single and the multiple. I 
will additionally borrow the concept of “single reality” as discussed by both Mol (2002: 
87) and Law (2002) to illustrate how ruling texts and discourses attempt to order people 
and their heterogeneous sociomaterial entanglements in ways that fit into a coherent, 
single, established way of doing or being. Single realities, translated into ruling texts 
                                                
130 The term was first used by Haraway (1994), and later borrowed by Law (2002: 126). 
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and discourses, are essential to the process of social coordination.131 At the same time, 
however, studies into multiplicity and difference have shown us that behind the 
‘presence’ of a seemingly coherent object—be it the body, the wing of an aircraft, or a 
ruling text—lies myriad heterogeneous relations left ‘absent.’ Law and Singleton 
(2005: 343-4) refer to this as “absent presence.”132  
 
Law and Singleton’s ‘absent presence’ is similar to the figure of the ‘ghost’ that 
appears in the book Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet: Ghosts and Monsters of the 
Anthropocene (Tsing et al., 2017).  In their introduction to the section on ghosts, the 
book’s editors describe how they use ‘ghosts’ as figures to help in thinking through 
various historical happenings—and their participants—that have been brushed aside or 
ignored in the linear, forward-moving industrial progress projects of the Capitalocene, 
their enduring existence haunting humans and more-than-humans who inhabit the 
Anthropocene. The editors explain: 
The winds of the Anthropocene carry ghosts—the vestiges and signs 
of past ways of life still charged in the present. […] Our ghosts are 
the traces of more-than-human histories through which ecologies are 
made and unmade. Our era of human destruction has trained our eyes 
only on the immediate promises of power and profits. This refusal of 
the past, and even the present, will condemn us to continue fouling 
our own nests. How can we get back to the pasts we need to see the 
present more clearly? We call this return to multiple pasts, human 
and not human, “ghosts.” (Gan et al., 2017: G1-2) 
Throughout this thesis, I follow the editors in attuning to the ‘ghosts’ that lurk within 
Japan’s post-2011 ruling relations. I additionally follow the editors in attuning to 
                                                
131 Put by Law and Singleton (2005: 342), a single reality “makes it possible to negotiate and 
secure transactions between different cultures or professional groups.” 
132 Law and Singleton (2005: 343-4) explain ‘absent presence’: “we cannot understand objects 
unless we also think of them as sets of present dynamics generated in, and generative of, 
realities that are necessarily absent. Such objects are transformative, but the transformations are 
not the gentle flows discussed […] in fluid objects. […] This is because they take the form of 
jumps and discontinuities. In this way of thinking, constant objects are energetic, entities or 
processes that juxtapose, distinguish, make and transform absences and presences. They are 
made in disjunction.” 
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‘monsters’ of the Anthropocene—specifically monstrous sociomaterial entanglements 
with humans and more-than-humans—which are often obfuscated within ruling 
relations and, thus, difficult to notice. In their introduction to the section on monsters, 
the editors use ‘monsters’ as figures to describe the frightening, monstrous qualities of 
some sociomaterial entanglements, and the need to attune to these messy material-
semiotic relations through careful, and often times uncomfortable, “arts of noticing.”133 
They explain: 
The seductive simplifications of industrial production threaten to 
render us blind to monstrosity in all its forms by covering over both 
lively and destructive connections. […] Somehow, in the midst of 
ruins, we must maintain enough curiosity to notice the strange and 
wonderful as well as the terrible and terrifying. […] Such curiosity 
also means working against singular notions of modernity. How can 
we repurpose the tools of modernity against the terrors of Progress to 
make visible the other worlds it has ignored and damaged? Living in 
a time of planetary catastrophe thus begins with a practice at once 
humble and difficult: noticing the worlds around us. (Swanson et al., 
2017: M7)  
Throughout this thesis, I attune to the ‘absent presence’ of both ‘ghosts’ and ‘monsters’ 
by attending to the oscillation between the “multiple absence” of heterogeneous 
relationality lying behind the “singular presence” of ruling texts and discourses (Law, 
2002: 9), while at the same time noticing how relations among these heterogeneous 
elements play out through everyday practices and ‘tinkerings.’134 I will also explore 
how the single reality being deployed through ruling relations attempts to ‘mute’ 
(Latour, 2005) and marginalize some actors and activities at the expense of others. In 
particular, I will focus on the muting of radionuclides, the people who try to notice 
them, as well as on how processes of muting may be contributing to experiences of 
konran or other forms of suffering (see Carolan, 2016: 236). In the following sections I 
will describe how both the entry level and secondary level investigations were 
actualized in the current research project.  
                                                
133 The phrase “arts of noticing” comes from Tsing (2015: 17). Also see Section 2.6.1. 
134 See Mol et al. (2010a: 13), Section 2.6.4 and Section 2.6.6. 
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3.3.1 Entry-level	ethnographic	investigation	
As its name suggests, institutional ethnography depends on the use of ethnographic 
methods to conduct scientific inquiry into everyday practices that make up the 
precarious assemblages we refer to as ‘the social.’ However, differing from classical 
ethnographic methods where scholars describe and interpret “how the culture-sharing 
group works” (Creswell, 2013: 92), institutional ethnography is focused on tracing the 
trans-local material relations that coordinate and contribute to the enactment of local, 
situated activity. Based on the principles and analytic goals of institutional ethnography 
(see M. L. Campbell, 1998; Deveau, 2008), my ethnographic inquiry was guided by 
three basic assumptions: (1) people are experts135 in conducting their everyday 
activities; (2) knowledge136 is produced through people’s everyday activities in situated, 
local settings; and (3) the everyday activities of locally-situated people are coordinated 
through trans-local, textually-mediated relations.  
 
Smith (1990a) uses the concept of ruling relations137 to explain the social organization 
of particular, locally-based activities by powerful, extra-locally situated forces. The 
concept of ‘social relations’ is also paramount to institutional ethnography as it “directs 
attention to, and takes up analytically, how what people are doing and experiencing in a 
given local site is hooked into sequences of action and coordinating multiple local sites 
where others are active” (D. E. Smith, 1999: 7, emphasis removed). The concept of 
ruling relations points to an institutional complex which, though it exists beyond the 
local setting, is active in attempting to coordinate people’s activities through material 
                                                
135 This is similar to Law’s (1994: 4, original emphasis) view that “we are all social 
philosophers.” 
136 While I focused on knowledge during my fieldwork, through the incorporation of material-
semiotic sensibilities I eventually turned away from epistemological debates, attending instead 
to ontological politics and the enactment of, and relations among, multiple realities. See 
Chapter 6 and Section 3.3.1.4. 
137 Similar to governmentality, in institutional ethnography the concept of ‘ruling relations’ 
refers to historically specific relations which, similar to the concept of the dispositif (see 
Section 2.4.2), are used to manage the social milieu in a way that promotes circulation of the 
economy (DeVault, 2006: 294; Nichols, 2014: 6-8). In Smith’s (1990a: 6) words, ruling 
relations refer to “those forms that we know as bureaucracy, administration, management, 
professional organization, and the media. They include also the complex of discourses, 
scientific, technical, and cultural, that intersect, interpenetrate, and coordinate the multiple sites 
of ruling.” 
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texts. 138  This is what Smith (1990a; 1990b; 1999) is referring to when she says that 
social relations are ‘textually mediated.’  Texts provide the materiality researchers need 
to trace social relations and understand institutions’ roles in shaping everyday local 
experience. As with other institutional ethnographic studies, in this thesis ethnographic 
observation and immersion into a specific local setting serves as an entry point for 
discovering and exploring the study’s problematic (Section 3.3.2.2), which involved 
searching for clues to how people’s experiences of konran are embedded within, and 
emerge from, trans-local textually-mediated ruling relations. The following sections 
will address some of the aspects of this entry-level ethnographic investigation. 
 
3.3.1.1 Entering	the	material-semiotic	field	
Guided by insights from institutional ethnography, discovery and exploration of the 
study’s problematic involved in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with 
forty-three participants in conjunction with participant observation, casual 
conversations, and auto-ethnographic reflections (see M. L. Campbell & Gregor, 2004; 
DeVault & McCoy, 2002; S. M. Turner, 2003a). All interviews and discussions were 
conducted by myself in Japanese, were recorded and later transcribed into Japanese. 
The interviews and focus groups were of great importance as they were opportunities to 
collect very rich descriptions and detailed accounts of people’s experiences of konran 
following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. While my fieldwork was originally designed to 
trace textually-mediated ruling relations, the attentiveness to “events-in-practice” (Mol, 
2002: 21) required for such a project produced process-narratives that were also useful 
for an analysis using material-semiotic sensibilities. Similar to Mol’s (2002: 15, 
original emphasis) ethnographic approach of ‘praxiography,’ my participants were 
asked questions as if they were ethnographers139 of their own experiences, giving them 
the opportunity to describe, in detail, how things are “done in practice.” Thus, though 
insights from institutional ethnography were used in designing the ethnographic 
                                                
138 Smith (1999: 49) describes those who rule as: “that internally coordinated complex of 
administrative, managerial professional, and discursive organisation that regulates, organizes, 
governs, and otherwise controls our societies.” 
139 In institutional ethnography, all participants are regarded as competent and knowledgeable 
informants, or ‘knowers,’ whose experiential accounts hold clues as to how their everyday lives 
are socially organized (M. L. Campbell & Gregor, 2004: 78). It is the task of institutional 
ethnographers to begin their inquiries from the actual experiences of the embodied knowers 
whose everyday actions are being coordinated by extra-local forces. 
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inquiry, what resulted were thick descriptions where experiences, objects and practices 
emerged as “both material and active” (Mol, 2002: 20), making them accessible for 
analysis using material-semiotic sensibilities. 
 
Ethnographic fieldwork for this thesis took place in six prefectures in the Kansai region 
of Japan including Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, Shiga and Wakayama (Figure 6).140 
The Kansai region is located approximately 600 kilometers south-west of TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster. As previously mentioned, by the time I began my fieldwork I had lived 
in the region for about five years. There are three major reasons for choosing to conduct 
my research in the region. First, my study’s problematic originated from some of my 
own observations and experiences of everyday eating in the Kansai region following 
the nuclear disaster, so staying in the region made sense for explicating ruling relations 
from that particular standpoint. Second, the region’s distance from TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster makes it an interesting location to study trans-local ruling relations. Because 
fallout from TEPCO’s nuclear disaster was not severe in the Kansai region, people’s 
everyday lives do not tend to involve navigating their relationship with radionuclides in 
the environment,141 but with navigating their relationship with radionuclides in food and 
other mobile materials. Thus, fieldwork in the region—an area where people should be 
far enough removed from the nuclear disaster that radiation should not be of concern—
provided fertile ground for exploring the trans-local ruling relations involved in 
coordinating everyday eating post-2011. Third, ‘consumers’—especially those living 
outside of prefectures directly suffering from the overflow of TEPCO’s radionuclides—
continue to be chastised in public discourse, blamed of spreading ‘fūhyōhigai’ (literally 
‘harm caused by rumors,’ but understood as scientifically ‘groundless’ and ‘harmful 
                                                
140 While all of my participants were living in Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara and Shiga in 2016, I 
have spent all of my time living in Japan in Wakayama—including during fieldwork for this 
project in 2016. I include it here as some of my auto-ethnographic reflections are based on my 
experiences in Wakayama. Also see Figures 3, 4 and 5 for the location of my participants in 
March 2011 and at the time of their interview or focus group session in 2016. 
141 Of course, seventeen of my participants had moved from areas within 260 kilometers of 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster where they dealt with external exposure from TEPCO’s 
radionuclides. However, all participants were living in the Kansai region at the time of our 
interviews in 2016. 
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rumors’ that lead to economic damage) if they choose not to purchase foods based on 
concerns about the possible presence of radionuclides. Through attending 
ethnographically to “events-in-practice” (Mol, 2002: 21), this thesis is an attempt  to 
‘unravel’ some of these categorizations and concepts to better understand how they 
participate in trans-local ruling relations and in enactments of everyday eating. 
 
My ethnographic fieldwork took place over seven months in 2016 and was conducted 
in two time frames: the first from March to June, and the second from September to 
November. The multi-sitedness of the inquiry was not designed to compare experiences 
Figure 6 Study area in the Kansai region. 
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of participants, but to provide a rich diversity of experiences to allow for tracing how 
people situated in different localities around the region were “hooked up” within ruling 
relations (D. E. Smith, 2005: 41), providing insights and clues as to how the activities 
of people embedded within material-semiotic relations in different locations are being 
coordinated across space and time. Conducting a multi-sited ethnography that attends to 
multiplicity also proved to be important as it provided a rich opportunity for tracing 
other heterogeneous actors involved in enacting experiences of konran related to 
everyday eating. Interviewing a variety of people from across the region became an 
informative way for tracing how materials and discourses, including ruling texts, 




Very similar to Latour’s (1986) concept of immutable mobiles (see Section 2.6.3), 
ruling texts do not only refer to printed or digital documents, reports and forms, but 
also photographs, sound recordings, videos, drawings and other formulations. The one 
thing that is required of the texts is that they have: 
 a relatively fixed and replicable character—that they can be stored, 
transferred, copied, produced in bulk, and distributed widely, 
allowing them to be activated by users at different times and in 
different places—that allows them to play a standardizing and 
mediating role. (DeVault & McCoy, 2002: 765)  
Smith (2001: 168) sees texts as being “of foundational ontological significance to the 
existence of anything we can call ‘large-scale organization,’ or ‘institution.’” 
Institutions depend on objectified forms of knowledge to coordinate the activities of 
large groups of people situated across various locations.142 At the same time, 
institutions themselves do not exist as entities or objects, but “only in actual people’s 
doings [...which] are necessarily particular, local and ephemeral” (D. E. Smith, 2001: 
163). Institutional ethnography challenges researchers to view and investigate 
institutions, not as taken-for-granted or abstract entities, but as a “complex of textually-
                                                
142 Smith (2001: 164) describes texts as necessary to the existence of institutions as their 
generalized and standardized forms allow institutions “to exist beyond particular times, places, 
and people’s doings.” 
 104 
coordinated work processes” (D. E. Smith, 2001: 177), a complex of ruling relations 
that are accomplished through the activation of ruling texts in local settings.143 
 
By viewing everyday activities as embedded within material relations of ruling, 
seemingly taken-for-granted everyday activities become “textually invaded and 
regulated” (D. E. Smith, 2001: 173). This does not imply that texts hold any power to 
subordinate people in and of themselves. A text’s ability to coordinate social relations 
is only possible when activated by a person in the everyday (M. L. Campbell, 2014: 
1503; D. E. Smith, 1999: 148-51). In other words, people are not completely 
subservient to textually mediated ruling relations. Instead they “actively constitute 
social relations. People participate in social relations, often unknowingly, as they act 
competently and knowledgeably to concert and coordinate their own actions with 
professional standards or family expectations or organizational rules” (M. L. Campbell 
& Gregor, 2004: 31).  
 
One of the ways texts are implicit in social organization is through text-reader 
conversations (see D. E. Smith, 2014; S. M. Turner, 2014). According to Smith (2001: 
175), people engage in text-reader conversations when reading, referring to or talking 
about ruling texts in their everyday activities.144 Though they are termed 
‘conversations,’ people’s interactions with texts do not allow for any discussion or 
revision of the original form. That is, while the reader is active in producing and 
reproducing knowledge through the act of reading, the text itself is static, immutable 
and unresponsive (D. E. Smith, 2001).  Instead, “[t]he text establishes a set of terms, 
formalized sequences, providing standardized-for-all-participants methods for 
analyzing and recognizing what might be done and what gets done” (D. E. Smith, 2001: 
183). Such texts are designed to coordinate work process so that they are efficient and 
accountable, while also ensuring that activities reflect the interests of the institution 
itself. However, through this process, other people’s interests can be subordinated in 
favor of the institution.  
 
                                                
143 See Smith (1990a; 1999) and Campbell (2014).  
144 Smith (1987: 166) explains that these actual activities are the “ways in which people are 
actually involved in the production of their everyday world, examined with respect to how that 
world is organized by and sustains the institutional process.”  
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Moreover, texts have the power to create generalized, abstract accounts of reality,145 
which are objective and do not account for the actual, local, unique, everyday bodily 
experiences of people acting and being enacted within specific historical settings, 
locations and times (M. L. Campbell & Gregor, 2004; D. E. Smith, 1999). Texts 
generalize and standardize the local, stripping people of any individual attributes and 
assigning them with institutionally defined subject positions such as ‘citizen,’ 
‘consumer’ or ‘lay public’ (D. E. Smith, 2001: 185). These categories define and direct 
appropriate behavior and indicate what forms of action are recognizable by the 
institution. However, as mentioned, texts written in ways that construct specific 
accounts of reality do not have the power to suppresses divergent opinions or force 
people into subservient subject positions. It is people’s active participation in activating 
institutional texts and discourses that accomplishes ruling relations. Therefore, unlike 
governmentality which tends to view discourse as a powerful force conducting 
activities, scholars of institutional ethnography see discourse as something that is 
activated, or not, in practice. That is, institutional ethnographers focus not on discourse, 
but on how “people participate in discursive activity” (M. L. Campbell & Gregor, 
2004: 41, original emphasis). Campbell (2003: 15) explains the implications of the 
focus on discourse-in-action: “If we accept Smith's view, no longer can we think of 
ruling being done by powerful others, somewhere out there, entirely separate from 
ourselves. We all take up ruling concepts and activate them as we go about our daily 
lives.” With this understanding, I asked many questions about practices during my 
interviews, specifically directed toward people’s experiences of konran related to 
everyday eating. In listening to their stories, I took note of ruling discourses or clues 
indicating textual mediation of their experiences, which I would bring up for discussion 
to clarify and problematize along with my participants.  
 
3.3.1.3 Attending	to	work	(broadly	defined)	
According to the principles of institutional ethnography, another way that texts 
organize social relations is through “the work processes and organization in which the 
text-reader conversation is embedded” (S. M. Turner, 2003a: 95). According to 
institutional ethnography, the organization of work processes does not only take place 
within hospitals, schools, government offices and other workplaces, but expands to 
                                                
145 Smith (2001: 176) has referred to this as a “virtual reality.” 
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organizing the everyday work (generally defined) of homemakers and homeless people, 
among myriad others. Thus, textually mediated attempts at coordination are not only 
deployed to guide the activities of paid workers in hospitals, schools and other places of 
work, but numerous other everyday activities and forms of unpaid work enacted by 
‘citizens,’ ‘consumers,’ ‘women’ or any other categorization of people. Regardless of 
where texts are activated, they have the power to create accounts of reality which are 
objective and do not account for the everyday experiences of locally situated people 
(M. L. Campbell & Gregor, 2004: 37). In other words, they are an attempt to enact a 
‘single reality’ based on the goals of the institution.  
 
Conducting an institutional ethnography requires understanding that ruling relations 
that objectify and attempt to standardize people’s experiences also participate in 
invisibilizing some of the activities accomplished by people in their everyday lives. 
When first developing institutional ethnography, Smith (1987) realized the concept of 
work, which usually refers to activities involving some form of paid labor, seemed to 
obscure or make invisible the everyday activities of women. This is why institutional 
ethnographers view the things people do in everyday life through a “generous concept 
of work.” That is, the concept of work is extended to include anything “people do that 
requires some effort, that they mean to do, and that involves some acquired 
competence” (D. E. Smith, 1987: 165-6). Seeing work as including activities beyond 
paid labor allows institutional ethnographers to gather robust accounts of what is 
actually happening in the everyday lives of people, giving them the opportunity to 
identify and explicate the subtle ways in which institutional texts mediate even the most 
seemingly mundane activities.146 While making everyday work processes visible is not 
the analytical goal of institutional ethnography, thick descriptions of these activities 
create data that holds clues to how institutional processes are organizing people’s 
activities.  
 
                                                
146 DeVault (1994) skillfully uses institutional ethnography’s generous concept of work to make 
visible the multitude of activities actually involved in “feeding the family”—work composed of 
innumerable tasks ranging from paying attention to supermarket sales, traveling to the 
supermarket, carefully making food choices that fit with their values and needs, organizing a 
meal time that fits with the needs of family members, preparing food, serving food, paying 
attention to items that need to be purchased, among numerous other activities. 
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Through their everyday work, people are active in constituting their own realities 
within relations of ruling, even if they are unaware that social organization of their 
activities is taking place. For example, DeVault (1994: 60) demonstrates how the often 
taken-for-granted work of provisioning food actually “connects ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
realms, but since it is largely invisible, the connections go unnoticed. Instead, people do 
shopping and use their purchases, to produce ‘personal life’ and thus, actually to 
construct the boundary between home and market.” It is the task of the institutional 
ethnographer to make visible the various overlooked or taken-for-granted linkages 
between what seem to be mundane, personal activities and the ruling relations which 
coordinate them. 
 
DeVault (1994: 12) goes on to explain the importance of collecting detailed accounts of 
people’s everyday work as the basis for completing institutional ethnography’s analytic 
goals of explicating ruling relations. She highlights that “[t]hrough their work, women 
are connected with organizations and institutions—families, workplaces, schools, stores 
and services, and the state. Typically, activities in these settings are organized by 
discourses that coordinate the workings of organizations and institutions in different 
local settings.” However, given the ephemeral nature of this work, the first step in 
explicating ruling relations is to collect detailed descriptions of everyday activities; 
only then could the institutional processes embedded within these activities be made 
knowable and traceable.147  
 
During my ethnographic inquiry, I had to learn to see my participants’, as well as my 
own, everyday activities, as well as my own, as being embedded within materially 
mediated ruling relations, while at the same time being fully aware that such relations 
are often not visible to most people in their everyday lives. Knowing that “analytical 
thinking begins in the (data-collection) interview” (DeVault & McCoy, 2002: 757),148 
during my interviews I was aware that my analytical task would not involve making 
                                                
147 Campbell and Gregor (2004: 72, original emphasis) explain how such inquiry into the 
particulars of everyday work “would name the participants, and the account would show the 
difficulties to be overcome as well as the tensions absorbed as part of doing the work. If an 
account were made of managing the household finances as work, it could no longer remain an 
abstract undertaking, with no subject, no particular object of action, and no social relations.” 
148 This quote comes from an interview with institutional ethnographer Eric Mykhalovskiy. 
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connections between the (local) and macro (extra-local institution), but explicating—
making visible—the trans-local ruling relations that are being enacted through everyday 
practices (see Travers, 1996). Thus, during my interviews I attentively listened for 
traces of discourses or texts in people’s descriptions, as these would make up the 
material clues necessary for later explicating ruling relations. Whenever texts or 
discourses were detected, I asked for further explanation as to the role they played in 
people’s everyday work and tinkerings. 
 
3.3.1.4 Standpoint,	researcher	positionality	and	collaboration	in	the	‘in-between’	
In order not to get lost within the vastness of the institutional complex, institutional 
ethnographers explore their study’s problematic from the standpoint of the people 
experiencing disjunctures, with a commitment to “knowing on behalf of those whose 
lives she studies” (M. L. Campbell & Gregor, 2004: 48). That is, researchers explicate 
ruling relations in a way that keeps participants and their situated experiences as an 
anchor in the analysis. In institutional ethnography people’s concerns are taken 
seriously, but are not considered as isolated incidents needing to be theorized. Instead, 
researchers maintain a focus on processes and activities in order to conduct research in 
a way that provides participants with a description of how these experiences “actually 
happen as they do” (M. L. Campbell & Gregor, 2004: 49).  
 
Explicit in the concepts of ruling relations or social organization are two different 
subject positions: actors who are organizing (i.e. those who rule) and actors whose 
activities are being organized (i.e. those who are being ruled). Attuning themselves to 
the existence of ruling relations, institutional ethnographers conduct their research from 
“the standpoint of those who are being ruled” (M. L. Campbell & Gregor, 2004: 16). 
Campbell and Gregor (2004: 48) point out that while openly taking the standpoint of 
those being ruled may seem biased, “[r]esearch is always framed from the perspective 
of those who need to know, whether it is those who are living in the setting or those 
who are located outside it and looking in.” That is, though in many scientific inquiries 
the standpoint of the researcher is not always stated outright, it is made explicit within 
institutional ethnography because it is only from the standpoint of people being ruled at 
the local level that the organization of social relations can be researched. Thus, while 
scholars within the rational risk paradigm may conceptualize differences in knowledge 
as an ‘expert-lay divide’—that is, ‘correct’ expert knowledge is pitted against 
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‘incorrect’ or ‘irrational’ everyday, tacit knowledge—institutional ethnography’s 
theoretical framework is grounded in a different understanding of what knowledge is 
and how it is produced. To institutional ethnographers, knowledge is produced through 
the active engagement of people entangled within textually-mediated ruling relations. 
As such, institutional ethnography’s ontological grounding is sometimes also referred 
to as the ‘theory of the social organization of knowledge’ (D. E. Smith, 1990b; 1999). 
 
In the field of material semiotics, however, the concept of standpoint has sometimes 
been met with critique. Mol (1999; 2011a) has pointed out that the notion of a 
standpoint can be implicated in perpetuating “perspectivalism”—the number of gazes 
from which to view a single reality is multiplied, but reality remains single and 
intangible, and perspectives on this reality distinct and plural. In reviewing the vast 
scholarship of Mol (1999; 2002; 2013) and other material-semiotic attuned scholars149 
we discover that there is not a single, ‘true’ reality of which there are multiple 
perspectives, but there are multiple realities being enacted simultaneously in different 
locations.150 While both institutional ethnography and material-semiotic attuned 
methods maintain a strong commitment to studying situated practices, institutional 
ethnography maintains a focus on the production of knowledge, while material 
semiotics maintains a focus on the production of reality.  
 
Both Law (2002) and Mol (2002) have discussed the role of perspectivalism in projects 
of coordination.  Law (2002: 89) describes the essential role of perspectivalism in the 
coordination of modern projects, which depend on maintaining a simple, singular 
ontological framing and the centrality of the singular objects this reality enacts: 
On the one hand there is the normative simplicity of the modern 
project, which seeks to enact the god-eye and presupposes the 
ontological singularity of the world that it desires to know and make. 
The simplicity is sustained by the theory of perspectivalism that 
                                                
149 For example, Law (2015), Law and Lien (2013), Law and Singleton (2005), and Mol and 
Law (2004). 
150 To repeat Mol’s (2002: vii) insight: “Attending to enactment rather than knowledge has an 
important effect: what we think of as a single object may appear to be more than one.” 
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allows, indeed requires, different viewers to see different things when 
they look at an object. 
The struggle, according to Law, is to keep the single reality, and the objects it enacts, as 
appearing singular, even in the face of ruptures and the exposure of heterogeneity—
something that is inescapable according to the ‘logic of oscillation.’ According to Mol 
(2002: 6), a single reality is epistemologically normative: “it tells how to know 
properly.” Perspectivalism provides a tool for maintaining the centrality of these 
objects, categorizing differences in experience as perspectival and not ontological in 
nature (Law, 2002: 64).  
 
Through the incorporation of material-semiotic sensibilities, this thesis will be an 
attempt to turn away from epistemological debates involved in a focus on knowledge 
production, attending instead to ontological politics and the enactment of, and relations 
among, multiple realities.151 Thus, in this thesis standpoint is principally articulated as a 
way of situating the inquiry within a specific, locally situated “regional space” (Law & 
Mol, 2001: 619)—a particular location from which people’s activities become ‘hooked 
up’ within ruling relations, and where particular ‘versions’ of reality are enacted 
through everyday practice (Mol, 2012).152 Specifically, this project is conducted from 
the situated standpoint of people living in the Kansai region who became concerned 
about food following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster and took some action to face and deal 
with these concerns. Participants in this study self-identified as being someone living in 
the Kansai region who was “concerned about” (kanshin no aru) food following 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. While I directly invited some participants to join my study, 
others contacted me after hearing about my study from a friend, meeting me at an 
event, hearing me speak at a meeting or event, or receiving my information sheet. This 
method of recruiting resulted in a heterogeneous collection of participants with a rich 
mélange of experiences from which ruling relations and material-semiotic 
entanglements could be explicated and explored.  
 
                                                
151 This is similar to a commitment made by Law (2002: 5) who positions his study as “an 
inquiry into ontology, into what is made, rather than what is represented.”  He explains how his 
insights were drawn from Andrew Pickering’s (1993; 1995) writings on the “mangle of 
practice.”  
152 See Section 2.6.4 for more on Mol’s concept of ‘versions.’ 
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Of the twenty-one people who participated in one-on-one interviews and the twenty-
two people who participated in focus groups, ten were male, seventeen were living 
within 260 kilometers of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster in March 2011, two held a position 
within a cooperative that tests for radionuclides in food, four ran restaurants or cafés 
that tested for radionuclides, ten volunteered at citizen radiation measuring stations 
(CRMSs, 市⺠測定所, shimin sokuteisho),153 one was an freelance journalist, three 
were involved in organizing recuperation camps for children living in radioactive hot 
spots, five were plaintiffs in court cases in which nuclear refugees154 sued TEPCO and 
the Japanese government for cutting financial support based on their classification as 
‘voluntary evacuees,’ among many other experiences. As clearly articulated on my 
study’s information sheet and ethics forms, all participants knew they would be asked 
about the ways they face (mukiai) and deal with (taisho suru) concerns about food in 
their everyday lives. Given the myriad experiences I was able to learn from through my 
interviews and fieldwork, my study’s standpoint became an essential tool for grounding 




My first attempt to make contact with potential research participants was on March 11, 
2016, at events surrounding the fifth anniversary of the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster. I attended my first event in Kyoto City, accompanied by an academic 
colleague with connections to the event’s organizers and speakers. As became the case 
at the numerous other events I attended, I would exchange business cards and share my 
                                                
153 See Kimura (2016a: Chapter 4) for an overview of the locations and numbers of citizen 
radiation measuring stations (what she refers to as citizen radiation-measuring organizations or 
CRMOs) in Japan until February 2014. 
154 While people who relocated from areas with high concentrations of TEPCO’s radionuclides 
are often referred to as ‘evacuees,’ I will follow some of my participants who instead refer to 
themselves as ‘nuclear refugees’ as they are seeking long term refuge—not temporary 
reprieve—from TEPCO’s radionuclides. I discussed this issue with many of my participants 
who were classified as either ‘evacuee’ or ‘voluntary evacuee.’ Many of them also agreed that 
the term ‘evacuee’ was not adequate for describing their experiences. As we discussed the 
label, we came to notice that the term ‘refuge’ is often used when there is a visible threat posed 
by war. However, when it comes to natural disasters, the term ‘evacuee’ is often used. Through 
our discussions, it seemed that the imperceptibility of radionuclides may play a role in the 
categorization of people as ‘evacuees’ instead of ‘refugees.’ 
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information sheet with anyone who showed interest in me or my project. It was often 
the case that I was the only foreigner at these gatherings, so it was not uncommon for 
me to be approached by people wondering about my interest in the topic at hand. I 
attended over fifty events throughout the duration of my fieldwork. These events were 
gatherings large and small, including: information sessions; seminars given by doctors, 
lawyers, nuclear refugees, politicians, journalists, academics, scientists and activists; 
various kōuryūkai;155 annual meetings of CRMSs; court hearings and their subsequent 
information sessions; planning meetings for recuperation camps; English classes for 
nuclear refugees and friends; and café times at various CRMSs, just to name a few. I 
also had the opportunity to visit five CRMSs, the radiation testing station of a food 
cooperative, as well as shops, cafés and restaurants that test for, or try to address, the 
possible presence of radionuclides in food.  
 
Trains became my main mode of transportation to and from interviews and events. 
Because most events were intentionally held near public transportation to increase 
turnout, transport was never an obstacle. The CRMSs I visited were also conveniently 
located near public transport. The long hours spent on trains became an important time 
for taking field notes and reflecting on my experiences at events or in interviews. In 
particular, because of my busy schedule and inability to fully transcribe interviews right 
away, train ride reflections played an essential role in the organization of my ideas. 
Long train rides became a space for working out my developing understanding of 
people’s sociomaterial entanglements which I could then test back156 for clarification in 
follow-up dialogues or with participants in future interviews and focus groups.  
 
For example, I went to my first interviews with a number of questions to guide my 
conversations with participants. While I did not always refer to these questions during 
the interview itself, the process of creating questions prepared me for these encounters, 
and were always available to help me in putting conversations back on track if 
                                                
155 These are meetings for exchanging ideas, mingling and coming together. The three kanji 
characters that make up the word (交流会) signify ‘crossing’, ‘flowing’ and ‘meeting.’  
156 While ‘testing back’ is normal practice in institutional ethnography (see M. L. Campbell & 
Gregor, 2004: 85; DeVault & McCoy, 2002: 757), it is also a strategy used by scholars in the 
field of material semiotics—for example, Krzywoszynska (2012) who adopted it from 
grounded theory methodology. 
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necessary. On my train rides home, I would take notes (in English and Japanese), often 
using the interview questions and notes taken during interviews to guide my notetaking 
on important insights I had gained. I would also list any confusions or new questions 
that arose. When I returned home, I would update my questions for my next interview, 
making sure to include queries that needed clarification or further discussion. Through 
this process, I had the opportunity to discuss my evolving understandings of people’s 
experiences and interactions with different texts, discourses and other humans and 
more-than-humans, collaborating with my participants in clarifying or correcting my 
comprehension. 
 
Ultimately, it took me two months to set up my first interview, the first two months 
spent solely attending events, introducing myself to people and circulating my 
information sheet. While finding participants was initially a struggle, by the end of my 




In addition to research standpoint, the positioning of the researcher in institutional 
ethnography is of utmost importance. Differing from other sociological methodologies 
which envision the researcher as existing in a place beyond what is happening in the 
local setting being researched, in institutional ethnography “findings are in and of the 
same world that it investigates” (D. E. Smith, 2005: 52). That is, institutional 
ethnographers must see their own lives as embedded within the same forms of social 
organization as the everyday lives of their participants.157 Again, there have been many 
notable critiques pointing out the unfeasibility of proclaiming true “transparent 
reflexivity” about one’s positionality in research (for example, G. Rose, 1997: 305). 
Recognizing this, I feel that institutional ethnography’s focus on overtly enunciating the 
researcher’s standpoint and considering researchers as being physically positioned 
somewhere within the same materially-mediated ruling relations as their participants 
avoids this problem, as this form of positionality is not based on an assumption that 
positionality is static or fully knowable. Instead, positionality becomes an important 
                                                
157 In Smith’s (2001: 161) words, “[t]he project calls on sociologists to discover just how the 
everyday/everynight worlds we participate in are being put together in people’s local activities, 
including, of course, our own.” 
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tool for ensuring researchers view themselves as locally situated, thus explicitly 
evading the lure of the “god trick” (Haraway, 1991c: 189) in the research process.158  
 
As a foreigner who lives and conducts research in Japan, my positionality might be 
referred to as “inside outsider” (Keesing, 1992), a label that comes with many 
complications and dilemmas, especially when a researcher’s goal involves an attempt to 
‘represent’ the knowledge perspectives of a group of people (see Gregory & Ruby, 
2011; Harris, 1976). Here, I believe my research’s focus on situated processes and 
ontology (as opposed to epistemology) buffers me from such dilemmas, allowing for a 
much more fluid positionality. In addition, through adopting the concepts of standpoint 
and positionality from the field of institutional ethnography, I was able to curate a 
research project that allowed for reciprocal, fluid and collaborative engagement with 
my participants. Following Krzywoszynska (2012), a Polish scholar in the field of 
material semiotics who conducted fieldwork in Italian and wrote her thesis in English, I 
attempted to conduct my cross-lingual, cross-cultural research through a space “in-
between”—a hybrid space where understanding emerges through a fluid co-
construction among researchers and participants (F. M. Smith, 1996: 163). These 
spaces emerge out of shared “interestingness” in the project and my attempts to 
maintain a sense of collaboration and politeness throughout the research process 
(Krzywoszynska, 2012: 68).159 Both my ‘insider’ experiences and ‘outsider’ roles, 
responsibilities and ethical commitments were clearly communicated through my 
information sheet and my ethics forms prior to my interviews. All forty-three 
interviewed participants signed an ethics form160 which provided them with clear 
information on their own rights within the research process—one of these rights being 
the ability to read through and edit their interview transcript before it was used in my 
analysis.  
 
In addition, because the vocalization of any concerns about food and radioactivity 
continues to be chastised in public discourse in Japan, the ‘in-between’ became a space 
where my participants could share experiences and speak the unspeakable. I found 
                                                
158 See Section 2.6.5. 
159 Also see Despret (2005; 2008). 
160 My ethics application was reviewed and approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee. 
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Harrison’s (2000) concept of “the sensate” helpful for understanding the delicate terrain 
within which my participant recruitment and interviews took place.161 Roughly defined 
as “the relation to an outside” which “constitutes the surface on which we dwell in 
everyday life,” the concept highlights the necessity to understand the “lived present”—
whether it be the interview itself or ethnographic descriptions of people’s lived 
experiences—as “open-ended generative processes; as practice” (Harrison, 2000: 499, 
original emphasis).  Not only were the everyday experiences shared by my participants 
“fluid, turbulent and blended,”162 but so, too, were my interviews. Harrison (2000: 502, 
emphasis added) goes on to describe ‘the sensate’ as “the surface and limit of everyday 
life. It is the in-between of the ‘vague and unordered feelings or sense of context’; the 
skin, texture, and ethos of everyday life. The sensate governs the continual movement 
from the multiple to the singular.” Navigating ‘the sensate’ became an important part of 
my interviewing process which involved an exploration into the multiple and its often 
turbulent relation to the singular. Having lived in Japan for three years following 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, I was already attuned to what was ‘okay’ and ‘not okay’ to 
speak of regarding radiation and food in public spaces. During my interviews, I tried to 
create a space where people could speak openly and anonymously about their multiple 
experiences, without feeling the pressure to self-sensor. As a result, participants were 
allowed to choose the interview location, and focus groups were always assembled by 
participants themselves. While in most cases this careful curation allowed for very open 
conversations, there were always some instances when participants hesitated, looked 
around the room, or drastically lowered their voices before answering a question. Of 
course, these instances also became opportunities for better understanding people’s 
everyday experiences and their embeddedness in ruling relations.  
  
Within the ‘in-between,’ my positionality was able to shift fluidly as I worked with my 
participants to understand their experiences of konran following the onset of TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster. As an ‘insider’ I was a Japanese-as-a-second-language speaking, 
eating body163 that participated in ordering food and drink, chatting, sipping, listening, 
                                                
161 I first learned about ‘the sensate’ from reading Krzywoszynska (2015). 
162 In this quote, Kavanagh (1986) is reviewing and interpreting the work of philosopher Michel 
Serres. 
163 The term ‘eating body’ is borrowed from the title of an interdisciplinary research project 
funded by the European Research Council and led by Annemarie Mol entitled ‘The eating body 
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chewing and tasting along with my participants during our interviews and focus 
groups.164 While we all have very different experiences of konran related to eating, 
focusing on activities and processes allowed for conversations about many shared 
activities—shopping, chopping, frying, baking, seasoning, boiling, burning, packing, 
setting, serving and cleaning grime in our daily lives in Japan. As an ‘outsider’ I am a 
researcher working with a university in New Zealand who is responsible for explicating 
people’s embeddedness within heterogeneous sociomaterial and ruling relations for 
both an English speaking academic audience and, eventually, my Japanese participants. 
The fluidity inherent in these ‘in-between’ spaces helped to avoid the false assumption 
that both myself and my participants remained autonomous and unchanged throughout 
the research process. Instead, it allowed us to view the experience as processes of 
“worlding” (Tsing, 2010)—processes of collaboration and cross-cultural, cross-lingual, 




Like other material-semiotic attuned methods, institutional ethnography is not fixed in 
its form, instead allowing researchers to fluidly adopt concepts and sensibilities as 
applicable to their specific project. As DeVault and McCoy (2002: 755) put it, “[t]here 
is no ‘one way’ to conduct an [institutional ethnography] investigation; rather, there is 
an analytic project that can be realized in diverse ways.” They go on to describe how 
“investigations are rarely planned out fully in advance. Instead, the process of inquiry is 
rather like grabbing a ball of string, finding a thread, and then pulling it out” (DeVault 
& McCoy, 2002: 755). Similar metaphors have been used to discuss analytical 
processes in the field of material semiotics.165 The difference I see between these 
practices is that while institutional ethnographers are trained to follow threads of 
                                                
in Western practice and theory.’ More on the project and its findings can be found at 
http://whatiseating.com. Also see Mol (2011b) for a discussion on the tasting body.  
164 Interviews and focus groups often took place at people’s homes or at cafés, so food and 
drink were almost always involved. 
165 Haraway (2016: 3) describes a similar process used in her material-semiotic attuned 
approach: “promiscuously plucking out fibers in clotted and dense events and practices, I try to 
follow the threads where they lead in order to track them and find their tangles and patterns 
crucial for staying with the trouble in real and particular places and times.” Also see Haraway 
(1994). 
 117 
textually mediated ruling relations, material-semiotic sensibilities allow for following 
other, messier and somewhat wilder, knotted and tangled threads that make visible 
human and more-than-human sociomaterial relationality (textual and otherwise).  
 
Following the principals of institutional ethnography, I have designed my analysis so 
that it “begins in experience and returns to it, having explicated how the experience 
came to happen as it did” (M. L. Campbell, 1998: 56). However, explication will not 
involve a precise mapping of textually-mediated ruling relations, but include an 
exploration of other human and more-than-human entanglements, including how 
attempts at coordinating everyday eating follow a “logic of oscillation” (Law, 2002: 9) 
between singular ruling logics and the multiplicity of everyday experiences. Thus, 
throughout my analysis, I will be attending to the ceaseless vacillation between the 
singular and the multiple in a way that attunes to myriad heterogeneous relations, and 
tensions, contributing to my participants’ experiences of konran related to everyday 
eating following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. The following sections will provide an 




As mentioned, all interviews and focus groups in this study were conducted by myself 
in Japanese. In addition, all interviews were recorded and transcribed into Japanese 
either by myself or by a Japanese transcriptionist. Given the vast amount of data 
involved—each interview or focus group session was between 1.5 to 3 hours in 
length—this was a very time-consuming process spanning almost a year from the time 
the first interview was conducted in May 2016. However, what seemed to be long and 
arduous processes of transcription and translation turned out to create amazing 
opportunities for constant reflection into my research topic and research process.166 As 
a Japanese-as-a-second-language learner, each interchange between Japanese and 
English provided an opportunity to reflect and deepen my grasp on both the content and 
meaning of what I or my participants were trying to communicate. From translating my 
ethics forms from English to Japanese; to making corrections to these forms after 
receiving feedback from Japanese colleagues; writing and designing my Japanese 
                                                
166 See Crane (2009) and Tremlett (2009) for similar reflections. 
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information sheet; making corrections to that sheet; engaging in polite verbal and 
written Japanese correspondence with potential participants; embarrassingly realizing 
when I had made mistakes during these exchanges; conducting interviews in Japanese 
with participants; writing field notes (in a mix of English and Japanese) about these 
interviews or events; transcribing interviews into Japanese; engaging in conversations 
with my transcriptionists in English and Japanese;167 reviewing the corrections and 
feedback I received from participants who reviewed their transcripts;168 reading updates 
from participants who were unable to participate in the review; coding interview 
transcripts; translating insights from my fieldwork into an English dissertation—each 
experience, interaction or challenge that arose provided an opportunity for deeper 
reflection.169 And, of course, all of this was made possible through collaboration with 
my participants and colleagues who worked with me in discovering and making 
meaning across the two languages. 
 
Co-constructing meaning with my participants—in interviews, post-interview dialogue, 
and my strategy of ‘testing back’ ideas—created a situation where meaning was 
generated through collaboration. As someone who considers herself to be fluent in 
conversational Japanese,170 as a second-language learner there were always 
opportunities to ask for clarification on terms—whether they be for my own 
comprehension or to unravel insider language or work processes (M. L. Campbell & 
Gregor, 2004: 72). Thus, I follow Watson (2004) and Krzywoszynska (2012) in 
                                                
167 I found it interesting that in some cases my Japanese transcriptionists were not familiar with 
vocabulary my participants and I were using. That is, we were using many words related to 
radiation that they had never heard of, but that I and my participants used freely throughout our 
conversations. 
168 Participants were contacted in May 2017 and asked if they would like to review their 
transcripts before they were used in the final analysis. Of the forty-three participants, twenty-
four requested to review their transcripts. Of the people who declined the invitation, a number 
sent short updates about experiences or thoughts they believed would be of interest to my 
project. 
169 I expect that the process of translating my findings back to Japanese to share with my 
participants will add another layer to this process of reflection. 
170 I began studying Japanese in high school and returned to my studies upon moving to Japan 
for the first time in 2008. In addition to living in Japan for approximately five years, I was 
enrolled in an intensive Japanese language course for one year, passed Level-N2 of the 
Japanese-Language Proficiency Test, and passed two semesters of 300-level Japanese courses 
at the University of Otago before embarking on my PhD fieldwork.  
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acknowledging that engaging in language learning with my participants and other 
Japanese colleagues was also one method that helped to greatly enrich and deepen my 
understanding and analysis.  
 
Linguistic translation is an inherently complex, political process that needs to be taken 
seriously by researchers (see Müller, 2007; Temple, 2005). To address this, I again 
follow Krzywoszynska (2012) in adopting some tools for staying attuned to the 
political nature of translation, as well as my positionality within this process. First, in 
the spirit of collaboration and to avoid concealing the multiplicities of experiences into 
a single narrative, I attempt to preserve a sense of “polyvocality” (or multivocality) 
(Coffey, 2002) throughout the thesis. That is, instead of a sanitized narrative where I 
attempt to represent my participants by organizing them into simplified categories, I 
make an attempt to keep multiplicity and its inherent tensions alive throughout the 
pages, providing opportunities for participants to speak for themselves when possible. 
Second, in order to attend to the contingency of translation and meaning, I also adopt 
Müller’s (2007) strategy of “holus-bolus.” I employ this strategy—described as “an 
instrument to problematize the fixation of meaning through translation and draw 
attention to the contingency of meaning” (Müller, 2007: 210)—by maintaining some 
original Japanese vocabulary in my writing and explicating the meanings of these 
words in a way that allows for attending to their ‘slippery’ nature.171 Adopting this 
strategy not only prevents “premature closure” and “tacit imposition of meaning” 
(Müller, 2007: 210-11), but also highlights my own positionality in the translation 




Another step in my analysis was to clarify my study’s problematic. According to the 
principles of institutional ethnography, identifying the study’s problematic involves 
discovering troubling experiences which point to clues of a disjuncture (or a 
contradiction) existing between what people are experiencing in their everyday lives 
and the official explanations of what and how something happens (M. L. Campbell & 
                                                
171 I borrow the term from Law and Lien (2013) who use it to describe multiple objects, in their 
case the multiplicity of Atlantic salmon. 
172 ‘Polyvocality’ and ‘holus-bolus’ are also used by Krzywoszynska (2012). 
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Gregor, 2004: 48).173 Smith (2005: 41) describes the essential role of the problematic in 
institutional ethnography:   
The ethnographic problematic recognizes the real interpenetration of 
the present and immediate with the unknown elsewhere and elsewhen 
and the strange forms of power that are at once present and absent in 
the everyday. A problematic is a territory to be discovered, not a 
question that is concluded in its answer. Exploration opens up an 
institutional complex as it is relevant to the problematic. 
Thus, disjunctures provide fertile opportunities for discovering how people’s everyday 
lives are embedded within textually-mediated ruling relations, and how people 
themselves participate in those relations. 
 
Smith (1987: 49-50) refers to a disjuncture as a “point of rupture” or a “line of fault” 
which directs researchers to focus on understanding how an experience or activity “is 
organized, how it is determined, [and] what the social relations are that generate it.” 
These are instances in which “[a]n orderly and familiar local world is suddenly 
disrupted by interventions that come from outside, that have no logic within the daily 
routines and the ordinariness of local life” (D. E. Smith, 2005: 39). The problematic 
does not refer to a research question or a problem in the way it is explained by study 
participants (M. L. Campbell & Gregor, 2004). Instead, it is used as a concept “to direct 
attention to a possible set of questions that may not have been posed or a set of puzzles 
that do not yet exist in the form of puzzles but are ‘latent’ in the actualities of the 
experienced world” (D. E. Smith, 1987: 91). Thus, while materially-mediated ruling 
relations are present in people’s everyday lives, they are often invisible to those who 
participate in them and it is usually “only when something goes unaccountably wrong 
that we stop and notice the organized complexity of our lives that we otherwise 
navigate so easily” (M. L. Campbell & Gregor, 2004: 31).  
 
I believe the concepts of “breakdowns” (Latour, 2005), “ruptures” (Krzywoszynska, 
2012), “interferences” (Mol, 2002: 142-9) and “controversies” (Mol, 2002: 88-100; 
                                                
173 The original concept of the problematic in institutional ethnography was taken from Louis 
Althusser (1971). See Smith (2005: 38) for further explanation. 
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Callon et al. 2009 : Chapter 1) discussed in the field of material semiotics both 
complement and enhance the concept of disjuncture. In this thesis, it is people’s 
experiences of konran that point me to disjunctures in their experiences. Disjunctures 
are useful for directing my attention to textually mediated attempts to coordinate my 
participant’s activities, some of which may need to be explicated to understand how 
they are entangled within trans-local, textually-mediated ruling relations. However, the 
concepts of ‘breakdowns’ or ‘ruptures’ are also helpful for attuning me to myriad other 
human and more-than-humans that participate in enacting situated experiences or 
objects. While multiple experiences, ways of ordering and versions of objects may be 
able to ‘hang together’ (Mol, 2002: 5) in some instances, new actors on the scene can 
multiply enactments and exacerbate tensions. Mol (2002: 121) explains: “where two or 
three modes of ordering, two or three ways of enacting a specific object meet: there is 
interference.” 
 
If interferences proliferate “when two (or more) practices which enact a particular 
‘object’ contradict or clash with each other” (Krzywoszynska, 2012: 65), then 
ethnographic inquiry into people’s experiences of konran provide opportunities to 
discover the myriad actors contributing to, though often not attended to, in these 
experiences. It is also an opportunity to uncover traces of actors that are silenced, 
ignored or “muted” (Latour, 2005) through attempts at ordering. ‘Muting’ usually takes 
place when something that is multiple and partial is translated into a “single reality” 
(Mol, 2002: 87), or unquestioned “matters of fact” (Latour, 2005: 114).174 Thus, a 
blending of insights from institutional ethnography and material semiotics provides a 
space to ethnographically explore the tensions and incompatibilities that emerge when 
standardized, single-reality wielding attempts to ‘control' and direct activities enter the 
everyday, where specific, local, messy and multiple realities are enacted through 
careful forms of ‘tinkering’ within heterogeneous sociomaterial relations. Put 
differently, attuning to everyday experiences using sensibilities from these two fields of 
scholarship is expected to expose seemingly stable ‘matters of fact’ as being 
heterogeneous sociomaterial assemblages—or ‘matters of concern.’ And once 
                                                
174 According to Latour (2005: 114, original emphasis), simplified, black-boxed ‘matters of 
fact’ contrast greatly with emergent “matters of concern”—“[w]hile highly uncertain and 
loudly disputed, these real, objective, atypical and, above all, interesting agencies are taken not 
exactly as object but rather as gatherings.”  
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seemingly singular ‘maters of fact’ are exposed as ‘matters of concern,’ a further step 
can be made to attend to the vigilant forms of care involved in living within these 
entanglements, exposing them to be what de la Bellacasa (2011) has termed “matters of 
care.”175 
 
As mentioned in my literature review, food possibly containing industrial toxins has a 
particularly disruptive agency given its simultaneous vital and vicious enactments, 
which can destabilize modernist ontological framings of ‘rational choice’ and ‘control.’ 
This disruption can lead to experiences of konran throughout the agrifood assemblage, 
from food safety officials to producers, manufacturers, and even people purchasing and 
ingesting these foods located far distances from toxic overflows themselves. In this 
study, the problematic originally arose from my own experience176 of konran related to 
everyday eating following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster (see Chapter 1). Though my 
partner and I were living in the Kansai region, 600 kilometers from the nuclear disaster, 
we found ourselves as active participants in an agrifood assemblage, compelled to 
understand our new relationship with historically reemerging actors: anthropogenic 
radionuclides. My awareness that we were embedded within complex sociomaterial 
relations was accompanied with a burning curiosity to understand how my own 
experiences were ‘hooked up’ within the greater ruling relations. However, as a 
foreigner living with my Japanese partner, I wanted to include the experiences of other 
locally situated people in my study—people whose own particular experiences of 
konran and experiences of eating in post-2011 Japan could enrich my analysis.  
 
In order to address the multiple experiences of konran felt by myself and my research 
participants, the institutional ethnographic problematic guiding my analysis has 
                                                
175 According to de la Bellacasa (2011), ‘care’ cannot be considered abstractly in the way 
‘concern’ might. Thus, attending to care involves exploring situated experiences within messy 
sociomaterial entanglements, where the ethics of what is attended to and what is not become 
essential. The art of representing ‘matters of care’ also becomes an ethical and political 
question which researchers must grapple with. De la Bellacasa (2011: 94) describes: “To 
represent matters of care is an aesthetic and political move in the way of re-presenting things 
that problematizes the neglect of caring relationalities in an assemblage.” 
176 It is common for institutional ethnographers to include auto-ethnographic accounts of their 
own experiences within textually-mediated ruling relations (for example, M. L. Campbell & 
Gregor, 2004; S. M. Turner, 2003a). 
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developed as: How is everyday eating being coordinated following TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster? This question was expected to open up the institutional complex to allow me 
to explore and trace materially-mediated ruling relations from the experiences of 
konran felt by myself and shared by my participants. However, this problematic also 
paved the way for using sensibilities from material semiotics for exploring two further 
questions pertinent to eating following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster: First, how do 
multiple ‘safe foods’ emerge and relate to each other in practice? Second, how do 
experiences of konran emerge through these ruling relations and how do processes of 
highlighting or muting relations among actors—human and more-than-human—
contribute to people’s suffering? These guiding questions, paired with sensibilities 
from both fields of scholarship, provided me with a clear objective, yet an unrestricted 
pathway for entering the diaspora of heterogeneous material relations contributing to 
my participants’, and my own, experiences of konran following TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster.  
 
3.3.2.3 Rhizomes,	 ‘folded	 time’	 and	 sympoiesis:	 Re-entangling	 the	 ‘established	
disorder’	
Mapping is a common metaphor to describe the analytical work involved in conducting 
an institutional ethnography. Smith (2005: 29, original emphasis) describes institutional 
ethnography as 
a method of inquiry into the social that proposes to enlarge the scope 
of what becomes visible from that site, mapping the relations that 
connect one local site to others. Like a map, it aims to be through and 
through indexical to the local sites of people's experience, making 
visible how we are connected into the extended social relations of 
ruling and economy and their intersections.  
That is, the practice of mapping used in institutional ethnographic analyses involves 
tracing people’s embeddedness, and participation, within textually-mediated ruling 
relations.  
 
Adopting insights from the field of material semiotics, I draw on Deleuze and Guattari 
(2004) to problematize and differentiate between the practices of tracing ruling 
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relations and explicating a rhizomatic map177 of heterogeneous relational materiality. In 
the introduction to their book A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (2004) use 
the image of a rhizome as a tool for visualizing the messy, overlapping relations and 
entanglements among heterogeneous humans and more-than humans within an 
assemblage. Here, I adopt the concept of a rhizomatic map—or the “rhizome-root 
assemblage” (2004: 16)—as a metaphor for imagining the ‘established disorder’ within 
which ruling relations are deployed. According to Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 15), a 
focused tracing of ruling relations alone risks concealing multiplicity and the myriad 
heterogeneous actors participating in enactments and happenings. The authors use the 
images of trees and roots, with their stable root-tree structure, to represent single-reality 
ordering projects which can be traced—or as the authors put it, “the tree or root […] 
plots a point, fixes an order” (2004: 7).  Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 15) expound:     
The tracing has already translated the map into an image; it has 
already transformed the rhizome into roots and radicles. It has 
organized, stabilized, neutralized the multiplicities according to the 
axes of significance and subjectification belonging to it. It has 
generated, structuralized the rhizome, and when it thinks it is 
reproducing something else it is in fact only reproducing itself. That 
is why the tracing is so dangerous. It injects redundancies and 
propagates them. What the tracing reproduces of the map or rhizome 
are only the impasses, blockages, incipient taproots, or points of 
structuration.  
In making this distinction between tracing and mapping, I am in no way accusing 
institutional ethnographers of using the method of tracing in a way that reproduces the 
ruling relations they are attempting to explicate—disrupting these ruling relations is of 
course the explicit goal of their analytical project. However, because one of the goals of 
this thesis is to engage in and provoke ontological politics, analysis will entail not only 
                                                
177 Greiller (2013) uses a technique of rhizomatic mapping in a study to problematize student 
learning approaches at an Australian university. There are a number of other scholars who have 
been working in the field of rhizomatics and rhizomatic analysis (Grosz, 1993; Lather, 1997; 
Smitka, 2012). In a way that is different from these authors, I adopt the concept of the 
rhizomatic map in an attempt to conceptualize the heterogeneous relational materiality of the 
‘established disorder’ which I attempt to explicate. 
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the tracing of ruling relations, but attuning my participants to their embeddedness 
within a wider assemblage of heterogeneous sociomaterial entanglements. Thus, in my 
analysis I adopt sensibilities and tools from both institutional ethnography and material 
semiotics in taking up Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004: 14, original emphasis) call to put 
tracings “back on the map”—referring, of course, to a rhizomatic map where the 
multiplicity and singularity that make up the ‘established disorder’ co-exist and clash in 
practice.  
 
An embodiment of historical contingency, the rhizomatic map “has no beginning or 
end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004: 27, original emphasis). Thus, I required a clear strategy for entering and 
explicating the rhizome. How to begin? Contemplating their own arguments, the 
authors ponder: “If it is true that it is of the essence of the map or rhizome to have 
multiple entryways, it is plausible that one could even enter them through tracings […], 
assuming the necessary precautions are taken” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 16). These 
precautions involve a staunch commitment to “[plugging] the tracings back into the 
map, [connecting] the roots or trees back up with a rhizome” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2004: 15). In this thesis, I adopt the ‘logic of oscillation’ to attend to the vacillation 
between the singular (the tree, ruling relations) and the multiple (the rhizome, the 
diaspora of heterogeneous material relationality) that constitute the ‘established 
disorder.’ That is, in tracing ruling relations, I will also be exploring “at what point in 
the rhizome there form phenomena of massification, bureaucracy, leadership, 
fascization, etc., which lines nevertheless survive if only underground, continuing to 
make rhizome in the shadows” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 16). This means that as I 
trace textually-mediated ruling relations—and the single reality they attempt diffuse 
and coordinate—I am simultaneously attending to other ‘ghostly’ and ‘monstrous’ 
sociomaterial relations that are being ignored or shunned to ‘the shadows,’ as well as 
the forms of suffering this exclusion might cause. 
 
The concept of ‘folded time’ offered by philosopher Michel Serres seems to be a good 
place to begin rhizomatic explorations for those of us working within the confines of 
tree traces. According to Serres, time is not necessarily linear, homogenous or 
predictable through metrics, but folded, heterogeneous, stochastic and complex. In a 
translated conversation with Bruno Latour, he describes his concept of time:  
 126 
Time does not always flow according to a line […] nor according to a 
plan but, rather, according to an extraordinary complex mixture, as 
though it reflected stopping points, ruptures, deep wells, chimneys of 
thunderous acceleration, rendings, gaps—all sown at random, at least 
in a visible disorder. […] [E]very historical era is likewise 
multitemporal, simultaneously drawing from the obsolete, the 
contemporary and the futuristic. An object, a circumstance, is thus 
polychromic, multitemporal, and reveals time that is gathered 
together, with multiple pleats. (Serres, Latour, & Lapidus, 2011: 57-
60) 
Serres goes on to use the metaphor of a handkerchief—one crumpled and folded, and 
another meticulously ironed-out—to differentiate between time as it is experienced by 
people in their everyday lives and time as mapped out through metrics and ruling 
logics: 
Classical time is related to geometry, having nothing to do with 
space, […] but with metrics. On the contrary, take your inspiration 
from topology, and perhaps you will discover the rigidity of those 
proximities and distances you consider arbitrary. And their 
simplicity, in the literal sense of the word pli [fold]: it's simply the 
difference between topology (the handkerchief is folded, crumpled, 
shredded) and geometry (the same fabric is ironed out flat). As we 
experience time […] it resembles this crumpled version much more 
than the flat, overly simplified one. Admittedly, we need the latter for 
measurements, but why extrapolate from it a general theory of time? 
People usually confuse time and the measurement of time, which is a 
metrical reading on a straight line. (Serres et al., 2011: 60-1, original 
emphasis) 
Inspired by Serres’ linguistic play, I turned to an online etymology dictionary178 to 
explore the root pli. According to the dictionary, pli comes from the Latin term plicare 
which means ‘to fold’ or ‘to weave.’ The word is also similar to the Latin term plectere 
which is ‘to weave, braid, twine, entwine.” These terms can be found in the words 
                                                
178 https://www.etymonline.com 
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simplify (to make one fold), complicate (to fold/weave/entwine with/together), multiply 
(to make many folds) and even explicate (to unfold). Here we get to the crux of the 
concept of folded time. It is not simple (one fold), but multiple (many folds) and 
complex (intertwined, interwoven, entangled). If modern science and industrial 
progress projects of the Capitalocene and the Anthropocene depend on linear, 
simplified conceptualizations of time (a singular fold, or a singular trace within which 
all must fit), it requires that the existing multiple, messy entanglements and stochastic 
realities be ironed out, overlooked, ignored. My participants and myself live our 
everyday lives acting and being enacted within the simplified tree traces—traceable 
through textually-mediated ruling relations. However, the stories my participants 
shared in interviews and focus group sessions revealed how they experience time as 
much more folded—past experiences and concerns about the future were all mixed up 
in a thick, crumpled present. Taking seriously the multiple experiences of my 
participants would, thus, involve attending to both linear and folded time. The 
analytical work of putting simplified traces of trees back onto the complex, multiple 
rhizome would necessarily involve both explicating (unfolding) the tree’s traces and re-
complicating (re-entangling) these traces. The conception of a vital institutional 
ethnography is just that: combining institutional ethnography’s goals of explication 
with material semiotics’ interest in re-entanglement.  
 
The differences between the tree and the rhizome could also be described as what 
Haraway (2016; 2017)—drawing on M. Beth Dempster (1998)—distinguishes as a 
difference between autopoietic stories and systems, and those that are sympoietic. 
While processes of autopoiesis enact realities where autonomous, atomized units 
produce and reproduce themselves within a harmonious, controllable and predictable 
whole, sympoiesis acknowledges the complex material-semiotic entanglements—the 
human and more-than-human collaborations involved in enacting objects, happenings 
and biological life itself. While autopoietic stories tend to be linear—and are thus never 
complete179—their contingency and dependency on material semiotic relationality is not 
always acknowledged within their stories of control and predictability. Sympoietic 
stories, on the other hand, do not imagine that everything fits into a romantically 
                                                
179 See Haraway (2016: 185, n54). 
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harmonious whole, the ‘intra-activity’180 among myriad heterogeneous collaborators 
imbue them with an enduring element of surprise or spontaneity—a performance of the 
“becoming-with” that both Isabelle Stengers (2011: 134) and Donna Haraway (2016: 
40; 2017: M26) speak of. In fact, the term sympoiesis, itself, means “making with” 
(Haraway, 2016: 58). While autopoietic and sympoietic stories often enact frictions 
(aggravated tensions in the Annemarie Mol sense), these frictions can also be 
generative (‘creative frictions’ in the Anna Tsing sense) (Haraway, 2017: M27; Mol, 
2012: 11; Tsing, 2005: x-4). Scientific knowledge and technologies produced within 
and through processes of autopoiesis may also be necessary for carefully working 
within sympoietic processes—especially in dealing with the overflows of toxic 
materials produced through autopoietic scientific processes—and, thus, should not be 
seen as antagonistic or oppositional to each other (see Haraway, 2017: M27). It is 
within a healthy interplay and oscillation between autopoietic and sympoietic stories 
and processes that opportunities for ‘creative frictions’ emerge. Thus, problems arise 
when this oscillation becomes static and stale, and only one form of storytelling is 
taken as the single, ‘correct’ way to enact reality—for example, when only autopoietic 
stories are acknowledged and sympoietic relationalities are discounted, disregarded or 
blatantly ignored. 
 
Anchored by my study’s standpoint, I have structured my analysis as a journey into the 
greater ‘established disorder,’ where I engage in tracing ruling relations while at the 
same time attempting to tell complex stories which highlight their entanglement within 
greater material-semiotic rhizomatic relations. While my background and analysis 
chapters (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) vary in focus, each engages in some way with the 
oscillation between the singular and the multiple. In attuning to the oscillations between 
the singular and the multiple, the autopoietic and the sympoietic realities acting and 
being enacted within the ‘established disorder,’ I hope to open possibilities for thinking 
differently about my participants’ experiences of konran following TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster.  
 
                                                
180 See Barad (2007; 2017) and Section 2.6.2. 
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3.3.2.4 Making	sense	from	within	the	textual	complex	
Following other studies in institutional ethnography, analytical thinking for this project 
began during fieldwork, where I would listen for hints of social coordination through 
my interviews and when attending events. Most of my initial analytical insights were 
captured in my field (train) notes and provided the basis for later coding of interview 
transcripts. Japanese interview transcripts were coded using the qualitative software 
program MAXQDA. While I used the features of MAXQDA to search for specific 
terms and hone in on certain areas of interest, my goal was to discover and code 
“chunks of data” (M. L. Campbell & Gregor, 2004: 92)—as opposed to isolated 
extracts—that contain contextualized accounts that were useful in deepening my 
understanding of the research problematic and guiding questions.  
 
Given the vast amount of textual data I was dealing with, I used my field notes to guide 
my initial attempts at coding. I began by trying to trace ruling texts and discourses that 
seemed to tie my participants into greater ruling relations by writing stories based on 
my field notes. Food safety metrics, food labels, discourses of fūhyōhigai (harmful 
rumors that lead to economic damage) and fukkō (recovery, reconstruction, 
revitalization), school lunch regulations, mass media news coverage, advertisements 
asking people to support the people of Fukushima by eating, just to name a few. It was 
clear that my participants were constantly relating to a barrage of institutional texts and 
discourses that infiltrated their everyday experiences. I began to question, what was the 
best string to follow to address my research problematic in a way that would be of most 
use and interest to my participants?  
 
I consider this thesis to be a co-constructed text as the experiences, knowledge and 
folded descriptions offered by my participants inspired my writing, directing me toward 
the strings that needed to be followed to explicate ruling relations, as well as other 
ghostly and monstrous sociomaterial entanglements that needed to be attended to.181 
While I was unable to incorporate quotations from all of my participants within this 
                                                
181 For example, the stories from my participants who were children during the time of 
hydrogen bomb testing in the Pacific, who were raising children during the Chernobyl nuclear 
disaster, or who lived through previous radiological overflows were especially informative. 
Many of my participants also taught me a lot about Japan’s long history of industrial pollution, 
insights which helped greatly as I myself explored these incidents. 
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thesis, insights that arose throughout all of my interviews and focus groups are woven 
within the body of this text, and the text itself designed in a way to provide insights that 
will be useful in some way to all of my study’s participants. Thus, direct quotations 
were not chosen as a way to represent a number of perspectives about radiation and 
food, but based on their ability to highlight how ruling relations—within which all of 
my participants participate—are enacted in practice. The analytic projects of both 
explicating my study’s problematic and re-entangling my participants within ghostly 
and monstrous sociomaterial relations have shaped the following four chapters 
(Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). 
 
In Chapter 4, I situate my participant’s current experiences living in the aftermath of 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster within Japan’s long history of industrial pollution. In 
retelling entangled stories that highlight the ghostly and monstrous sociomaterial 
entanglements and the role of ruling texts in muting humans and more-than-humans 
living within industrial ruins, I collect insights that help to guide the analytic projects of 
explication and re-entanglement I undertake in in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
All of my study’s participants were concerned in some way about the origins and 
scientific validity of the 100 Bq/kg reference limit for radionuclides in food, a metric 
used to ensure the ‘safety’ of the foods lining supermarket shelves my participants 
visited. Thus, in Chapter 5, I follow a string from these experiences into the vast 
institutional complex of radiation protection standards which participate in coordinating 
all of my participants’ everyday eating practices, but which are decided extra-locally.  
Through the process of explicating how these ruling relations evolved and are enacted, 
I highlight many of the ghostly and monstrous entanglements which are obfuscated 
within the ruling relations.  
 
In Chapter 6, I follow another string from my participants’ experiences, this time 
explicating how both radionuclides and my participants’ concerns about food ‘safety’ 
are muted through various enactments of ‘safe food.’ Here, telling entangled stories that 
highlight the humans and more-than-humans that participate in the multiple enactments 
of ‘safe food’ helps to illustrate how everyday eating is being coordinated in post-2011 
Japan. Finally, in Chapter 7, I again step back to take a broader view, telling entangled 
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stories of how my study’s participants carefully enact their lives within the constrictive 
ruling relations explicated in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
3.4 Into	the	‘established	disorder’	
In this methods chapter, I have illustrated the need for an innovative method that allows 
for disrupting modernist ways of conceptualizing experiences of konran related to 
eating in the aftermath of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. Borrowing sensibilities and tools 
from the fields of institutional ethnography and material semiotics, I have attempted to 
sketch out my conception of a method—a vital institutional ethnography—I believe is 
up to the challenge.  
 
Through the following four chapters, I will lead the audience of this thesis into the 
‘established disorder’ of human and more-than-human sociomaterial relationality from 
which my participant’s experiences of konran emerge. Following the ‘logic of 
oscillation,’ I will attempt to explicate my study’s problematic in a way that allows 
readers to notice and attune to people’s sociomaterial entanglements and the tensions 
and inconsistencies inherent in their everyday experiences, without attempting to 
smooth them over or explain the differences away. My goal is to create a narrative that 
holds true to the multiplicity inherent in the contingent histories and histories-in-the-








Hirata Madoka (pseudonym) was in Koriyama City in Fukushima Prefecture, taking 
care of her newborn baby and three-year-old son at the time of the earthquake on 
March 11, 2011. Koriyama is located approximately 60 kilometers due west of 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, and suffered not only from earthquake damage, but also 
radioactive fallout—though no official evacuation notice was deployed. At the time of 
the disaster, Madoka knew very little about radioactivity, and, like many of my 
participants, was not acutely aware of the nuclear power plants in her prefecture of 
residence. Because her home was destroyed by the earthquake, she was living in an 
evacuation center with her children and husband when the nuclear disaster began. With 
no internet, all she could rely on was the TV news and her own knowledge about 
nuclear power and radioactivity.  
My knowledge about nuclear power was that it was safe and clean, 
and that there was absolutely no chance that an accident would 
occur. That’s all I knew. I didn’t know how to deal with [a nuclear 
disaster]. So information was flowing from the TV, from news media 
and whatnot. The government’s instructions were being announced, 
that’s all I had to listen to. While on one hand they were announcing, 
“There will be no immediate health effects,” the circular zone [for 
evacuation and calls for residents to stay indoors] was 2 kilometers, 
3 kilometers, 20 kilometers, 30 kilometers. It was getting closer. So, it 
was very scary. 
She describes how calls for ‘reconstruction’ and ‘revitalization’ [fukkō] 182 were being 
made almost directly after the onset of the nuclear disaster, at the same time that she 
                                                
182 The term fukkō is made up of the kanji characters of fu (復) ‘return’ and ko (興) ‘arise’ or 
‘amusement.’ While the term is often used to describe physical ‘reconstruction’ or ‘recovery’ 
following a disaster, it also refers to a ‘revitalization’ or ‘revival’ of the activity and energy of a 
place. In fact, the term ‘revitalization’ is the translation for fukkō used by the Fukushima 
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was trying to apprehend and enact her new relationship with the invisible radionuclides 
now swirling around her neighborhood.  
From the outset, there was the earthquake, the explosions. Within a 
month it was like “Keep Trying Tōhoku [Ganbarō Tōhoku]!” 
“Reconstruction/Revitalization [fukkō]!” “All Fukushima [Ōru 
Fukushima]!” “All Eastern Japan [Ōru higashi Nihon]!” “All Japan 
[Ōru Jyapan]!” It was totalitarian-like. Reconstruction [fukkō], 
bonds [kizuna], keep trying [ganbarō]. Since immediately after [the 
disaster], this was the customary grand chorus. Therefore, to even 
start thinking about evacuating gave you an extreme feeling of guilt. 
There was already a hurdle. It wasn’t only radioactivity and all of 
that. In a place where [the message is] “keep trying [ganbarō],” 
“head toward the goal of reconstruction [fukkō wo mezashite],” it 
was like you were running away and turning your back on everyone, 
exactly like a traitor [hikokumin]. It was a sequential reconstruction 
[fukkō]. Bonds [kizuna], keep trying [ganbarō], buy to support [katte 
ōen], eat to support [tabete ōen], go to support [itte ōen],183 all of it. 
It was pressuring us not to leave. 
The term hikokumin, Madoka went on to explain, literally translates as ‘not a citizen’ 
and was used to describe those people who were not swept up by the drumbeats of war 
in 1945, seventy-one years before our interview. She also described how the chorus of 
                                                
Prefectural Government on their English language website: 
http://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/site/portal-english/. 
183 This is referring to the major efforts put into increasing tourism in Fukushima Prefecture 
following the nuclear disaster. 
 134 
ganbarō184 and fukkō began coordinating activities around the city.185 First, the phrase 
“keep trying toward reconstruction [ganbattemasu fukkō ni]” was broadcast on TV 
news. In April preschools and elementary schools opened as usual with their entrance 
ceremonies. Local news outlets encouraged people to keep trying (ganbarō) and to 
work toward reconstruction (fukkō). Roads and bridges destroyed by the earthquake 
were being repaired. Messages of “keep trying Tōhoku [ganbarō Tōhoku]” were 
broadcast by large supermarket chains which were back in business. Glass windows 
shattered in the earthquakes were covered with sheets spelling out GA-N-BA-RO-U, 
FU-KKŌ, O-O-RU JYA-PA-N. While outside of her new home, the rhythm of everyday 
life seemed to be progressing as people were swept up in a flood of nationalistic 
solidarity and a reconstruction spirit, Madoka was struggling to care for her children: 
I also feel like I was trying my best [ganbarō]. I am a mother, so at 
the same time doing my best meant I had to bring my children outside 
to play. I had a 3-year-old so I had to periodically get him in the sun, 
hang out the bedding [futon]. But I couldn’t hang them out. I couldn’t 
put them outside. [We] didn’t step one foot outside. We were like 
moles. Even though we sealed up the room and confined ourselves 
inside, radioactivity flew about. We didn’t turn on the ventilation fan. 
                                                
184 The term ganbarō has been translated in many ways, ranging from “Stay strong” (Tsuiki et 
al., 2012: 558), to “Let’s hang on” (Shindo, 2014: 17), “Let’s do our best” (Hommerich, 2012: 
48), “Don’t give up” (Hornung, 2011: 1; Kimura, 2017: 461), “Hang in there” (R. Pringle, 
2011: 24), “Keep it up” (“Silenced by gaman,” 2011), and even "It's hard, but keep trying! 
Together we'll succeed! Go! Go! Go!" (specifically referring to the phrase ganbarō yo that was 
activated in discourse following the greatly destructive and deadly 1995 Hanshin earthquake in 
Kobe, Japan) (Hanson, 1999: 43). The mutable meaning of the word means that it sometimes 
changes connotation depending on the situation. I follow the author of an article published in 
The Economist which uses the phrases “keep it up” as the message being deployed by the 
authorities in post-2011 discourse, as it highlights the plea for people to endure (gaman suru) 
the hardships they are facing and continue to perform their everyday lives as usual (“Silenced 
by gaman,” 2011). It points to the need for the struggle to be a collective act of perseverance 
(see Samuels, 2013). That said, I may use some of the other translations for this word 
depending on the connotations intended by my participants, which sometimes differ from the 
meaning deployed in ruling texts and discourses. 
185 Others have also pointed out the instantaneity of the deployment and activation of term such 
as ganbarō (for example, Samuels, 2013). 
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We didn’t open the windows. It’s completely bizarre. It’s not the 
occasion to have “keep trying [ganbarō]” plastered onto windows. 
I then asked her what she did about food in the early days after the onset of the nuclear 
disaster. Not knowing much about radioactivity, Madoka explained that she did not 
know how to carefully enact her relationship with radionuclides at the outset. 
I was really wondering, what should I eat? First, there was no water. 
Not even bottled water at the supermarket. So there was only tap 
water to drink. Next, vegetables. […] People [at the evacuation 
shelter] were talking about putting harvested vegetables in a barn or 
a shed, and quickly picking all vegetables currently growing because 
radiation was falling. […] So for food, I first stopped buying 
vegetables. Then, about contaminated water and such, I didn’t know 
about that yet. […] I was experiencing disorder [konran] about my 
cooking tools. My house was wrecked by the earthquake, so I didn’t 
have many household goods. So we ate boil-in-the-bag foods. I care 
about additives in foods, but I didn’t care for the time being, we just 
ate what we had. […] But I didn’t know much about radioactivity. If 
you boil radioactivity, like bacteria, you can eliminate it. That was 
my level [of understanding].  
Though Madoka was overwhelmed with the vast efforts involved in taking care of a 
newborn baby and a 3-year-old, she was paying attention to the restrictions on food 
being announced by the government, alongside the experiences of local farmers. In 
particular, she remembers hearing the news about the farmer in Sukagawa (a city just 
south of Koriyama) who committed suicide after finding out vegetables he had sold 
were over the ‘provisional reference limits.’ Madoka went on to share how back in 
2011 she also noticed the suffering of the dairy farmers living nearby, and connected 
their experiences with that of her own as a breastfeeding mother: 
The dairy farmers, I watched as they had to keep milking the dairy 
cows so they wouldn’t die, but cried as they discarded the milk onto 
their fields. I deeply thought, hey, [the cows are] mammals. I’m also 
a mammal because I’m feeding my daughter breastmilk. But she also 
drinks the water. It’s the same, no? So milk was also out. For myself 
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also, I didn’t know how much exposure I had received. But I was 
feeding [my daughter]. I remember feeling really afraid. 
Despite the deafening chorus summoning people to stay, endure and rebuild their city 
in solidarity, Madoka carefully observed her surroundings. Not only did she notice the 
suffering of local farmers, but that there were no children outside in her neighborhood, 
no children in the parks. While at first she did not notice people leaving, it soon became 
clear that a number of people were—though sometimes it was only a brief escape over 
the weekends. In May, Madoka herself relocated to the Kansai region with her two 
children, though her husband stayed behind to work and live in Koriyama City. She 
classifies herself as boshi hinansha (⺟⼦避難者), referring to a configuration of 
mothers who sought or continue to seek refuge for their children outside of radioactive 
hot spots, leaving their husbands behind—possibly because the men need to continue 
working to support their family, have work or community duties and obligations they 
do not want to abandon, or have separated or divorced their wives, often due to 
perspectival debates.186  
 
In this chapter, I will situate my participant’s experiences of konran following 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster in 2011 within Japan’s long history of industrial pollution 
and industrial ruination. In her book The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the 
Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins, Tsing (2015: 6) uses the concept of “ruins” to 
                                                
186 Of the boshi hinansha I interviewed, all of their partners were supportive of their decision to 
leave and protect their children. However, there were, of course, a number of strains on all 
aspects of their family relations. There were people who told me that they were so 
overwhelmed with everyday life as a nuclear refugee with no financial support that they hardly 
ever speak to their partners. One woman I spoke with brought most of her children with her 
from Fukushima Prefecture to the Kansai region, but her eldest child refused to come, staying 
behind with her father. She was already in high school and did not want to leave her friends. 
Others had to tempt their children with trips to Disneyland and trips to hot springs before they 
would agree to relocate. While relocating with a young child has its own set of challenges, it 
was definitely easier as the children followed without many complaints. Ripping children away 
from their schools and friends was just one of the many challenges for people trying to seek 
refuge from TEPCO’s radionuclides. The bullying of refugee children at schools has also been 
a challenge for those families who have relocated (for example, AFP New Agency, 2017). 
However, the bullying does not stop in schools, but permeates throughout the everyday 
experiences of nuclear refugees. As just one example, in April 2017, the Reconstruction 
Minister told reporters asking questions on behalf of the ‘voluntary evacuees’ to “shut up!” at a 
press conference (“Minister yells,” 2017).  
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refer to physically damaged landscapes produced through the enactment of industrial 
progress projects. She points out how both simplification and alienation are essential 
ingredients for enacting these projects and, thus, the ruins they leave in their wake: 
“simplification for alienation produces ruins, spaces of abandonment for asset 
production.” Exploring the “world-making projects”187 of matsutake mushrooms—a 
delectable delicacy in Japan which also happen to be an efficient bioaccumulator of 
radionuclides—Tsing (2015: 131) illustrates how “salvage rhythms” sometimes take 
over when the drumbeats of progress become faint as capitalist investors abandon the 
ruins they create. While industrial projects tend to require progress stories presented on 
a linear, forward-moving trajectory where imagined human subjects and natural objects 
can participate in harmonious unison, the temporality of ‘salvage rhythms,’ Tsing 
(2015: 131-2) argues, is much messier and diffuse: “without the singular, forward pulse 
of progress, the unregularized coordination of salvage is what we have.”  
 
The concepts of ‘ruins’ and ‘salvage’ not only attune us to the destruction, 
contamination and precarity188 enacted through industrial progress projects, but how 
stories of ‘progress’ and conceptualizations of human bodies as both ‘liberal’ and 
‘autonomous’ participate in these enactments. However, industrial overflows189 disrupt 
this linear, forward-moving trajectory, creating konran in the lives of humans and 
more-than-humans caught in their wake. A historical lens reveals how, far from being 
an experience particular to the aftermath of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, experiences of 
konran following industrial overflows have been faced by humans and more-than-
humans throughout the history of Japan. In fact, overflows of industrial toxins have 
been producing industrial ruins throughout the Japanese archipelago dating back to at 
least the 1600s.  
 
In the following sections, I follow Tsing (2017b: 8) in using various historical “high 
seats” to explore sociomaterial entanglements within Japan’s industrial ruins, with a 
particular focus on people’s entanglements within industrial toxins and textually-
mediated ruling relations. Guided by insights from both the fields of institutional 
                                                
187 See Tsing (2015: Chapter 1). 
188 Here, I borrow the definition of precarity provided by Tsing (2015: 2) who describes it as 
“life without the promise of stability.” 
189 I borrow the concept of ‘overflow’ from Callon et al. (2009). Also see Section 2.6.4. 
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ethnography and material semiotics, I will retell these stories in a way that highlights 
how overflows of industrial toxins cause suffering in the everyday lives of people 
forced to live within industrial ruins, and how textually-mediated ruling relations 
interfere in people’s attempts to enact their everyday lives within complex, messy and 
contaminated spaces. I then turn to a short reflection on monstrous entanglements 
before discussing the implications of attuning to the materiality of toxins and texts in 
the aftermath of TEPCO’s industrial overflow.  
 
4.2 Industrial	toxins	and	institutional	texts	enter	‘the	myriad	things’	
I take the Edo era as my first high seat for exploring sociomaterial entanglements 
within industrial ruins. Spanning from 1603 to 1868, the Edo era was a period of 
feudalistic ruling relations in Japan in which a centralized Tokugawa shogunate 
employed Neo-Confucian ideologies of social harmony and respect of hierarchies in an 
attempt to coordinate the activities of humans and more-than-humans. At the top of the 
hierarchy sat the emperor, and at the bottom the lowest cast—derogatively referred to 
as burakumin (hereafter ‘outcasts’), a categorization which contained an even lower 
classification of people referred to as hinin (“non-persons”) (Thomas, 2010: 36). The 
period is described as ‘early modern’ as it signaled a change in how people related to 
each other, their country and their sociomaterial entanglements (B. L. Walker, 2015). 
While there were various terms used within philosophical texts to describe 
sociomaterial entanglements during the Tokugawa period, the term shizen—now a 
common term for ‘nature’ which is used to describe “the natural environment [shizen 
kankyō]”—seems to have been scarcely mentioned (Thomas, 2010: 312-3). Instead, 
terms such as manbutsu (万物—“the myriad objects” or ‘the myriad things’), tenka (天
下—“all under heaven”)190 and kaibutsu (開物—“the opening up of things”) were used 
to describe the situated sociomateriality human bodies found themselves entangled 
within (Morris-Suzuki, 1991; Thomas, 2001).  
 
                                                
190 Interestingly, the same kanji characters make up the word amakudari (天下り—“descendant 
from heaven”), a word that refers to the established institution in which Japanese government 
officials are guaranteed an industry position upon retirement, usually within the same industries 
that they were once responsible for regulating (Aldrich, 2013: 254; Colignon, 2003; Lim, 2012: 
14). 
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Thinking through material-semiotic sensibilities, I find the concept of manbutsu of 
particular interest. Made up of the characters man (万)—‘10,000’ or ‘myriad’—and 
butsu (物)—‘thing,’ ‘object,’ ‘figure’—the term seems to have connoted the “totality of 
the physical universe” (Morris-Suzuki, 1991: 83, n13), while also having 
acknowledged the myriad sociomaterial relations within which humans were entangled 
and expected to enact their everyday lives. The Japanese anthropologist Fukushima 
Masato (2005) also points out that the word butsu (also read mono) not only refers to 
physical ‘objects’ or ‘things,’ but also the dead and spirits—a nuance which signals the 
word’s ability to hold the ghostly presences often obfuscated in modernist progress 
stories. On the other hand, the term kaibutsu—made up of the kanji characters for 
‘open’ (開) and ‘things’ (物)—denotes a transition from appreciating humans as one of 
various heterogeneous actor within the vast ‘myriad things,’ to a particular kind of actor 
with a “special role,” a “uniquely active role” in “improving” ‘the myriad things’ as a 
part of its moral duty (Morris-Suzuki, 1991: 83-6). According to historian Tessa 
Morris-Suzuki (1991: 84-5), the term kaibutsu could be translated as “‘revealing the 
nature of things’ or as ‘developing’ or ‘making use of’ the natural world,” and, thus, 
has a deep connection to technological developments of the time, especially in 
agriculture. While the term manbutsu may have attuned people to their own 
embeddedness within a rhizomatic heterogeneous materiality, kaibutsu provided a way 
forward for tracing out stable root-tree structures to coordinate human activities and to 
map out and enact progress projects (see Section 3.3.2.3).191 Thus, kaibutsu may be 
thought of as a concept deployed in an attempt to coordinate harmony; a way to 
harmonize the messy heterogeneity inherent in ‘the myriad things.’ Before concepts 
like kaibutsu emerged, the sociomaterial relations people found themselves embedded 
within were probably considered to be much more fushigi (mysterious or strange).192 
                                                
191 Morris-Suzuki (1991: 84) describes the writings of philosopher Kumazawa Banzan who 
uses the image of a plum tree to describe the special role of humans within manbutsu, 
specifically their role “in the survival and growth of the whole.” He describes the roots as the 
sky, the trunk as the nation, manbutsu as the leaves, and humans as the flowers and fruits.  
192 I borrow the term fushigi from Stolz (2014) who highlights its use among philosophers 
imagining the separation of humans from their natural environments, as well as people living in 
toxic industrial ruins. Following Stolz, I will use the term in a similar fashion to describe the 
‘strange’ things that happen when industrial toxins enter people’s sociomaterial 
entanglements—especially in times when bodies are supposed to be autonomous and liberated 
from entanglements with the natural world. 
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However, the process of enacting kaibutsu helped to produce a vision of sociomaterial 
entanglement not as “a hostile force, but instead abundant and benign” (Morris-Suzuki, 
1991: 85). The simultaneously vital and vicious entanglement of Haraway’s (2016) 
Chthulucene were ideologically tamed through such simplified conceptualizations. 
 
Beginning in the 1600s, an array of materials—including coal, copper and silver—were 
being discovered beneath farmlands and in other locations throughout Japan. As 
industrial projects were enacted, farmers and fishers began noticing changes to the 
fields and waterways they interacted with everyday (Iijima, 1979; Stolz, 2014; B. L. 
Walker, 2010). Until this point concepts of ‘pollution’ tended to refer to the Shinto 
notion of defilement or impurity (kegare) and the avoidance of dirt, blood and death 
(imi), or Buddhist teachings on the impurities and evils of eating or killing animals. 
Rituals and taboos were formed to deal with the major ‘pollutants’ of the day and to 
protect people from ‘demons’ that accompanied them—for example by putting 
‘outcasts’ in charge of all practices of butchery, death or defecation (Pharr, 1990: 
Chapter 5). Historian Robert Stolz (2014: 21-33) also points out that concepts of 
outside and inside—specifically “that world [ano yo]” and “this world [kono yo]”—
were already being used in both Shinto and folk medical practices as a way to ward off 
disease and hinder the spread of epidemics. Many rituals were created to ensure the 
impurity (kegare) and deathly (yomi) qualities of ‘that world’ remained separate from 
‘this world’—referring to the human body and its dwellings. Thus, much before the 
emergence of ‘modern,’ ‘autonomous,’ ‘liberal’ bodies, bodies as ‘individual’ and 
separate from an ‘outside’ world were already being discussed and enacted through 
ruling texts and discourses. People were enacted as individual bodies which could 
remain healthy if they could protect themselves from external invaders. However, with 
the dawn of modern industrial projects, novel forms of ‘pollution’ began to migrate 
from newly established mines into local sociomaterial entanglements and agrifood 
assemblages within which human bodies were to act out their moral obligations. In the 
way that Madoka’s knowledge on bacteria was unable to help her in carefully 
interacting with radionuclides, the knowledge on avoiding pathogens would be of little 
help to the people living downstream of new industrial projects and their effluents.  
 
Within the feudalistic ruling relations of the time, protesting industrial pollution of 
local farming and fishing grounds was not easy, as there existed no legal appeals 
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system for people within the Tokugawa ruling regime. However, this did not make 
protest impossible. As social harmony and respect of hierarchy served as the basis of 
ruling relations, causing an open conflict was going strongly against the norms of 
society. Under this form of feudalism, however, people in authority were expected to 
protect the interests of those beneath them and, therefore, protest within these ruling 
relations was possible if people could criticize those in authority for not adequately 
meeting their needs (Pharr, 1990). Petitions were sent to local officials from farmers 
and fishers who were either concerned about possible contamination, or who were 
physically suffering from overflows of industrial toxins. There were some cases where 
farmers or fishers succeeded in winning some forms of compensation. In some 
instances, people were offered silver from the shogunate’s Ginza mint—ironically the 
same silver collected through the mining practices themselves—as a way to monetarily 
compensate damages to people’s livelihoods. In other cases, restrictions to mining 
practices were enacted—for example, mines could agree to operate only during the off-
season of farming. There was even the possibility for the complete shutdown of some 
mines.193 On the other hand, it was also possible for people’s concerns to be ignored, or 
for the shogunate to send a mission to investigate. However, this could end in people 
being forced to sign an agreement declaring that they would no longer interfere with 
mining operations. Regardless of the outcome, these protests generally took place at the 
local level—though sometimes composed of people from multiple villages—and 
locally situated bodies began enacting their everyday lives in relation with these novel 
forms of pollution (Iijima, 1979).  
 
Here we see early forms of the entangled trouble that would ensnarl my participants in 
2011: even over 300 years ago, people’s sociomaterial entanglements with industrial 
toxins were being met with further entanglement within textually mediated ruling 
relations and monetary compensation schemes. The physical entanglements of people’s 
situated realities were being mediated by objectified versions and ways of handling 
                                                
193 The decision to shut-down a mining operation seemed to be dependent on how important it 
was to the shogunate. For example, during this time period the Besshi copper mine in Ehime 
Prefecture suffered from many natural disasters—including fires, storms and earthquakes—and 
operators themselves asked the shogunate if they could suspend their mining practices. Instead 
of agreeing to the mine’s request, the shogunate ordered its owners to continue mining silver in 
order to meet its needs (see Iijima, 1979; Ui, 1992). 
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these experiences; monetary compensation, and their accompanying textual contracts, 
would be a tool for pacifying those bodies living within ruined landscapes of 
overflowing industrial effluents. Put differently, people’s everyday experiences with 
industrial toxins could be ‘muted’194 by institutional texts designed to ‘solve’ the 
konran they were experiencing as they attempted to conduct their lives within ever-




The onset of Japan’s Meiji Restoration becomes my next high seat for exploring 
sociomaterial entanglements within industrial ruins. With the fall of the Tokugawa 
shogunate in 1868, the Meiji Restoration period (1868-1912), ruled by the Meiji 
oligarchy, began reorganizing ruling relations in Japan with the goals of securing 
“civilization and enlightenment” (bunmei kaika) through rational and scientific thought 
(Stolz, 2014: 3; B. L. Walker, 2015: 8 & 72). The kanji characters for bunmei kaika (⽂
明開化) represent ‘literature’ ‘bright/light’ ‘open/unfold’195 and ‘change into’—terms 
which elicit a sense of positive transformation, a chance to escape from the dark ages of 
Tokugawa feudalism and head toward modern visions of enlightenment and progress. 
The newly established Meiji government would use liberal philosophies in an attempt 
to coordinate how humans enacted their everyday lives within increasingly 
industrialized landscapes. 
 
During this period, philosophers began further reconceptualizing ‘nature’ (now referred 
to as shizen) as a resource that could be fully controlled by human activity. Historian 
Julia Adeney Thomas (2001: 32-4) emphasizes how the term shizen was methodically 
used by the Enlightenment philosopher Maruyama Masao to erase the multiple 
‘natures’ that existed during the Tokugawa period. This new singular ‘nature’ 
represented an abstract, stable, inactive and controllable resource from which humans 
could easily extract raw materials to fulfill the Meiji policies of “encouragement of 
industry” and creation of a “rich nation, [with a] strong army” (Stolz, 2014: 20). Thus, 
                                                
194 See Latour (2005) and Section 3.3.2.2. 
195 This is the same character as found in kaibutsu (開物). 
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‘nature’ no longer needed to be considered as frightening and strange (fushigi), but 
could be rationalized in ways so that human bodies could be liberated from their 
sociomaterial entanglements with the natural world (Stolz, 2014: 42). These newly 
imagined ‘liberal citizens’ would receive a number of “inalienable natural rights” 
(Stolz, 2014: 79) which would serve as the basis for their existence, not to be disrupted 
by previous, messy entanglements within ‘the myriad things.’ From public spaces to 
clothing, sociomaterial relations of this period were to be reconstructed and reenacted 
in purified and rationalized ways in order to fit with Meiji philosophy. The ‘ghosts’ of 
the past were also cleansed from Meiji landscapes, and public hygiene practices further 
enacted bodies as ‘individual,’ ‘autonomous,’ ‘rational’ and ‘pure.’196  
 
The reconceptualization of human bodies as disentangled, alienated and liberated from 
their situated, ‘natural’ sociomaterial entanglements made possible the enactment of a 
new type of political subject to function within the newly designed liberal ruling 
relations. The Meiji Constitution provided a set of rights for governing the modern, 
autonomous, liberal bodies that could inhabit such a story. Stolz (2014: 22) explains:  
By transcending the natural body, liberal political philosophy sought 
to create an ideal body with no (or only voluntary) relations with the 
outside world. This transcendence was accomplished through the 
epistemological, discursive, and (as much as possible) physical 
separation of the new political subject from the material environment. 
In other words, the Meiji government attempted to engineer and enact human bodies 
which, epistemologically separated from their situated sociomaterial entanglements, 
would support the new government on its path toward economic and military 
advancement.197 Meiji liberal subjects would be those who prioritize entanglement 
                                                
196 Stolz (2014: 28) explains: “we can see the goal of evacuating a central point—whether the 
individual body or the new imperial capital—of all wastes and impurities, leaving a pure, 
rational space, a clean slate with an unlimited possibility for expansion.” 
197 This is not to say that no remnant of Tokugawa ruling relations remained. In fact, though the 
new concept a ‘liberal individual’ was created, this subject was expected to follow the same 
Neo-Confucian principles of social harmony and respect for hierarchy—which maintained the 
status and power of the emperor who remained a very powerful figure within the period’s 
ruling relations. These social norms were disseminated through the new public education 
system’s ‘morals courses’ (Pharr, 1990: 24; Ui, 1992), and within the workplace (Gordon, 
1985). According to the Japanese environmental scholar Ui Jun (1992: 5), “strong group 
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within textually mediated liberal ruling relations, not the messiness of everyday situated 
entanglements with dirt, microbes and other unruly human and more-than-human 
participants. 
 
Beginning in the 1880s, however, the seemingly stable and controllable ‘nature’ 
(shizen) began acting in strange (fushigi) ways again, calling into question the validity 
of the concept of a normative, external ‘nature’198 that underpinned the existence of the 
autonomous, liberal bodies essential to Meiji ruling practices (Iijima, 1979; Stolz, 2014: 
33-5). The onset of a long-term overflow of industrial pollutants from the Ashio mining 
complex beginning in the late 1880s—considered the first major pollution incident of 
the Meiji period—provides a vantage point for exploring the konran experienced by 
people living within competing sociomaterial entanglements: textual ruling relations 
enacting pure, liberal bodies and the contaminated sociomaterial entanglements of 
people living within industrial ruins. Thus, from my high seat in the Meiji period, in the 
next section I tighten my focus on people’s lives within the industrial ruins of the Ashio 
copper mine. 
 
4.3.1 From	 pure	 citizens	 to	 poisoned	 victims:	 The	 limits	 of	 liberal	 subjectivity	 in	
industrial	ruins	
The copper extracted from the Ashio mine, tied to the state power in both the Edo and 
Meiji periods, was a great source of foreign wealth as a material export,199 but was also 
used for domestic projects—including the transmission of electricity (Shoji & Sugai, 
1992; B. L. Walker, 2010: 72). Located in Tochigi Prefecture at the top of the Watarase 
and Tone watersheds, this government-owned mine was eventually sold to the 
Furukawa zaibatsu (financial conglomerate) in 1877 (Iijima, 1979; McKean, 1981). At 
its peak in 1890, the Ashio copper mine was producing almost forty-percent of Japan’s 
                                                
orientation, loyalty to the organization, decision-making inability relative to primary concepts, 
submission to authority, attitudes of discrimination, and excessive concern for social status are 
all national characteristics of the Japanese which have been nurtured throughout the length and 
breadth of the educational system.” 
198 Thomas (2001: 32-3, n3) points out how when used in its adverb form, shizen—the currently 
widespread Japanese term for ‘nature’—connotes ‘spontaneity,’ a nuance that, as some 
linguists argue, is not implicit in its English translation. It is also a nuance that seems to disrupt 
notions of the controllability of nature and the existence of autonomous liberal subjectivities. 
199 Copper earned capital which allowed Meiji leaders to purchase industrial machinery and 
weapons for their military projects (see Shoji & Sugai, 1992; B. L. Walker, 2010). 
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total copper output. Though the Meiji Constitution was established in 1889—creating 
the Meiji Diet—the state remained under the authority of the emperor who maintained 
full control over the military and was the only entity with the power to create or 
dissolve government organizations. While the Lower House of the Diet was filled 
through elections, the Upper House was filled with appointed bureaucrats, industrial 
capitalists, large landowners and noblemen (Shoji & Sugai, 1992). Within these newly 
established ruling relations, the Furukawa zaibatsu had successfully built many 
relationships with government officials, often through familial and personal ties (Shoji 
& Sugai, 1992; Ui, 1992). 
 
While attempts at alienating city dwellers from their situated, ‘natural’ sociomaterial 
entanglements may have been less of a challenge, farmers and fishers still depended on 
these entanglements to perform their livelihoods. It is, therefore, no surprise that these 
very people began noticing changes in fish abundance and plant health beginning in the 
1880s. By 1881, the overflow of toxins from the mine forced the governor of Tochigi to 
ban the sale of fish from the Watarase river, years before massive toxic floods hit the 
Watarase and Tone watersheds in 1890 (Iijima, 1979). Eventually, farmers and fishers 
became vocal about the role of Ashio’s pollutants in disrupting their everyday lives 
(Iijima, 1979; Shoji & Sugai, 1992; Stolz, 2014). Not only were farmlands destroyed, 
but fisheries were left barren and illness ravaged villages along the river. The normal 
flows of birth, death and breast milk were all unsettled by the overflow of Ashio’s 
sulfuric acid and heavy metals (B. L. Walker, 2010: 96); the pollution was so bad that 
people began renaming the Watarase river “the River of Death” (B. L. Walker, 2010: 
96). Walker (2010: 96-7) describes the scene: 
Fisheries crashed, insects no longer chirped, seedlings no longer 
grew, and grotesque sores developed on the hands and feet of the 
farmers who labored in the paddies and irrigation channels. Farmers 
drew on local traditions and assumed that the river deities had 
become possessed by demons, but the only demons were the Ashio 
bosses who had ordered that the waste be discharged into the river: 
sulfuric and arsenic poisons, ammonia, cadmium, chlorine, copper, 
iron, lead, magnesia, nitrates, phosphoric acid, and zinc. 
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At this point, some people began requesting that the local government survey their 
land; they wanted to prove that the suffering and death erupting within and around them 
was caused by Ashio’s pollutants. As ‘liberal citizens’ entangled within textually-
mediated ruling relations, they needed to scientifically prove this link for their concerns 
to be taken seriously. Other ways of entangled knowing—for example, the complete 
lack of birdsongs noted by Matsumoto Eiko (2000), a female journalist reporting on 
Ashio’s pollution for the Mainichi Shimbun—provided insufficient evidence.  
 
Matsumoto’s (2000) reporting revealed a messy, entangled reality that could not be 
comprehended by those who viewed humans and their bodies as disentangled from 
their situated sociomaterial entanglements. Her writings provide thick ethnographic 
accounts of how Ashio’s pollutants defied all concepts of Meiji individuality, 
liberalism, autonomy and divisions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’—they freely flowed 
through water, fish, plants and human bodies. Both her stories and the detailed 
drawings that line the pages of her manuscript illustrate that these pollutants were not 
benign as the philosophers preached, but material, vibrant and remarkably vicious. In 
her writing, Matsumoto (2000: 17) described the pollution as a “strange thing 
[fushigina mono],” pointing out how the many news articles, speeches and volunteer 
efforts produced and enacted to help in solving the pollution problem were not of much 
use in curbing the contamination and suffering these materials caused in the lives of 
people living within Ashio’s overflow. Instead, both the suffering and the care involved 
in living intimately with Ashio’s pollutants became as invisible as many of the 
pollutants themselves. She goes on to explain the “strange feeling [fushigi no kan]” that 
emerged from this blindness to people’s real sociomaterial entanglements with vicious 
toxins: “No one stands against the victims, nowhere has a contrary voice been raised. 
And yet the problem has receded into the background, operating now in the shadows. 
Truly, this gives rise to a sense of the strange [fushigi no kan]” (Matsumoto, 2000: 
17).200 Thus, far from being disentangled liberal subjects, people’s intimate and situated 
sociomaterial entanglements with Ashio’s effluents erupted not only as malaise—
through blindness, sores and illness—but through loss of livelihood, low birth rates, 
loss of voting rights, poverty, inability to marry due to discrimination, among many 
                                                
200 The English translation is borrowed from Walker (2010: 47) whose writings first introduced 
me to the fascinating work of Matsumoto. 
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other egregious horrors (Matsumoto, 2000; Stolz, 2014: 45). Being a citizen within the 
ruling relations of the Meiji period required bodies to be pure and disentangled, a 
liberty that was not possible for the porous, contaminated bodies living downstream of 
Ashio’s mine.  
 
While scientific testing was conducted to measure Ashio’s effluents in agricultural 
soils, the results were “immediately confiscated by the authorities” (Shoji & Sugai, 
1992: 23). Originally having faith that industrial overflows could be resolved within 
Meiji liberal ruling relations, Lower House representative from Tochigi Prefecture and 
protest organizer Tanaka Shōzō argued for the rights of people living in Ashio’s 
overflow whom he still considered to be liberal-bodied as stipulated in the Meiji 
Constitution. During the second Diet Session in December 1891, Tanaka argued that 
the Constitution provided for property rights as well as the inalienable right for citizens 
to petition the government. He also pointed out that, according to the country’s mining 
laws, if mining operations harm public welfare, the mine loses its right to operate 
(Iijima, 1979; Shoji & Sugai, 1992; Strong, 1995; B. L. Walker, 2010: 98-9). The 
government’s response was not what Tanaka had in mind. Instead of upholding the 
rights of liberal citizens, the Meiji government attempted to further alienate people 
from their situated sociomaterial entanglements—entangling them further within ruling 
texts that promised to ‘solve’ the industrial overflow while simultaneously ignoring 
people’s very real entanglement with Ashio’s toxins. 
 
In its official government response in 1892, the Diet announced that the causes of 
pollution were still unknown, that a study was underway, and that pulverized ore 
collectors would be used to prevent copper from overflowing again—it did not seem to 
matter that pulverized ore collectors are only intended to recover waste, not prevent 
pollution (Iijima, 1979; Shoji & Sugai, 1992). The government’s utilitarian stance—the 
shadow that lurked behind promises of enlightenment and perpetual progress—was 
more clearly illuminated in an 1892 response by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce which was printed in a Tokyo newspaper (quoted in Strong, 1995: 74):  
Suppose for the sake of argument that copper effluent [was] 
responsible for the damage to the farmland on either side of the 
Watarase—the public benefits that accrue to the country from the 
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Ashio mine far outweigh any losses suffered in the affected areas. 
The damage can in any case be adequately […] taken care of by 
compensation. 
For the porous and entangled bodies living along the Watarase watershed, this news 
added insult to injury. On the one hand, these people were experiencing the myth of 
liberal subjectivity—their intimate connection with Ashio’s pollutants revealed they 
were neither autonomous and liberated from worldly entanglements, nor were their 
‘inalienable rights’ acknowledged or protected under the Meiji Constitution. The ruling 
texts themselves refused to acknowledge their very real entanglements with Ashio’s 
effluents. On the other hand, they were being enacted as liberal subjects within the 
established ruling relations and, thus, were expected to sacrifice their bodies for the 
nation. The message from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce was clear: 
sacrifices must be made and suffering must be endured to be a liberal body under Meiji 
rule, and financial compensation would be the tool for resolving any disputes (see B. L. 
Walker, 2010: 100).  
 
As a result, financial compensation became the only resort for many people living in 
Ashio’s industrial ruins. The same year the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce’s 
quote appeared in the Tokyo newspaper article, farmers and fishers joined negotiations 
which promised them annual compensation for losses. However, in return, they needed 
to abstain from protesting until June 1896 when the new pollution-preventing 
equipment would be tested (McKean, 1981; Shoji & Sugai, 1992). Ruling relations 
would ensure that those receiving compensation would no longer disrupt the flow of 
Ashio’s effluents or business as usual.  
 
Nevertheless, continual overflows of Ashio’s effluents into people’s everyday lives 
impeded attempts at simply pushing the pollution problem into the shadows or 
stabilizing unrest through monetary compensation schemes. Protests—silent during the 
Sino-Japanese war in 1894 and 1895—picked up again after an even larger flood hit the 
Watarase basin in 1896 (McKean, 1981). Fed up with the poor results they were getting 
from their interactions with local governments, people living within Ashio’s ruins 
began revolting, this time protesting the central government. In 1896, approximately 
2,000 people marched from Unryuji (Unryu-temple) in Gunma Prefecture to Tokyo—a 
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distance of over 60 kilometers. This resulted in further textually-mediated attempts at 
problem-solving: The Agriculture and Commerce Minister visited the mine, a meeting 
which ended in a thirty-seven-point order requesting the Furukawa zaibatsu improve 
mining operations which, if not obeyed, could result in the shutting down of the facility 
(Iijima, 1979). While the Furukawa zaibatsu did invest in new pollution control 
methods—and even undertook additional research for controlling the release of 
pollutants—these activities did not improve the situation downstream (McKean, 1981). 
In 1898, some people were awarded tax exemptions for having their farming or fishing 
livelihoods destroyed by Ashio’s toxins, but again accepting such monetary 
compensation often included a deal which infringed on their voting rights (B. L. 
Walker, 2010). In the same year, a second group of 3,000 people living in areas 
contaminated with Ashio’s pollution marched from Unryuji to Tokyo. In 1900, a third 
group of over 10,000 people made the same journey (Iijima, 1979). In the 1900 march, 
the people protesting overpowered police. As a result, the Diet passed a Police and 
Regulation Law to prevent such large-scale gatherings in the future (McKean, 1981).  
 
The term kōgai has been used to refer to incidences of ‘pollution’ or ‘public nuisance’ 
dating back to Ashio’s overflows (Ui, 1980: 321). Stolz (2014: 94) points out how the 
term—which literally translates as ‘public injury,’ though tends to refer to something 
“injurious to the public [interest]”—was born out of liberal philosophy: a classification 
tool useful for distinguishing between what is public and what is private, as well as 
allowing for cost-benefit analyses to be used in deciding on “acceptable levels of 
toxicity” which would be “based on the current definition of public interest.”201 The 
term also classifies people into categories of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator,’ creating blunt 
group divisions which make creatively solving the problem much more difficult, if not 
impossible (see Kada et al., 2006). Regardless of its role in polarization and 
categorization of people and their experiences, the term kōgai continues to be a tenet of 
Japanese environmental law today. Avoiding becoming trapped within the utilitarian 
debates implicit in the term kōgai, Tanaka instead referred to pollution in its material 
form—‘doku’ (poison, 毒)—which he viewed as disrupting the “eternal motion of 
                                                
201 This description is reminiscent of the process for crafting radiation protection standards 
which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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material energy”—what he referred to as ‘nagare’ (flow, 流れ)’ (Stolz, 2006; 2014: 
94). 
 
Realizing the vast complexity of Ashio’s toxic overflows202 and the futility of his 
efforts to address these issues within the liberal governing structures, Tanaka turned 
away from liberal politics. Distraught and disenchanted with Meiji liberalism, in 1901 
he attempted what he thought would be his final protest: a direct appeal (jikiso) to the 
emperor which, according to Tokugawa law, would have resulted in a death sentence. 
On the morning of December 10th, Tanaka ran toward the carriage of the Meiji emperor 
as it was leaving the national Diet in Tokyo. Yelling while waiving a written appeal 
above his head, he was ultimately unsuccessful in reaching the emperor, arrested after 
being obstructed by a police officer and his horse who had both collapsed during the 
incident. While his act was supposed to be legendary and resonant, Tanaka soon 
learned that jikiso was no longer illegal under Meiji rule. The symbolically heroic story 
that Tanaka attempted to enact that day would prove to be as futile as his attempts to 
protect people living within Ashio’s ruins through liberal governing structures. Though 
he was detained, Tanaka was soon let free, and copper effluent continued to freely 
overflow from the Ashio mine (Stolz, 2014: 51-5; Strong, 1995). In the end, the Ashio 
mine operations polluted around 250,000 acres of paddy lands, and contamination is 
still present today (Shoji & Sugai, 1992: 40-1). The government’s final solution in this 
case was to purchase Yanaka village—considered the heart of the protest movement—
as part of its flood-control plan, erasing it, as well as any evidence of the suffering of its 
inhabitants, from the Earth so as not to stain the pure image needed for the progression 
of the Meiji Restoration.  
 
Fast-forward to November 2013 and Yamamoto Tarō203 followed in Tanaka’s footsteps 
in using the process of jikiso to help people suffering from an industrial overflow, this 
time the overflow from TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. At a garden party, Yamamoto 
passed a hand-written note to Emperor Akihito, a note he says was intended to inform 
                                                
202 Tanaka began writing about the “‘invisible’ (me ni mienai)” nature of Ashio’s poisonous 
overflows, the resulting contamination which he felt required much care and caution (Stolz, 
2014: 45, original emphasis; Strong, 1995). 
203 Yamamoto is a young lawmaker in Japan’s Upper House who transitioned from an acting 
career to politics following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
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the emperor about the realities of people working and living in areas contaminated by 
TEPCO’s radionuclides. While jikiso is not illegal under current Japanese law, it is 
considered taboo, and the act of passing the letter opened Yamamoto to a barrage of 
attacks. Yamamoto, who ran as an independent and has since formed a coalition 
party,204 had run his campaign based on an anti-nuclear platform. However, after about 
a year in government he found himself in a similar position as Tanaka: he was unable to 
follow through on any of his campaign promises (see Associated Press, 2013). I saw 
Yamamoto speak at least three times during my fieldwork in the Kansai region. I twice 
heard him speak at Osaka Station in the heart of a busy shopping district, educating 
people on their constitutional rights and the current ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s 
plans—under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō—to change the constitution.205 The third 
time, I heard him speak at a small café that tested its food for radionuclides.206  
 
As doku (poison) from the melted cores of TEPCO’s nuclear reactors have been 
continuously flushing into the Pacific Ocean each day since the onset of the nuclear 
disaster in March 2011—some of it diverted and piled up in hundreds of leaking, 
makeshifts tanks—questions arise as to how much things have actually changed in over 
100 years of liberal, and now neoliberal, ruling relations.207 While Ashio’s overflowing 
effluents became a frightening reminder of people’s inescapable sociomaterial 
entanglements,208 the disruption industrial toxins caused in people’s everyday lives was 
never enough to stop the expansion of industrial progress projects—their bright future 
                                                
204 While the party was first called the Seikatsu no tō (People's Life Party), it has now changed 
its name to Jiyū tō (Liberal Party). 
205 The proposed changes would both allow Japan to engage actively in war, and also grant the 
government further powers during a state of emergency—for example the right to change the 
constitution following an emergency such as TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. According to Assistant 
Professor Koide Hiroaki, Japan is still officially under a state of nuclear emergency—it issued a 
Radiation Emergency Declaration in March 2011 due to TEPCO’s nuclear disaster—which has 
allowed for greatly changing laws relating to people’s exposure to radioactivity (Hirano et al., 
2016).  
206 Yamamoto has always been a strong advocate for food testing, and even appeared as a 
spokesperson for Co-op Shizen-ha, a food cooperative that also tests the food it sells for 
radionuclides. 
207 See Stapczynski and Urabe (2016) and TEPCO (n.d.) regarding the contaminated water 
building up and flowing into the ocean each day—approximately 300 metric tons of water 
flows through the damaged reactors each day according to TEPCO. 
208 This concept is similar to Linda Nash’s (2007) concept of “inescapable ecologies.” 
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projections blind to the situated suffering of the humans and more-than-humans 
entangled with their overflowing pollutants.  
 
As the 20th century advanced, so did the expansion of industrial ruins throughout 
Japan—though the development of new technologies and the engagement in 
negotiations with local farmers and fishers did sometimes help to thwart overflows as 
large-scale as those experienced at Ashio.209 However, attempts made to better engage 
with local communities did not prevent the overflow of toxins and the expansion of 
industrial ruins. By the end of the Meiji period, not only were there imperial ruins210 to 
overcome, but a sprawling of industrial ruins. How to keep people moving toward a 
bright future while they are living in industrial ruins? One way is through further 
entangling them within textually-mediated ruling relations. Here I turn to Japan’s 
pollution incidences in the 20th century as my next vantage point for exploring 
sociomaterial entanglements within industrial ruins. 
 
                                                
209 In 1894, the Besshi copper mine (owned by the Sumitomo zaibatsu) invested greatly in 
moving its operations to an offshore island to prevent the pollution of farmlands following 
complaints and protest due to crop damage. When that was not enough, the company agreed to 
pay compensation to farmers, limit its yearly production, and limit production when rice 
seedlings were most delicate (including shutting down operations for the ten days during the 
most vulnerable periods). As pollution did not improve the suffering of island residents, 
Sumitomo invested in new pollution-reduction technologies that went beyond government 
regulations, while also paying out large sums of compensation money to ‘victims’ of toxic 
overflows, not because they were legally bound to, but because of the pressure from local 
farmers. The Hitachi copper mine follows a similar storyline. In 1907, Hitachi began 
negotiating with farmer representatives after their effluents caused major damage to crops and 
forests. In this case the owner never refuted that the damage to the crops came from the mine. 
In order to deal with the pollution, the company implemented the use of dilution devices and, 
figuring compensation payments into the company budget, set up easy ways for farmers to 
negotiate and receive compensation payments for pollution. In addition, Hitachi increased the 
amount of compensation given to visible, calculable damage by ten percent in order to cover 
for any mental suffering that may occur, while also offering free medical care for people 
suffering from smoke-related problems. In 1914, Kuhara decided to construct the world’s 
largest chimney as a dilution technology to prevent damage to local residents (McKean, 1981). 
These stories are reminiscent to the insights shared by Fressoz (2007) noted in Section 2.2.4, 
mainly that people’s active participation in voicing their concerns about polluting technologies 
sometimes led to the creation of technologies that were less polluting. 
210 See Stoler (2008; 2013) for a discussion on “imperial debris.” 
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4.4 Muting	toxins	and	highlighting	texts:	Using	ruling	texts	to	contain	overflows		
For my final high seat, I turn to Japanese cases of industrial pollution and ruination of 
the 20th century, focusing specifically on people’s entrenched entanglements within 
textually-mediated ruling relations in tandem with the vast proliferation of industrial 
ruins. In 1912, the Taishō government came into power and attempted to keep people 
aligned with its goals of empire building and military mobilization, even within 
sprawling industrial ruination. How were ruling elites able to enact progress projects 
while simultaneously creating industrial ruins? One way was by further alienating 
people from their situated sociomaterial entanglements and entangling them further 
within ruling discourses and texts. More specifically, ruling relations were coordinated 
through schools and workplaces that enacted ‘nature’ not as ‘the myriad things’ people 
were entangled within and dependent on for their survival, but an abstract concept 
representing national ideology. To coordinate this disentanglement from situated 
sociomaterial relations, local sites of worship which foster situated entanglement were 
destroyed. Trees were cut down and sold for lumber, and shrines were torn down, all as 
a way to physically disentangle people from their local sociomaterial relations 
(Thomas, 1998: 120-3).211 Historian Julia Adeney Thomas (1998: 128) explains: “one 
was either natural and, therefore, what one said and did was in harmony with Japanese 
culture, or one was unnatural, at odds with the national body and, not being part of that 
body, ultimately invisible and inaudible.” Thus, if people did not agree with the new 
national policies, their disagreement would make them at best invisible, and at worst a 
target for persecution for not performing the progress goals of the nation. Not only 
would this result in a further alienation of humans from their situated sociomaterial 
entanglements, but the classification of protest or complaints about pollution as a threat 
to “national security” (Ui, 1992: 3)—a reality which is hauntingly reminiscent of the 
                                                
211 Thomas (1998: 120-3) points out how, throughout local villages in Japan, Shinto shrines 
provided a space for villagers to revere the natural world and pay respect to their family 
ancestries. As these sites maintained nature as a physical space to perpetuate individual village 
identities, the government needed to co-opt it in order to enhance nationalism. This was done 
by de-emphasizing human connection with a physical nature (for example, the worshiping of a 
physical nature at diversified, local shrines) and instead focusing on a worship of an abstract, 
nationalized form of ancestor at new, district level shrines. As a result, local shrines connecting 
people to local sociomaterial entanglements were seen as detrimental to nation-building and 
were destroyed; the sacred parts of local shrines were moved in an attempt to ensure there was 
only one shrine for each administrative village where subjects were expected to worship 
ancestors of the national family of Japan within which they were expected to be a part. 
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current Japanese situation since the passing of the State Secrecy Law in December 
2013.212  
 
The end of World War II signaled the defeat of the Japanese imperial rule and a new 
period of occupation by the United States (US). Facing a country whose infrastructure 
had been almost entirely destroyed through a widespread US bombing campaign, 
industry took the lead in pulling Japan out of its defeat and establishing it as a global 
economic power. Industry’s ability to lead the nation back from defeat gained it much 
admiration from people throughout the country. While this was good for those profiting 
within the newly booming economy, those entangled with pollutants found themselves 
struggling in battles against industries who no longer felt compelled to follow 
government orders to act in ways that respected people’s situated sociomaterial 
entanglements (McKean, 1981). Additionally, the new obsession with high-paced (but 
‘peaceful’) economic growth—the new ‘peace constitution’ prevented Japan from 
having a military—made the task of protecting people from pollution even more 
difficult when using once-useful tactics such as direct action and informal negotiations 
(Hoshino, 1992). Instead, people suffering within industrial ruins started to move their 
battles into the judicial system.  
 
By the 1970s, Japan’s industrial ruination was no longer restricted to small towns and 
villages, but was expanding throughout the country, even into large cities (Ui, 1992). In 
fact, by the mid-1960s, the country was considered the most polluted of all 
industrialized nations (Almeida & Stearns, 1998). Along with sprawling industrial 
ruination, there were ‘four big court cases’ in particular fought in the 1970s that seemed 
to galvanize the interest of the wider Japanese public in pollution incidences (McKean, 
1981)—so much so that they have been attributed to the birth of Japan’s Environmental 
Agency in 1971 (Kada et al., 2006).213 Here I would like to focus in on one of these 
                                                
212 Frackler (2016) describes Japan’s currently active State Secrecy Law, pointing out the 
“symbiotic relationship” between Japanese journalists and government which creates a 
frightening prospect for the state of press freedom in Japan. Symbiosis and its role in enacting 
monstrous sociomaterial entanglements will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter. 
213 While I will not discuss it in detail here, the creation of the Environmental Agency (now the 
Ministry of Environment) and enactment of subsequent environmental laws and bureaucratic 
and judicial processes for managing industrial overflows—what Avenell (2012) refers to as a 
“green leviathan”—was also a way for the Japanese government to textually define and 
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court case, that of methylmercury poisoning in Minamata City, Kumamoto Prefecture. 
In particular, I will explore how the overflow of industrial effluent into Minamata Bay 
has entangled people in toxins and textually-mediated ruling relations for the past six 
decades, seemingly ‘resolved’ through the rebirth of the city in March 2011. 
 
4.4.1 Court	battles,	‘rebirth’	and	everyday	care	within	industrial	ruins	
Methylmercury poisoning, or organic mercury disease, was first observed in Japan 
within the small fishing village of Minamata on the island of Kyushu in 1956.214 In this 
case of industrial ruination, the Chisso chemical company released large amounts of 
industrial effluent into Minamata Bay, a vibrant fishing ground for local fishers and a 
food source for local villagers. Given the specific location of the industrial overflow, 
the mix of symptoms this specific type of poisoning enacts has become widely referred 
to as Minamata disease.215 Chisso used mercury as a catalyst in its production 
processes; methylmercury itself is produced by bacteria interacting with the heavy 
metal (Grandjean et al., 2010; Hamdy & Noyes, 1975). Once in the marine 
environment, methylmercury bioaccumulated in the bodies of fish and shellfish, and 
ultimately wreaked havoc on the lives of any human or animal body that ingested it 
(Harada, 1995).  
 
Similar to the experience of people living in the overflow of Ashio’s effluents, those 
living along Minamata Bay began noticing ‘strange’ things happening in their 
surroundings during the 1950s. Harada (1995: 3) paints a picture of the troubling scene:  
During the 1950s, people began to witness strange phenomena in and 
around Minamata Bay. For no apparent reason, fish rotated 
continuously and floated belly-up to the surface, shellfish opened and 
decomposed, and birds fell while in flight. The most shocking of all 
incidents was the frenzied death of cats. Cats suffered from excessive 
                                                
textually ‘clean up’ or ‘solve’ sprawling industrial ruination. Also, if some of these new laws 
meant that some polluting technologies were not allowed in Japan, companies would move 
abroad to create industrial ruins in less regulated spaces in Asia and Latin America (Ui, 1992: 
11). 
214 Though symptoms were evident years before 1956, their link to methylmercury was not 
established by Japanese medical doctors until that year (see Harada, 1995). 
215 It is also sometimes referred to as Chisso-Minamata disease to highlight the role of the 
polluting company (see Nabi, 2014). 
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salivation and manifested general convulsions or violent rotational 
movements, were unable to walk straight, and often collapsed dead. 
Many jumped into the sea to drown, and eventually cats were no 
longer seen in the area. 
Eventually human bodies that ingested seafood containing methylmercury started to 
exhibit similar symptoms: they randomly convulsed, lost consciousness, and generally 
began acting in strange ways due to damages the toxin caused to the brain and nervous 
system. Children who developed along with methylmercury within their mother’s 
wombs were born with mental retardation, deformities of the limbs, hyper-salivation, 
trouble with muscle coordination, impaired speech, among many other troubling 
ailments (Harada, 1995: 8). The source of these monstrous effects took years to 
uncover, and people who themselves or had family members exposed to the neurotoxin 
found themselves in an extremely precarious situation as neither the company nor the 
Japanese government were willing to take responsibility for the konran and suffering 
wreaked on their everyday lives. If people did want to seek compensation from Chisso, 
they needed to take on the label of ‘victim,’ which would automatically pit them 
against community or family members working at the chemical complex. 
Acknowledging the presence of methylmercury in one’s body or family member’s body 
might also bring shame to oneself or one’s family, or lead to a decrease in fish sales as 
speaking up might publicize the possible contamination of seafood with Chisso’s 
effluent (Kada et al., 2006). 
 
 Regardless of the many drawbacks of speaking out, many of the villagers exposed to 
methylmercury did fight back through protest and the judicial system—where they 
faced ruling texts head-on. However, the court battles for compensation have been 
brutally painful and time consuming. In fact, decisions on compensation were still 
being made in March 2011, and continue until today. Even six decades on, gaining 
financial compensation for all sufferers—particularly those not ‘officially’ 
recognized—remains unclear (Keiji Hirano, 2016; Jobin, 2014; Kyodo News, 2011a; 
Marran, 2011). It was also in March 2011, after years of attempts to revitalize 
Minamata through tourism, that the city was named ‘Environmental Capital of Japan’ 
(see FutureCity Initiative, n.d.; Kada et al., 2006; Saigusa, 2011). Thus, the same month 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster began unfolding, Minamata City was being reborn—the 
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ghostly hauntings of its own industrial ruination erased from its image through its 
rebirth as an ‘environmental capital.’ 
 
However, anyone who has viewed the photography and writings of W. Eugene Smith 
and Aileen Mioko Smith (Figures 7 and 8) or the video footage provided by 
Tsuchimoto Noriaki (1971) quickly realize there is something missing from discussions 
focusing merely on Minamata’s judicial battles and environmental rebirth. Providing a 
glimpse into the everyday lives of people living within Chisso’s industrial ruins, their 
images not only visually portray the monstrous state of human bodies entangled with 
Chisso’s methylmercury, but the very vigilant forms of long-term care involved in 
living within these very real, vital and vicious sociomaterial entanglements. 
 
While the court cases are often valorized in historical reflections into the industrial 
overflow, they provide only one piece of the story; many of the people suffering from 
methylmercury poisoning require full-time nursing care, care that is often provided 
entirely by family members (Harada, 2005). Thus, while people’s monstrous 
entanglements within textually-mediated ruling relations and industrial toxins both 
require attentive care, the latter is often overlooked in stories about these happenings. 
One reason might be that these stories are less exciting than those discussing “trials of 
strength” of ‘victims’ versus their ‘oppressors’ (Haraway, 2016: 41-3). While these 
‘trials of strength’ are important for attempting to rewrite legal texts in a way that 
acknowledges multiplicity and sociomaterial entanglements with toxic industrial 
overflows, as Haraway (2016) points out, they alone are no longer adequate for dealing 
with the messes we find ourselves in living in the industrial ruins of the Capitalocene. 
 
Here, telling more entangled stories which reveal sociotechnical disasters as both 
‘matters of concern’ and ‘matters of care’—as opposed to purely ‘matters of fact’ that 
can be categorized and controlled—seems to be an important first step (de la Bellacasa, 
2011; Latour, 2005).216 However, seriously attending to ‘matters of care’ involves the 
somewhat uncomfortable task of attuning the messy, monstrous entanglements 
Haraway (2016) describes in her conceptualizations of the Chthulucene. And it is not 
only attunement to care that is difficult, but the backlash one might face through paying  
                                                
216 Also see Section 3.3.2.2. 
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Figure 7 Photograph by W. 
Eugene Smith. Copyright: 
Aileen Mioko Smith (Aileen 
Archive). From the book 
Minamata by W. Eugene 

































attention—seen in the ways in which W. Eugene Smith was not only targeted, but 
physically beaten so badly that it was difficult for him to continue his work as a 
photographer (Nabi, 2014: 197), or in the ways bodies not following the autopoietic, 
single-reality-wielding stories of what I will go on to characterize as the ‘transnational 
nuclear assemblage’217 are categorized away as ‘irrational’ or suffering from 
‘psychological distress.’ How to deal with simple, autopoietic coordination efforts that 
are blind to messy, sympoietic sociomaterial entanglements? It must begin with 
noticing these very complex, messy and situated sociomaterial entanglements ruling 
texts overlook and, thus, mute—an attunement, I argue, can be developed with 
sensibilities from institutional ethnography and material semiotics. 
 
4.5 A	 reflection	 on	 monstrous	 sociomaterial	 entanglements:	 “We	 are	 all	
lichens,”	“We	are	all	hibakusha,”	and	we	all	participate	in	textually-mediated	
ruling	relations	
As the previous sections illustrate, attending to historical industrial overflows reveals 
many of the vicious sociomaterial entanglements humans and more-than-humans find 
themselves relating within when living in industrial ruins. However, given the 
terrifying nature of many of these entanglements, questions arise on the best ways to 
attend to them. According to the editors of the book Arts of Living on a Damaged 
Planet (Tsing et al., 2017: M7), this work must begin with the simple act of noticing. 
However, as mentioned, noticing is not always easy, and can even be painful and 
uncomfortable, especially when exploring monstrous sociomaterial entanglements with 
toxins and all of their vibrant and vicious qualities and enactments.  
 
In attuning to monstrosity, thinking through lichens and mushrooms might help. The 
last line of a paper authored by Gilbert and colleagues (2012: 336), “We are all 
lichens,” is a statement that attempts to attune researchers to the symbiotic 
                                                
217 I use the term ‘transnational nuclear assemblage’ to refer to the vast institutional complex of 
scientists, governments and organizations involved in managing radiological overflows from 
nuclear weapons and nuclear disasters as well as paving the textual path forward for the further 
proliferation of nuclear technologies. The development of the transnational nuclear assemblage 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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entanglements that participate in enacting living organisms.218 In the way Latour’s book 
We Have Never Been Modern (1993) challenges readers to rethink modern society’s 
self-description as dominant and disentangled from the natural world, the subtitle to the 
article by Gilbert et al.—“We Have Never Been Individuals”—highlights how a 
number of findings in the biological sciences are challenging conceptualizations of 
organisms as ‘biological individuals,’ instead revealing organisms—including 
humans—to be ‘holobionts’ (Gilbert et al., 2012: 325-6).219  
 
First introduced by Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg (2008), and born out of the work 
of Lynn Margulis (1993), the term ‘holobiont’220 has been defined by biologist Scott 
Gilbert (2017: M73) as “an organism plus its persistent communities of symbionts.” 
Haraway (2017: M26, original emphasis) offers a more tangled description: “Like 
Margulis, I use holobiont to mean symbiotic assemblages, at whatever scale of space or 
time, which are more like knots of diverse intra-active relatings in dynamic complex 
systems than like the entities of a biology made up of preexisting bounded units (genes, 
cells, organisms, etc.) in interactions that can be conceived only as competitive or 
cooperative.” These symbiotic entanglements, Haraway (2017: M26) goes on to 
describe, do not only refer to the nice “mutually beneficial,” vital interactions, but 
include the terrifyingly vicious as well. 
 
As someone whose research explores radioactivity, in reading Gilbert and colleagues’ 
statement “We are all lichens,” I was immediately reminded of the Lapp reindeer who 
enjoy feasting on lichens and mushrooms—both symbiotic biota, and both efficient 
accumulators of radionuclides. Named ‘Lapp’ because of their symbiopoietic221 
                                                
218 I first learned about this statement from reading Tsing (2015: 142), Haraway (2016) and 
Tsing and colleagues (2017). 
219 This ‘new biological paradigm’ is being referred to as the “postmodern synthesis”—as 
opposed to the “modern synthesis” (see Mcfall-Ngai, 2017). 
220 The term is based on ‘the hologenome theory of evolution’ (see Margulis, 1993). 
221 Gilbert and colleagues (2010: 672) have proposed the term “symbiopoiesis” to describe how 
holobionts are developed through “codevelopment of the holobiont.” Haraway (2017: M25) has 
also proposed the term ‘holoent’ to engage all ‘critters,’ abiotic and biotic. Haraway (2016: 60) 
proposes the term ‘holoent’ be used as a sympoietic-infused alternative to autopoietically 
enacted ‘units’ or ‘beings.’ I will sometimes borrow the term ‘critters’ from Haraway (2016: 
169, n1) who uses it to “promiscuously” refer “to microbes, plants, animals, humans and 
nonhumans, and sometimes even to machines.” 
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entanglements with the indigenous Sámi herders—also known as the Lapp people—
some of these reindeers have been found to have high levels of cesium-137 in their 
bodies since the expansion of nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s. The Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster in 1986 and overflows from nuclear fuel reprocessing plants—such as 
Sellafield in England and La Hague in France—have also been implicated in these 
increased radioactivity levels (see Gómez-Guzmán et al., 2011). Even now, levels of 
radioactivity have not ‘stabilized’ in the bodies of reindeer. For example, in 2014 the 
amount of radioactivity measured in the bodies of reindeer living in Central Norway 
suddenly skyrocketed following a vibrant mushroom season. Scientists singled out the 
reindeers’ “mushroom snacks” as the culprit for the higher-than-expected levels of 
radionuclides in their bodies (Hooper, 2014). While some parts of the so-called 
“lichens-reindeer-human food chain”222 may be monitored by government authorities 
and translated into ruling texts which can then be deployed in an attempt to coordinate 
the activities of humans—that is, to prevent human bodies from eating foods 
categorized as ‘over the limit,’ which is designated as reindeer meat over 3,000 
Becquerels per kilogram (Bq/kg)223 in Norway224—little can be done to help the 
reindeer ‘choose’ their mushrooms, or the lynx ‘choose’ which reindeer they eat 
(Skuterud et al., 2005). The same goes for the wild boar who lavishly dine on 
mushrooms and truffles in the forests of Germany. To this day many of them—the 
boars and their snacks—are too radioactive to be considered ‘safe’ for ingestion by 
human bodies—600 Bq/kg according to German law (Huggler, 2014).225 In Japan, there 
are many animals living in the most contaminated areas near TEPCO’s nuclear disaster; 
monkeys roaming the Fukushima forests have become one of the many objects of 
                                                
222 See Skuterud and Thørring (2015: 3145). 
223 While there are a number of possible units for measuring radioactivity, radioactivity in food 
is often measured in Becquerels per kilogram (Bq/kg) or liter (Bq/l). 1 Bq represents a rate of 
radioactive decay equal to 1 disintegration per second (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
2017). 
224 See Liland and Skuterud (2013) for a discussion on reference levels for radionuclides in 
food following the Chernobyl disaster. Gralla and colleagues (2014) point out that there are 
various reference limits for radionuclides in food in effect across Scandinavia and Europe. 
225 According to the news article, hunters are required to have the wild boars inspected for 
radioactivity. If the wild boar meat is found to be over a certain limit—and, thus, classified as 
‘radioactive’—it must be disposed of. Again, we see how sociomaterial entanglements with 
toxins lead to further entanglements with textually-mediated ruling relations. 
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scientific investigations into the effects of ionizing radiation on living organisms 
(Hayama et al., 2013).  
 
The bioaccumulation of radionuclides by mushrooms and lichen has also been observed 
in Japan following previous overflows of radionuclides, as well as following TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster.226 And, of course, fungi, bacteria, plants and animals are not the only 
ones who do not ‘follow the rules’ when it comes to regulating their intake of 
radionuclides. In August 2012, two elderly couples living in Fukushima Prefecture, 
who continued to eat homegrown food following the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster, were discovered and their bodies measured with a device called a ‘whole body 
counter’—a device that is only able to measure the gamma radiation being emitted by a 
body, not alpha or beta particles possibly harbored within.227 Each of the four 
Fukushima residents had over 6,500 Bq/kg of measurable gamma emissions from 
cesium-134 and cesium-137 radiating from their bodies. One of the men’s bodies was 
emitting 19,507 Bq/kg of cesium-134 and cesium-137. He and his wife had been eating 
locally grown shiitake mushrooms, bamboo shoots (takenoko) dug up near their home, 
and dried persimmons. The shiitake mushrooms themselves measured over 140,000 
Bq/kg. After calculating the measured gamma emissions into an estimated whole-body 
effective dose,228 the examining doctor assured the four people, and the press, that 
“these are not levels that will cause damage to health, but I would like you to measure 
before eating home grown vegetables and other such things” (“Fukushima Daiichi,” 
2012). The textual mediation of these monstrous entanglements could, again, be 
smoothed over through activating dose estimates devised by organizations active within 
the transnational nuclear assemblage.229  
 
                                                
226 See, for example, Kuwahara et al. (2005), Nakashima et al. (2015), Ohnuki et al. (2016), 
Orita et al. (2017), Sugiyama et al. (2008; 2000) and Yamada (2013). 
227 Ochiai (2015) discusses the difficulty in measuring internal radiation—as mentioned, whole 
body counters are only able to pick up gamma radiation, not the possible internal activity of 
alpha or beta particles. See Section 5.2 for more details on these different types of ionizing 
radiation.  
228 This is discussed in Section 5.4.1. 
229 Dose estimates in radiation protection are discussed in detail in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 
6. 
 163 
What do stories of radioactive lichens, reindeer, mushrooms, wild boars, lynxes, 
monkeys or elderly gardeners tell us about monstrous sociomaterial entanglements 
within radiological overflows? Attuning to the ‘unregulated,’ free-flowing movements 
of radionuclides within socioecological assemblages not only reveals the limits of 
modernist ontologies and their stories of ‘control’ when it comes to the overflow of 
unstable and invisible radionuclides, but how we have all become mixed-up within 
these monstrous entanglements since the onset of nuclear weapons testing in the 
1940s.230 Once we begin to recognize our lichen-like qualities, that we are “holobiont 
by birth,”231 we are faced with the startling realization that, as Terry Tempest Williams 
(1995, emphasis added) puts it, “We are all hibakusha” in one way or another.232  
 
4.6 Conclusion:	 Noticing	 sociomaterial	 entanglements	 beneath	 the	 chorus	 of	
‘rebirth’	and	‘revitalization’	
In this chapter, I have situated TEPCO’s nuclear disaster within Japan’s long history of 
industrial overflow and ruination. When revisiting these historical industrial overflows 
using sensibilities from both the fields of institutional ethnography and material 
semiotics, we do not only notice experiences of konran, but also how overflows of 
industrial toxins are often accompanied with textually-mediated ruling relations used to 
define human and more-than-human sociomaterial relationality within industrial ruins. 
                                                
230 See the brilliant video made by artist Hashimoto Isao (2003) showing the 2,053 nuclear 
explosions conducted around the world between 1945 and 1998. Also see Hirano and 
colleagues (2016) for Assistant Professor Koide Hiroaki’s comparison of TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster to the fallout from nuclear weapons testing. 
231 See Gilbert (2017). 
232 Hibakusha—literally “explosion-affected people”—is the Japanese term used to refer to the 
survivors of the US atomic bomb attacks in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (see Lindee, 1994: 5-10; 
T. T. Williams, 1995: 661). However, in recent years, its use has expanded to refer to all 
survivors of nuclear fallout from nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon tests, and even disasters at 
nuclear power plants, as well as exposures from mining, transportation and other processes 
involved in producing nuclear weapons and nuclear energy (IPPNW, 2014). Author and photo 
journalist Toyosaki Hiromitsu (1997: 348, emphasis added) describes some of the ways people 
become entangled with radionuclides and, thus, might take on the label of hibakusha: “[P]eople 
all over the world have become hibakusha as a result of exposure to radiation that is produced 
in all the stages of nuclear arms productions and nuclear power generation such as uranium ore 
mining and refining, uranium enrichment, the production of nuclear armaments and nuclear 
testing, production of nuclear fuel and nuclear power generation, reprocessing of spent nuclear 
fuel, and treatment and disposal of nuclear waste.” 
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A historical analysis reveals how ruling relations have been attempting to coordinate 
people’s disentanglement from their situated sociomaterial relations, instead working to 
enact pure citizen bodies that will participate in military and economic projects. 
Though overflows of industrial toxins remind people of their situated sociomaterial 
entanglements and disrupt stories of purity and perpetual progress, ruling texts continue 
to ignore, and attempt to mute, these very vital and vicious entanglements. Using 
sensibilities from both institutional ethnography and material semiotics, we are able to 
notice these entanglements: beneath the deafening chorus of ‘rebirth’ and 
‘revitalization’ are many humans and more-than-humans attempting to carefully enact 
their lives within TEPCO’s industrial ruins.  
 
Simultaneously entangled in toxins and ruling texts, people living in industrial ruins are 
burdened with the enormous task of carefully enacting their lives alongside industrial 
toxins—and their monstrous enactments and effects—while also finding the time to 
take on textually-mediated ruling relations in judicial battles. Taking seriously both 
forms of entanglement is essential when dealing with industrial overflows: while ruling 
texts attempt to mute toxins and pave the way for more progress projects, people 
continue to carefully enact their lives in relation to these toxins. In the following 
chapters, I will turn my focus to TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, where I will employ 
sensibilities from institutional ethnography to explicate textually-mediated ruling 
relations that participate in enacting my participants’ experiences of konran, while also 
using sensibilities from material semiotics to highlight people’s very real sociomaterial 
entanglements with TEPCO’s radionuclides.  
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5 The	 uneven	 history	 and	 ghostly	 hauntings	 of	 radiation	
protection	standards:	From	the	atomic	bombings	of	Hiroshima	
and	 Nagasaki,	 to	 the	 crafting	 of	 Japan’s	 100	 Becquerel	 per	
kilogram	reference	limit	for	radionuclides	in	food233	
5.1 Introduction	
On Friday, March 11, 2011, Yamaguchi Chiho (pseudonym) and her husband were 
living in the Kansai region and had just heard some exciting news from the doctor: 
Chiho was pregnant with their first child! The excitement permeated Chiho’s day until 
she got home and turned on NHK news234 to see the devastation of the earthquake and 
tsunami in the Tōhoku region. She had never thought much about nuclear power until 
she saw one of TEPCO’s nuclear reactors explode a day later.  
 
While she remembers feeling a bit shaken by the news of the nuclear disaster, she 
settled back into life as usual, only occasionally receiving reminders of the disaster’s 
aftermath when turning on her TV:  
On TV I heard spinach over the 500 Becquerel limit was found, but it 
did not really hit home. The news said it was okay, the newscasters 
were saying it was okay, the TV was also saying it, so at that time I 
figured it was okay. Well, I figured that eating just a little would be 
okay, the government was also saying it was okay. [The news] said 
Becquerels were found. They did not explain the extent of the danger. 
At that time, I don’t think they said anything about whether or not it 
was dangerous. It was the first time I had heard the word 
‘Becquerel.’ And when they said 500, I had no idea exactly how much 
it really was. 
                                                
233 Some parts of this chapter have been included in a forthcoming publication based on my 
research that I co-authored with my supervisors Katharine Legun and Hugh Campbell (see 
Burch et al., forthcoming). 
234 NHK stands for Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) and is the national 
public broadcasting news organization in Japan. 
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Chiho explained that she ate a lot of cucumbers at that time, and when she went to the 
supermarket in April and May, all of the cucumbers being sold were from Fukushima 
Prefecture. She bought and ate them. She also bought lettuce from Ibaraki Prefecture.  
It was so cheap! Really. And even though it’s really close [to 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster], in my head I didn’t clearly understand 
that. I remember thinking that Ibaraki was in Kantō, not Tōhoku. I 
bought it. 
She did not notice any differences in marketing or labeling among foods from 
Fukushima and those from other prefectures until July and August:  
Fukushima peaches were being sold like crazy! I saw the Fukushima 
governor’s face with “It’s safe [anzen]” written. […] “Not detected 
[kenshutsu genkai],” something like “below the standard [kijunchi 
ika]” was also written. The limit, the particular numbers were not 
written. “It was tested safe [anzen], so it’s okay” was written. 
Regardless of these intermittent reminders of the ongoing nuclear disaster, Chiho 
admitted that she did not start thinking much about radioactivity in food until she heard 
Koide Hiroaki,235 former Assistant Professor at Kyoto University’s Research Reactor 
Institute, on the radio.  
He said a number of things that were not being said on TV. It was 
amazingly detailed, but easy to understand. It was even easy to 
understand for people like me who had no knowledge. […] He spoke 
about food. He said that before the disaster, when rice, when 
Japanese rice was measured it was below 0.1 Becquerels. When I 
heard that, I understood just how high 500 or 100 Becquerels was.  
When I asked how she reacted to hearing this, she replied: 
                                                
235 See Hirano and colleagues (2016) for a translated and transcribed interview with Assistant 
Professor Koide which includes many of the points discussed by Chiho, the dissolution of the 
radio program Tanemaki (or ‘sowing seeds’) Journal that Chiho heard him speak on, a 
discussion as to why he remained an Assistant Professor throughout his tenure at Kyoto 
University due to his stance on nuclear power’s safety, his own censorship, among numerous 
other topics. 
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Shock, I was shocked. Because I was pregnant. 
In coping with konran regarding everyday eating and feeling very uncomfortable 
shopping at the supermarket, Chiho decided to join a food cooperative (seikyō) that was 
testing food for radiation down to about 10 Bq/kg and eventually joined a citizen 
radiation measuring station (CRMS). I met her at one of the café-times at her local 
CRMS. 
 
As time went on, Chiho had heard about the new reference limits for radionuclides in 
food on the news, and also from Assistant Professor Koide who she had been listening 
to weekly on the radio.  
The radio announcer asked Koide-san what he thought about 
reducing [the reference limits] to 100 Becquerels. He said, if you 
compare it to 0.1 Becquerels, how many thousands? It’s about 1,000 
times that. It is really easy to understand when you compare how 
many times [higher it is]. 
Five years after TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, Chiho was still being careful about 
radionuclides in food, and questioned the ability of the government to adequately 
ensure the safety of the food circulating throughout the country. As she and her 
husband own a small restaurant, they have been struggling to maintain a profitable 
business while also serving food that they themselves would feel comfortable eating 
and feeding to their child.  
 
The proposed ‘new standards’ put into effect on April 1, 2012 established 100 Bq/kg236 
as a “magic number”237 indicating the government’s commitment to public health and 
safety, as well as its competency in managing the presence of radionuclides in the 
agrifood assemblage through the application of Science.238 For all of my participants, 
                                                
236 100 Bq/kg became the reference limit put in place to ensure the chosen standard—
represented as a dose of radionuclides absorbed by human bodies—would not be exceeded. 
This will be covered in detail later in this chapter. 
237 I borrow the term “magic number” from Higuchi (2016) who borrowed it from Radiation 
Council member Kai Michiaki (see Radiation Council, 2012a). 
238 I capitalize ‘Science’ here because the terms ‘science’ (科学, kagaku), ‘scientific’ (科学的, 
kagakuteki) or ‘safe’—in an objective or technical sense—(安全, anzen) are often thrown 
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however, the numbers were much more mystical than magic, generating many more 
questions than answers. What is a Becquerel? Why are both 500 and 100 Becquerels 
considered safe? Where do these numbers come from? Why should they be trusted?  
 
When asked, most of my participants wanted the reference limits to be much lower—
usually down to 10 or even 1 Bq/kg. However, government proclamations about the 
safety of 100 Bq/kg made such suggestions seem ill-informed or unscientific. The 
experience of Takano Miki (pseudonym), a mother of a young girl with a severe dairy 
allergy who was living in the Kansai region at the time of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, 
illustrates: 
Miki: I researched myself about the 500 Becquerel [limit]. Before my 
daughter entered elementary school, for school lunch, because she 
has an allergy she still brings a bento. But I thought about what 
would happen if she was eating school lunch. I called the Board of 
Education. Then, for the time being, [my] city had a standard lower 
than the country’s. They had determined a standard, a standard limit 
for school lunch. But I thought even that was high. 
Karly: The government standard was 500 at the time? 
Miki: Yes, that was when it was 500 Becquerels. Then, um, 
vegetables. For the time being, the [data] was being made public. I 
looked at [the vegetables] and sardines, sweet potatoes and such. The 
numbers were like 8 and 11. It was made public that they were 
contaminated and they were used in school lunch. Well, they were 
used a few times. At that time there was stock that was several times 
divided and used in school lunch. Those values were much lower than 
the standard limit. If that was the case, I asked, “Isn’t it possible to 
lower the standard?” They told me that kind of [lower] value has no 
scientific basis. 
                                                
around as a basis for why the government’s standards for radionuclides in food are adequate, 
without actually providing much information on the situated scientific processes or historical 
episodes involved in devising these standards. This chapter is an attempt to explore the 
processes, historical and scientific, from which these standards emerge. 
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As various numbers ranging from 10 to 8,000 Becquerels have been officially referred 
to as ‘safe’ following the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, many of my participants 
began questioning the scientific basis of these various limits which were being devised 
and decided in extra-local places far beyond their control. My focus group session with 
three volunteers at a CRMS in the Kansai region—Chiaki Daiki (pseudonym), Mukai 
Kazuki (pseudonym) and Hashizume Maiko (pseudonym)—highlights questions that 
were arising about the scientific basis for these various legal standards for radiation 
protection which had been fluctuating since the onset of the nuclear disaster.  
Daiki: Is this safe [anzen]? If it’s below this is it safe [anzen], or not 
safe [anzen]? There is no reason for it to be safe [anzen]. After all, 
until this point, we have been eating food at this level.   
Daiki pointed to a chart on the wall which showed that foods measured before 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster contained 0.1 Bq/kg of cesium-134 and cesium-137 on 
average. 
Daiki: Well, this level, it couldn’t be helped, so we put up with this 
level.239 Why 100 Becquerels? There is no basis. No basis. There is no 
basis… 
Kazuki: There is no basis. That’s why it’s a hazardous level, for 
children who eat such food. 
Daiki: Yes. 
Maiko: Also, did you see the lead container [outside]? The things you 
enclose inside of there. It’s 100. 
Daiki: Yeah, it’s 100. 
Maiko: Formerly, the values we are eating now, formerly [things 
containing] those values needed to be enclosed within that kind of 
container. Now we are eating it. 
                                                
239 He later described the 0.1 Bq/kg as the gaman (endurance, 我慢) level for radionuclides in 
food. 
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Kazuki: Yes. Previously, people could not enter. Really, only people 
holding a license were supposed to look after those things. Now they 
are being sold in the supermarket.   
Daiki: Things over 100 Becquerels had to be properly and strictly 
stored, properly put into a lead container, properly managed. 
However, now things up to 8,000 Becquerels are okay.240 Now it is 
okay to incinerate things under 8,000 Becquerels. It’s also okay to 
dispose of them. 
Maiko: And then it’s possible to use as building materials. So if there 
are 8,000 Becquerel trees, those chips and whatnot. If it’s rocks, they 
are mixed into cement. From now on living in a newly built house is 
really risky [riskī]. 
My interviews and focus group sessions uncovered that there were unmistakably many 
questions regarding the origin and scientific basis for the various reference limits for 
                                                
240 Here, Daiki and the others are pointing to the increase in Japan’s exemption levels for what 
is legally considered ‘nuclear waste.’ Following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, the Japanese 
government increased the exemption level for what is considered nuclear waste from around 
100 Bq/kg to 8,000 Bq/kg of cesium-134 and cesium-137. In fact, according to new laws, 
things measuring under 8,000 Bq/kg of cesium-134 and cesium-137 can be disposed of in the 
same way as general household wastes. Japan disposes of waste through incineration. Because 
radiation levels increase through the process of incineration, the law also changed to allow 
ashes up to 100,000 Bq/kg of cesium-134 and cesium-137 to be disposed of in landfill sites 
(Ministry of the Environment, 2011). During my interviews, the 8,000 Bq/kg exemption limit 
was an issue of particularly high concern because there was a decision allowing for the re-use 
of soils containing under 8,000 Becquerels/kg of cesium-134 and cesium-137 in public works 
projects (see Watanabe, 2016). Collected in decontamination projects, the soil has been piling 
up in black ‘furikon’ bags throughout Fukushima Prefecture, and can be found on farmlands 
and even people’s back yards. The bags, which are supposed to be containing TEPCO’s 
radionuclides, have not only been broken open through the “auto-rewilding” (Tsing, 2017b) 
activities of plants growing inside of them, but microbial activities have also been disrupting 
control measures—for example, photos at an exhibition I attended in the Kansai region in 2016 
showed how when the piles of bags were covered with a tarp, it filled up with so many gases 
from microbial activities that it looked like a balloon ready to burst. The bags continue to 
provide a visual reminder of the nuclear disaster, so quickly removing them has been a priority 
of reconstruction and revitalization efforts. However, their removal from Fukushima Prefecture 
means that the soil will be transported and used in public works and other construction projects 
throughout the archipelago of Japan (see Igarashi, 2017), something that concerns many of my 
study’s participants who do not want any more of TEPCO’s radionuclides overflowing into 
their situated sociomaterial entanglements. 
 171 
radiation protection that have been activated and designated as ‘safe’ by the media and 
government documents since March 2011. It is these very questions that direct me to a 
vital string to follow in explicating the coordination of everyday eating in the aftermath 
of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster: tracing the origin of Japan’s safety standards for 
radionuclides in food which my participants continue to grapple with in 2016.  
 
Recommended standards for radiation protection have originated within a complex, 
transnational network of scientists, industry and government actors—and their human 
and more-than-human objects—with its own political, philosophical and economic 
foundations. Following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, these recommendations were to be 
translated into numerical ‘reference limits’ and deployed throughout the agrifood 
assemblage in an attempt to direct activity and command a single, ‘correct’241 way for 
people to conceptualize and enact their relationship with a newly re-galvanized actor: 
the radionuclide.242  
 
Radionuclides are unstable isotopes that release energy or particles to transform 
themselves into a more stable state.  This process of emission (the activity of 
radionuclides) is referred to as radioactivity or radioactive decay. The particles or 
energy released in the process of radioactivity are termed radiation. Through their 
activity, radionuclides do not simply disappear, but continue to transform themselves 
into different (‘daughter’) isotopes, a process that ranges from seconds to millions of 
years. Ionizing radiation is the type of radiation that has the power to damage living 
tissue, making the radionuclides that emit ionizing radiation those of most concern 
following a nuclear disaster. What complicates the management of radionuclides, 
however, is their imperceptible nature: they cannot be seen, smelled or tasted, so 
require very sensitive technical equipment able to identify them through their 
activity.243 
                                                
241 The word tadashī (‘correct,’ ‘accurate’) is often used in Japanese to describe the information 
on the relationship among radionuclides, food and human bodies the government regards as 
most scientifically sound. See, for examples, Government of Japan (2007b: Article 2(1)), 
Consumer Affairs Agency (2012: 6) and Ministry of Education (2011). 
242 See Callon (1991) for a discussion on how numerical standards are often used in 
standardizing translations and processes as a way to reduce transaction costs and foster 
cooperation among actors within a network. 
243 See Martin and Harbison (1996) and Grupen (2010). 
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Within the four units of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the activity 
of radionuclides was harnessed to heat fuel rods, which boiled water to produce energy 
that was transported from the rural towns of Futaba and Ōkuma in Fukushima 
Prefecture to the metropolis of Tokyo. However, when released into the wild, TEPCO’s 
radionuclides travelled with weather patterns around the globe, with some of the 
highest concentrations deposited into the Pacific Ocean and onto areas of north-eastern 
Japan (Stohl et al., 2012). TEPCO’s radionuclides may become lodged in soil, travel up 
into plants, and into the bodies of livestock animals. They may travel through the ocean 
where fish and seafood incorporate the unstable actors into their bodies. Vegetables, 
meat and seafood possibly containing these unstable isotopes are then harvested and 
shipped around the country, and around the globe, to be made into meals where they 
have the potential to enter eaters’ bodies. In short, radionuclides move fluidly and 
imperceptibly though a range of mediums and can easily wind up in a variety of foods. 
 
The ‘overflow’244 of TEPCO’s radionuclides destabilized Japan’s agrifood assemblage, 
complicating government attempts at managing the ‘safety’ of foods it circulates. 
However, radionuclides are also particular in their reputation, instability and that they 
are generally imperceptible except when manifesting as malaise or disease. Thus, while 
people rely on technologies to produce numbers to make the activities of radionuclides 
knowable, these numbers also become active in organizing activities within what 
appears to be a closed and controllable agrifood ‘system.’ However, the overflow of 
radionuclides disrupts such stories of control, revealing the drawbacks of such an 
oversimplified categorization. 
 
In this chapter, I employ sensibilities from both institutional ethnography and material 
semiotics to explore the institutional complex and other sociomaterial entanglements 
from which food safety standards for radiation protection emerge, following the 
numbers from their historical beginnings, to their intended role in guiding policy, to 
how they are currently being deployed and activated within Japan’s agrifood 
assemblage. By following the numbers through the institutional complex of radiation 
protection, I hope to illustrate how the political, economic and philosophical values 
                                                
244 Again, I borrow the concept of ‘overflow’ from Callon et al. (2009). Also see Section 2.6.4. 
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embedded within the numbers are intended to enact a ‘single reality’245—a single, 
‘correct’ way of relating to radionuclides deployed through a stable, redemptive 
narrative that attempts to smooth over difference and allow for the procession of 
business as usual. However, the making of these standards has been much more 
uneven, coarse and turbulent than the seemingly solid and neutral numbers may 
indicate. In fact, behind these numbers lurk many ghostly and monstrous presences, the 
‘absent presence,’ which—though often obfuscated by stories of stability, progress and 
control—continue to haunt them to this day.  
 
Following the ‘logic of oscillation,’ I will attend to the endless wavering between 
multiplicity and singularity, emphasizing the “multiple absence” of heterogeneous 
relationality lying behind the “singular presence” of seemingly stable numerical 
standards (Law, 2002: 9). What results is a narrative that opens up the history and 
current application of radiation protection standards in a way that highlights and holds 
their inherent tensions, multiplicities and contingencies—the ‘multiple pasts’ that haunt 
the present of many of my participants and others living in the industrial ruins of 




Following Wilhelm Röntgen’s discovery of the x-ray in 1895, Henri Becquerel’s 
observation of uranium’s ability to emit radiation in 1896, and Marie Curie’s discovery 
of polonium, a number of scientists excitedly joined in the effort to study the 
mysterious phenomenon of radioactivity (see R. H. Clarke & Valentin, 2009; Magill & 
Galy, 2005). However, injuries stemming from x-ray use grew in tandem with the 
progress of this research, and soon the dangers of x-rays and other forms of ionizing 
radiation were being revealed on human bodies in the form of burns, blotches, blisters, 
the loss of limbs, and even painful death (see Boudia, 2007; Taylor, 1971). It was clear 
the unbridled activity of radionuclides needed to be both investigated and tamed before 
humans could interact with these materials without suffering pain and physical harm. 
The development of radiation protection standards was proposed as a way forward for 
                                                
245 See Mol (2002: 87), Law (2002) and Section 3.3. 
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protecting scientists, medical practitioners and their patients from the possible negative 
effects of working or being treated with ionizing radiation. 
 
An initial challenge to setting recommendations for radiation protection, however, was 
the lack of shared measurements, units and ways of quantifying radiation doses among 
scientists (Taylor, 1971). To overcome this hurdle, the International Commission on 
Radiation Units and Measurements (ICRU) was established in 1925. Three years later, 
the International Committee on X-Ray and Radium Protection (ICXRP) was formed 
and given the responsibility of extracting from available scientific data 
recommendations on how to protect human bodies from the deterministic effects246 of 
ionizing radiation (see Boudia, 2007; R. H. Clarke & Valentin, 2009; Cooper, 2012). 
The group was formed in order to find a “tolerance dose” for radionuclides below 
which administration of radioactivity would pose little harm to human health (Taylor, 
1971: 13-16). 
 
The field of radiation protection247 emerged as a multidisciplinary form of science that 
borrowed units from physics and applied them to biology with the goal of evaluating 
how unstable radionuclides interact with active human bodies (Taylor, 1971: 22). As 
noted, this new field also adopted concepts such as ‘tolerance dose’ developed in 
toxicology. While multi-disciplinarity is usually viewed in a positive light, there were, 
and remain, some fundamental obstacles to combining the disciplines of biology and 
physics. According to Whittemore (1986: 9): 
The complex variety of functions of various bodily parts was at odds 
with the uniform units contained in the basic definition of dose. More 
significantly the use of concepts from physics fostered the popular 
                                                
246 Deterministic effects can be lethal and acute and usually involve the “killing or gross 
malfunction of cells. These effects have a dose threshold below which they do not occur and 
above which the severity of the effect increases with dose” (Cooper, 2012: 82). The 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) (2007: 20)—the descendant of 
the ICXRP—defines deterministic effects as “[i]njury in populations of cells, characterised by a 
threshold dose and an increase in the severity of the reaction as the dose is increased further. 
Also termed tissue reaction.” 
247 The field of research is also referred to as health physics (see Taylor, 1971: 22). 
 175 
belief that analysis of radiation should result in a single, quantifiable 
‘safe’ limit.248  
In short, translating and inscribing complex science into concrete numerical values may 
be useful for regulatory purposes, but risks invisibilizing the uncertainty that existed, 
and continues to exist, in the always evolving field of biology (see Goodhead, 2010).249 
The first ‘tolerance dose’ for radiation workers was set by the ICXRP in a 1934 
meeting, with the uncertainty of the underlying science explained with qualifiers and 
assumptions that were not, however, visible within the numbers themselves: “The 
evidence available at present appears to suggest that under satisfactory working 
conditions a person in normal health can tolerate exposure to x-rays to an extent of 
about 0.2 international roentgens (R)250 per day” (ICXRP, 1934: 1; Taylor, 1971: 16, 
emphasis added). The activities of the ICXRP and their ability to collectively evaluate 
and update their standards were put on hold from 1937 to 1950 in the midst of World 
War II, though the dawn of the nuclear era ensured that a vast population of humans 
and more than-humans would be coming into contact with a variety of newly-
materialized anthropogenic radionuclides.  
 
Nuclear fission created a new breed of anthropogenic radionuclides that humans, 
plants, animals, microbes, fungi and a range of other microscopic critters251 had not 
previously been in relation with. However, the top-secret nature of military-directed 
nuclear programs kept questions about the widespread dispersal of radionuclides in the 
environment concealed until the first overtly murderous overflow of the atomic age: the 
dropping of the atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
1945. The attacks by the US military killed hundreds of thousands of people, instantly 
                                                
248 For his doctoral dissertation, Whittemore (1986) conducted a study on the development of 
radiation protection standards in the United States between 1928 and 1960. 
249 As mentioned in Section 4.5, the newest findings in biology are no longer able to fit within 
conceptual and theoretical confines of the ‘modern synthesis.’ Thus, scientists who take 
seriously symbiosis and understand organisms as ‘holobionts’ (Gilbert et al., 2012) are, instead, 
forging paths within the ‘postmodern synthesis’ (see Gilbert, 2017; Haraway, 2017; Mcfall-
Ngai, 2017; Swanson et al., 2017) 
250 Roentgens—named after Wilhelm Röntgen—are units that represent the intensity of gamma 
rays or x-rays (see Grupen, 2010: 314; Martin & Harbison, 1996: 23). 
251 As mentioned in Chapter 4, I borrow the term ‘critters’ from Haraway (2016: 169, n1) who 
uses the term to “promiscuously” refer “to microbes, plants, animals, humans and nonhumans, 
and sometimes even to machines.” 
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changing the identity of survivors exposed to the bombs’ ionizing radiation to 
hibakusha.252  
 
During the hiatus of the ICXRP, the United States National Committee on Radiation 
Protection and Measurements (US NCRP)253 began preparing its own radiation 
protection recommendations. Unlike the ICXRP whose membership was reserved only 
for scientists, the US NCRP’s membership was composed of scientists, government 
officials and industry representatives (see Boudia, 2007: 392; Taylor, 1971: 23). At a 
meeting in 1946, the US NCRP divided itself into nine subcommittees which focused 
on different areas of radiation protection, including the subcommittees for permissible 
external dose (Subcommittee 1) and permissible internal dose (Subcommittee 2) 
(Taylor, 1971: 24-5; US NCRP, 1954: III).  
 
In the United States, the field of radiation protection emerged in 1943 alongside the 
Manhattan Project—the project responsible for assembling the atomic bombs dropped 
on Hiroshima (made of uranium) and Nagasaki (made of plutonium).254 Karl Z. 
Morgan, one of the founding scientists in the field of radiation protection in the United 
States, headed the US NCRP’s Subcommittee 2 for permissible internal dose. In his 
memoir, Morgan describes how it was his responsibility to set standards for radiation 
protection for a heterogeneous assortment of anthropogenic radionuclides, each 
emitting different combinations of four types of ionizing radiation: alpha, beta, gamma 
and neutron. Reflecting back on his work in the 1940s, Morgan (1999: 15-7, emphasis 
added) clarifies the differences among the four types of ionizing radiation he tried to 
create standards for: 
                                                
252 See Section 4.5. 
253 The Committee was first referred to as the Advisory Committee on X-ray and Radium 
Protection and was later renamed the National Council on Radiation Protection and 
Measurements, which it remains today. Both the National Committee and the National Council 
share the same acronym: NCRP (see Sheetz, 2015). 
254 The nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima was called ‘Little Boy.’ It contained uranium-235 
produced at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, United States. The nuclear bomb 
dropped on Nagasaki was named ‘Fat Man.’ It contained plutonium-239 produced at the 
Hanford Nuclear Facility in Washington State, United States (K. Brown, 2013; Morgan & 
Peterson, 1999: 39-52). 
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Alpha particle emitters do not present a problem if kept outside the 
body, since the alphas can penetrate less than 1 millimeter of soft 
tissue. However, alpha emitters present a serious threat if inhaled or 
ingested—a real possibility because they attach to dust, food, and 
clothing. Once alpha-emitting radionuclides enter the body, they 
cause severe local damage to tissue because they deliver all their 
energy to relatively few human cells, which may then become 
cancerous. Beta particles present similar risks, even though they can 
penetrate only a little more than 1 centimeter of soft tissue. Gamma 
or X-ray radiation can penetrate the entire body and alter 
chromosomes in cells along their tracks. Fast neutrons penetrate 
deeply into the body, but their dangers were not fully appreciated 
until thirty years later, when we discovered that their doses in energy 
units cause at least thirty times more human damage than gamma 
rays that deliver the same amount of energy.  
Morgan and his subcommittee were expected to translate the inherent messiness and 
heterogeneity of radioactivity and biological processes into clear recommendations to 
protect people and the environment from potentially dangerous exposures.255 In 1947, 
another US government organization, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission 
(ABCC)—later renamed the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF)256—was 
set up in Japan to collect data on the biological effects of ionizing radiation exposure 
being experienced by hibakusha in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Set up during the United 
States’ occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952, the Atomic Bomb Casualty 
Commission was initially financed through the US National Research Council257 with 
funds from the US Atomic Energy Commission (US AEC)—an institution born out of 
                                                
255 See Morgan (1992) for a reflection on some of the challenges of working in the field of 
radiation protection (what he refers to as health physics) which demanded scientists to keep up 
with overflows of radionuclides from military and industry projects. 
256 The group was renamed in 1975 and would be funded equally by Japan and the United 
States (Lindee, 1994: 245). The renaming removed the history and ghostly hauntings of the 
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the group’s title. 
257 The National Research Council is an agency of the US National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine. 
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the Manhattan Project (Lindee, 1994: 32-36; Morgan & Peterson, 1999 39-52; B. L. 
Walker, 2015). 
 
In her book Suffering Made Real: American Science and the Survivors at Hiroshima, 
Susan Lindee (1994: Chapter 2) describes the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission’s 
research as a form of “colonial science,”258 where the United States used its powers as 
occupying force to organize and control a human study on the biological and genetic 
effects of ionizing radiation—exploiting the work (broadly defined)259 of hibakusha, 
local Japanese scientists, Japanese midwives and others, without recognizing or 
acknowledging their important contributions. Although the hibakusha of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were described by the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission’s director, Robert 
Holmes, as “the most important people living,”260 they were not always treated as such. 
The hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the objects of the project’s data 
collection efforts, though the United States’ “no treatment policy” meant that any 
suffering the victims of the US atomic bombs experienced was set aside for people to 
deal with on their own (Lindee, 1994: 117-42). And it was not only the suffering of the 
hibakusha that went ignored, any suffering experienced by scientists was also left out 
of these studies—though has not been completely expunged. Lindee (1994: 257) 
explains:  
suffering was explicitly excluded from the scientific study. […] 
[H]owever, the emotional meaning of the survivors remained, 
stubbornly, refusing to disappear, lingering in the margins of [US] 
AEC directives and calculations of exposure levels. The screen 
through which the survivors’ experiences were filtered was 
imperfect.  
And not only were these scientific techniques limited in their ability to study the 
complex suffering and torment afflicting people living and working in the ruins of the 
                                                
258 While the author points out many forms of colonial science, in her book she refers to 
“science, conducted by outsiders, that depends on local knowledge, particularly when that 
knowledge is invisible to the colonizers themselves” (Lindee, 1994: 20). 
259 See Section 3.3.1.3. 
260 This quote was taken from Lindee (1994: 5). 
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atomic bomb blasts, but many other aspects of the project were riddled with uncertainty 
and ambiguity from the study’s commencement. 
 
Trying to conduct a study that extracts concrete, evidence-based conclusions from 
extremely chaotic and heterogeneous happenings poses its challenges, and this was 
especially the case when dealing with an experience as tragic and horrifying as the 
dropping of the atomic bombs in 1945. In an attempt to extract data on the biological 
effects of exposure to ionizing radiation on the first large-scale cohort of human 
subjects, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission organized three types of studies. The 
epidemiologist Steven Wing261 and his colleagues (1999: 137) explain:   
Three types of studies among A-bomb survivors can be 
distinguished: studies of inherited genetic effects among children 
whose parents had been exposed to A-bomb radiation; studies of 
various effects of fetal irradiation; and studies of long-term effects of 
postnatal exposure to radiation. This last study, called the Life Span 
Study (LSS), has primarily addressed cancer as an outcome and is the 
main source of cancer risk coefficients that are widely used to 
estimate the impact of radiation on cancer among workers and other 
exposed populations.  
Still an important foundation for radiation protection standards today, the Life Span 
Study was initiated in 1950, five years after the nuclear bombs were dropped. This time 
lag has been a point of debate among scientists—such as Alice Stewart262—due to 
                                                
261 Steven Wing and his colleagues evaluated the onset of cancer following the 1979 Three Mile 
Island nuclear disaster in Pennsylvania, United States. Their findings disputed other studies 
which claimed there were no increases in cancers for those people living near the disaster (see 
Wing & Richardson, 2000; Wing, Richardson, & Armstrong, 1997a; Wing et al., 1997b). 
262Alice Stewart was a female epidemiologist and physician who discovered the danger of x-
raying fetuses in the mid 1950s and who fought her entire career to prevent pregnant women 
from receiving x-rays. Stewart and colleagues’ (1958; 1956) studies implicating x-rays as 
possible contributors to the onset of childhood cancer were brashly attacked by male colleagues 
(for example, Court Brown & Doll, 1957; Court Brown, Doll R, & Bradford Hill, 1961; Court 
Brown, Doll, & Bradford Hill, 1960). As with Assistant Professor Koide, her concerns about 
the ‘safety’ of ionizing radiation stunted her scientific career. On the other hand, Richard Doll, 
one of the scientists who vehemently attacked Stewart’s work, had an extremely prestigious 
career—not only was he knighted, but he also became famous for proving the link between 
cancer and smoking. Opposition from Stewart’s male colleagues meant that pregnant women 
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concerns that the sample of research participants, chosen through the 1950 census, only 
represent hibakusha robust and healthy enough to survive the initial five years—thus 
ignoring enormous amounts of death and suffering that occurred between 1945 and the 
study’s commencement.263 
 
The development of a system of dosimetry—estimations of radiation doses received by 
each survivor—has also been a point of contention. In order to study the genetic and 
biological effects of ionizing radiation on their human subjects, Atomic Bomb 
Causality Commission researchers needed to somehow uncover the exact quantities of 
radiation that each hibakusha received from the blasts of the bombs. This was 
foundational to the work of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission since without 
precise estimates of the radiation doses received by each survivor, it would be 
impossible to quantify ‘radiation risk.’264 To extrapolate the estimated doses received 
by hibakusha, researchers would interview the survivors, asking about their exact 
position at the time of the blasts—including information on surrounding buildings, 
walls, anything that could have possibly shielded their bodies from the bomb’s 
discharges—as well as a number of details about what they did or ate following their 
exposures. Cram (2015: 799, original emphasis) explains the research process: 
“researchers were asking the hibakusha to reconstruct the rubble of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in their minds, to translate moments of fractured reality for which no words 
existed into exact descriptions that could be used for statistical analysis.” Through these 
processes, the ‘objective’ data extracted from the memories and bodies of hibakusha 
was filtered through the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission and translated back to 
members of the US NCRP, and eventually the international community, to inform 
                                                
continued to receive x-rays for almost two decades after her first paper was published. Stewart 
continued her work in the face of adversity and eventually her ever-expanding scientific 
database convinced official medical bodies to stop the x-raying of fetuses, but not until the 
1970s (see Greene, 2011a). For more on Alice Stewart’s pioneering efforts and struggles see 
Greene (2011b; 2017). 
263 See Stewart (1978: 1260, original emphasis) for a commentary on how the atomic bomb 
survivors “must have been selected for fitness to outlive the initial blasts (and other early 
effects of the radiation).” Also see Stewart (1982). 
264 As Imanaka and Hasai (2008: 297) explain, the “ABCC started developing radiation 
dosimetry able to estimate radiation dose for individual survivors, without which quantitative 
evaluation of radiation risk was impossible.”  
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radiation protection recommendations—particularly risk coefficients for estimating 
cancer from exposure to ionizing radiation.  
 
In the late 1940s, it became clear that the vast expansion of the use and global 
dispersion of radionuclides required that radiation protection extend its 
recommendations from covering only medical practitioners, patients and radiation 
workers, to the public at large. Back in the United States, the US NCRP’s 
Subcommittee 1 on permissible external dose met in 1948 and began deciding on its 
own radiation protection standards. Instead of a ‘tolerance dose,’ members began 
discussing, and eventually adopting, a “maximum permissible dose” for external 
radiation—and eventually internal radiation—as well as “maximum allowable 
radioactive contents” for water and air (Taylor, 1971: 25-6).  The more precise 
designations were intended to express the newfound scientific understanding that there 
is no certifiably ‘safe’ dose of ionizing radiation, but instead an “acceptable risk” that 
should be determined through a risk-benefit philosophical approach (Taylor, 1971: 25-
6; US NCRP, 1954: 20-2; S. J. Walker, 2000: 11). In addition, Subcommittee 1 chose 
to use calculated radiation doses to blood forming organs, the skin, gonads and eye 
lenses (defined as ‘critical tissues’ or ‘critical organs’) as the units for calculating these 
doses (US NCRP, 1954). That is, permissible external—and eventually internal—doses 
would be calculated based on the potential detrimental effects to a number of ‘critical 
tissues’ in a model human body. 
 
This move to break the body down to study it in pieces—rather than sympoietic, or 
even symbiopoietic assemblages—remains the basis for radiation protection standards 
today.265 It requires sophisticated forms of modeling to extrapolate permissible doses 
for human bodies, and human populations, from models estimating doses received by 
isolated, atomized body parts. By 1949, a representative, model body—the “Standard 
                                                
265 To reiterate what has been mentioned in Sections 4.5, Gilbert (2010: 672) and his colleagues 
have proposed the term “symbiopoiesis” to describe how holobionts are also developed through 
“codevelopment of the holobiont.” Again the concept of the holobiont views biological 
organisms as sympoietic assemblages—as opposed to individual, atomized units that can be 
broken down into even smaller, manageable units for analysis. Thus, a distinction has been 
made between the ‘modern synthesis’ in biology—with its atomized individuals and units—and 
the ‘postmodern synthesis’—with its holobionts, symbiosis, sympoiesis, symbiopoiesis and 
symbiogenesis (Gilbert, 2017; Haraway, 2017; Swanson et al., 2017). 
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Man”266—was designed to help in estimating permissible doses. Organ and tissue 
weights from real human bodies were averaged together to provide the basic biological 
and physiological parameters for the Standard Man—later renamed the ‘Reference 
Man,’ now referred to as the ‘Reference Person.’267 Though their bodies may not have 
fit to his standard form, data extracted from the bodies of male, female and child 
hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would eventually inform the Standard Man and 
his successors (see Cram, 2015).  
 
While various permissible doses for external radiation were discussed by the US 
NCRP’s Subcommittee 1 in 1948, with a draft written in 1949, the values were not 
officially published until September 1954 (Taylor, 1971: 24-5; US NCRP, 1954: 61-
73). On the other hand, the complexity involved in studying internal radiation exposure 
meant that the first full report of Subcommittee 2 on internal radiation was not 
published until 1953 (US NCRP, 1953). The 1953 report provided numerical values to 
indicate the maximum permissible doses for human bodies and maximum permissible 
concentrations in air and water for over seventy-five radionuclides (Taylor, 1984: 5; US 
NCRP, 1953). These reports were not only confined to the US NCRP, but shared with 
and developed through the input of other US-allied nations. Beginning in 1949, the US 
Atomic Energy Commission organized the first of three Tripartite Conferences with 
representatives from the United States, England and Canada (Taylor, 1984). Draft 
reports of the US NCRP’s Subcommittee 1 on external radiation, and eventually 
Subcommittee 2 on internal radiation, were circulated during these meetings and 
eventually provided the basis for internationally accepted radiation protections 
standards (Taylor, 1971: 37). 
 
Since the 1940s, the genetic threats of low-level ionizing radiation presented by 
geneticist Hermann Muller268 were widely recognized, and it became clear that 
radiation protection standards must address both deterministic and stochastic effects269 
                                                
266 The Standard Man was first discussed at the Tripartite Conference in 1949 (see Taylor, 
1984). 
267 See Section 5.4.1 for more on the ICRP’s Reference Person. 
268 Muller’s research from the 1920s on fruit flies “indicated that reproductive cells were highly 
susceptible to damage from even small amounts of radiation” (S. J. Walker, 2000: 3).  
269 Stochastic effects “may occur at lower doses. These effects include cancer and heritable 
effects, and are assumed to result from the mutation of cells following damage to DNA caused 
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for the nuclear workforce and members of the public at large—though not much 
attention was given to all the other more-than-humans who would be forced to relate 
with these unstable materials. While radiation protection until that point had been 
largely able to deter the onset of deterministic effects from high doses of ionizing 
radiation, protecting people from difficult-to-measure stochastic effects from low-level 
exposures has been much more challenging. When reflecting back on a 1952 meeting 
held by the US NCRP’s Subcommittee 1 on external exposure, Lauriston S. Taylor 
(1971: 25)—the then president of the US NCRP—explained how deciding on a per-
capita ‘dose’ of radiation for the public which took into account the uncertainty of 
stochastic effects “was clearly a controversial subject and one involving a great deal of 
basic philosophy in addition to basic science.” This meant that along with scientific 
data, a procedure or philosophy for making decisions in the face of uncertainty was 
necessary. The US NCRP’s Subcommittee 1 on external exposure admitted to using a 
policy of consensus and omission to deal with the uncertainty: “[a]s a matter of 
committee policy any controversial questions were debated and argued out until 
agreement was reached; when agreement could not be reached the item at issue was 
omitted” (Taylor, 1971: 25).  
 
The difficulty in quantifying stochastic effects of exposure to ionizing radiation was 
initially an obstacle for those in charge of finding a ‘safe’ dose of ionizing radiation for 
human bodies. Nevertheless, expansion of military and energy projects required 
scientists to provide reliable answers even in the face of glaring uncertainty. 
Eventually, uncertainty in the science of radiation protection became manageable 
through the adoption of a number of assumptions to compensate for gaps in 
understanding. However, overflows of radionuclides into the ‘wild’ caused 
disturbances in the lives of humans and more-than-humans around the world and 
continued to call the uncertainties and assumptions behind the radiation protection 
standards into public debate. In the next section I will discuss some of these overflows 
and how they were contained within the developing transnational institutional and 
textual entanglements I refer to as the transnational nuclear assemblage. 
                                                
by ionizing radiation” (Cooper, 2012: 82). The ICRP (2007: 49) describes stochastic effects as 
“cancer and heritable effects involving either cancer development in exposed individuals owing 
to mutation of somatic cells or heritable disease in their offspring owing to mutation of 
reproductive (germ) cells.”  
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5.3 Containing	 overflows	 through	 standards	 and	 texts:	 The	 making	 of	 a	
transnational	nuclear	assemblage	
In the 1950s Lauriston S. Taylor, as one of the only two surviving original members of 
the ICXRP and head of the US NCRP at the time, was asked to help in reestablishing 
the ICRU and the ICXRP. In order to expand its relevance to issues of the time, the 
ICXRP changed its name to the International Commission on Radiological Protection 
(ICRP). The newly resuscitated ICRP not only included many of the US NCRP’s 
members, but adopted the group’s subcommittee structure and eventually adopted its 
philosophy for managing uncertainty (Taylor, 1971). The United States—
simultaneously testing nuclear weapons which violently and murderously disrupted the 
lifeways of humans and more-than-humans as it worked toward developing a ‘peaceful’ 
nuclear power industry—would play a major role in developing internationally 
applicable standards for radiation protection.  
 
While science on radiation protection had been developing over the twentieth century, 
the nebulous interaction between an unstable material and active human bodies 
continued to hamper the establishment of clear guidelines for ‘safety.’ The post-World 
War II dream of propagating ‘peaceful’ nuclear technologies was being threatened by 
incessant overflows of radionuclides into the wild, causing concerns not only among 
people directly exposed, but also those who recognized that radionuclides could travel 
via food or weather patterns into their own situated sociomaterial entanglements. Thus, 
the containment of ‘socio-activity’270 became a major goal of militaries and industries 
wanting to use these technologies. In this section, I will retell stories of some of the 
overflows and subsequent textually-mediated containment strategies developed over the 
20th century, and how these overflows have participated in the development and 
expansion what I refer to as the transnational nuclear assemblage. 
 
To begin, nuclear hydrogen bomb tests had been continuing throughout the world since 
the dropping of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and one controversial 
overflow in particular both visualized the dangers of ionizing radiation and brought it 
                                                
270 See Callon et al. (2009: 109) and Section 2.6.4. 
 185 
directly to Japanese dinner tables.271 On March 1, 1954, a Japanese fishing boat was 
caught in the fallout of a US hydrogen bomb test in the Marshall Islands,272 resulting 
not only in the visible illness of many of the young male crew members, but in the 
contamination of Japan’s air, water and food (T. Higuchi, 2008; Lapp, 1958). In 
particular, the presence of anthropogenic radionuclides in tuna raised concerns and 
became a symbol of the overflow. The controversy, named the ‘Lucky Dragon incident’ 
after the name of the ship,273 created a public uproar and release of anti-nuclear 
sentiment among people in Japan, especially housewives who had to confront the 
possible presence of radionuclides in their everyday shopping and food preparation 
routines—leading some to begin carefully avoiding foods which might harbor the US’s 
radionuclides. The tuna industry had been revived following the end of the US 
occupation of Japan in 1952, and the possible presence of radionuclides in food also 
caused a “tuna panic” among US importers who wanted “proof of no contamination” 
                                                
271 In the words of Whittemore (1986: 514): “Radiation safety had left the laboratory and 
landed on the dinner table.”  
272 While I am unable to go into the grave and horrendous suffering of the people of the 
Marshall Islands in this thesis, I do highly recommend the work of Barbara Rose Johnston 
(2007; 2010; 2013), Holly Barker (2013)—including their collaborations (see Johnston & 
Barker, 2008)—as well as Martha Smith-Norris (1997; 2016) for shedding light the experiences 
of the Marshallese people. The United States dropped sixty-seven nuclear weapons on the 
Marshall Islands between the years of 1946 and 1958, with an estimated total equivalence of 
over seven thousand ‘Little Boys’—the name of the atomic bomb dropped on the city of 
Hiroshima (these bombs are also referred to as ‘Hiroshima bombs’ or ‘Hiroshima equivalents’) 
(Johnston, 2013). Just to put it in perspective, the US military’s Castle Bravo test conducted on 
March 1, 1954 is said to have been equivalent to approximately one thousand ‘Little Boys’ (see 
Smith-Norris, 1997: 1-2). The legacy of these tests do and will continue to wreak havoc on the 
everyday activities of the Marshallese people who must live their lives ‘intra-acting’ with—
literally ‘becoming-with’—the US’s radionuclides for thousands of years to come. Not only 
have the islands been covered with the US’s radionuclides, but they are now the home to a US 
nuclear waste dump—a blasted lagoon that has been retrofitted into what is now a leaking 
nuclear waste dump. The nuclear waste dump, covered by a thin concrete shell already ridden 
with cracks and ‘auto-rewilding’ with vines, has been abandoned by the United States and 
continues to leak radionuclides into its surroundings—materials the lagoon supposedly contains 
have been found floating in the waters of the South China Sea (Gerrard, 2015). The 
documentary Nuclear Savage: The Islands of Secret Project 4.1 (Horowitz, 2011) provides an 
excellent portrayal of the deep suffering of the Marshallese people, and how they live their 
lives entangled with the US’s radionuclides. For more on ‘auto-rewilding’ see Tsing (2017b).  
273 The ship was called the Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon Number 5, 第五福⻯丸). Both 
Fukushima (‘lucky island,’ 福島) and the ship share the kanji character for ‘luck’ (fuku, 福), a 
painful irony pointed out by some of my study participants. 
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(T. Higuchi, 2011: 36).274 As it would again do in 2011, the Japanese government 
decided to deploy numerical standards to reassure the public and importers of the safety 
of consuming the US’s radionuclides. In the midst of the unfolding controversy, the 
Japan Scientific Council decided on a testing regime using Geiger counters275 to 
measure beta and gamma radiation emitting from tuna. 
 
The numerical reference limit was to be 100 counts per minute (cpm) over natural 
background radiation.276 However, when using a Geiger counter in unconfined, wild 
environments, distinguishing between ‘natural’ and ‘anthropogenic’ ionizing radiation 
was a challenge. Moreover, as Higuchi (2011: 39) points out, the Geiger counters being 
used to test tuna were hurriedly gathered and may not have been properly calibrated 
prior to their use. Additionally, Geiger counters are only able to convert the energy they 
detect into audible sounds and counts per minute, and do not indicate which 
radionuclides are actually being picked up in the measurement.277 Not only were the 
Geiger counters producing discomforting audible translations of the activity of natural 
and anthropogenic radionuclides in the fish being measured, but large numbers of tuna 
fished after the Lucky Dragon incident were being found over the 100 cpm limit, 
causing a huge shock in the tuna industry. To add to the turmoil, at the time of the 
Lucky Dragon incident, the Japanese government had been busy allocating part of the 
national budget to build the country’s first nuclear reactor (Aldrich, 2013; P. Pringle & 
Spigelman, 1981). Thus, from the position of the Japanese government, the overflow 
                                                
274 It was not only the tuna fished by the Lucky Dragon Number 5 that contained the US’s 
radionuclides, but other fish swimming in the Pacific Ocean—within which radionuclides from 
the US’s hydrogen bomb tests were freely flowing. Watch Hashimoto’s (2003) video to see the 
locations of the hydrogen bomb tests conducted between 1945 and 1998. While both the Soviet 
Union and the United Kingdom were testing nuclear weapons in 1954, their tests were taking 
place in the Soviet Union or in Australia, not as close to the Japanese archipelago as the US 
tests. 
275 A Geiger counter (also referred to as a G-M counter or a Geiger-Müller counter) is a device 
“that gives a clicking sound and a sharp electrical pulse (discharge) when struck by an ionizing 
particle, such as an electron [—beta particle—] or photon—gamma ray—or sufficient energy to 
produce an electrical discharge” (Morgan & Peterson, 1999: 199). 
276 According to a 1960 report titled “Fish and Radioactivity,” “[t]he acceptable level was 
arbitrarily set as a value less than 100 counts per minute as measured with an end window G-M 
counter placed 10 cm from the surface of the fish. Fish of higher counts were discarded and 
usually buried” (Seymour, 1960). Also see Higuchi (2008; 2011). 
277 The limits to using a Geiger counter to measure for radionuclides was something many of 
my study’s participants discovered following the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster in 2011. 
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not only needed to be contained in order to save the tuna industry, but to advance and 
ensure the smooth establishment of the country’s nuclear industry—its newest 
industrial progress project. The United States’ plans to continue its nuclear testing in 
the Pacific added another dimension to the Japanese government’s considerations as it 
found itself trying to curb public concern about radionuclides in food and rain, while 
also maintaining stable relations with US allies (T. Higuchi, 2008).  
 
Through discussions with the US government and taking into consideration possible 
economic consequences for the fishing industry, in 1956 the Japanese Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (hereafter Ministry of Health)278 decided to revise its safety 
standards. Instead of simply banning all tuna measuring 100 cpm above ‘natural’ levels, 
the new standards adopted new calculations which shifted the allowable limit 
upward.279 The new standards additionally loosened the requirements for reporting 
intermittent cases of high fallout measured in food and rain. Though the numerical 
standards were based on the ‘maximum permissible concentrations’ of the time—which 
recognized the impossibility of setting a clear threshold for ‘safety’—once in the wild, 
the values began to operate beyond their original intent and “in effect ‘normalized’ the 
presence of human-made radionuclides in foods below the threshold as ‘safe’” (T. 
Higuchi, 2008: 344-5). Ultimately, the use of these new numerical standards created an 
“illusion of certainty”280 in which the layers of uncertainty known by scientists were no 
longer accessible in the numerical standards themselves. 
 
As overflows of radionuclides proliferated, so did the institutional complex for 
textually taming and containing them. By the 1960s there were a number of new 
committees and organizations that became involved in developing radiation protection 
                                                
278 While the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare active in 1956 and the Japanese Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare active in 2011 are organizationally different, I refer to both of 
them as Ministry of Health in this chapter (see Section 5.5). 
279 The allowable limit changed from 100 cpm to 0.1 microcuries (µc) or 222 disintegrations 
per minute (dpm) per liter. Higuchi (2008: 364-5, n62) explains: “One microcurie is equal to 
2,220,000 dpm. The conversion of dpm into cpm depends on the efficiency of Geiger-Muller 
survey meters, which affects the accuracy of readings.” The unit of dpm has been replaced by 
the Becquerel (disintegration per second), the unit my participants wrestle with today (T. 
Higuchi, 2011: 37, n17).  
280 See Whittemore (1986: 5).  
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recommendations, and the ICRP became entangled within a whole new range of 
political and economic actors. In 1955, the British Medical Research Council and the 
US National Academy of Science both undertook studies on the possible medical 
consequences of radioactivity. Data collected for the US National Research Council’s 
study—named the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR)—would eventually 
be used by the ICRP to inform its recommendations for handling TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster in 2011 (Boudia, 2007; ICRP, 2007). The United Nations Scientific Committee 
on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) was created in the same year with the 
goal of studying the health effects of nuclear weapons testing (Taylor, 1971: 47). In 
1956, the ICRP received non-governmental organization status with the World Health 
Organization (WHO) which offered to translate ICRP materials into multiple languages 
to be used to guide radiation protection projects, and the proliferation of nuclear energy 
and weaponry, throughout the world (Boudia, 2007). The following year, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created within the United Nations 
Atoms for Peace program281 to help in promoting the ‘peaceful’ use and proliferation of 
nuclear energy (Roehrlich, 2016).  
 
The ICRP began interacting with all of these agencies by the early 1960s and also set 
up a more permanent financial plan for itself.282 By 2010, the ICRP was being 
“financed mainly by voluntary contributions from national and international bodies 
with an interest in radiological protection” (ICRP, 2011: 4).283 In short, the overflows of 
                                                
281 Originating in the United States, the program was announced to the world by US president 
Dwight D. Eisenhower in a speech to the United Nations on December 8, 1953 (see 
Eisenhower, 1953). 
282 The ICRP initially received assistance from the International Society of Radiology, the 
World Health Organization, the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation (Boudia, 
2007). 
283 In 2010 the ICRP (2011: 33) received grants from: the IAEA; the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD’s) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA); the Japan Atomic 
Energy Agency; the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the US Environmental Protection 
Agency; the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency; the Canadian Nuclear 
Safety Commission; the Chinese Society of Radiation Protection; France’s Institut de 
Protection et de Sûreté Nucléaire; South Korea’s Korea Nuclear International Cooperation 
Foundation; the Commission of European Communities; the International Radiation Protection 
Association; the International Society of Radiology; Argentina’s Autoridad Regulatoria 
Nuclear de Argentina; Denmark’s Statens Institut for Strålehygiejne; Finland’s 
Säteilyturvakeskus, Germany’s Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit; Iceland’s Geislavarnir Rikisins; Norway’s Statens strålevern; Russia’s 
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radionuclides in the 1940s and 1950s were met with the establishment and expansion of 
what I will refer to as the transnational nuclear assemblage. This institutional 
complex—within which memberships mingled and overlapped, and finances flowed 
freely—would establish itself as expert in all aspects of radiation protection. The 
proliferation of ‘safe’ and ‘peaceful’ nuclear technology would be made possible 
through cooperation among these entangled organizations, and overflows would no 
longer be a threat as they could be filtered and contained through their vast textual 
archives. 
 
The establishment of this transnational nuclear assemblage was paired with, or rather 
paved the way for, the proliferation of nuclear energy in countries around the world. In 
Japan, the establishment of the nuclear industry was a long and arduous process (see 
Aldrich, 2008), though the crusaders of the project were ultimately successful in 
overcoming what was termed Japan’s “nuclear allergy” (kaku arerugi)—a term used to 
refer to the country’s aversion to nuclear weapons and, as a result, other forms of 
nuclear technologies (Aldrich, 2013). The country’s first commercial nuclear reactor 
went online in 1966 in Ibaraki Prefecture’s Tokai-mura (Tokai-village). By 1970 the 
country had four nuclear reactors, but that number jumped to twenty-two by 1980, 
thirty-nine by 1990, and finally fifty-four by 2010 (see Figure 1). While expansion of 
the nuclear industry was initially driven by slogans of ‘peace’ and ‘safety’—what is 
now referred to as the ‘myth of safety’—in the 1990s, following a number of oil 
shocks, the industry was re-branded as ‘green’ for its alleged ability to curb global 
warming (Sugiman, 2014).284  
 
                                                
Burnasyan Federal Medical Biohysical Center; Russia’s Federal Medical Biological Agency; 
Spain’s Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear; and Sweden’s Miljödepartementet. 
284 Nuclear power’s marketing as ‘green’ or ‘carbon neutral’ is only possible if the carbon 
emissions resulting from uranium mining and refinery, transport of materials as well as reactor 
construction are omitted from calculations. These claims also overlook the dangers of nuclear 
weapon proliferation, nuclear disasters, the storage of nuclear waste, and questions about the 
ability of nuclear reactors to remain ‘safe’ during the unprecedented weather events and 
changes in sea level that are predicted to accompany climate change—what is now being 
referred to as ‘climate chaos’ (see Girardet, 2007; Jacobson & Delucchi, 2011; Lenzen, 2008; 
Sovacool, 2008).   
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As the Japanese nuclear industry forged forward and began establishing itself 
physically in small, often marginalized and financially distressed towns and villages 
throughout country, overflows continued to challenge and disrupt attempts at 
unconstrained, limitless progress. Large-scale nuclear disasters—for example, the 1979 
Three Mile Island nuclear disaster in Pennsylvania, United States; the 1986 Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster in the former Soviet Union; and the 1999 Japan Nuclear Fuel 
Conversion Co. (JCO) nuclear criticality disaster in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, Japan285—
seemed to slow the unfettered expansion of the country’s nuclear industry (see Aldrich, 
2013; Sugiman, 2014). However, at the same time, the extensive and intricately 
connected transnational nuclear assemblage of councils, committees, commissions, 
agencies, academies and organizations working in the fields of nuclear power, nuclear 
weaponry, nuclear medicine and radiation protection had developed the capacity and 
authority to translate overflows—confining their messiness and the suffering they cause 
to humans and more-than-humans within its vast and ever-expanding textual archive. 
 
One example of this form of textual containment can be found following the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster. In the same way that the chaotic, messy and traumatic experiences of 
the hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were translated into quantitative equations 
and models for setting standards for radiation protection, the vast and chaotic aftermath 
of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster was translated into reports and statistical data by 
a number of institutions in the transnational nuclear assemblage. Evolutionary 
biologists Møller and Mousseau (2013b: 18-9)286 describe how the haphazard and 
chaotic nature of the 1986 disaster has been translated into the reports of organizations 
active in the transnational nuclear assemblage: 
                                                
285 The JCO nuclear criticality disaster took place on September 30, 1999 and was considered 
the worst radiological disaster connected to nuclear power in Japan before the onset of 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster in 2011. It occurred at a uranium processing facility in Tokai-mura, 
Ibaraki Prefecture that was operated by JCO, one of the subsidiaries of the Sumitomo Metal 
Mining Co. On September 30th, the activities of three workers set off a ‘nuclear criticality’—
also described as a “limited uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction”—while they mixed uranium 
oxide to produce fuel for one of Japan’s experimental nuclear reactors. Two of the workers died 
after their exposures (World Nuclear Association, 2013). 
286 Both Møller and Mousseau have been studying the biological effects of ionizing radiation on 
animals and insects in Chernobyl, and are now also working in Fukushima (for example, 
Mousseau & Møller, 2014; 2016; 2017; Møller & Mousseau, 2013a; Møller et al., 2012). 
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Unfortunately, the chaotic events in Chernobyl in 1986, with the 
evacuation of thousands of inhabitants, were not used for selecting a 
random cohort that would have allowed quantitative assessment of 
public health effects. Today close to 1 million Ukrainians collect 
pensions linked to the effects of Chernobyl contamination. […] In the 
official reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
United Nations and several other organisations released on the 20th 
anniversary of the accident in 2006, the total number of excess deaths 
was estimated to be very low. An additional conclusion in these 
reports was that negative health effects were likely to be due to 
psychological stress associated with worrying about the effects of 
low-dose radiation rather than being directly caused by biological 
effects. Interestingly, we can show strong negative effects on birds 
and other animals, and it is certain that neither birds nor free-living 
animals are known to worry about the negative effects of low-dose 
radiation. The official reports were restricted to effects recorded in 
highly contaminated regions of Ukraine, thereby excluding vast 
contaminated areas in Russia and Belarus. Several official 
representatives from these countries refused to sign the final 
documents. Subsequent research in Ukraine has shown extensive 
negative effects of low-dose radiation on many different medical 
conditions.  
Thus, not only has the IAEA-sponsored Chernobyl Forum focused its study on the 
areas of highest fallout to determine the consequences of the nuclear disaster, but when 
heterogeneous health-effects experienced by people exposed to low-doses of ionizing 
radiation do not fit within the clear, linear quantifications put forth by the IAEA and 
other organizations in the transitional nuclear assemblage, they are simply 
compartmentalized away—in this case, said to be caused purely by ‘psychological 
distress.’ Radically different, Møller and Mousseau (2013b: 16) situate their studies 
within a messier “patchwork” of fallout, taking seriously the heterogeneity and 
diversity in biological effects from low-doses of ionizing radiation revealed on the 
bodies of barn swallows and other animals and insects living within a “haphazard 
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distribution of radiation.” Møller and Mousseau (2013b: 19, original emphasis) point 
out what they see as a major flaw in the IAEA’s approach:  
In effect, the Chernobyl Forum took the position that if risks could 
not be measured because of relatively low frequencies, then they 
should not be estimated either. […] [E]ven if the probability of a 
negative health outcome for an individual is small, if a large 
population is exposed, then a correspondingly large number of 
individuals are likely to be affected. 
Recognizing the difficulty in measuring the biological effects of low-level ionizing 
radiation exposure on humans, the authors suggest a different approach, one that 
acknowledges and takes seriously the heterogeneity and stochastic nature of these 
exposures: 
A better perspective on the effects of low-dose radiation is perhaps 
achieved by investigating organisms with short lifespan[s] such as 
birds, rodents or even insects, many of which […] are now in their 
25th or greater generation. Unfortunately, the negative effects of low-
dose radiation from Chernobyl documented for these organisms are 
much worse than what is reported for humans.  
 
5.4 Assumptions	and	philosophies	for	managing	uncertainty	and	heterogeneity	
Creating regulations to assert international consensus when findings refuse to fit within 
manageable, linear categories poses its challenges. Over time, ICRP members have 
come to a consensus on a number of assumptions and quantitative tools to manage 
uncertainties they see in the science of radiation protection, as well as a philosophy to 
address the ethical implications of making policy decisions that affect the lives and 
livelihoods of both radiation workers and the public at large. Termed 
‘Recommendations,’ the ICRP’s consensus reports provide an overview of agreements 
decided upon by the Commission’s members.287 By 2011, the ICRP had produced over 
                                                
287 Examples of these Recommendations can be found in Publication 6 (1955), Publication 9 
(1966), Publication 26 (1977), Publication 60 (1991a) and Publication 103 (2007) which are 
issued among a vast number of other publications designed for supplementary guidance. 
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117 major publications, with Publication 103 published in 2007 providing the most 
current recommendations on radiation protection at the time of TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster (ICRP, 2007). According to Publication 103, the aim of the ICRP’s 
recommendations for radiation protection were “to contribute to an appropriate level of 
protection for people and the environment against the detrimental effects of radiation 
exposure without unduly limiting the desirable human actions that may be associated 
with such exposure” (ICRP, 2007: 41). The ‘detrimental effects’ include both 
deterministic effects—which are thought to have a threshold and, thus, be more easily 
preventable—and stochastic effects (or probabilistic effects)—which are thought to 
have no clear threshold and therefore can only be limited.  
 
As mentioned, the possible genetic effects of ionizing radiation became known in the 
1940s, and by 1952 excess cases of leukemia were being found among hibakusha in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.288 In response, the ICRP—borrowing directly from the US 
NCRP—admitted its inability to set a threshold for stochastic effects from exposure to 
ionizing radiation.289  Fast-forward to 2007, and the same assumptions provide the 
backdrop of the ICRP’s Recommendations. Finding an “appropriate level of 
protection” is therefore not only based on scientific knowledge, but “value judgements 
about the relative importance of different kinds of risk and about the balancing of risks 
and benefits” (ICRP, 2007: 41). But who would be making these value judgements? 
And on what basis would they be made?  
 
To cope with the innumerable ethical issues behind setting standards for radiation 
protection, the ICRP has not only developed a number of assumption and philosophical 
approaches, but has also moved away from recommending concrete numerical 
standards, to what the group terms a “System of Radiological Protection.” Through this 
‘System,’ the ICRP includes recommendations not only for risk assessment, but also 
                                                
288 See Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (1974) and Lindee (1994: 244-5). 
289 Recognizing the inability to set a threshold for absolute ‘safety,’ the ICRP’s 1955 
Recommendations instruct: “Whilst the values proposed for maximum permissible doses are 
such as to involve a risk which is small compared to the other hazards of life, nevertheless, in 
view of the incomplete evidence on which the values are based, coupled with the knowledge 
that certain radiation effects are irreversible and cumulative, it is strongly recommended that 
every effort be made to reduce exposure to all types of ionizing radiation to the lowest possible 
level” (ICRP, 1955: 10). Also see ICRP (2007: 35). 
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risk management, where numerical reference limits become just one of the many 
aspects considered when setting standards for radiation protection. In the following 
sections I will explicate some of the major assumptions and philosophical 
underpinnings which provide the basis for the ICRP’s recommendations in an attempt 
to highlight how this ‘System’ is intended to operate when dealing with overflows of 
radionuclides into the wild. 
 
5.4.1 Stabilizing	uncertainty		
One of the earliest assumptions adopted to compensate for the uncertainty of the onset 
of stochastic effects following exposure to ionizing radiation is the linear-non-threshold 
(LNT) model, a theoretical model which assumes that “in the low dose range, radiation 
doses greater than zero will increase the risk of excess cancer and/or heritable disease 
in a simple proportionate manner” (ICRP, 2007: 26). Here the ‘low dose range’ is 
defined as “below about 100 mSv” (ICRP, 2007: 51).290 Described as “the philosophical 
and practical foundation for risk assessment and management of exposures in the 
environment and workplace,” (Mossman, 2012: 190) the linear-non-threshold model 
provided the basis for the recommendation printed in the ICRP’s Publication 60 
(1991a). In 2007, the ICRP continued to advocate the importance of this assumption in 
the development of its Recommendations, arguing that using “this so-called linear-non-
threshold (LNT) model is considered by the Commission to be the best practical 
approach to managing risk from radiation exposure and commensurate with the 
‘precautionary principle.’” (ICRP, 2007: 43).291 The adoption of the linear-non-
threshold model is viewed as precautionary due to the ‘uncertainty’ the ICRP asserts as 
present within not only current, but also future investigations into the biological effects 
of low-dose ionizing radiation.292  
 
                                                
290 The unit mSv stands for millisieverts and is a unit for measuring an estimated effective dose 
to the whole human body, or an estimated equivalent dose to an individual organ. These doses 
will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
291 The document sites a report on the precautionary principle by the World Commission on the 
Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) (2005), published by the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 
292 The ICRP (2007: 51, emphasis added) explains its position: “whilst the LNT model remains 
a scientifically plausible element in its practical system of radiological protection, 
biological/epidemiological information that would unambiguously verify the hypothesis that 
underpins the model is unlikely to be forthcoming.”  
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Providing support for its use of the linear-non-threshold assumption, Publication 103 
cites UNSCEAR (2000a; 2000b) the US NCRP (2001) and the US National Research 
Council (2006). Although the ICRP points out one report from the French Académie 
des Sciences293 which is described as supporting an alternative “practical threshold for 
radiation cancer risk,” Publication 103 continues to maintain the linear-non-threshold 
assumption based on an analysis presented in Publication 99 in 2005:  
from an analysis conducted by the Commission […], the Commission 
considers that the adoption of the LNT model combined with a 
judged value of a dose and dose rate effectiveness factor (DDREF) 
provides a prudent basis for the practical purposes of radiological 
protection, i.e., the management of risks from low-dose radiation 
exposure. (ICRP, 2005; 2007: 51) 
Here the ICRP brings up another important aspect of the linear-non-threshold model: it 
depends on a ‘judged value’ used to extrapolate the potential risk of cancer below 
‘around 100 mSv,’ referred to as the ‘dose and dose-rate effectiveness factor 
(DDREF).’ The ICRP (2007: 21) defines the DDREF as a “judged factor that 
generalises the usually lower biological effectiveness [or biological injury] (per unit of 
dose) of radiation exposures at low doses and low dose rates as compared with 
exposures at high doses and high dose rates.” That is, the factor is used to account for 
possible “cellular adaptive responses”—or the potential, assumed ability of the body to 
repair damage caused by ionizing radiation—following low-dose exposures to ionizing 
radiation that may not be possible at higher doses.294  
                                                
293 The French report was written by Tubiana and Aurengo (2005). In addition to them, there 
are a number of other scientists who argue against the linear-non-threshold model, instead 
advocating for a ‘supra-linear dose model’(Morgan, 1992; Sawant et al., 2001) or possibly a 
‘linear response model’ (Møller & Mousseau, 2013b).  
294 As mentioned in Section 5.2, the ICRP’s (2007: 52) data on “the risk of organ-specific 
cancer” is based on the somewhat questionable data collected through the Life Span Study 
conducted on hibakusha from Hiroshima and Nagasaki (for example, Preston et al., 2007; 
Preston et al., 2003) as well as studies by UNSCEAR (2000a; 2000b) and the US National 
Research Council (2006). The ICRP (2007: 52) says that it borrowed the DDREF from 
UNSCEAR as a tool “to project cancer risk determined at high doses and high dose rates to the 
risks that would apply at low doses and low dose rates.” Mossman (2012: 193) also explains its 
importance in estimating health ‘risks’ from exposure to low doses of radiation: “Dose and 
dose-rate effectiveness factors (DDREF) are used to adjust LNT-derived risk coefficients to 
account for biological repair. The extent of repair is an important determinant of risk.” 
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The assumptions underlying these estimates continue to evolve over time, with some 
scientists contending that, based on recent studies on low-dose radiation, the ICRP’s 
current estimates are not conservative enough.295 Regardless, the ICRP (2007: 53) cites 
‘uncertainty’—or lack of “statistical precision”—in the literature as the reason for using 
“broad judgements” in deciding on factors such as the DDREF: 
In principle, epidemiological data on protracted exposure, such as 
those from environmental and occupational circumstances, should be 
directly informative on judgements of DDREF. However, the 
statistical precision afforded by these studies and other uncertainties 
associated with the inability to adequately control for confounding 
factors (see Annex A), do not allow for a precise estimate of DDREF 
at this time. Accordingly the Commission has decided to continue to 
use broad judgements in its choice of DDREF based upon dose-
response features of experimental data, the LSS, and the results of 
probabilistic uncertainty analysis conducted by others. 
Along with the DDREF, another extremely important assumption underlying the linear-
non-threshold model is what Tsuda et al. (2017) refer to as the “100 mSv threshold 
assumption.” In their paper addressing the ethical issues concerning the unquestioned 
adoption and proliferation of the assumed ‘100 mSv threshold’ for radiation-induced 
cancer, the authors point out how the assumptions and uncertainty in the science behind 
this numerical threshold is often erased as the value is reproduced in scientific and 
government reports, the media, and recommendations for radiation protection. In 
Publication 103, the ICRP (2007: 173) describes the logic behind its adoption of the 
‘100 mSv threshold assumption’ in spite of ongoing contention and debate: 
In formulating Recommendations for protecting humans against the 
tumorigenic effects of radiation, the Commission is required to 
consider a very broad span of biological data and concepts; many of 
these are subject to ongoing debate and, in some cases, contention. 
There is, however, general agreement that epidemiological methods 
used for the estimation of cancer risk do not have the power to 
                                                
295 For example, see Tsuda et al. (2017), Imanaka and Hasai (2008), and Morgan (1992). 
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directly reveal cancer risks in the dose range up to around 100 mSv. 
Accordingly there is a growing role for biological data in the 
development of ICRP Recommendations and, where there is 
uncertainty and/or contention, there is a need to arrive at a 
scientifically balanced judgement based upon peer-reviewed data.  
The ‘power’ being discussed, as pointed out by Tsuda et al. (2017), refers again to 
“statistical power” mentioned in the ICRP’s Recommendations (2007: 186, emphasis 
added) some pages later: “As already noted, direct estimation from epidemiological 
studies of cancer risks from doses below a few hundred mSv is difficult, largely for 
reasons of statistical power.” However, Tsuda et al. (2017) point out the lack of 
epidemiological evidence and citation in the ICRP’s statement, listing a number of 
studies published since 1956 which indicate possible carcinogenic effects appearing in 
absorbed doses lower than 100 mGy (which translates to an effective dose296 to the 
human body of about 100 mSv). Here, what worries Tsuda and colleagues is the 
uncertainty of radiation-induced cancers, along with other non-cancerous outcomes, 
that occur below the 100 mSv threshold, but are easily written off by scientific and 
government authorities as ‘uncertainty,’ or, worse, erroneously translated to an 
assumption that “there is no excess cancer risk under 100 mSv” (Tsuda et al., 2017: 3). 
That is, while ‘uncertainty’ may be acknowledged within the vast textual complex of 
the ICRP and other organizations within the transnational nuclear assemblage, the 
rounded and seemingly stable numerical value of 100 mSv has the potential to make 
invisible the important historical evolution and assumptions imbued within this metric. 
 
The overall purpose of devising calculations for biological damage from low-dose 
exposure to ionizing radiation is to determine dose coefficients of estimated equivalent 
and effective doses to guide the setting of radiation protection standards. Equivalent 
dose refers to an estimated dose of ionizing radiation received by a specific ‘critical 
tissue’ or ‘critical organ’ of the body, while effective dose refers to an estimated dose of 
radiation to the whole body—calculated as the “tissue-weighted sum of the equivalent 
                                                
296 “Effective dose expresses biological damage to an individual” following exposure to 
radiation (Martin & Harbison, 1996: 28). The effective dose “takes into account the type of 
radiation and the sensitivity of particular tissues and organs to that radiation” (Grupen, 2010: 
291). 
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doses in all specified tissues and organs of the body” (ICRP, 2007: 23).297 According to 
the ICRP’s Publication 103 (2007: 49-59), effective dose is risk-informed because it is 
based on estimates of the risk of deterministic and stochastic effects extracted from 
studies on hibakusha in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (for example, Preston et al., 2003; 
2007) and other ‘exposed’ populations (for example, UNSCEAR, 2000a; 2000b). 
Because these doses represent ionizing radiation absorbed by different bodily tissues or 
organs, they cannot be directly measured and are instead obtained through complex 
calculations and modeling using ‘voxel reference phantoms’ to determine equivalent 
and effective doses for a Reference Person.298 Publication 103 explains:  
For adults, equivalent doses will be calculated by sex-averaging of 
values obtained using male and female phantoms. Effective dose will 
then be calculated using revised age- and sex-averaged tissue 
weighting factors, based on updated risk data and intended to apply 
as rounded values to a population of both sexes and all ages. 
Effective dose is calculated for a Reference Person and not for an 
individual. (ICRP, 2007: 13) 
Again, the Reference Person was originally designed as a tool to allow for conveniently 
standardizing assumptions involved in establishing estimated doses for radiation 
protection that could be sweepingly applied to all members of the public.299 The 
purpose of the original Standard Man, later Reference Man, was to provide a “set of 
                                                
297 More specifically, effective dose “expresses biological damage to an individual” human 
body following exposure to radiation (Martin & Harbison, 1996: 28) and “takes into account 
the type of radiation and the sensitivity of particular tissues and organs to that radiation” 
(Grupen, 2010: 291). As such, effective dose is also described as “a risk-related quantity based 
upon the consequences of whole body exposure” (ICRP, 2007: 311). 
298 According to Publication 103 (ICRP, 2007: 31), reference phantoms are “[v]oxel phantoms 
for the human body (male and female voxel phantoms based on medical imaging data) with the 
anatomical and physiological characteristics defined in the report of the ICRP Task Group in 
Reference Man” (see ICRP, 2002). At the time of the report, reference phantoms for different 
aged children, pregnant women and fetuses were only being planned, not yet developed (ICRP, 
2007: 69). See Hoseinian-Azghadi et al. (2014) and Kim et al. (2016) for some of the newest 
developments. 
299 Eckerman and Cristy (1995: 1) explain:  “The well-defined reference individual enabled 
health physicists to compare and check their calculations without tedious enumeration of 
assumptions and without minor differences in these assumptions obscuring the basic agreement 
or disagreement of their estimated doses.”  
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biological parameters which would be accepted for calculating permissible levels for 
work with radioactive nuclides” (ICRP, 1975: 1-2). Having a single, reference body 
seemed to be the perfect answer for dealing with messy “biological variability” among 
the bodies of radiation workers; the Reference Man’s body provided the perfect tool for 
taming the heterogeneity and messiness inherent in biological idiosyncrasies (US 
NCRP, 1954: 8).300 Thus, the art of averaging became an important tool for ensuring 
universal application of radiation protection standards—intended mostly for a male 
nuclear workforce at the time. But it came with a twist: though the Reference Man was 
designed through an averaging of real human characteristics and parameters, the 
recommended doses could only be used to set standards applicable to protect an 
abstract ‘human population’ and could not be used to make epidemiological predictions 
regarding individual human bodies. This remains a basic tenet of radiation protection 
standards today. 
 
While dose coefficients were initially designed for the body of a Standard or Reference 
Man,301 eventually biological parameters of women were considered, managed by 
adding female organs to the carefully atomized body of the Reference Man and creating 
a hermaphroditic ‘Reference Individual.’302 Given the different radio-sensitivities of 
male and female bodies, some have suggested using dose coefficients for a ‘Reference 
Female’ to deal with problems of “radioactive gender inequality” in the setting of 
radiation protection standards (Cram, 2015: 801).303 By 2007, the ICRP’s 
Recommendations moved away from the hermaphroditic model, instead calling for the 
calculation of equivalent dose separately for both males and females, and then “sex-
                                                
300 The US NCRP’s Subcommittee 1 clarifies its stance: “‘biological variability’ […] makes it 
necessary to deal with averages rather than with the individual. Since the factors that cause 
such variations are unknown, it is impossible to predict how a given individual will respond to 
a dose that is known to produce a certain effect on the average” (US NCRP, 1954: 8). 
301 In ICRP Publication 23, the Reference Man was described as a young man “20-30 years of 
age, weighing 70 kg, is 170 cm in height, and lives in a climate with an average temperature of 
from 10 to 20 C. He is a Caucasian and is a Western European or North American in habit and 
custom” (ICRP, 1975: 4). 
302 See Cram (2015) for a discussion on the sexual evolution of the ICRP’s Standard Man. 
303 In the case of cancer, data on the increased radio-sensitivity of woman and children are 
made clear in the BEIR VII Phase 2 report by the US National Research Council (2006: 311-2). 
Some of the data from this report, which visually portray the difference in radio-sensitivity in 
the case of lung and other cancers, have been plotted by Li et al. (2011: 409). 
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averaging” to obtain equivalent or effective doses suitable for a more gender-neutral 
‘Reference Person’ (ICRP, 2007: 12).304 Thus, instead of creating doses based on the 
most radio-sensitive members of a population, the ICRP (2007: 69-70) advocates 
radiation protection standards to be based on a single sex-averaged value:  “[f]or the 
purposes of radiological protection, it is useful to apply a single value of effective dose 
for both sexes.” As it was at the invention of the Standard Man, averaging remains an 
important tool for translating the heterogeneity of active human bodies into a 
homogenous Reference Person—a model that is used to smooth over messy ‘biological 
variability’ through quantitative risk assessments.  
 
Again, while current dose coefficients estimated for an ‘idealized’ Reference Person are 
used in setting radiation protection standards applicable to all members of an exposed 
population, the ICRP makes clear that—because the doses were designed for a 
Reference Person and not a specific human body—they are merely “protection 
quantities which are used for limiting stochastic effects at low doses” and should never 
be used in epidemiological investigations, cancer projections or risk assessments 
involving real people (ICRP, 2007: 13 & 64).305 Thus, while the Reference Person can 
aid in making decisions about ‘acceptable’ doses of ionizing radiation for all members 
of the public, it cannot be held accountable for any detrimental effects that may result 
from these doses. Here, the role of the Reference Person exposes the inherent tensions 
between the messy heterogeneity of human bodies with the homogeneity of models and 
statistics behind radiation protection standards, and thus the policy recommendations 
they are based upon.  
 
                                                
304 ICRP Publication 103 defines the Reference Person as “[a]n idealised person for whom the 
organ or tissue equivalent doses are calculated by averaging the corresponding doses of the 
Reference Male and Reference Female. The equivalent doses of the Reference Person are used 
for the calculation of the effective dose by multiplying these doses by the corresponding tissue 
weighting factors” (ICRP, 2007: 31). 
305 The ICRP (2007: 51) explains its position: “Because of this uncertainty on health effects at 
low doses, the Commission judges that it is not appropriate, for the purposes of public health 
planning, to calculate the hypothetical number of cases of cancer or heritable disease that might 
be associated with very small radiation doses received by large numbers of people over very 
long periods of time.”  
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In reading through the ICRP’s Recommendations, it becomes clear that ‘uncertainty’ is 
an important tool for maintaining flexibility in setting recommendations for radiation 
protection. In categorizing all possible negative effects of effective doses of ionizing 
radiation below 100 mSv as ‘uncertain,’ any attempts to link low-dose ionizing 
radiation to malaise or disease are also easily compartmentalized away, recognized only 
as “noise”306 or “scatter”307 in statistical analyses. The word “trivial” can also be found 
in ICRP documents to describe low-dose exposures that do not fit into its statistical 
models (ICRP, 2007: 13 & 76).308  
 
Ultimately, the linear-non-threshold model, and its accompanying assumptions, serves 
as an important pillar in the ICRP’s attempt to stabilize uncertainty as a tool for 
containing overflows of radionuclides from their confined spaces within the 
transnational nuclear assemblage into the wider environment. Even one of the most 
inherent tensions within the model—its acknowledgement that there is no ‘safe’ dose of 
ionizing radiation—is managed through the stabilization of uncertainty. ICRP 
Publication 103 (2007: 43, emphasis added) explains how the uncertainty of stochastic 
effects, combined with the analytical possibilities afforded by the linear-non-threshold 
model, create a situation where standard-setting institutions, as well as members of the 
public, must “assume” and thus accept any possible detrimental effects from exposure 
to low-level ionizing radiation that is “deemed acceptable”: 
The probabilistic nature of stochastic effects and the properties of the 
LNT model make it impossible to derive a clear distinction between 
‘safe’ and ‘dangerous’, and this creates some difficulties in 
explaining the control of radiation risks. The major policy implication 
of the LNT model is that some finite risk, however small, must be 
                                                
306 In Publication 99 the ICRP (2005: 27, emphasis added) writes: “At low and very low 
radiation doses, statistical and other variations in baseline risk tend to be the dominant sources 
of error in both epidemiological and experimental carcinogenesis studies, and estimates of 
radiation-related risk tend to be highly uncertain because of a weak signal-to-noise ratio and 
because it is difficult to recognise or to control for subtle confounding factors. At such dose 
levels, and with the absence of bias from uncontrolled variation in baseline rates, positive and 
negative estimates of radiation-related risk tend to be almost equally likely on statistical 
grounds, even under the LNT theory.” 
307 See Gonzalez et al. (2013: 510). 
308 The ICRP (2007: 13 & 76) refers to these as “trivial individual doses” or “trivial exposures.” 
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assumed and a level of protection established based on what is 
deemed acceptable.  
Here, uncertainty is used as a tool to abdicate the ICRP of the responsibility of taking 
seriously the messiness and heterogeneity of the effect of low-level exposure to 
ionizing radiation, instead translating it from a technical problem that needs to be 
solved, to a “problem of social acceptance” (T. Higuchi, 2011: 6).309 However, how 
‘acceptable’ doses and radiation protection standards are decided remains a highly 
contentious ethical issue. Over time, the ICRP has developed basic principles to help in 
guiding the application of its Recommendations in an attempt to smooth over ethical 
questions implicit in its scientific foundation and intended applications. 
 
5.4.2 The	fluidity	and	mutability	of	radiation	protection	values	
The philosophy of the ICRP is embodied in its three guiding principles of 
‘justification,’ ‘optimization of protection’ and the ‘application of dose limits’ which 
are to be used to inform either ‘practices’—“human practices increasing exposure”—or 
‘interventions’—“human actions that decrease exposure.”310 These three principles are 
to be employed differently depending on the type of exposure situation—‘planned,’ 
‘emergency,’ or ‘existing’ (ICRP, 2007: 82-3). According to the ICRP, while 
‘justification’ and ‘optimization’ are applicable in all three situations, the ‘application 
of dose limits’ is only recommended for use in planned situations where doses can be 
controlled (for example, work to be completed within a functioning nuclear power 
plant). As mentioned in Section 5.4, the uncontrollable nature of nuclear disasters, 
according to the ICRP, requires that people accept higher doses of ionizing radiation in 
the event of an ‘unplanned’ radiological overflow.311 
 
                                                
309 As Higuchi (2011: 6) puts it: “Subscribing to the linear non-threshold (LNT) hypothesis, 
radiation protection experts have long insisted that the risk of low-level radiation is not a 
technical fact but a problem of social acceptance.” 
310 This was first introduced in ICRP (1991a), quoted in ICRP (2007: 81-2). 
311 In referring back to Perrow’s (1999) work on ‘normal accidents’ in Section 2.6.6, the 
particular design of nuclear reactors guarantees the technology may not easily cope with even 
small, predictable disruptions. Thus, overflows can never be referred to as ‘unexpected,’ 
‘accidental’ or even ‘unplanned’ as the very design of these reactors guarantees an overflow is 
likely to occur. 
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The 2007 ICRP Recommendations explain that in an emergency situation, the principle 
of ‘justification’ becomes:  
the process of determining whether […] a proposed remedial action 
[…] is likely, overall, to be beneficial, i.e., whether the benefits to 
individuals and to society (including the reduction in radiation 
detriment) from introducing or continuing the remedial action 
outweigh its cost and any harm or damage it causes. (ICRP, 2007: 25)  
Correspondingly, during an emergency the principle of ‘optimization of protection’ is 
described as a “process of determining what level of protection and safety makes 
exposures, and the probability and magnitude of potential exposures, as low as 
reasonably achievable, economic and societal factors being taken into account” (ICRP, 
2007: 28, emphasis added).312 The term ‘ALARA’—the acronym for ‘as low as 
reasonably achievable’—is used to describe the recommended process for choosing an 
acceptable radiation dose for the public that takes into account not only the health of 
humans, but other societal and economic considerations.313 The ICRP makes sure to 
emphasize that “[o]ptimisation of protection is not minimisation of dose”—a nuance 
the Commission would later blame the Japanese government of ignoring in the setting 
of its ‘new reference limits’ for radionuclides in food in April 2012 (González et al., 
2013; ICRP, 2007: 92).314  
 
Both principles require making judgements that affect the lives of “exposed 
individuals,” whether they be the public (“general individuals”), workers (“informed 
individuals”), or patients and their caregivers (ICRP, 2007: 24). The ICRP’s 
recommendations expect government officials will be in charge of employing these 
principles and making judgements during emergency situations. Therefore, while the 
ICRP does recommend that in some cases decisions on ‘justification’ should be 
“informed by a process of public consultation” and ‘optimization’ “may often include 
the participation of relevant stakeholders rather than radiological protection specialists 
                                                
312 The principle of ‘optimization’ is expanded upon in Publication 101 (ICRP, 2006). 
313 See Hansson (2013) for a reflection on the ALARA approach in radiation protection. 
314 This will be discussed further in Section 5.6. 
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alone” (ICRP, 2007: 90-3), the choice of who to include and how the inclusion takes 
place is awarded to governing authorities.315  
 
The ICRP additionally provides guidance in the form of numerical recommendations 
for setting reference levels—or dose limits—in ‘planned,’ ‘existing’ and ‘emergency 
situations’ (ICRP, 2007: 14). The values are represented as a recommended annual 
effective dose—measured in millisieverts per year (mSv/year)—for both workers and 
the public. In its Recommendations, the ICRP translates equivalent and effective doses 
into reference levels to guide the setting of radiation protection standards. In an 
emergency situation, the ICRP advises government officials to choose a numerical 
reference level which represents the chosen “restriction on dose or risk, above which it 
is judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposure to occur, and below which 
optimisation of protection should be implemented” (ICRP, 2007: 44). According to 
Publication 103, reference levels are always situation-dependent, allowing for 
flexibility in the setting of radiation protection measures—for example, the numerical 
reference values for a planned exposure situation would not be considered applicable in 
an emergency situation. The ICRP (2007: 95-8) stipulates that, in an emergency 
situation, the inability to know the extent of a radiological overflow a priori means that 
deciding on an appropriate reference level involves a posteriori calculation of 
estimated projected, residual and averted doses.316 
 
The residual dose represents the difference between the estimated projected dose of 
ionizing radiation people may receive in an emergency and the estimated averted 
                                                
315 The philosophical underpinnings of these principles have been described as both 
utilitarian—there is an effort to judge benefits and costs to find a level of protection judged as 
best for society at large—and deontological—concerned with a moral duty of taking into 
account the importance of reducing individual doses to a level as low as reasonably achievable 
(Valentin, 2013: 27). 
316 According to Publication 103: “The overall exposure, which is projected to occur as a result 
of the emergency exposure situation, should no protective actions be employed, is called the 
projected dose. The dose that would result when a protection strategy is implemented is called 
the residual dose. In addition, each protective measure will avert a certain amount of exposure. 
This is referred to as averted dose, and is the concept for the optimization of the individual 
protective measures as given in Publication 63 […] that will make up the overall protection 
strategy” (ICRP, 2007: 109, original emphasis). Publication 63 was published by the ICRP in 
1991(see ICRP, 1991b). 
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dose—the reduction in dose expected to result from a particular intervention. Thus, it 
becomes the responsibility of governing authorities to calculate the projected dose 
people may be exposed to, to decide on an intervention strategy, to estimate the dose 
that would be averted through that strategy, and to estimate the residual dose that 
people would still be exposed to following the intervention. According to the ICRP 
(2007: 15), residual dose “should be below the reference level” as it represents the 
“dose remaining after implementation of protection strategies.” The principle of 
‘optimization’ would be employed to ensure the cost of the intervention strategy would 
result in a residual dose “as low as reasonably achievable, economic and societal 
factors being taken into account” (ICRP, 2007: 28).317 While estimated residual dose is 
calculated for a single intervention, the total residual dose takes into account the total 
dose (absorbed through all pathways) that is expected to remain following various 
interventions. Thus, the reference limits chosen for an emergency situation should “be 
expressed as the total residual dose to an individual as a result of the emergency that 
the regulator would not plan to exceed” (ICRP, 2007: 96, emphasis added). 
 
Publication 103 advises that choosing a protection strategy in an emergency situation 
means government officials must take into account the “multiple exposure pathways” 
through which radionuclides enter the body (ICRP, 2007: 15). In the case of food, 
internal exposure must be calculated. However, the complex and heterogeneous nature 
of the interaction between myriad unstable radionuclides and active human bodies 
complicates attempts at estimating these doses. Publication 103 (ICRP, 2007: 77) 
explains:  
In general, it can be said that uncertainties of assessments of radiation 
doses from internal exposures, including the biokinetics of 
radionuclides, are larger than those from external exposures. The 
degree of uncertainty differs between various radionuclides. 
The ICRP’s recommendations for reference levels—measured in mSv/year—are 
broken into three “bands” to help in the setting of radiation protection standards. The 
first band of 1 mSv/year or less is recommended for a “usually planned” exposure 
                                                
317 In short, “[e]mphasis on optimization using reference levels in emergency and existing 
exposure situations focuses attention on the residual level of dose remaining after 
implementation of protection strategies” (ICRP, 2007: 15). 
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situation in which people “are exposed to a source that gives them little or no individual 
benefit but benefits to society in general.” The second band recommends setting 
reference levels between 1 to 20 mSv/year for exposure situations in which people “will 
usually receive benefit from the exposure situation but not necessarily from the 
exposure itself.” The third band recommends a reference level between 20-100 
mSv/year for exposure situations in which people are “exposed by sources that are not 
controllable, or where actions to reduce doses would be disproportionately disruptive” 
(ICRP, 2007: 97, emphasis added).  
 
According to Publication 103, reference levels chosen for emergency situations—such 
as TEPCO’s nuclear disaster—should fall into this third band of 20-100 mSv/year, 
granting governing authorities the power to judge and define what is considered 
‘disproportionately disruptive’ (ICRP, 2007: 98). Again, while it would be 
‘unacceptable’ to knowingly expose people to between 20 and 100 mSv/year of 
ionizing radiation in ‘normal’ circumstances, following a nuclear disaster the public is 
expected to accept much higher levels of exposure simply because the situation is 
categorized as ‘not controllable.’ 
 
Again, according to the protocol laid out in Publication 103, government authorities 
managing the safety of food must use the process of ‘optimization’ to decide on an 
appropriate reference level (ICRP, 2007). Though previous and current publications 
differ in their recommended approaches—previous publications recommended using 
the process of ‘optimization’ to decide on specific intervention levels, while newer 
publications recommend using ‘optimization’ when deciding on the entire protective 
strategy using reference levels (ICRP, 2007: 117)318—Publication 103 continues to 
include recommended intervention levels specifically for managing radioactivity in 
food. Publication 63 recommends setting an intervention level of 10 mSv/year for food, 
                                                
318 The authors of Publication 103 (ICRP, 2007: 109, original emphasis) explain “each 
protective measure will avert a certain amount of exposure. This is referred to as averted dose, 
and is the concept for the optimisation of the individual protective measures as given in 
Publication 63 […] that will make up the overall protection strategy. The Commission now 
recommends focusing on optimisation with respect to the overall strategy, rather than the 
individual measures. However, the levels of averted dose recommended in Publication 63 for 
optimisation of protection in terms of individual protective measures may still be useful as 
inputs to the development of the overall response.”  
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which would result in reference limits319 between 1,000-10,000 Bq/kg for some 
radionuclides (ICRP, 2007: 117).320  
 
Here, the concepts of NORM and ‘normal’ discussed in Publication 103 may help to 
better contextualize how the process of ‘optimization’ is used in setting reference 
levels. NORM—the acronym for “naturally occurring radioactive material”—is defined 
as “[r]adioactive material containing no significant amounts of radionuclides other than 
naturally occurring radionuclides” (ICRP, 2007: 29). According to the ICRP (2007: 
29), NORMs are excluded from calculations of “public exposure.”321 The word 
‘normal,’ on the other hand, is used to describe processes that operate by the books322 as 
well as the flow of economic and societal activities prior to any disruptive ‘non-
controllable’ overflow of radionuclides. Publication 103 (ICRP, 2007: 109) expounds: 
In emergency exposure situations particular attention should be given 
to the prevention of severe deterministic health effects as doses could 
reach high levels in a short period of time. In case of major 
emergencies an assessment based on health effects would be 
insufficient and due considerations must be given to societal, 
                                                
319 While estimated radiation doses absorbed by human bodies are measured in millisieverts 
(mSv), reference limits are presented in the “convenient form” of “activity concentration” 
measured in Becquerels per kilogram (Bq/kg) or liter (Bq/l) (ICRP, 1991b: 26). 
320 Publication 63 (ICRP, 1991b: 17) recommends “[f]or any single foodstuff, an intervention 
level that is almost always justified is an averted effective dose of 10 mSv in a year.” 
According to Publication 63, “[f]or radionuclides with low values of dose per unit intake (e.g. 
most beta and gamma emitters), the optimized intervention levels for various foods would be 
expected to lie in the range from 1-10kBq/kg [1,000-10,000 Bq/kg]. For radionuclides with 
high values of dose per unit intake (e.g. alpha emitters) the optimized intervention levels would 
be in the range 10-100 Bq/kg” (ICRP, 1991b: 17-8). To decide on the appropriate intervention 
level, Publication 63 recommends using a cost-benefit analysis. That is, an ‘optimized’ 
intervention level should take into account whatever is judged to be the costs and benefits of 
putting restrictions on food. It should also take into account the potential effective dose to be 
endured by the population as a whole, as well as the potential cost of replacing the supply of 
food (ICRP, 1991b: 26).  
321 The ICRP (2007: 29) defines public exposure as: “Exposure incurred by members of the 
public from radiation sources, excluding any occupational or medical exposure and the normal 
local natural background radiation.”  
322 For example, the ICRP (2007: 105) refers to “normal operations” at nuclear power plants, or 
what has been documented as “normal exposures” to the workforce or public in controlled 
situations. 
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economic and other consequences. Another important objective is to 
prepare, to the extent practicable, for the resumption of societal and 
economic activities considered as ‘normal’.  
Nuclear disasters are inherently messy happenings which may not only lead to 
disruptions in the health of members of the public, but in the smooth and ‘normal’ 
functioning of economic and societal activities. While the ICRP’s recommendations 
rely on quantitative equations and linear models to design reference limits (activity 
concentrations) for radionuclides in food which should be set based on calculations of 
projected, averted and residual doses, precise estimates of dose are not always able to 
be gauged and calculated in the chaos of an overflow. Thus, policymakers require 
flexibility in the setting of radiation protection standards during an overflow; they 
require numerical reference values—usually considered solid and immutable—to be 
mutable.  
 
In this section, I have explicated how the ICRP’s philosophical approaches—such as 
the principle of ‘optimization’ and situation-dependent recommendations—enact the 
seemingly immutable numerical standards for radiation protection as mutable, fluid and 
flexible. While the mutability of these numbers may create flexibility for policymakers 
attempting to get economic and societal flows back to ‘normal’ as soon as possible 
following a radiological overflow, it simultaneously exposes them to be ‘matters of 
concern’—as opposed to authoritative, black-boxed ‘matters of fact.’ As Chiho’s story 
highlights, the numerical reference limits for radiation protection deployed within 
Japan’s agrifood assemblage were treated as immutable mobiles with the authority to 
direct people on how to ‘correctly’ enact their relationship with unstable radionuclides. 
However, shift-shaping of numerical values from immutable, to mutable and back 
again undoubtedly raises concerns among people being asked to ingest TEPCO’s 
radiological overflow—including many of my research participants who, like Chiho, 
were asked to trust in first the 500 Bq/kg and then the 100 Bq/kg numerical reference 
limits set by the Japanese government. Chiho’s story also reveals how the meaning of 
the term ‘safe’ remains mutable throughout this process, shifting depending on what is 
considered ‘normal’ to the governing agencies in charge of implementing radiation 
protection. In the next section, I will explore the processes and institutional texts 
involved in the crafting of Japan’s 100 Bq/kg reference limit for cesium-134 and 
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cesium-137 in food, and how mutable values and interpretations of ‘safety’ were 
translated back into immutable mobiles in an attempt to coordinate the activities of 
human actors in the agrifood assemblage.  
 
5.5 Setting	reference	limits	for	radionuclides	in	Japan’s	agrifood	assemblage	
Given the inherent perplexity of establishing guidelines for setting ‘acceptable levels’ 
of radionuclides within secluded spaces, it is no surprise that the need to expedite 
standards after TEPCO’s 2011 overflow was a considerable challenge. Following the 
onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, the Japanese government undertook its assigned 
role of translating radiation protection recommendations into numerical reference limits 
in an attempt to stabilize the agrifood assemblage and ensure the ‘safety’ (anzen-sei) of 
the food it circulates in accordance with the Food Sanitation Act (Government of Japan, 
2007b). While the logic of the ICRP’s system of radiation protection and the 
consensuses met by its members may have seemed stable and consistent within the 
textual complex of the transnational agrifood assemblage, once in the wild, the group’s 
underlying philosophies and assumptions were forced to engage with other 
philosophies and regulations active within Japan’s agrifood assemblage. In this section, 
I will describe how reference levels—dose limits—and their corresponding reference 
limits for radionuclides in food were decided in the messiness of the aftermath of 
TEPCO’s overflow, and how seemingly consistent radiation protection principles 
published in the ICRP’s Publication 103 were put in tension with other actors, 
philosophies and ruling texts active within Japan’s agrifood assemblage. 
 
According to the Japanese Food Sanitation Act, the government is legally liable for 
ensuring that food harmful to human health is not consumed by citizens (Government 
of Japan, 2007b; MHLW, 2011g). Japan’s Food Safety Basic Law of 2003 (hereafter 
the Basic Law) was created following the outbreak of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) in 2001 (Government of Japan, 2006). The Basic Law 
represented an overhaul of previous food safety laws, using a risk analysis framework 
to prove to eating bodies that foods circulating in the agrifood assemblage are both 
anzen (safe in a technical, objective sense) and anshin (safe in a psychological, 
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subjective sense) (Tanaka, 2008).323 Under the framework set forth by the Basic Law, 
management of food safety became the role of government ministries, and food safety 
laws were to be based on scientific assessments conducted by a new, independent body: 
the Food Safety Commission. In short, the establishment of the Basic Law in 2003 
advanced science as a governance tool to ensure food ‘safety’ and to rebuild people’s 
trust in the agrifood assemblage in the face of TEPCO’s destabilizing overflow. 
 
In the days following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, the Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare (MHLW, hereafter Ministry of Health) had the responsibility of managing 
radiation in the agrifood assemblage. However, with no pre-existing standards in place, 
the government needed to quickly decide on how to manage radionuclides in the 
domestic food supply. In the chaos of the aftermath of the disaster, the Ministry of 
Health did not have time to consult with the Food Safety Commission—as stipulated in 
the Basic Law—before deciding on allowable limits for radionuclides in food. Instead, 
as specified under the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency 
Preparedness (Government of Japan, 2007a), the Ministry of Health consulted with the 
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, receiving permission to act swiftly 
without consultation. On March 17th, five days after the first explosion at TEPCO’s 
nuclear power plant, the Ministry of Health announced its chosen ‘provisional reference 
limits’ for radionuclides in food and drink (MHLW, 2011b; 2011g).324 Most of the 
values were adopted from the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan’s ‘Indices Relating 
to Limits on Food and Drink Ingestion’—originally developed in 1980 following the 
1979 Three Mile Island nuclear disaster in the United States, and updated in 2010 
(NSCJ, 2010).325 The provisional reference limits would use radionuclides cesium-134, 
cesium-137 and iodine-131 as indicators for radioactivity in food. The Nuclear Safety 
Commission’s guidelines were based on a recommended annual effective dose of 
radioactive cesium-134 and cesium-137 amounting to 5 mSv/year and an annual 
equivalent dose to the thyroid of radioactive iodine-131 up to 50 mSv/year. These 
numbers were published in the ICRP’s Publication 40 (1984a: 21) and a World Health 
                                                
323 See Sternsdorff-Cisterna (2015), Hall (2010) and Chapter 6 for more on the terms anzen and 
anshin. 
324 Fish was not added to these regulations until April 5, 2011 (MHLW, 2011i). 
325 Also see Umeda (2013). 
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Organization Report (1988) as the lowest recommended intervention limits to be 
applied during the first year of a nuclear disaster.326  
 
While recommended effective or equivalent doses represent estimated doses of 
radiation to the whole body or the ‘critical tissues’ within model human bodies, 
designing intervention strategies involves calculating the ‘activity concentration’ of 
radionuclides in food and deciding on a numerical quantity that should prevent these 
doses from being exceeded. These ‘activity concentrations’—measured in Bq/kg or 
Bq/l in Japan—also need to take into account the different radio-sensitivities of 
members of the public (i.e. that there are more vulnerable members of the population, 
including women and children, who are more sensitive to the effects of ionizing 
radiation than men).327 To ensure the chosen effective dose, the provisional reference 
limits for cesium-134 and cesium-137 were set at 200 Bq/l for drinking water and milk, 
and 500 Bq/kg for other foods. For iodine-131, an equivalent dose limit for the thyroid 
was set at 300 Bq/kg for drinking water and milk,328 and 2,000 Bq/kg for vegetables 
and fishery products (FSCJ, 2011d; 2011c).329  
 
From the outset, the numbers were contentious, in part because they appeared much 
higher than the international consensus of what constituted dangerous levels of 
radioactivity. As mentioned by Daiki, Kazuki and Maiko, at the time of TEPCO's 
nuclear disaster, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (2004: 13) 
recommendations for managing the disposal of low-level radioactive waste had an 
exemption level for radioactive cesium-134 and cesium-137 set at 100 Bq/kg.330 While 
the logic of these numbers may have made sense within the transnational nuclear 
assemblage, it was difficult for my participants and other Japanese citizens to 
understand why the Japanese government claimed it was acceptable for citizens to 
                                                
326 The Japanese recommendations remained at those levels in 2010, even though by 1991 the 
ICRP (1991b: 17) began recommending an annual effective dose of 10 mSv/year as an 
“intervention level that is almost always justified” for a single foodstuff. 
327 See Section 5.4.1 for more on questions of sex in radiation protection. 
328 Milk used for powdered baby formula was not to exceed 100 Bq/l. 
329 For an overview of post 2011-Japanese food safety regulations see Hamada, Ogino and 
Fujimichi (2012) and Hamada and Ogino (2012). 
330 That is, anything over 100 Bq/kg required regulatory control (and was thus classified as 
radioactive), while anything under 100 Bq/kg was no longer classified as radioactive. 
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consume foods containing up to 500 Bq/kg of these radionuclides—this appeared to be 
levels of cesium-134 and cesium-137 five times higher than the materials stored in 
drum cans labelled as nuclear waste.331  
 
Given the ambiguity of the numbers and their conflicting interpretations, establishing 
new guidelines presented a significant challenge. From March 2011 to February 2012, 
debates on the provisional limits ensued amongst factions of the Japanese government 
and included two opportunities for public comment. Upon setting the provisional 
reference limits, on March 20th the Ministry of Health followed the protocols of the 
Basic Law and requested that the Food Safety Commission (2011d)—referred to as the 
“risk assessor”—conduct an investigation into the adequacy of the chosen standards. 
On March 29th, the Food Safety Commission issued an interim Emergency Report and 
then convened a working group to discuss the standards.332 The report engaged with a 
number of publications by organizations active within the transnational nuclear 
assemblage, some dating back to the 1970s.333 In its March 29th Emergency Report, the 
Food Safety Commission (2011c: 10) also cited the ‘100 mSv threshold,’ stating “in 
terms of information available at this point, there are very limited data on effects 
exerted on human body by low-dose radiation below 100 mSv.”334 In the end, the report 
conceded that an effective dose of 5 mSv/year was not only sufficient, but “considered 
as highly conservative in terms of preventing radiation exposure caused by food and 
securing human health,” especially when compared to the ICRP’s (1991b: 17) 
                                                
331 A book published by Mothers Revolution Network [Okāsan Kakumei Nettowāku] (2013) 
outlines the struggle of mothers who actively contested the application of the provisional food 
safety restrictions where the activity of radionuclides in a canister of nuclear waste was directly 
compared to the activity of radionuclides they were expected to consume and feed to their 
families. As mentioned, these comparisons were also made by many of my participants during 
interviews and focus group sessions. 
332 See Food Safety Commission (2011c) for the report in English, Food Safety Commission 
(2011b) for Japanese. 
333 For example, the ICRP (1977; 1984b; 1984a; 1991a; 1991b; 1999; 2000; 2007), the US 
National Academy of Sciences (see Kahn & Kleinerg, 1977), the World Health Organization 
(1988), the International Atomic Energy Agency (1994; 1996), UNSCEAR (2011), Codex 
Alimentarius (1995), the US Food and Drug Administration (1988), among others. 
334 This quote was taken from the English translation of the document. See Food Safety 
Commission (2011b) for the original Japanese version. 
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recommendation of 10 mSv/year for a single foodstuff (FSCJ, 2011c: 26).335 When it 
came to the 50 mSv/year equivalent dose to the thyroid, the report concluded that, at 
present, the level seemed “to be sufficiently safe for prevention of radiation exposure 
from food” (FSCJ, 2011c: 24).  
 
At the same time, however, the report is adamant in specifying that these values are 
only suitable for emergency situations and should not be considered applicable in 
normal circumstances:  
It should be clearly heeded that this Emergency Report is not 
appropriate as a basis for risk management measures under normal 
circumstances. All parties concerned are needed to lay out 
appropriate risk communication so as to prevent confusing 
emergency response with non-emergency response. (FSCJ, 2011c: 
26, original emphasis) 
Finally, acknowledging that the Emergency Report was hurriedly compiled, the Food 
Safety Commission (2011c: 28) recommended assessments continue, including a 
recommendation that the role of radioactive strontium as an internal emitter be 
investigated further.336 
 
On April 4th, after discussions with both the Food Safety Commission and the Nuclear 
Safety Commission, the Ministry of Health—named the “risk manager” (FSCJ, 
2011d)—decided to go along with the provisional reference limits. In order to keep the 
international community informed on the status of the safety of Japan’s food, Koizumi 
Naoko (2011a; 2011b; 2011c), then chairperson of the Food Safety Commission, wrote 
                                                
335 I find it interesting that while the Food Safety Commission refers to its own 5 mSv/year 
effective dose limits as “conservative” as compared to the ICRP’s 10 mSv/year 
recommendation, they point out that they were not able to find evidence supporting the 10 
mSv/year limit. The report notes: “ICRP is an international organization in the field of 
radiological protection, and its recommendations are considered as evidenced to certain degree, 
thus being a reference for risk management measures in emergency situations. Such evidences, 
however, could not be confirmed from the available materials” (FSCJ, 2011c: 26). 
336 Strontium is a beta emitter and is, thus, difficult to measure as most devices for measuring 
radionuclides in food are only able to detect gamma emissions. As a result, strontium is often 
left out of measuring schemes as the pace of measurement does not keep up with the pace of 
the market. See Section 6.5 for more on the measurement of radionuclides. 
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a number of English-language letters directed at ‘those concerned overseas.’ In her first 
letter published on April 8th, Koizumi (2011a) represented the provisional food safety 
measures differently from the way they were presented in the Emergency Report, 
describing them as being “a bit too stringent,” and therefore “effective enough to ensure 
the safety of vegetable, seafood and other foodstuffs placed in domestic markets and 
exported abroad from Japan.” However, by leaving out the important point that these 
values are only intended for, and could only possibly be considered stringent in, 
emergency situations, Koizumi’s message seems to misrepresent the meaning and 
purpose of the provisional values—her confidence and enthusiasm erase the scientific 
uncertainty and philosophies imbued within the provisional reference limits. Actors 
within both domestic and global agrifood assemblages were expected to accept the 
values as ‘safe’ without receiving proper information on what they really represented—
‘safe’ for the first year following a nuclear disaster.337 
 
After issuing its Emergency Report on March 29th, the Food Safety Commission 
convened a working group to perform further science-based risk assessments and 
deliberate over the provisional reference limits. The working group met between April 
21st and July 26th and released a draft report that was opened for public comment from 
July 29th to August 27th (FSCJ, 2011a). According to Koizumi’s (2011b) second 
English-language letter, the draft report included a literature review of over 3,300 
sources. It also included a review of various radiation protection recommendations and 
insights from experts in toxicology338 and radiation protection,339 among others.  
 
One major point made in the draft report was the potentially higher radio-sensitivity of 
children compared to adults when it comes to both thyroid cancer and leukemia. 
Another major point made in the draft report concerned the Food Safety Commission’s 
take on the ‘100 mSv threshold assumption.’ The point was clearly underscored in 
Koizumi’s (2011b) July 26th English-language correspondence in which she described 
the ‘100 mSv threshold assumption’ as a “conservative as well as rough value based on 
                                                
337 See Chapter 6 for further discussion on Koizumi’s letters and the multiple enactments of 
‘safe food’ following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
338 For example, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). 
339 For example, the ICRP, UNSCEAR, the World Health Organization, and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, among others. 
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major-scale epidemiological studies.” She goes on to illustrate how the draft report 
positions itself with other texts in the transnational nuclear assemblage, basing its 
evaluation on an assumption that a cumulative effective dose340 of more than “around 
100 mSv” (not including NORMs) could potentially be detrimental to human health 
(Koizumi, 2011b: 2). At the same time, however, the draft report explicitly abandons 
the concept of a ‘threshold’ due to glaring uncertainty in the science. Koizumi (2011b: 
2) summarizes: “100 mSv can not be threshold level, because threshold value is a level 
at which a substance starts causing toxicity, although it is nontoxic under that level.”  
While the Food Safety Commission says it has abandoned 100 mSv as an indicative 
threshold for the onset of deterministic effects, it continues to activate the value as a 
legal limit above which government intervention is not deemed necessary, but below 
which scientific uncertainty allows for fluid interpretation and application of reference 
limits. 
 
Ultimately, in explaining the uncertainty in predicting health effects for exposures 
under 100 mSv, the Food Safety Commission recused itself from the responsibility of 
defining such risks. In other words, because of the inability to draw a clear line between 
‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ levels of exposures below 100 mSv, uncertainty about lower doses 
was compartmentalized from the discussion and erased from public processes as there 
was no ‘sound scientific evidence’ within the textual complex of the transnational 
nuclear assemblage to prove otherwise. Even after receiving 3,089 comments in the 
first public commenting period, mostly from people calling for stricter standards (see 
FSCJ, 2011e), the Food Safety Commission went along with its initial 
recommendations, presenting its final Risk Assessment Report to the Ministry of Health 
on October 27th.341 In her letter describing the final assessment, Koizumi (2011c) makes 
sure to reemphasize that the Food Safety Commission does not view 100 mSv as a 
threshold above which exposures would necessarily damage health, and below which 
no damage would occur. Instead, both Koizumi’s letter and the report refer a quantity 
of “around 100 mSv” representing “the value which the risk management ministries 
                                                
340 Cumulative effective dose is an estimated effective dose received over a person’s lifetime. 
341 See Food Safety Commission (2011g) for the full report in Japanese. See Food Safety 
Commission (2011f) for the report’s abstract in English. 
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have to consider for appropriate management” (FSCJ, 2011f; 2011g: 9 & 215; 
Koizumi, 2011c: 4). 
 
Once receiving the final Risk Assessment Report from the Food Safety Commission 
(2011f; 2011g), the Ministry of Health sprang into action. In fact, just one day after 
receiving the report, Minister Komiyama Yoko from the Ministry of Health publicly 
announced that the government aimed to decrease the standards by April 2012 (see 
MHLW, 2011d)—a move which angered members of the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology’s (MEXT’s) Radiation Council (hereafter 
Radiation Council) who had yet to have their say in the setting of the proposed 
reference limits (see T. Higuchi, 2016). On the same day, the Ministry of Health 
consulted with the Pharmaceutical Affairs and Food Sanitation Council and its Food 
Sanitation Subcommittee to begin working out the new reference limits (MHLW, 
2011a). 
 
The Food Sanitation Subcommittee’s Radioactive Material Response Working Group 
(hereafter the Working Group) submitted its proposed ‘new reference limits’ on 
December 22nd, recommending a decrease in the annual effective dose of cesium-134 
and cesium-137 in food from 5 mSv/year to 1 mSv/year (MHLW, 2011a). To ensure 
this effective dose, the proposed changes calculated 100 Bq/kg as the reference limit for 
cesium-134 and cesium-137 in ‘general foods.’ Baby food and milk would be reduced 
by half (to 50 Bq/kg), drinking water by one tenth (to 10 Bq/l). Iodine-131 would no 
longer be included in the standards due to its short half-life.  
 
In setting these standards, the Working Group did not follow the ICRP-prescribed 
system of radiation protection. Instead, they adopted standards from a number of 
different international organizations, some active within the transnational nuclear 
assemblage. For example, the 10 Bq/l limit for water was adopted from the World 
Health Organization (2004), while the 1 mSv/year limit was borrowed directly from 
Codex Alimentarius (1995). According to the Codex (1995: 33) regulations, 1 
mSv/year represents an “intervention exemption level” for international food trade—
that is, the lowest recommended level for protection, below which regulatory 
intervention is not justified. By enforcing an intervention level of 1 mSv/year, Japan 
would be able to maintain its international trade relationships, making it possible to 
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legally challenge trading partners trying to restrict imports based on concerns about 
radiation within the framework of the World Trade Organization.342 The standards 
would not only be useful as legal tools to reprimand ‘irrational’ trade partners (Kyodo 
News, 2016c), but also prevent Japanese citizens from requesting a lower intervention 
level. In the words of Higuchi (2016: 125), adopting standards based on 1 mSv/year 
“would not only reassure consumers with a stricter standard but also allow the 
government to balk at a demand for further reductions.” The 1 mSv/year limit seemed 
to be so conservative that any controversy that plagued the provisional standards would 
most certainly subside.  
 
While the Ministry of Health was eager to enforce the proposed ‘new reference 
limits,’343 many people, including a number of radiation protection experts, did not 
share the same enthusiasm. The various numbers seemed to illuminate, or possibly 
provoke, deepening divisions between those wanting lower standards and those 
wanting more flexibility. When looking at responses from the second public comment 
period from January 6 to February 4, 2012, over seventy-five percent of the 
commenters (approximately 1,449 out of 1,877) demanded even stricter reference limits 
(MHLW, 2012a). On the other hand, experts within the Radiation Council, some of 
whom were members of the ICRP, felt that the new standards were unnecessarily 
stringent.  
 
The Radiation Council, which was not consulted by the Ministry of Health until 
December 27, 2011 (MHLW, 2011c), held six meetings to discuss both technical and 
regulatory aspects of the proposed new standards. Many members of the Radiation 
Council objected to the more stringent standards and the fact that the 1 mSv annual 
effective dose (and subsequent reference limit of 100 Bq/kg for cesium-134 and 
cesium-137) had been brought to the mass media before the group had a chance to 
                                                
342 So far this strategy has proved to be useful in challenging trade restrictions for Japanese 
food in South Korea (Miles, 2015). In Taiwan, import restrictions have been challenged with 
accusations of the bans being ‘unscientific’ (Kyodo News, 2016b) or ‘irrational’ (Kyodo News, 
2016c). 
343 See Ministry of Health (2012b) for an overview (in English) of the ‘new standards’ effective 
on April 1, 2012. Though the standards were put into pace on April 1st, exceptions were made 
for beef and rice (enforceable in October 2012), soy beans (enforceable in January 2013) and 
foods processed before April 1, 2012 (not enforceable). 
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deliberate the proposed numbers (see T. Higuchi, 2016). Under immense pressure to 
accept the 1 mSv limit, the Radiation Council tried to, at the very least, increase the 
reference limits for baby food and milk from the reduced 50 Bq/kg to 100 Bq/kg, but 
was ultimately unsuccessful in its attempts (Kimura, 2012: 16; Kojima, 2012). In the 
end, after much debate and some complaints that the proposed standards were “too 
strict,” the Radiation Council finally accepted the new standards following their final 
deliberative meeting on February 16, 2012 (Radiation Council, 2012b). The result of 
these new dose limits and their corresponding reference limits being institutionalized 
was that all ‘general food’ below 100 Bq/kg of cesium-134 and cesium-137 would 
legally be determined ‘safe’ (anzen) for human consumption. The ‘magic number’ 




In the end, it appeared that not only were the concerns of the public as well as 
politicians’ desires to stabilize the agrifood assemblage confusing the intended meaning 
of recommended radiation protection standards set by the ICRP, but there was a 
fundamental clash in the philosophies of Japanese governmental agencies and the ICRP 
regarding the process of ‘optimization.’ According to a memorandum on TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster written by members of the ICRP: 
The philosophy of the [Food Safety Commission] implies that the 
regulatory food limits even for radioactive materials should be 
decided independently of the exposure situation, since there is no 
difference in the criteria for protecting health effects between 
emergency and planned situations. […] [T]he risk-based philosophy 
of radiological protection has not prevailed even in the academic field 
of chemical toxicity with non-radiation experts who seem unlikely to 
take a risk-informed approach. (González et al., 2013: 557)  
As mentioned in Section 5.4.2, 1 mSv/year is recommended by the ICRP’s Publication 
103, but represents an annual recommended dose to the public in ‘planned’ exposure 
situations and is not the recommended limit for ‘emergencies’—situations where dose 
limits are assumed ‘not controllable’ (ICRP, 2007). The ICRP members’ memorandum 
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goes on to describe this discrepancy and what they view as an inappropriate use of 
radiation protection standards, as 1 mSv should not be applicable in an emergency 
situation:  
The current recommendations are to select a reference level between 
100 and 20 mSv year-1 for emergency exposure situations and 
between 20 and 1 mSv year-1 for existing exposure situations. […] 
The public and others do not completely understand the reasons why 
different dose levels are recommended for different exposure 
situations, in large part because they believe, incorrectly, that a ‘safe’ 
dose is below 1 mSv year-1, independent of the exposure situation. 
[…] The use of crude numbers without the philosophy behind them 
unsurprisingly resulted in disastrous confusion. (González et al., 
2013: 545-6, emphasis added)  
This ‘confusion’ was also confounded by the mutable meaning of ‘safety’ used 
throughout the standard-setting process. Turning back to the experience of Chiho, 
people in Japan were being bombarded with news about ‘Becquerels’ and ‘safety’ 
following the disasters. That is, instead of being taught the philosophy behind the 
numerical values, the people of Japan were seeing numerical reference limits for 
cesium-134 and cesium-137—first 500 and then 100—and being told these were ‘safe 
(anzen).’ The use of the word ‘safe’ also distorts the expectation that, following a 
nuclear disaster, members of the public are expected to accept, without question, 
exposure to ionizing radiation that would not be considered acceptable under ‘normal’ 
circumstances. The authors of the memorandum explain their view:  
After an accident occurs, people hold a natural but equivocal 
expectation of being better protected than before the accident. It is 
difficult for them to recognise that, because an accident has 
unfortunately occurred, they will obviously be subjected to higher 
risks. Whatever good the wishes of the authorities, better protection 
might simply be unfeasible: while in planned exposure situations 
authorities may be very conservative in their protection strategies, 
during the aftermath of an unplanned emergency they have to deal 
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with the situation as it is and apply the best protection they can under 
the prevailing circumstances. (González et al., 2013: 548)  
This view, also explained in the ICRP Publication 103, not only reveals the strong 
influence of utilitarian philosophy in the ICRP’s Recommendations for radiation 
protection, but how what may seem ‘obvious’ and ‘acceptable’ within the transnational 
nuclear assemblage may not be clearly translated or deemed acceptable to actors in the 
agrifood assemblage (see ICRP, 2007: 43). While the fluid use of numerical values and 
the relative meaning of the term ‘safe’ may be stabled and unquestioned within the 
textual complex of the transnational nuclear assemblage, once translated into Japan’s 
agrifood assemblage these same numbers and terms lose their nuance. Thus, attempts to 
translate and activate them as pure immutable mobiles become distorted as each 
interaction reveals an oscillation between mutable and immutable, ghostly absence and 
seemingly pure presence, multiple and singular. The authority of these values remains 
contingent as they succumb to the ever-flowing ‘logic of oscillation.’ 
 
5.7 Moving	beyond	numerical	reference	values	
Just thirteen days after the first explosion at TEPCO’s nuclear power plant, Professor 
Yamashita Shunichi from Nagasaki University stood before a crowd of people in 
Fukushima City, approximately 60 kilometers north-west of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
Yamashita had built his career through studying the hibakusha from Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki and people exposed to fallout from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. His 
mother was said to have been a survivor of the Nagasaki bombings herself. These 
experiences earned him the respect of being considered one of the leading Japanese 
experts on the medical consequences of exposure to ionizing radiation. Standing before 
the crowd in Fukushima City, Yamashita (2011) argued for what he saw as bright 
opportunities that could arise from the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster: 
From now on, the name Fukushima will be well known throughout 
the world. Fukushima, Fukushima, Fukushima, it’s all Fukushima. 
This is amazing you know. Hiroshima and Nagasaki have already 
lost. The name Fukushima is already unparalleled globally in its 
reverberations. A crisis is a chance. A great chance. […] How to 
make use of it. First revitalization [fukkō]. Offer your sincere 
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condolences to the people who died in the earthquake and tsunami, 
then at the same time that you respond to those people it is essential 
to quickly recover [fukkō] from the nuclear disaster. 
After explaining the human body’s ability to combat exposure to doses of radioactivity 
under 100 mSv (earning him the nickname Mr. 100 mSv), Yamashita (2011) went on to 
make what would become a widely known and circulated statement about the 
importance of smiling and general positivity in warding off the negative effects of 
exposure to ionizing radiation: “In reality, the effects of radiation will not come to 
those people who smile. They will come to those people who fret. We know this 
definitively based on animal experiments.” Promptly receiving a position at Fukushima 
Medical University in 2011, Yamashita went on to lead the Fukushima Health 
Management Survey until he stepped down in March 2013. The survey was launched 
with three major objectives: to estimate radiation doses received by Fukushima’s over 2 
million residents, to conduct screening for thyroid cancer in children,344 and to study the 
effects of the disaster on the mental health of Fukushima’s residents (see Brumfiel, 
2013).345  
 
During my fieldwork in 2016, I attended an event where a different story was being 
told about the science of radiation protection. At a gathering following one of the court 
cases where nuclear refugees faced off against TEPCO and the Japanese government, a 
journalist stood before the group to tell us about his recent meeting with second-
generation hibakusha from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “The hibakusha are mad,” he said. 
He went on to explain that this anger comes from the fact that data extracted from their 
                                                
344 There has been a proposal to drop the thyroid screening program, even though tests from 
October 2011 to 2016 “indicated 20-61-fold excess thyroid cancer cases” (Tsuda et al., 2017: 
6). 
345 Regardless of the vast uncertainty that exists in the science of radiation protection and the 
substantial advances—and subsequent ontological reframings—in the field of biology, the 
medical survey remains extremely narrow in its focus and curiosity about the possible negative 
effects of low-level exposure to TEPCO’s radionuclides. The survey does not seem to engage 
with any of the newest research in the postmodern synthesis or the latest findings regarding 
exposures to low levels of ionizing radiation presented by Møller and Mousseau (2013b) 
discussed in Section 5.3. Instead of investigating heterogeneous, stochastic effects, ‘mental 
health’ plays a major role in this study, as following the Chernobyl disaster, where concerns 
about stochastic effects were discounted a priori as ‘anxiety’ or ‘psychological distress’ (see 
Section 5.3). 
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own bodies, and the bodies of their family members and friends, are currently being 
used prove it is ‘safe’ for children to live in areas where external exposure from 
cesium-134 and cesium-137 amount to as much as 20 mSv/year—a 20-fold increase 
from the usual 1 mSv/year limit for members of the public recommended by the 
ICRP.346 Though the suffering of the hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their 
decendants continues, these realities are not reflected in the radiation protection 
standards themselves. The concerns raised by hibakusha are a stark reminder to the 
many ghostly-hauntings that lurk in the shadows of seemingly stable standards for 
radiation protection that are enacted to coordinate a single, ‘correct’ way for human 
bodies to relate with unstable radionuclides. Such stories are a reminder that, regardless 
of the efforts involved in concealing these ghosts, the ‘logic of oscillation’ ensures 
complete control and smoothing over of heterogeneity and multiplicity is impossible. 
 
Through traversing the vast textual and institutional complex of the transnational 
nuclear assemblage, I have attempted to tell a story of how radiation protection 
standards have emerged out of complex histories of overflow, containment, controversy 
and consensus—processes that contribute to the establishment of numerical standards, 
though are often invisible within numbers themselves. While numerical reference limits 
are not able to manage the activity of radionuclides, they are deployed in an attempt to 
guide actors in the agrifood assemblage on the ‘correct’ ways of both conceptualizing 
and relating to the imperceptible isotopes. Beginning in March 2011, numerical 
reference limits were deployed throughout Japan in an attempt to manage the activities 
of people producing, exchanging, buying and ingesting foods possibly containing 
radionuclides. My analysis has uncovered the ways in which assemblage thinking 
allows for attuning to and taking seriously the agency of these numbers and the ruling 
texts that contain them, as well as myriad other actors acting and being enacted within 
the agrifood assemblage—from spinach, to radios, cesium-137, texts, hibakusha, 
                                                
346 The annual effective dose for external radiation for the Japanese public was raised to 20 
mSv/year following the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 20 mSv/year is usually the legally 
allowable limit of external exposure for radiation workers—for example, workers in nuclear 
power plants. As mentioned, it is also one of the ICRP’s recommended reference levels to be 
used during an emergency situation. See Higuchi (2016) and Hirano and colleagues (2016) for 
more on the increased standards for external exposure to radiation implemented following the 
onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
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Geiger counters, hydrogen bombs, thyroids, nuclear power plants and tuna, among 
countless others.  
 
I have also argued that numerical standards and reference limits both historically and 
currently play an important role in ruling relations, attempting to black-box the 
complexity, unevenness and ghostly presences folded into radiation protection science, 
translating messy and contentious histories and scientific uncertainty into 
uncontroversial ‘matters of fact’ which can be deployed as ‘immutable mobiles’ (or 
ruling texts) to coordinate the activities of actors situated across the vast agrifood 
assemblage. The mutable meaning of the word ‘safety’ derived from a stabilization of 
uncertainty regarding the effects of receiving doses of ionizing radiation lower than 100 
mSv is a tool for smoothing over difference and paving the way for further progress 
and advancement of institutions and industries within the transnational nuclear 
assemblage. The expansive effort to deploy this ‘single reality’ has assisted in the 
proliferation of nuclear technologies. It has been the vigilant propagation of this single 
reality that has transformed ‘lethal atoms’ into ‘friendly atoms,’ ‘peaceful atoms,’ ‘safe 
atoms,’ ‘green atoms’ and even ‘edible atoms.’ However, inherent inconsistencies in 
the numbers mean that stabilization of the agrifood assemblage and enacting food as 
‘safe’ requires much more effort than simply drawing up and attempting to coordinate 
activity using numerical reference limits. Exactly what is involved in enacting the 





Kahoru, whose story I shared in Chapter 1, was planning to participate in an event 
about TEPCO’s nuclear disaster in the Kansai region in late 2011. Prior to the event, 
she received an email from the organizers which left her in an unexpected state of 
konran and discomfort. She shares her experiences: 
They said that at the venue they would be distributing apples grown 
by farmers in Fukushima that were tested. Well, they just all of a 
sudden said they would have them. In any event, I was surprised. If 
they want to do it at this kind of gathering, they need to accurately 
tell us the minimum detection limit [kenshutsu kagenchi]. Even more 
than telling us clearly how many Becquerels was in it, or if 
[radiation] was not detectable. Well, I thought they have to 
accurately share their awareness about internal radiation, and 
should show the kind of data [they have] along with distributing [the 
apples]. I said something like that. And then the organizer was 
surprised. What’s more, the thing I wrote [about my concerns], she 
forwarded it just like that directly to the farmer. The farmer said to 
the anti-nuclear activists: “We face so many hardships. We try so 
hard and sweat blood to raise those apples, you know? Just like that 
harmful rumors [fūhyōhigai] spread about and we aren’t able to 
distribute [the apples] anymore.” Then, from the side of the 
organizer, they didn’t know what to do, they said the distribution [of 
apples] was cancelled. That’s the way it was all determined. In the 
end, it was me and the farmer who were divided [against each other]. 
[…] In any event, it was a terrible mess [konran], you know? It was 
standard, common practice to share data on the minimum detection 
limit [kenshutsu kagenchi]. But at that time, that didn’t seem to be 
understood. 
As Kahoru’s experience illustrates, the term fūhyōhigai, which literally translates to 
‘harm caused by rumors,’ has been playing a particular role in discussions about 
radionuclides in post-2011 Japan, particularly in discouraging people from discussing 
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concerns about radiation and food.347 And it was not only Kahoru who found herself in 
messy situations upon trying to discuss food and radiation following TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster. The term was well known by all of my participants, many of whom kept quiet 
about their concerns regarding radiation and food to avoid such conflicts as Kahoru 
experienced.  
 
Yoshikawa Aimi (pseudonym), a mother of two who had been living in Kansai at the 
time of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, described her experiences in discussing her concerns 
related to radiation in food—or more precisely, her experiences in hiding her concerns 
about food and radiation: 
I’ve basically become really skilled at avoiding [conversations about 
food and radiation], but even that, you know. How to say? Not to 
stand out. People who don’t know continue not knowing. Even though 
it’s not a conflict. […] Even though is much more comfortable for 
oneself to avoid [talking about the issues]. If no one earnestly faces it 
or says their ideas, nothing will change.  
Nakajima Katsunori (pseudonym), was living in Ibaraki Prefecture both during the JCO 
nuclear criticality disaster in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999 and TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster in 2011. He relocated to the Kansai region due to his concerns about 
radiation and was particularly concerned about radiation and food. He shared some of 
the responses he receives when trying to discuss his concerns with others: 
They say “Aren’t you caring too much? If you complain so much, 
you’ll have nothing to eat!” 
It turned out that Katsunori was already accustomed to hearing the term fūhyōhigai 
living in Ibaraki following the onset of the JCO nuclear criticality disaster. He reflected 
on the term and its use following both of the nuclear disasters during our interview: 
But even now that kind of word is being used, fūhyōhigai. It was like, 
“things grown in Ibaraki are dangerous so don’t buy them.” Dried 
                                                
347 See Kimura (2016a) for a discussion on fūhyōhigai as a tool for food policing, especially of 
and among women. See Yamaguchi (2016) for a discussion on the role of the term in post-2011 
social control. The term will also be discussed further throughout this chapter. 
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sweet potato, dehydrated sweet potatoes are a local specialty of that 
area. It was like, “It is best not to buy them.” […] But now 
comparing to the problems in Fukushima, it seems to have clearly 
been fūhyōhigai. But, well, you really can’t say “rumor [fūhyō],” can 
you? Because, in actuality, it is not clear whether it is safe or not. 
That’s the problem with radiation. 
Another participant, Yanagi Nanami (pseudonym), a mother of a nine-year-old who 
had been living in the Kansai region since before 2011, describes her understanding of 
the term fūhyōhigai.  
The word fūhyōhigai works very effectively, doesn’t it? I personally 
think so. But, I don’t really know, but if you talk about radiation, it’s 
an image as if you are being heartless toward people in Fukushima 
Prefecture. That’s the side being circulated. I don’t really 
understand. I don’t really understand, but for some reason it seems 
like I care too much.  
While numerous farmers living within 260 kilometers, or more, of TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster have been forced to relate with TEPCO’s radionuclides in their everyday 
farming practices (see Figure 1), farmers in Fukushima Prefecture have faced great 
hardship because their produce gets labeled with the name of the prefecture which, 
unluckily, shares the same name as TEPCO’s damaged nuclear power plant. Thus, 
while the hardship of farmers is undeniable, the deployment of terms such as 
fūhyōhigai, along with the plotting of consumers against producers in ruling texts and 
discourses remains questionable, especially as these terms are activated in everyday 
discussions, further pluralizing people based on the ‘perspective’ each person activates. 
 
For all of my participants, merely discussing the issue of food and radiation following 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster has been a challenge, plotting people with different 
‘perspectives’ against each other and causing disorder in how they enact their everyday 
relations with other people. Supermarket food labels in Japan are not legally required to 
provide information on radiation measurements, though labels on fresh foods—fruits, 
vegetables, seafood, meat and rice—are required by law to indicate the food’s 
prefecture or country of origin (see MAFF, 2009). For all of my participants, these 
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labels of origin became one of the only pieces of information available to them as they 
attempted to decipher between foods that may contain TEPCO’s radionuclides and 
those that may not.348 However, not agreeing with the 100 Bq/kg reference limit and, 
instead, choosing food based on prefecture of origin would label you as a propagator of 
‘harmful rumors [fūhyōhigai].’ What is a person concerned about consuming 
radionuclides to do? It is from within the troubling experiences of my participants, all 
of whom would be categorized as propagators of fūhyōhigai based on their shopping 
practices, that I identify another string to lead me into the institutional complex of 
Japan’s post-2011 ruling relations. This chapter represents my attempt to explicate how 
people’s experiences of konran related to everyday eating emerged from 
inconsistencies that surface when textually-mediated ruling relations pushing to 
coordinate singularity interact within tangles of myriad other humans and more-than-
humans acting and being enacted within Japan’s agrifood assemblage.  
 
As explored in Chapter 5, in Japan first the ‘provisional’ and then the ‘new’ numerical 
reference limits for radionuclides in food and drink (hereafter food) were deployed as 
‘immutable mobiles’ in an attempt to coordinate heterogeneous actors in the agrifood 
assemblage based on a ‘single reality’ born out of the transnational nuclear assemblage. 
Through this single-reality-based coordination effort, agrifood assemblage actors are 
expected to participate in enacting, purchasing and ingesting what appears to be a 
single object: ‘safe food.’ In this chapter I will explore the various techniques used in 
these coordination efforts which work to stabilize the messiness and multiplicity 
exposed by the overflow of unstable and imperceptible radionuclides into the agrifood 
assemblage. Specifically, I will explore the multiplicity of the seemingly single object 
of government certified ‘safe food,’ while also attuning to how the seemingly single 
object participates in coordinating activities based on a single reality regarding 
anthropogenic radionuclides, bodies and food where ‘perspectivalism’ seems to be the 
only option for dissent and debate.349  
 
                                                
348 People would need to use information they had about areas possibly contaminated with 
TEPCO’s radionuclides—for example by studying radiation contour maps like the one made by 
Professor Hayakawa (see Figure 1). 
349 See Section 3.3.1.4. 
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In this chapter I argue that Japan’s standards for radionuclides in food—born out of the 
transnational nuclear assemblage and tinkered with by actors within Japan’s agrifood 
assemblage—present a single way of understanding and enacting one’s relations with 
unstable anthropogenic radionuclides. In this way, the single reality may be debated by 
multiple, pluralized perspectives—as in the case of Kahoru being plotted against the 
farmer regarding her questions about apples tested for radiation—but the reality itself 
and its ontological grounding remain intangible and unmovable. How to break out of 
perspectival debates? Both institutional ethnography and material-semiotic sensibilities 
offer a very different opportunity for grappling with single-object-single-reality 
structurations. As Mol (2002: 6, original emphasis) eloquently explains: “ontology is 
not given in the order of things, […] instead, ontologies are brought into being, 
sustained, or allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day, sociomaterial practices.” 
Thus, one opportunity for breaking free from the confines of perspectivalism is through 
focusing on practices and enactments, taking seriously heterogeneity, multiplicity, and 
all of their political and ethical implications. 
 
In the spirit of both institutional ethnography and material semiotics, in this chapter I 
engage in ontological politics in an attempt to both elucidate and interfere with the 
established system of perspectivalism which structures most discussions regarding 
human exposure to anthropogenic radionuclides in post 2011-Japan. Throughout the 
chapter, I borrow sensibilities from institutional ethnography, where I again enter the 
institutional textual complex of Japan’s post-nuclear disaster food safety regulations, 
this time exploring the prescribed practice for enacting different versions of 
government certified ‘safe foods’ that, in line with Japan’s Food Sanitation Act 
(Government of Japan, 2007b), are legally permitted to circulate in Japan’s agrifood 
assemblage and fill supermarket shelves visited by my participants. Guided by 
material-semiotic sensibilities, I direct my focus away from epistemological knowledge 
debates about ‘radiation and food safety,’350 to the processes that enact the object of 
‘safe food.’ In doing so, ‘safe food’ is exposed as being multiple,351 not a black-boxed 
                                                
350 Some very intriguing insights into these epistemological debates have been made by 
Yamaguchi (2016), Reiher (2016), Kimura (2016a) and Morris-Suzuki (2014). Kimura and 
Katano (2014: 109) also discuss various perspectival “schisms” between farmers and 
consumers, as well as among family members following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
351 As mentioned, in her study of the disease termed ‘atherosclerosis,’ Mol (2002) turns away 
from epistemological debates in medicine, to an empirical focus on the multiple enactments of 
 229 
‘matter of fact,’ but heterogeneous sociomaterial entanglements, or ‘matter of concern’ 
(Latour, 2005). In noticing these heterogeneous sociomaterial assemblages—or 
‘matters of concern’—a further step can be made to attend to the care involved in 
living within these entanglements, thus exposing them as “matters of care” (de la 
Bellacasa, 2011). Thus, instead of participating in epistemological and perspectival 
debates about how to understand ‘food safety,’ I follow Mol (2002) and other scholars 
in the field of material semiotics to explore how multiple ‘versions’ of government 
certified ‘safe food’ are enacted through situated, entangled processes of relational 
materiality.352 In exploring multiplicity, I also follow Mol (2013) in playing with 
“ontonorms,” borrowing the concept as a methodological tool for detecting the 
normativities that participate in not only enacting government certified ‘safe food,’ but 
also the bodies of people who are intended to purchase and ingest them.353  
 
Drawing on government texts, media articles and the experiences of my study’s 
participants, in the following sections I will explore the enactment of government 
certified ‘safe food’ as it is prescribed within government texts and discourses, as well 
as its role in attempting to coordinate the everyday eating of my participants. At the 
same time, I will use media articles to untangle some of the ways in which these 
prescribed procedures are enacted by actors within the agrifood assemblage, each 
acting within their own specific sociomaterial entanglements. Beginning with discourse 
and working my way down through metrics, to everyday ‘tinkerings’354 with radiation 
measurement devices, I explore how Japan’s food screening system, that was put in 
place to enact the single object of ‘safe food,’ actually enacts multiple versions of ‘safe 
food’ which are sometimes put in tension with each other. 
 
                                                
the disease itself, including an exploration of how these multiple enactments interact and clash 
with each other in practice. That is, while in many cases multiple enactments may precariously 
‘hang together’ and appear to be stable and singular, new enactments can exacerbate tension 
and lead to ‘interference’ (Mol, 2002: 121). 
352 I borrow the term ‘versions’ from Mol (2012: 120-1) to refer to multiplicity of seemingly 
singular objects. See Section 2.6.4. 
353 See Section 2.6.6. 
354 Again, I borrow the term ‘tinkering’ and corresponding insights about ‘care’ from Mol 




As explored in Chapter 5, reference limits for radionuclides in food translate ‘mutable’ 
recommendations curated by institutions within the transitional nuclear assemblage into 
‘immutable mobiles’ used to enact government certified ‘safe food’—food that is 
legally permitted to circulate within the agrifood assemblage. However, the reference 
limits themselves tell us little about the true status regarding the ‘safety’ of food in 
circulation. That is, for the activity of radionuclides to be perceptible, foods must be 
measured using highly sensitive (and highly expensive) technological devices. Thus, 
producing ‘safe food’ requires that these numbers be ‘activated’355 in situated practice. 
As discussed in Section 5.5, the ‘provisional reference limits’ for radionuclides in food 
were established on March 17, 2011, five days after the first explosion at TEPCO’s 
nuclear power plant. The reference limits played two major roles in enacting food as 
‘safe’: First, they set legally binding limits for food safety in accordance with the Food 
Sanitation Act; Second, they set out prescribed practices for inspecting foods possibly 
containing TEPCO’s radionuclides.356  
 
According Article 1 of the Food Sanitation Act, in the case of “sanitation hazards” it is 
the role of the government “to ensure food safety and thereby to protect citizens' good 
health” (Government of Japan, 2007b: 1-2).357 Article 6 goes on to explain how the 
government must ensure that foods posing any risk to human health “shall not be sold” 
or circulated within the agrifood assemblage until they are proven to “involve no risk to 
human health.” In 2011, TEPCO’s radionuclides were classified as a ‘sanitation hazard’ 
which, according to Article 6 (ii) of the Food Sanitation Act, needed to be prevented 
from entering the agrifood assemblage. Article 6 (ii) describes such ‘sanitation 
hazards’:  
Articles which contain or are covered with toxic or harmful 
substances or are suspected to contain or be covered with such 
substances; provided, however, that this shall not apply to cases 
where the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare specifies that such 
                                                
355 See Smith (1999: 148-51), Campbell (2003: 15), DeVault (2002: 765) and Section 3.3.1.2. 
356 See Government of Japan (2007b) and Ministry of Health (2011g; 2011f). 
357 Also see Ministry of Health (2011g: 1). 
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articles involve no risk to human health. (Government of Japan, 
2007b: 4; MHLW, 2011g: 1) 
This legal framework for defining ‘safe food’ reveals many important aspects regarding 
the object’s enactment, at least within Japanese government texts. For one thing, 
according to Article 5, the objects of focus in Article 6 are “[f]ood or additives which 
are provided for sales” (Government of Japan, 2007b: 4). Thus ‘safe food’ is a 
commodity, but not just any commodity—it is a commodity that has been recognized to 
“involve no risk to human health” by the Minister of Health (Government of Japan, 
2007b: 4; MHLW, 2011g: 1). Thus, according to legal texts, ‘safe food’ is an object 
that has been legally established by the Minister of Health to cause ‘no risk’ to human 
bodies that purchase and ingest it. The enactment of ‘safe food’ within the legal system 
already clashes here with its enactment within the transnational nuclear assemblage, 
which claims that there is no ‘safe’ dose of exposure to radiation based on the linear-
non-threshold model it adopts (see Section 5.4.1). And what about the bodies of the 
people intended to ingest legally certified ‘safe food’? They are not only ‘citizens’ who 
should be kept in ‘good health,’ but ‘consumers’ of the food being circulated in the 
agrifood assemblage. 
 
By March 2011, however, it was no longer the sole responsibility of the Minister of 
Health to define these ‘risks to human health.’ Since the introduction of Basic Law in 
2003 (Government of Japan, 2006), it had become the responsibility of the Food Safety 
Commission to perform as “risk assessor” to assist the Ministry of Health which, along 
with the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF, hereafter Ministry of 
Agriculture) and the Consumer Affairs Agency (CAA), must fulfill its legal obligations 
as “risk manager” (FSCJ, 2011d; T. Yamaguchi, 2016: 70). With the outbreak of BSE 
in 2001 leading to a severe questioning of the abilities of the Ministry of Health to 
maintain the safety of food, ‘Science’ has been employed as the major tenet and 
technique to guide the Food Safety Commission’s risk assessments, which strive to 
enact food as being both anzen (safe in a technical, objective sense) and anshin (safe in 
a psychological, subjective sense) (see Tanaka, 2008; T. Yamaguchi, 2014). Thus, ‘safe 
food’ following the 2011 nuclear disaster would need to be proven to be anzen while 
also instilling a feeling of anshin in the consumer bodies who would be buying and 
ingesting this matter. But what if bodies do not feel anshin when it comes to ingesting 
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TEPCO’s radionuclides? As the Food Sanitation Act (2007b: Article 2(1)) explains, the 
government will disseminate to these bodies “correct knowledge concerning food 
sanitation through educational activities and PR activities.” Thus, while the Basic Law 
(Government of Japan, 2006: 3) discusses how proving food is anzen involves 
conducting “objective, neutral and fair” risk assessments based on what is considered to 
be “state-of-the-art scientific knowledge of the time,” the feeling of anshin is expected 
to be achieved through risk communication of this ‘state-of-the-art scientific 
knowledge.’358  
 
Within its March 29, 2011 Emergency Report to the Ministry of Health, the Food 
Safety Commission (2011c: 26) confirmed the appropriateness of the effective (whole 
body) dose of 5 mSv/year for cesium-134 and cesium-137, an equivalent dose of 50 
mSv/year to the thyroid for iodine-131, and the subsequent reference limits chosen to 
represent activities of these radionuclides that could adequately ensure these doses. 
These legally binding ‘provisional reference limits’ were the numbers deployed in 
public discourse to enact ‘safe food,’ and as intervention levels to coordinate the 
enactment and circulation of ‘safe food’ in the agrifood assemblage.359 As mentioned in 
Section 5.5, setting the ‘provisional reference limits,’ the Food Safety Commission 
(2011c) emphasized the need for risk communication to relay the distinction that these 
numbers are considered ‘safe,’ but only in emergency situations. The report reads:  
It should be clearly heeded that this emergency report is not 
appropriate as a basis for risk management measures under normal 
circumstances. All parties concerned are needed to lay out 
appropriate risk communication so as to prevent confusing 
emergency response with non-emergency response. (FSCJ, 2011c: 
26)  
                                                
358 In practice, in the Food Safety Commission’s (2011c) first assessment of the ‘provisional 
reference limits’ published in the Emergency Report on March 29, 2011, ‘state-of-the-art 
scientific knowledge’ used to review the ‘provisional standards’ was not so ‘state-of-the-art.’ In 
fact, some of the reports were so dated that they are now stamped with the message “no longer 
valid” (for example, IAEA, 1994; 1996). 
359 Again, for cesium-134 and cesium-137 the ‘provisional reference limits’ were 200 Bq/l for 
drinking water and milk, and 500 Bq/kg for other foods; for iodine-131 they were 300 Bq/l for 
drinking water and milk (100 Bq/l for milk used in infant formula), and 2,000 Bq/kg for 
vegetables and (eventually) fishery products. See Ministry of Health (MHLW, 2011b; 2011g). 
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Here, the enactment of ‘safe food’ becomes more nuanced in its materiality, but not in 
its representation. In other words, while foods containing activity concentrations of 
radionuclides below the ‘provisional reference limits’ are referred to as ‘safe,’ legally 
the values representing the foods’ ‘safety’ are only applicable to situations categorized 
as ‘emergencies.’ Regardless of the appeal by the Food Safety Commission, in most 
risk communication materials this distinction between ‘safe food’ in emergency and 
normal situations was not made. Even in risk communication coming directly from the 
Food Safety Commission itself. For example, as mentioned in Section 5.5, in her 
English-language correspondence regarding the Emergency Report, the then 
chairperson of the Food Safety Commission, Naoko Koizumi (2011a), mentioned the 
‘provisional reference limits,’ but did not clearly describe the differences between ‘safe 
food’ in emergency and normal situations. The food was safe. Period. 
 
Koizumi’s correspondence also highlights a number of ontonorms participating in the 
enactment of ‘safe food’ and the bodies intended to purchase and ingest these foods 
according to the Food Safety Commission and their risk assessment framework. Having 
first framed the work of the Food Safety Commission as being in line with the Basic 
Law—as an institution that uses “science-based risk assessments in an objective, 
neutral and unbiased manner”—Koizumi (2011a) ends her one-page letter by 
describing the behaviors expected of consumers in the agrifood assemblage concerning 
the ‘safe food’ being enacted following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. She writes:  
The warm support of Japan does involve your calm and rational 
behavior unaffected by groundless rumors, which will be definitely 
encouraging the people of Japan who are putting every effort into its 
rehabilitation. I deeply appreciate your course of action based on 
unbiased scientific data on foods imported to your country from 
Japan. (Koizumi, 2011a) 
What does this statement say about the ontonorms participating in the enactment of 
‘safe food’ or the bodies of those people who are intended to purchase and ingest it? 
First, Koizumi follows previously-mentioned logics, enacting ‘safe food’ as a 
commodity. However, her description goes a step further, enacting ‘safe food’ as an 
object connected to the rehabilitation of the suffering people of north-eastern Japan. 
This, in turn, enacts two categories of bodies: those that are supporting the recovery of 
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the country, and those that are sabotaging it. The ‘Eat to Support’360 “catchphrase”361 
and campaign launched soon after TEPCO’s nuclear disaster further elucidates these 
ontonorms.  
 
The campaign produced a number of commercials362 and advertisements featuring the 
popular all-male musical group TOKIO, a move which was surely designed to attract a 
large number of female fans to the cause (see Kimura, 2016a: 7). Within these 
commercials and ads, TOKIO members would savor and describe the deep flavors of 
food from the Tōhoku region—with particular focus on foods from Fukushima 
Prefecture—and would meet with farmers to show the faces of some of those bodies 
whose efforts to produce and sell ‘safe food’ could be either supported or sabotaged by 
consumers. By the time of my fieldwork in 2016, an additional ‘catchphrase’ linked to 
the ‘Eat to Support’ campaign and featuring the band TOKIO had also emerged, that of 
‘Fukushima Pride.’363 The commercials and advertisements using this new catchphrase 
adds a further dimension to the support-sabotage binary: sabotage not only involves 
preventing producers from performing their livelihoods, but rejecting their sincere 
offering of food, callously wounding their pride.  
 
Onishi Hisako, a mother of two who was living in the Kansai region since before 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, describes how ‘Eat to Support’ campaigns showed up in a 
‘reconstruction/revitalization [fukkō] corner’ at her local supermarket.   
                                                
360 The campaign has been translated into English as both ‘Eat to Support’ and ‘Eat and 
Support’ (see Kimura, 2017: 462, n65). I prefer the ‘Eat to Support’ translation as I feel it better 
captures the message of the campaign. See Minister of Agriculture and Minister of State of 
Consumer Affairs (2011) for one of the first messages encouraging subscription to the 
campaign (in Japanese). Also see Ministry of Agriculture (2015) for a brief overview of the 
campaign (in Japanese). 
361 The slogan is referred to as a “catchphrase” by the Ministry of Agriculture (2015). 
362 Kimura (2016a: 7; 2017: 462-3) provides an illustrative description of an early ‘Eat to 
Support’ commercial in 2011 featuring TOKIO. The commercial was produced through a 
collaboration between the Ministry of Agriculture and the group Food Action Japan (Food 
Action Nippon). While the original commercial is no longer available on Food Action Japan’s 
website, it can still be found on Dailymotion and other video streaming sites. The Food Action 
Japan site provides a link to the group’s current YouTube channel See 
http://syokuryo.jp/tabete_ouen/. 
363 The new campaign is being implemented by Fukushima Prefecture. A gallery of 
commercials produced for the new campaign can be found on the campaign’s website: 
http://fukushima-pride.com. 
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There was a reconstruction/revitalization [fukkō] corner at the 
supermarket, […] eat to support [tabete ōen] and whatnot. There was 
a period of time that it was there. […] There were also many Tōhoku 
fairs. At those events they went through all the trouble to bring food 
from the Tōhoku region. It was like “people are suffering so we have 
to buy to support.” There was a period where it was prevalent. In any 
case, it was after the disaster. 
Miki, whose experience in contacting the Board of Education regarding school lunch 
was shared in Chapter 5, described how ‘fūhyōhigai’ and ‘tabete ōen’ entered her 
lexicon through friends and television commercials.  
Miki: There were mothers [in the group] who did not care about 
radiation. Nevertheless, I thought it was a danger. I was wondering 
how the people around me were being careful. I thought it was good 
to care about it. But it was only me, well, [it was only me] talking 
about it. I was the only one to mention of it. In the [local women’s 
group I’m in], in the locally-circulated newspaper they often have a 
small flier inside of it that they ask people to write. I had written it 
many times. I made a questionnaire about what kind of things people 
were being careful about at home and I asked some people close to 
me to answer. Even people without awareness [about food and 
radiation issues] were somewhat choosing [food] by place of origin. 
Then I heard that on the news at that time fūhyōhigai was being used 
to explain [why food] could not sell. We don’t have a TV at my house. 
Because we don’t have a TV, we didn’t really hear what was being 
said. But, as expected, when we went back to my husband’s family’s 
home, the TV was on all the time. And on commercials and what not 
they were really saying “eat to support [tabete ōen].” 
Karly: Was it TOKIO? 
Miki: Yes, yes. It was so surprising this was going on! I thought these 
things were going on, but it was more incessant than I could have 
imagined. “Let’s eat to support” and calling people to sightsee. I felt 
those kinds of things were quite overtly being dispatched one after 
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another. And fūhyōhigai. From my perspective, radiation was being 
detected, so even though there is real harm [jitsugai], the fact that 
there is real harm. It is wrong that it completely becomes fūhyōhigai. 
It’s, how to say, I feel like for people who do not think or inquire 
much, they will end up believing that it is really fūhyōhigai that has 
occurred. In any event, I believe there is really harm. As someone 
without a TV, I don’t always hear “it’s okay, it’s okay.” But people 
like my friends, […] seeing those commercials, I feel that they start to 
believe “it’s okay to eat, we have to eat to support.” It’s really 
frightening.  
Another participant, Oikawa Mari, who was also living in the Kansai region since 
before TEPCO’s nuclear disaster and who had two small children at the time of 
Chernobyl’s nuclear disaster, expressed the questions that arose when she encountered 
‘tabete ōen’ at the supermarket near her house: 
They say “support reconstruction/revitalization [fukkō]” right? But 
are they really measuring it properly? It seems like they are only 
saying that things produced in Fukushima are under the limit. 
Especially fish. Boiled fish-paste products, processed seafood 
products. If it’s like, “It’s to support reconstruction/revitalization 
[fukkō], but radiation is not detected!” If that were the case, I could 
feel at ease [anshin]. 
Like many of my participants, Mari did not agree with the government’s 100 Bq/kg 
reference limit and wanted to eat foods that contained levels of radiation as close to 1 
Becquerel as possible.  
 
Thinking back to Miki’s experience about asking her child’s school to reduce its safety 
standard (Section 5.1), the desire to eat food measuring less than established reference 
limits may be labeled by others as being ‘scientifically baseless.’ I turn back to 
Koizumi’s (2011a) letter to explore how conceptualizations of what is considered 
‘scientific’ and ‘unscientific’ was enacted in ruling discourses shortly following the 
onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
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Koizumi’s (2011a) multiple mentions of ‘unbiased science’ highlight the ontonorms 
active in official enactments of ‘safe food’ and bodies that intend to ingest it. When it 
comes to ‘safe food,’ the concept of ‘objective,’ ‘neutral,’ and ‘unbiased’ science 
enacts food as anzen in discourse, though the precise scientific techniques behind this 
enactment remain ambiguous and unexplored. According to Koizumi (2011a: 1), 
recognizing the ‘safety’ (anzen-sei) of these foods requires bodies that are ‘rational’ 
and ‘calm;’ bodies that will continue purchasing government certified ‘safe food’ 
because they accept the Science that enacts these objects. With one of the first attempts 
at risk communication seen in Koizumi’s letter, we already see a structuration of 
perspectivalism setting in—the ‘correct’ way of understanding and enacting the 
relationship between bodies and radionuclides is established as a Scientifically-derived 
‘single reality’ upon which all human actors must gaze and use as a basis when 
deliberating and debating radionuclides, food and bodies.  
 
Koizumi’s (2011a) call for ‘calm’ bodies relates to the feeling of anshin—‘rational’ 
bodies who accept the ‘safe food’ described by the Food Safety Commission will feel at 
ease about purchasing and eating these government certified objects. Thus, good bodies 
must feel anshin; they look at the ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ scientific claims of the Food 
Safety Commission and other government bodies and accept it as the single, ‘correct’ 
way of understanding the complex relations among radionuclides, food and bodies. 
Concurrently, if ‘rational’ and ‘calm’ bodies who continue to purchase government 
certified ‘safe food’ are enacted as good, then any body that does not want to purchase 
these foods gets immediately categorized away as ‘irrational’ or ‘uneasy.’364 The 
ontonorms embedded in performances of ‘safe food’ help to deal with these 
‘unscientific’ bodies by categorizing them away as ‘irrational’ bodies that require 
scientific knowledge to cure them from the uneasiness they experience. Thus, any 
uneasiness these bodies feel would be due to their own irrationality and inability to 
accept or understand the ‘unbiased’ and ‘neutral’ Science being presented to them. In 
the way that the International Atomic Energy Agency-sponsored Chernobyl Forum 
(2006: 36) categorizes all claims of radiation-induced health effects that models and 
calculations within the transnational nuclear assemblage are unable to recognize as 
                                                
364 Interestingly, the necessity of scientific knowledge as the basis of ‘rational’ decision-making 
regarding radiation seems to imply that bodies without the input of scientific knowledge would 
be repulsed by the idea of eating anthropogenic radionuclides. 
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caused by “psychological distress” or “anxiety,” in Japan the word fuan has been 
widely used to describe bodies that do not fit into the categories of ‘rational’ and 
‘calm.’365 Here we see how the structuration of perspectivalism does not only depend 
on the enactment of the seemingly single, stable object of ‘safe food,’ but the enactment 
of a number of terms for discussing the ‘single reality’ among various, pluralized, 
perspectives. 
 
There are interesting similarities among the kanji characters for anzen, anshin and fuan 
which deserve some attention.366 All three are compound words containing the 
character an (安) which can be translated as ‘peaceful.’ Anzen combines an (安) with 
zen (全)—meaning ‘whole.’ This description is interesting when thinking of ‘safe food’ 
as being enacted through scientific risk assessments which attempt to present the 
unstable relations among food, bodies and radionuclides as knowable, a ‘peaceful 
whole.’ This translation seems to fit well with the ambitions of reductionist scientific 
techniques: using sound, ‘unbiased’ techniques and ‘objective’ scientific practices to 
reduce reality into easily manageable units which can be used to enact a clear picture of 
that reality. Through these reductions, objects and phenomena emerge and appear to be 
understandable, whole. And if some pieces remain uncertain—as in the case of the 
stochastic effects of exposure to low-doses of ionizing radiation—risk assessments 
based on consensus about this uncertainty can stabilize predictions about the emergence 
of future happenings.367 Thus, what seemed to be unmanageable and uncertain—such as 
stochastic effects to ionizing radiation below a cumulative effective dose of ‘around 
100 mSv’—becomes whole and knowable again. There is control. There is stability. 
There is peace of mind. Questions about which reductions are made and through which 
techniques and sociomaterial entanglements are pushed to the side and ‘Science’—in 
all its reverence—gets placed at the center: the best and only way to stabilize the 
messiness and heterogeneity of the world. While different scientific practices produce 
pictures of reality that are necessarily ‘partial,’368 they can be enacted as singular and 
‘whole’ with the help of perspectivalism. 
                                                
365 Also see Section 5.3. 
366 Yamaguchi (2014) and Sternsdorff-Cisterna (2015) also provides many interesting insights 
into these terms and their uses. 
367 See Section 5.4. 
368 See Section 2.6.5 for Haraway’s (1991c) discussions on ‘partial perspectives.’ 
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Sternsdorff-Cisterna (2015: 458, original emphasis) provides another interesting 
description of the term anzen and its role in enacting perspectivalism: “While there can 
be arguments about how food safety is measured and degrees of acceptable risk, anzen 
speaks to a system based on rationality and consistency in its standards.” Thus, 
‘rational’ and ‘objective’ science sets up consistent logics and forms of enacting reality 
in a way that provides a full, ‘whole’ picture of it. While this picture can be debated, 
the reverence given to Science as a ‘neutral’ and ‘unbiased’ institution, positions 
‘Science’ as providing a single, reliable picture for knowing, especially in the case of 
very complex, messy subjects—such as the study of invisible radionuclides and their 
intra-actions with active human bodies. The possible limits of the reductions being 
made by particular scientific techniques—in this case, science born out of the 
transnational nuclear assemblage and all of his uneven, ghostly hauntings (Chapter 5)—
as well as the ethical and political implications of valuing one reality over others, 
become muddled by the enactment of Science as reverent and ‘neutral.’ 
 
Correspondingly, anshin combines the character of an (安) with shin (⼼)—heart or 
mind—to create a word which can translate to ‘peace of mind,’ ‘freedom from anxiety’ 
or ‘freedom from care.’ In the logic of the Food Safety Commission, the ‘rational’ body 
that accepts the ‘single reality’—represented as anzen—must also be a ‘calm’ body 
experiencing anshin. I find the third definition particularly interesting when thinking 
about stories of singularity and control versus stories of multiplicity, ‘tinkering’ and 
care. Following the ‘single reality’ and entering a state of ‘ease’ thus requires bodies to 
relinquish care, leaving the enactment of ‘safe food’ to the authorities alone. Inversely, 
yōjin, one of the Japanese words for ‘care’ or ‘carefulness,’ combines the characters of 
‘use’ or ‘errand’ (⽤) and ‘heart’ or ‘mind’ (⼼), creating an image of care which 
involves a vigilant, as opposed to a ‘calm’ or ‘peaceful,’ heart and mind.  
 
If a ‘rational’ and ‘calm’ body is one that relinquishes care, then a body carefully 
tinkering within its own sociomaterial entanglements—treating them as ‘matters of 
care’—would succumb to a different valuation. Going back to Koizumi’s (2011a) first 
English-language letter, instead of being categorized as feeling anshin, people who do 
not follow the single reality being presented by the Food Safety Commission are 
categorized as having adverse characteristics: they are anxious, uneasy, experiencing a 
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feeling of fuan. Literally translated as ‘not’ (不) ‘peaceful’ (安), the word fuan serves 
as a description of the psychological state of those bodies who are categorized as 
‘irrational’ or ‘uneasy.’ While the word is used to refer to bodies that do not agree with 
the ‘single reality,’ the ‘peaceful whole’ that enacts ‘safe food’ as anzen, it can also be 
translated as a state of ‘restlessness’ or ‘uncertainty.’ That is, in not accepting the 
scientifically-performed ‘peaceful whole,’ these bodies are enacted as lacking peace 
and certainty. How to treat a body ailing from ‘lack of peace’? Through sound risk 
communication that explains the ‘single reality’ in a way to instill a feeling of anshin. 
Thus, ‘irrational,’ ‘careful’ or ‘anxious’ bodies can be transformed into ‘rational’ and 
‘calm’ bodies if they are able to digest the ‘single reality’ being presented by 
government institutions and members of the transnational nuclear assemblage. Once the 
feeling of anshin is achieved, business as usual can continue. People can stop being 
‘careful’ and feeling ‘uneasy’ or ‘uncertain’ and get back to their lives as they were 
before the nuclear disaster. Managing the relationship between radionuclides and 
bodies would be the work of the government, not something to be cared for or tinkered 
with by people in their everyday lives. 
 
One further pair of words containing the character an (安) and pertaining to radiation 
that are worth mentioning are antei and fuantei. Combining the character of an (安)—
‘peace’—and tei (定)—‘fixed,’ ‘decided,’ ‘regular’ or ‘permanent’ —antei is used to 
describe a state of stability, or in its verb form (antei suru), the process of stabilization. 
In risk communication literature, antei is used to describe the ‘stable’ decline in food 
found ‘over the reference limit,’ or to refer to stable forms of iodine or other non-
radioactive isotopes (for example, CAA, 2017b: 6 & 37). The term fits well with the 
stability, control and ‘peace of mind’ promised to bodies that follow the ‘single reality’ 
being deployed by the Japanese government regarding how radionuclides, food and 
bodies ‘safely’ relate with each other. Fuantei, on the other hand, combines the three 
characters of ‘not’ (不), ‘peaceful’ (安) and ‘fixed’ (定) which can be used to describe a 
state of ‘instability,’ or used as an adjective to describe something as ‘unstable.’ The 
word fuan can be found in this term, indicating a prolonged state of uncertainty or 
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uneasiness.369 In Japanese, fuantei is often put in front of the name of an isotope to 
specify that it is radioactive, highlighting its instability. Thinking through these words, 
the single reality being deployed by the Japanese government can be seen as an attempt 
to use science born out of the transnational nuclear assemblage to regain a sense of 
stability (antei) over the overflow of unstable (fuantei-na) radionuclides and all of the 
instability (fuantei) they bring to modernist industrial projects that rely on an image of 
control for their continuing expansion. 
 
While in many cases the enactment of dissenting bodies as ‘irrational’ and ridden with 
anxiety might be enough to maintain the centrality of the singe reality being deployed, 
the enactment of ‘safe food’ as a commodity connected to stabilization, recovery, 
renewal and progress following the destabilization caused by TEPCO’s nuclear disaster 
allows for further normative valuations and enactments of bodies—enactments which 
aim to categorize bodies whose activities may negatively influence economic and 
progress-oriented projects. In fact, as described by Madoka in Chapter 4, there have 
been huge progress projects in the works since the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, 
which Japanese government officials urged all Japanese people to support ‘in unison.’  
 
In December 2012, the then prime minister of Japan, Noda Yoshihiko (2012), gave a 
speech to the Japanese Diet declaring 2012 as "the First Year for the Rebirth of Japan." 
In his speech, he calls on “all Japanese people” to “join hands and together create a 
page in history titled, ‘Japan’s rebirth through reconstruction.’” TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster and the ‘rebirth’ of Fukushima Prefecture also played a major role in his 
speech. Noda (2012) proclaimed:  
Without the rebirth of Fukushima, there can be no rebirth for Japan. 
Unless Fukushima is reborn, a vibrant Japan can neither be restored. I 
hope that my making repeated references to this will lead to all 
people sharing this notion. In order to translate this hope into 
concrete action, a special measures bill will be submitted to this Diet 
                                                
369 It is the state of precarity discussed in Chapter 4, in which neither certainty nor control (two 
basic ingredients for modern progress projects) can be guaranteed. 
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session for the Government and communities to promote the rebirth 
of Fukushima in unison.  
Noda’s aspirations for a united approach to the recovery efforts in Fukushima 
Prefecture emerged in two policy documents370 which would help to ‘unify’ and 
coordinate activities of industry and citizenry.371 Both of these documents outline plans 
for urgently and intensively coordinating economic projects that will ‘revitalize’ and 
‘reconstruct’ (fukkō suru) Fukushima Prefecture, and thus the country. While these 
plans include a number of economic endeavors in nuclear power—not only cleaning up 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, but advocating the ‘safe’ restart of Japan’s remaining 
nuclear power plants—and agriculture—for example, the establishment of “plant 
factories”372—at its core, its success depends on the stabilization of the overflow of 
radionuclides following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. Thus, “sweeping away rumors 
[fūhyō fusshoku]”373 and obtaining coordinated unity in implementing proposed 
‘rebirth’374 and ‘revitalization’ progress projects have become the cornerstone of 
Japanese economic policies post-2011.  
 
Revisiting the excerpt from Koizumi’s (2011a) letter, we see the use of the term 
‘groundless rumors,’ which corresponds to the Japanese word fūhyōhigai. The term 
appeared in the 1980s as a way to describe a decrease in seafood sales following 
                                                
370 The documents are titled: Comprehensive Strategy for the Rebirth of Japan: Exploring the 
Frontiers and Building a "Country of Co-creation" (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 2012) and 
Japan Revitalization Strategy: Japan's Challenge for the Future (Prime Minister of Japan and 
His Cabinet, 2014). 
371 See Williamson (2015) for a commentary of Noda’s speech in June 2012 where he also 
called for the restart of the Ōi Nuclear Power Plant in Fukui Prefecture—within 160 kilometers 
of all of my study’s participants in 2016. 
372 Plant factories are discussed by Sekine and Bonanno (2016) in their recent book describing 
the entrenchment of neo-liberal corporate takeover of agriculture—“disaster capitalism” (Klein, 
2007)—in post-2011 Japan. While the stated goal of plant factories is “to rebuild home-grown 
products’ features such as ‘tasty,’ ‘safe’ and ‘environment-friendly,’” their establishment are 
expected to lead to the further alienation of farmers from their local environments, turning 
farmers into factory workers for mega trans-national corporations (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 
2012: 53).  
373 This is a new ruling discourse regarding ‘harmful rumors’ circulating in the news and mass 
media. See, for example, a news article by the Kahoku Shimpō (“Sweeping away rumors,” 
2017). 
374 The push toward ‘rebirth’ is reminiscent of the case of Minamata discussed in Section 4.4.1. 
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overflows from nuclear power plants (Kimura, 2016a: 32; Sekiya, 2003; 2011). As 
pointed out by Katsunori in the introduction to this chapter, the term gained popularity 
following the 1999 JCO nuclear criticality disaster in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki where it was 
used to describe the reason behind loss in agricultural sales following the overflow of 
radionuclides into nearby sweet potato fields and other farmlands.375 The use of the 
term reveals a shift in emphasizing the role of ‘irrational’ and ‘anxious’ consumers in 
the decline in food sales, and not the possible material presence of radionuclides or the 
people responsible for their overflow. The lingering message? People cause economic 
damage, not radionuclides and not energy corporations or the government. 
 
The term fūhyōhigai has also been established as a legal tool: producers can apply for 
compensation of losses in sales caused by ‘irrational consumers,’ but not necessarily 
because their fields have been contaminated with radionuclides—especially when the 
activity of these radionuclides falls under the government’s legal definition of ‘safe’ 
doses or concentrations. Because there is no other legal term available in the Japanese 
legal system that recognizes a situation in which people might avoid eating foods 
possibly containing radionuclides, we see how the establishment of legally recognized 
‘safe food’ enacts all bodies that are ‘careful’ or question a food’s ‘safety’ as vectors of 
‘harmful rumors.’376 Again, it is the rumors from ‘irrational’ bodies that require legal 
attention, not the presence of radionuclides.  
 
Koizumi’s (2011a) use of the word ‘groundless’ adds another clue to the ontonorms 
contributing to the enactment of bodies intended to eat government certified ‘safe 
                                                
375 See, for example, Furukawa (2000) Kyodo News (1999), Osnos (2011), Ramseyer (2012) 
and Sekiya (2003; 2011). 
376 Interestingly the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012: 
111-2) published a report which points out the problems with using “‘rumour-related’ damage” 
as a legal tool as it focuses only on damage caused by what is termed ‘irrational’ behavior by a 
third party, and seems to imply that there is no reasonable reason why someone might avoid 
products or activities due to concerns about radionuclides. The document reads: “when related 
to a nuclear accident such as the accident [in Fukushima], at the very least it should be regarded 
as an adverse reaction by the market in order to avoid the risk of contamination with 
radioactive material, which is not necessarily clear scientifically, and consequently there is 
eligibility for compensation as nuclear damage where such avoidance behaviour can be said to 
be reasonable” (CRPPH, 2012: 111-2). However, the report continues using this expression (in 
quotations) because “currently no appropriate substitute expression has been indicated in court 
procedure” (CRPPH, 2012: 112).  
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food.’ Within the structuration of perspectivalism, something that follows the single 
reality presented by the Food Safety Commission and other government factions is 
considered to be standing on solid, scientific ‘ground.’ If the science used to enact ‘safe 
food’ is ‘grounded,’ then any body that denounces this single, ‘correct’ reality or 
questions the object of ‘safe food’ automatically falls into the category of ‘groundless.’ 
And not only are these perspectives scientifically ‘groundless,’ but legal texts recognize 
them as the sole reason why producers in the most contaminated regions suffer and 
cannot rebuild their livelihoods. Therefore, bodies that do not purchase government 
certified ‘safe food’ are not only enacted as ‘irrational’ and ‘uneasy,’ but legally liable 
for spreading ‘unscientific,’ ‘groundless rumors’ that sabotage recovery efforts and 
cause harm to both local and national economies.377 
 
In 2016 and 2017, the words anzen, anshin, fuan, antei and fūhyōhigai continue to litter 
media articles378 and risk communication documents. As an example, the Food and 
Radiation Q&A booklet updated yearly by the Consumer Affairs Agency—the main 
agency tasked with risk communication—continues to activate these words. Each 
updated booklet begins with a note from the agency’s current secretary general. While 
the first half of the letter has varied throughout the years, the last paragraph has for the 
most part remained the same.379 The paragraph reads:  
Using an easy to understand Q&A format, this booklet strives to 
explain information about food safety and radioactive materials about 
which consumers appear to have questions and uneasiness [fuan]. I 
hope the information provided will help to ensure food safety [anzen-
                                                
377 This set-up between the victims and perpetrators of ‘harmful rumors’ is also described by 
Yamaguchi (2016: 71-2). 
378 For example, Belogolova (2013) and “Harmful rumors: Signs of no further worsening” 
(2016). 
379 I have been able to review the eighth (CAA, 2013: 3), ninth (CAA, 2014: 3), tenth (CAA, 
2016: 3) and eleventh (CAA, 2017b: 3) versions which all include the exact same statement. 
One of the first versions (published in July 2011) is very similar, but instead of hoping the 
“information provided will help to ensure safety and security about food, and prevent 
groundless rumors” (CAA, 2017b: 3), it only shares the hope that the information will “prevent 
harm to health and groundless rumors” (CAA, 2011: 3). While the eighth edition was translated 
into English (CAA, 2013), I used my own translation of the paragraph to highlight some of the 
nuances in the Japanese version.  
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sei] and a sense of security [anshin] about food, and prevent 
groundless rumors [fūhyōhigai]. (CAA, 2017b: 3) 
Here, the structuration of perspectivalism continues to be enacted through government 
texts, even more than six years following the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. In 
2012, the Consumer Affairs Agency initially attempted to provide ‘correct’ information 
about food safety to an uneasy public through a number of events and promotional 
materials outlined in its Action Plan for Consumers to Feel at Ease [Anshin] (CAA, 
2012).380 The agency has additionally been conducting bi-annual investigations into 
consumer ‘awareness’ since 2013. Led by a group called the ‘Team to Advance 
Consumer Understanding,’ the survey-style investigation is titled “The Survey of the 
Current State of Consumer Awareness Concerning Harmful Rumors [Fūhyōhigai]” 
(CAA, 2017a).381 While surveys are usually guilty of confining participants to pre-
determined categories,382 the title of the Consumer Affairs Agency’s survey is strikingly 
unambiguous about how it plans to enact the bodies of the people answering its 
questions. That is, people who willingly purchase foods from the seventeen 
prefectures383 where testing for radionuclides is mandated have ‘correct’ awareness, 
while those who hesitate have faulty knowledge and are promulgaters of fūhyōhigai. It 
is the job of the Consumer Affairs Agency to identify these tendencies and revise their 
risk communication materials in an attempt to transform bodies that are ‘irrational’ to 
‘rational,’ bodies suffering from fuan to those feeling anshin. 
 
However, the experiences of my participants poke holes in the idea that these forms of 
knowledge are the cure for unease (fuan). Experiences shared by Kawano Hotaru 
(pseudonym), a nuclear refugee from Yokohama City in the Kantō region, reveal that it 
is not merely scientific knowledge about radiation that helped to transform her feelings 
                                                
380 See Reiher (2016: 66-8) for a description of some of the risk communication leaflets 
produced by the Consumer Affairs Agency in affiliation with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Health and the Food Safety Commission (2012a; 2012c; 2012b). 
381 Yamaguchi (2016: 84-5 n3) also discusses this survey, pointing out how the questions are 
not about rumors, but consumer purchasing behaviors and knowledge on radioactivity—
questions which implicate and enact consumers as the ones to blame for any hardships suffered 
by producers, not the Japanese government or TEPCO.  
382 See Callon et al. (2009: 153-8) for a discussion on surveys and their role in thwarting truly 
democratic discussions and deliberations. 
383 See Ministry of Health (2017) and Figure 9. 
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of fuan to anshin, but the ability to discuss her concerns and make visible radionuclides 
that might be present in the foods she and her family eat.  
If you don’t have knowledge, you can’t get scared. Information was 
overwhelming scarce. Also people did not know much about 
radiation. Well, really only some at the time of Chernobyl, there were 
some people who studied. There were really only some who 
understood. I by chance interacted with those people. I could start 
studying. However, most people don’t know anything, so they have 
nothing to be scared about. Then, since the start of the accident, in 
any case, the state says that it is safe [anzen], so I feel like everyone 
is going in that direction. Everyone is being brainwashed. That’s the 
feeling I get. 
She describes the difficulty she experienced in trying to talk about radiation with 
people around her. 
We lived in a company residence, friends that lived at that residence, 
five, six people also promptly understood the radiation problem. We 
were all careful together. However, school classmates’ mothers who 
I have absolutely no relation with and such, those people did not care 
at all. Well, if I asked, “Do you care about food?” The conversation 
would become, “If you care so much, you will have nothing to eat.” 
Hmm. I felt like I couldn’t communicate with those people, I couldn’t 
talk with them. I just exchanged information with my friends at the 
company residence.  
Hotaru eventually relocated to the Kansai region where she found another community 
of people with whom she could discuss her concerns about radiation at a CRMS near 
her new home. For her, it was having access to this new community and a measuring 
device that brought a feeling of ease (anshin).  
The ability to measure is near so, for example, I bought rice from 
Akita Prefecture [in the Tōhoku region]. Well, when I thought about 
how Akita Prefecture was doing, I could quickly measure. After 
checking if it was safe [anzen], I could eat it. The fact that this kind 
of measuring ability is so near, it’s a really big change. You know, it 
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has reached the point that I am able to eat food I feel at ease 
[anshin] about. 
Kikuchi Aoi (pseudonym) and Ueno Masami (pseudonym), two mothers who were 
living in Fukushima Prefecture at the time of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, describe their 
experiences in shopping after relocating to the Kansai region. During our focus group, 
they also provide insights into how both numbers and opportunities to discuss their 
concerns helped to bring them a sense of anshin. 
Karly: How do you choose food at the supermarket?  
Aoi: I look at the place of production. 
Masami: I look. I look. I always look. […] Also at the place of 
manufacture, for processed things. 
Aoi: Normally, there are also things like additives, as much as 
possible, when I can I pay attention to it. […] 
Masami: Yes, of course. I’m really sorry, but I don’t buy, I don’t buy 
things from the Kantō region. Gunma, Ibaraki, Chiba. 
Aoi: Even Ibaraki. 
Karly: What makes you particularly concerned about food from the 
Kantō region? 
Masami: They are not really measuring, well, there are measuring 
stations where private people are measuring, though. Still, for food 
produced in Fukushima Prefecture, the reference limit is high, but 
rice over 100 Becquerels is not being shipped. As far as measuring 
goes, there are facilities in Fukushima Prefecture. But, the 
reasonably contaminated Kantō region. 
Aoi: Measurements in the surrounding areas.  
Masami: They aren’t measuring. They aren’t, right? 
Aoi: Not really, because their awareness is low. 
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Masami: Yes. So, on the contrary, I’m more worried about food from 
prefectures around Fukushima. It seems like this is how normal 
market circulation goes. Even people in the Kantō region who care, 
they go to a measuring station and have things measured. But I guess 
only if there is a measuring station they can do it. My understanding 
is that there are things not being measured. So I end up thinking that 
it is best not to choose them. 
Aoi: That’s why, the best thing is to measure and publicly share the 
numbers.  
Masami: Yes, yes, yes. If you do that, you can better decide what not 
to buy. 
Aoi: It’s possible. Even for us. 
Masami: With only the place of production, in any case, all you can 
do is use your awareness about contaminated regions. 
Aoi: Ultimately, that may get connected to rumors [fūhyō]. But, in 
any case, if you share the measurements with producers. 
Masami: Yes, I want the numbers to be rendered visible. 
Aoi: It would have an influence on producers right? I think those 
producers would really understand. I think there are definitely 
producers who think measuring is really important and can stir 
awareness. 
Masami: There are. There are. 
Aoi: Well, in any case, this point represents the first reaction of 
citizens. But, unmistakably, I think there are people who will not utter 
their concerns, but just choose foods outside of the prefecture. 
Especially in Fukushima. You know, it’s like, “It’s all okay!” is the 
normal message being purveyed. Gradually this way of making 
people buy. You know, it is imposed. 
Masami: It’s awful! 
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Aoi: But if ordinarily numbers would reliably appear, I would be 
really happy! 
Masami: Conversely, because they are reliably rendered visible, I 
feel this will connect to safety/feeling at ease [anzen/anshin]. In 
order to decide. 
Karly: And what is your experience shopping here in the Kansai 
region?  
Aoi: Here, it’s still safe. 
Masami: It’s still okay, things from the west. Things from Fukushima 
are sold here but, there’s not so much. Also, in any case, there is the 
measuring station, so if you are worried, you can have them measure 
it. 
Aoi: There are also people to discuss it with. 
Masami: Those are the aspects that bring a feeling of ease [anshin], 
aren’t they? 
Here, again we see that the feeling of ease (anshin) is not produced through 
proclamations of ‘safety’ or a belief in Science, but through having access to 
measurement results at the site of purchase, people to discuss these values or other 
concerns with, and a measuring station to check for radionuclides if one is concerned. 
Viewing the numbers allows people to more carefully relate with radionuclides; 
without the numbers, people are left only with prefecture of origin labels to guide their 
practices. 
 
Mai, whose story I shared in Chapter 1, also expressed how ruling discourses of ‘eat to 
support (tabete ōen)’ and ‘harmful rumors (fūhyōhigai)’ worked against her own 
attempts to carefully relate with TEPCO’s radionuclides, especially as she was 
breastfeeding at the time of the disaster’s onset in 2011. Again, numbers played a role 
in instilling her with a feeling of ease (anshin).  
Eat to support [tabete ōen], even harmful rumors [fūhyōhigai]. It’s 
really not harmful rumors [fūhyōhigai]. But that kind of label, in any 
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case, I feel it’s the kind of society that labels you. Any people who 
care are deliberately labeled negatively as spreading harmful rumors 
[fūhyōhigai] and obstructing reconstruction/revitalization [fukkō] 
and whatnot. And then for the good intentioned people, for people 
like those in Fukushima, I feel it’s really difficult. I feel the good 
intentions of the people of Fukushima are being used, manipulated. 
Also eat to support [tabete ōen]. Really. You know, if it’s really eat to 
support [tabete ōen] […] the increase from 1 millisievert to 20 
millisieverts, the food safety standard increasing from 1 Becquerel to 
100 Becquerels and whatnot, this government, they are deliberately 
hiding the severity of the contamination. In any case, if there was 
accurate communication about the accident. Even more, there should 
be discussion. Real eat to support [tabete ōen] means accurately 
measuring and making public the amount of Becquerels. More than 
that, if it’s okay to eat, even if it’s higher than 1 Becquerel, it might 
be strange for me to say, but for the people who want to eat it, it’s 
okay. In any case, at [the time of the accident], I was breast feeding, 
so I became very nervous. The things I would eat. Contaminated 
things would go directly to my child. I experienced that kind of fear. 
Hmm. That’s why I go to the measuring station, the citizen radiation 
measuring station. I’m a member. 
As visible in my participants’ various experience, terms such as fūhyōhigai, anzen, 
anshin, fuan and tabete ōen were quickly dispatched through media outlets, providing a 
language for people to discuss and negotiate their newfound relations with 
radionuclides. Good bodies are not ‘careful’ (yōjin-bukai), measuring foods, 
deliberating Becquerel counts and discussing their concerns. Instead, they are ‘calm’ 
and ‘peaceful’ (anshin) because they have accepted the ‘unbiased science’ behind legal 
reference limits. Any bodies espousing carefulness or discussing the ‘safety’ (anzen-
sei) of government certified ‘safe food,’ are enacted as not only anxious (fuan), but 
purveyors of ‘groundless,’ ‘harmful rumors’ (fūhyōhigai), malicious saboteurs of 
recovery and revitalization (fukkō) efforts.  
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In this section I have explored how ‘safe food’ and the bodies intended to ingest it are 
enacted in ruling discourses and texts, and how these objectified accounts misrepresent 
and disregard the needs of my participants who want to know the activity of 
radionuclides in the foods they ingest. Living so far away from the actual places where 
government measurements were taking place, all of my participants had some questions 
about how ‘safe food’—in its material form—was being enacted through situated 
practice. In the next section I will go one layer deeper to explore the food-testing 
regime designed by the Japanese government which begins to uncover the multiple 
enactments of ‘safe food’ and how any inconsistencies among these multiple 




While the then chairperson of the Food Safety Commission, Koizumi Naoko (2011a), 
sent out her English correspondence on April 8, 2011 explaining how the provisional 
food safety measures were “effective enough to ensure the safety of vegetable, seafood 
and other foodstuffs placed in domestic markets and exported abroad from Japan,” on 
the ground government personnel were still scrambling to find equipment to test foods. 
That is, while foods were instantly being enacted as ‘safe’ in ruling discourses, actual 
testing procedures were taking place in a haphazard fashion as people on the ground 
were trying to gauge the extent of the overflow of radionuclides into the agrifood 
assemblage. Given the impossibility of testing all foods, a screening process was 
developed in an attempt to stabilize the radionuclides that had reemerged as vicious and 
mischievous actors within the agrifood assemblage. Instructions for testing procedures 
were being outlined in an ever evolving textual complex developed by the Japanese 
government, creating an image of stability and control in the face of instability and 
grave uncertainty. However, these procedures offered a lot of room for creative 
interpretation among the people activating them in practice. In this section, I will 
provide a brief overview of the evolving government-prescribed testing procedures that 
participate in the enactment of ‘safe food,’ and how a very mutable meaning of ‘safety’ 
is used to stabilize ruptures in control and maintain circulation of the economy when 
messy, heterogeneity rears its head.  
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When the ‘provisional reference limits’ were set on March 17, 2011,384 they included an 
announcement asking all testing for radionuclides to follow the Manual for Measuring 
Radioactivity of Foods in Case of Emergency published by the Ministry of Health in 
2002.385 From March 19 to April 3, 2011, over 900 samples were said to have been 
tested, and the data was used to inform the first comprehensive guidelines for enacting 
‘safe food’ disseminated in a press release on April 4, 2011 (MHLW, 2011c). The press 
release, titled The Handling of Provisional Regulation Values Related to Radioactive 
Materials Present in Food, included an attachment from the Nuclear Emergency 
Response Headquarters titled Concepts of Inspection Planning and the Establishment 
and Cancellation of Items and Areas to Which Restriction of Distribution and/or 
Consumption of Foods Concerned Applies (hereafter Concepts of Inspection). The lack 
of proper machinery for measuring was also mentioned in an attachment to the April 4th 
press release, with the Ministry of Health acknowledging that it was working to secure 
proper inspection equipment for those prefectures not equipped to enact the new 
guidelines. If the process of ‘testing’ is supposed to enact ‘safe food,’ without 
machinery to make the activity of radionuclides perceptible to humans, how could ‘safe 
food’ be enacted? The answer? Indexes and judgements.  
 
The April 4th Concepts of Inspection specified eleven prefectures and municipalities 
(out of forty-seven total) that were expected to test for radionuclides in food (Figure 
9).386 Local governments were asked to “divide prefectural areas into appropriate 
districts” to manage both the testing of food and assist in organizing processes of 
restricting foods found ‘over the limit.’ As mentioned, given the chaotic circumstances 
that ensued following the nuclear disaster, the prefectural and municipal governments 
were awarded great flexibility in implementing the Concepts of Inspection.  
 
The instructions did not ask prefectures and municipalities to test all foods—this would 
be impossible given the time and preparation involved in testing procedures as well as 
the reality that many local districts did not have equipment for testing—so the 
document laid out a list of foods which should be prioritized. Prioritized foods  
                                                
384 See Ministry of Health (MHLW, 2011b; 2011g). 
385 See Ministry of Health (2002). 
386 The eleven prefectures and municipalities were Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, 
Miyagi, Yamagata, Niigata, Nagano, Saitama, Chiba and Tokyo. 
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 were those of the 900 measurements found to have high levels of radioactivity, so 
would become “indexes” for radioactivity in other foods (MHLW, 2011c: 6). On April 
4th, these foods included leafy vegetables, milk and other explicitly specified foods. 
Testing of these foods was recommended to take place “about once per week” 
(MHLW, 2011c: 6). Here, the ‘safe food’ in Koizumi’s (2011a) letter on April 8th was 
not all “vegetable, seafood and other foodstuffs,” but an estimation of ‘safety’ based on 
results from measurements of radionuclides in leafy vegetables, milk and other selected 
items. In fact, provisional standards for seafood were only established on April 5th, 
Figure 9 Prefectures and municipalities mandated by the Japanese government to test for 
radionuclides in food. 
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three days before Koizumi’s letter was written.387 And in a press release on April 8th 
concerning radioactive iodine in fishery products, the Food Sanitation Subcommittee’s 
Radioactive Material Response Working Group (hereafter Working Group) argued that 
“the inspection and monitoring system needs to be enhanced in order to improve the 
safety [anzen-sei] and sense of security [anshin] of people” (MHLW, 2011j). There 
seemed to be a disjuncture between the ways ‘safe food’ was being enacted in discourse 
and in situated practice. So how would the results from the weekly tests be used to 
ensure foods circulating within the agrifood assemblage were ‘safe’? According to the 
Concepts of Inspection, weekly ‘judgements’ would be used to determine which foods 
to restrict. The document explains: 
inspection results are summed up every week, and the applicability of 
the requirements is judged in a comprehensive manner. […] As for 
items exceeding the provisional regulation values, if the regional 
spread is unclear, the surrounding areas will be inspected and the 
judgement will be made on the necessity of restriction of distribution. 
As for items for which a significantly high concentration value is 
detected, restriction of consumption is promptly set irrespective of 
the number of samples of relevant items. (MHLW, 2011c: 9) 
The policy behind the setting of restrictions is legally based on the Act on Special 
Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Article 20 (3) which outlines 
the right of the director-general to “give necessary instructions to the heads of the 
relevant designated administrative organs” in order to implement “emergency response 
measures accurately and promptly” following a nuclear disaster (MHLW, 2011h). 
However, the abovementioned excerpt highlights how the type and extent of the 
restriction will be based on the judgement of local government authorities. In scanning 
the week’s data, local officials have discretion in implementing a “restriction on 
distribution”—if there seems to be contamination spread over a regional area—or a 
“restriction on consumption”—targeting specific items where high amounts of 
radioactivity were measured (MHLW, 2011c: 9). That is, within the evolving screening 
processes, if some food item was found to be ‘over the provisional reference limits,’ a 
restriction might be put in place, but only if judged appropriate. There does not seem to 
                                                
387 See Ministry of Health (2011i). 
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be a clear definition for interpreting what constitutes an ‘appropriate’ versus an 
‘inappropriate’ restriction.  
 
While some prefectures and municipalities may have had the adequate testing 
equipment and the impetus to enact stringent testing schemes, others used their 
judgements to avoid testing foods. Of course, these judgements are not visible within 
the documents outlining the screening procedure which are intended to guarantee the 
enactment of ‘safe food.’ As Berends and Kobayashi (2012: 58) explain in their review 
of the early Concepts of Inspection: “There is not always an instruction on the number 
of samples, or on the size of the material, to be collected. The categories of items to be 
inspected are also not exhaustively defined. Prefectural governments reacted differently 
to this discretion.” In some cases, prefectural and municipal governments decided to 
blatantly dismiss government requests to enact the Concepts of Inspection when it came 
to foods of high economic value and importance. That is, even though the government 
certified ‘safe food’ being enacted in discourse was to be food ‘under the provisional 
reference limits,’ testing practices could be manipulated in ways to prevent possible 
restrictions on foods from being made visible. One example of this could be found in 
the enactment of ‘safe tea’ in Shizuoka Prefecture, the leading producer of tea in Japan 
located over 350 kilometers from TEPCO’s nuclear disaster (see Akune, 2016).388 
 
Tea featured prominently during my fieldwork in 2016. Not only was it something I 
drank with my participants, but I observed the process of measuring tea at a CRMS, 
and also visited a tea farm in the Kansai region on a field trip organized by a CRMS. 
Being the largest tea producer in Japan, many of my participants remembered when tea 
from Shizuoka was found to be ‘over the reference limit.’ And because tea is consumed 
so regularly and frequently in Japan, a number of my participants expressed their 
specific concerns about its possible contamination. Arioka Kanna (pseudonym), who 
was living in the Kansai region at the time of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, shared her 
concerns about tea: 
                                                
388 See Figure 9 for the location of Shizuoka Prefecture and its capital, Shizuoka City. 
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I was really concerned about tea. I felt the contamination of tea was 
quite extensive. It was being found as far away as Aichi Prefecture. 
Hmm. Even though they were regularly testing it.  
So just how was ‘safe tea’ being enacted in practice? Here, I turn to a somewhat well-
known controversy that erupted in May 2011 to explicate one enactment of ‘safe tea’ 
through the use of reference limits and judgements. 
 
A Yomiuri Shimbun article published on May 19, 2011 tells an interesting story about 
some of the judgements made by Shizuoka Prefecture’s governor Kawakatsu Heita who 
participated in enacting ‘safe tea’ just two months after the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster (“Governor gives 'safety declaration'”). Sipping on a cup of freshly-harvested 
tea with tea growers at a promotional event on May 18, 2011, Kawakatsu issued a 
“safety declaration [anzen sengen]” for all teas produced in the prefecture. The 
declaration of ‘safety’ was based on test results at eighteen locations around the 
prefecture which showed both raw tea leaves and read-to-drink tea to be “under 
provisional reference limits.” The chairman of the Japan Agriculture Shizuoka branch 
also proclaimed the ‘safety’ (anzen-sei) of the teas at the publicity event: “Tests have 
confirmed that the prefecture’s tea is safe [anzen]. We would like everyone in Japan to 
feel at ease [anshin] when drinking Shizuoka’s tea.” The article points out that the 
Ministry of Health had been requesting fourteen prefectures, including Shizuoka, to test 
for radionuclides in aracha—fresh tea leaves that are steamed and dried, also referred 
to as ‘unprocessed’ or ‘crude tea.’389 Governor Kawakatsu refused this request. Why 
not test aracha? Because the results “will confuse [cause konran among] consumers.” 
He goes on to explain: “If we do something to make consumers feel confused [konran 
saseru], it will lead to an unnecessary deepening of distrust in the government.”  
 
A number of ontonorms can be found in Kawakatsu’s performances of ‘safe tea’ and 
the bodies who are intended to drink it. As with ‘safe food’ in general, ‘safe tea’ is 
                                                
389 Information on Japanese tea processing can be found at Ministry of Agriculture (n.d.). 
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enacted as a commodity. Resembling Koizumi’s (2011a) declaration on the safety of all 
“vegetable, seafood and other foodstuffs” circulating in domestic and international 
markets, Kawakatsu’s ‘safety declaration’ attempts to enact all tea from Shizuoka as 
‘safe,’ whether it has been tested or not. That is, the sheets of data produced through 
testing the activity of radionuclides in some teas are used to represent the ‘safe’ level of 
radioactivity in all teas. Not only do these statements ignore the unstable and 
disobedient nature of radioactivity, but the longevity of many radionuclides—and thus 
their potential to act-out for hundreds or even millions of years into the future390—
becomes smoothed over by his ‘declaration of safety’ based on test results that were 
                                                
390 Throughout years of research, there have been predictions made about the physical half-lives 
of radionuclides, or “the time after which a half of the initially existing atomic nuclei has 
decayed” (Grupen, 2010: 5). It can take up to ten (Grupen, 2010), possibly twenty (Nuclear 
Information and Resource Service, 2009) half-lives for radionuclides to completely transform 
into other elements (see ATSDR, 2004: 114 & 117). Thinking in terms of “hazardous life” 
(Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2009)—as opposed to ‘half-life’—we can 
understand the long-term relational entanglements different radionuclides entail. For example, 
while iodine-131 may only be active for 80-160 days, cesium-134 can be active for 20-40 
years, cesium-137 for 300-600 years, strontium-90 for 280-560 years and plutonium-239 for 
244,000-488,000 years (see ATSDR, 2004: 116 & D4). 
Figure 10 Tea leaves gathered by the author during a farm visit with a CRMS in the Kansai 
region during fieldwork for this study in 2016. Photo taken by author. 
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determined to be ‘under provisional reference limits’ at a particular point in time. While 
no numerical values were shared in the article, it is very likely that the results may not 
have been legally considered ‘safe’ according to the ‘new reference limits’ rolled out in 
2012, further complicating a smooth enactment of ‘safe food’ as coherent and singular.  
 
Back to the promotional event, in drinking the ‘safe tea,’ Kawakatsu also enacts it as 
something bodies enjoy and find to be delicious. The farmers standing beside him enact 
this ‘safe tea’ as the product of the hard work and pride of local producers. Tea is 
already enacted as a symbol of the prefecture. But what about bodies? Because ‘safe 
tea’ is tea that is legally allowed to circulate within the agrifood assemblage, bodies are 
both citizens and consumers. However, the ‘rational’ and ‘calm’ Science-reverent 
consumer bodies in Koizumi’s (2011a) letter have disappeared: Kawakatsu only enacts 
consumer bodies as ‘irrational’ and easily ‘confused’ (put in a psychological state of 
konran).391 The bodies of government officials, on the other hand, are enacted as 
trustworthy and knowledgeable: they understand the science behind the enactment of 
‘safe tea’ that would only confuse the poor ‘irrational’ bodies of the consumer class. In 
Kawakatsu’s enactment of ‘safe tea,’ risk communication would be of no use in 
transforming ‘irrational’ bodies into ‘rational’ ones. In order to avoid being labeled as 
‘confused,’ bodies must accept Kawakatsu’s enactment of ‘safe tea’ and leave the 
complex details to he, his fellow government officials and the tea industry. The 
message here is: ‘Drink up! Don’t mind your cup! You are not smart enough to 
understand the science behind safe food. If you do try to understand what is going on, 
you will only be confused. Don’t worry, we’ve got it under control.’  
 
However, as explored in Section 6.2, for many of my participants, ‘safety’ (anzen-sei) 
is not something that can be declared without providing clear information on the 
activity of radionuclides. Segawa Haruo (pseudonym)—who had been living in the 
Kansai region prior to 2011 and who grew up in the 1950s and 60s during the time of 
nuclear bomb testing in the Pacific—discusses problems that may arise from merely 
                                                
391 Here, the governor uses the term konran to describe a psychological state of confusion, a 
diagnosis that fits when enacting bodies as either with or against a ‘single reality,’ feeling 
anshin or fuan, in perspectival debates. However, in an attempt to interfere with 
perspectivalism, in this thesis I instead attend to the term using sensibilities from the field of 
material semiotics, focusing on how disorder emerges from inconsistencies and tensions within 
heterogeneous sociomaterial entanglements, from multiple realities clashing in practice. 
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using the terms anzen and anshin without linking them to actual measurements and 
testing procedures. 
In a situation where it’s safe [anzen], in any event, well, physically, 
with evidence from physics, there is a uniform measurement. 
Something is measured, and if it seems to be close to zero, if it is 
zero, it is safe [anzen]. That kind of certification is possible. For 
feeling at ease [anshin], it’s very, hmm, psychological. Well, you 
know, just because a person says it to another person. Well, even if 
you are being controlled, you get the feeling of ease [anshin], right? 
[…] To say safe [anzen], in any case, I feel it is best to accurately 
show detailed evidence. Therefore, it is overlapping with feeling at 
ease [anshin]. I feel it is really difficult to divide the two. 
 
Why would testing aracha cause such confusion? Because the process of steaming and 
drying leaves might increase the level of radioactivity measured in samples. If ‘tea 
under provisional reference limits’ could be enacted as ‘safe tea,’ then food measured 
as ‘over provisional reference limits’ could not be easily enacted as the same. These 
versions of ‘safe food’ would be incompatible. Konran—not as psychological 
confusion, but as disorder caused by aggravated tensions from these versions clashing 
in practice—would emerge. But judgements can help to smooth over these glaring 
tensions. According to Kawakatsu’s judgement, only aracha in its drinkable state392 
should be measured, not the raw ingredients. While these ‘crude’ tea leaves may be 
measured as ‘over provisional reference limits,’ they are not intended to be sold directly 
to consumers, but blended and made into ready-made drinks to fill vending machines 
and line supermarket shelves. However, explaining such results would complicate 
attempts to enact all Shizuoka-produced tea as ‘safe tea’—tea that is ‘under provisional 
reference limits.’ So instead of testing the teas and allowing ‘rational’ bodies to be 
‘calmed’ by the ‘unbiased’ Science, the governor made his own judgement—a 
judgement which attempted to coordinate and stabilize the heterogeneity and messiness 
of the relations among numbers, raw tea leaves, crude tea leaves, ready-made tea 
                                                
392 In fact, under the 2012 ‘new’ standards, Kawakatsu’s method prevails as only tea in its 
liquid form is measured (see MHLW, 2012b: 10). 
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drinks, vending machines, radionuclides, farmers, consumers, the delicious taste of 
freshly harvested tea, provisional reference limits, billions of yen in tea sales,393 the 
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant, equipment for measuring radionuclides, among 
multitudinous other sociomaterial relations the governor may be entangled within. And 
this messiness is only looking at the case of ‘safe tea’ in Shizuoka. What about all of 
the other different foods in all of the various prefectures, each being enacted within 
their own sociomaterial entanglements?  
 
In fact, less than a month after the governor’s ‘safety declaration,’ Shizuoka tea 
measuring ‘over provisional regulation limits’ was discovered in the prefecture 
(“Cesium detected,” 2011), and was also measured at levels beyond what was 
considered ‘safe’ according to French law (Kyodo News, 2011b).394 With the Ministry 
of Health requiring tests on aracha, judgements could not as easily be used to smooth 
over the unstable and disruptive activities of radionuclides. Instead, further propagation 
of PR events and applications for financial hardship due to fūhyōhigai became 
strategies to re-enact tea as ‘safe’ (anzen).395 Unnecessarily strict regulations combined 
with ‘confused,’ ‘rumor-spreading’ bodies would become the target of blame for 
business losses, not radionuclides, not TEPCO, and not the policies of the Japanese 
government. 
 
Institutional ethnography teaches us that while ruling texts are intended to coordinate 
activities and work process in a way to make them both efficient and accountable to the 
people they are intended to protect, they are also designed to uphold the interest of the 
institution.396 With the goal of maintaining a smooth circulation of legally certified 
‘safe food’ following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, in some cases judgements were made 
in an attempt to maintain stories of control and prevent the instability and heterogeneity 
of radioactivity from interfering with the pace of economic markets. While legally 
established reference values are intended to distinguish between foods that are legally 
allowed to circulate within the agrifood assemblage and those that are not, they have 
                                                
393 See Akune (2016). 
394 According to the article, 1,038 Bq/kg of cesium was found in the tea. 
395 See, for example, “Governor Under Pressure from Minister of Health” (2011) and “Shizuoka 
City's Mayor Takes to the Streets” (2011). 
396 See Section 3.3.1.2. 
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been used as a tool for enacting all food testing ‘under the reference limit’ as ‘safe.’ 
The stability of this enactment is not fixed, however, and oscillation between the 
singular object of ‘safe food’ and its multiple enactments reveals the precariousness of 
the stories of control behind their enactments.  
 
All of my participants observed such fervent attempts to prove the ‘safety’ of foods 
possibly containing TEPCO’s radionuclides from the very outset of the nuclear disaster. 
Masuda Fumika (pseudonym), a mother of one whose hometown is in Fukushima 
Prefecture, reflected on government ‘safety’ declarations during a focus group session. 
Fumika was living in Tokyo at the time of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster and, after first 
seeking refuge from TEPCO’s radionuclides in Okinawa, ended up in the Kansai region 
where I met her in 2016. During our interview, she described her thoughts on the 
difficulty of enacting food as ‘safe’ without accompanying such declarations with 
actual measurements. 
Image, image, it’s merely an image. Only saying safe/feel at ease 
[anzen/anshin]. It’s all an image. Concretely, let’s say the detection 
limit [kenshutsu genkaichi] was 1 Becquerel and it was measured, 
and it seemed that nothing was detected. That would somewhat be the 
sense of safe/feel at ease [anzen/anshin]. 
When asked what she knew about the government’s actual countermeasures, she 
pointed out how the inconsistency in government claims about the safety of food has 
left her with little option but to question their entire measuring process.  
What do I know about the government’s countermeasures? It seems 
like they aren’t doing anything. Let’s see, now it’s okay for food less 
than 100 Becquerels to circulate, right? Exactly what are they doing? 
They must be doing something, but ultimately, in any event, they are 
doing things for their own convenience, right? Even if they actually 
do things, they only tell lies about it. I have no idea what they are 
doing. 
The suspicion of government activities expressed by Fumika is something that was 
discussed by a number of my participants. Some of my participants even argued that 
zealous claims of ‘safety’ unaccompanied by actual radionuclide measurements has 
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produced what the Japanese government views as an epidemic of fūhyōhigai. Kuroda 
Asami (pseudonym), a mother of two who relocated from the Kantō region following 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, shares her take on this phenomena: 
There are also people who say, “that’s harmful rumors 
[fūhyōhigai]!” But that’s also mind control [maindo kontorōru]. 
They are not properly investigating, they are also not properly 
publishing the numbers, they are not officially announcing them. 
Terms like harmful rumors [fūhyōhigai], eat to support [tabete ōen] 
are only used to block people who are concerned. They are just 
trying to make it look like nothing ever happened. […] Even if it is 
okay now, at the outset they did not investigate. At the outset, they did 
not publish the data. Even more, the fact that they said it’s okay. Now 
things that are okay, things that are really okay have become tied to 
harmful rumors [fūhyōhigai]. At the outset, if they really investigated, 
published the data, informed everyone, […] people would be clear on 
what was actually okay and what was not. […] If you hide things 
from the outset, then real harmful rumors [fūhyōhigai] will emerge. 
Therefore, the responsibility for the harmful rumors [fūhyōhigai] we 
have now. The government is saying they cannot believe the distrust. 
It’s very strange, no? The government produced this situation where 
people cannot trust. 
 
As my participants’ experiences highlight, tensions arise when ‘safety’ declarations are 
made without sharing data on radionuclide concentrations. Without information on 
radionuclide concentrations available for deliberation, when food ‘over the reference 
limit’ enters the arena, fervent attempts to enact food ‘over the reference limit’ as ‘safe’ 
clash with the enactment of food testing ‘under the reference limit’ as the same. In the 
next section, I will discuss the ways in which differences between these two 
government certified enactments—foods ‘over the reference limit’ and ‘under the 
reference limit’—are smoothed over through another practice: broadening the 




Since its first publication on April 4, 2011, the Concepts of Inspection has been 
continually updated based on data being collected (MHLW, 2011i). Along with the 
deployment of ‘new’ reference limits in 2012, the Concepts of Inspection were updated 
in March 2012, July 2012, and annually every March following.397 By June 27, 2011, 
the number of prefectures and municipalities mandated to test for radionuclides in food 
rose from eleven to fourteen, and finally to seventeen by August 4, 2011 where it 
remains today (see Figure 9).398 On June 27, 2011 the updated Concepts of Inspection 
also expanded the list of which foods need to be tested, broken into five categories.399 
Again, because all food was not being tested, local governments divided their 
prefectures into what they viewed as “appropriate zones,” collecting samples from each 
zone (MHLW, 2011k: 4). Some areas were targeted, for example those with foods that 
exceeded provisional limits, or where soil concentrations of cesium-134 and cesium-
137 were high. The frequency of these inspections was to be decided at the local level 
“in accordance with the actual situations of the production and distribution and/or 
consumption,” but was to be conducted regularly—again, “about once a week, in 
principle” is recommended (MHLW, 2011k: 1 & 5). In addition, seasonal foods or 
foods with “limited” distribution were to be tested three days before they were first 
distributed (MHLW, 2011k: 1). Inspections were expected to be intensified if any food 
                                                
397 See Ministry of Health (2012e; 2013b; 2014; 2015; 2016b; 2017). 
398 These include the prefectures and municipalities listed in the April 4th press release—
Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Miyagi, Yamagata, Niigata, Nagano, Saitama, Chiba and 
Tokyo—along with six additional locations—Aomori, Iwate, Akita, Kanagawa, Yamanashi, 
and Shizuoka (MHLW, 2011i; 2011k; 2011m). 
399 The first category listed foods that were found to have levels of radionuclides higher than 
the provisional values, including vegetables (prioritizing those grown outdoors and specifying 
spinach, log-grown shiitake, bamboo shoots, and tea leaves, among others), milk, fishery 
products, and meat (specifically beef). The second category included foods which, according to 
a National Health and Nutrition Survey conducted in 2008, were consumed in high quantities 
by Japanese people (including rice, tea—specifically for drinking—milk, eggs, fishery 
products, mushrooms and algae, among others). The third category included foods whose 
distribution was once restricted. The fourth included other foods selected by the government 
which included wild foods (such as wild boar). Finally, the fifth group took into account both 
major agricultural products currently being cultivated as well as foods already distributed 
within the market. Migratory fish species were to be dealt with through separate instructions 
(MHLW, 2011k). 
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over the reference limit was found. If anything over the limit was found, again a 
‘judgement’ would be made on how to deal with it (MHLW, 2011k: 5).  
 
While the flexibility afforded to local governments in the various versions of the 
Concepts of Inspection allowed for some creativity in enacting ‘safe food’ within public 
discourse and an evolving textual complex, it did not always ensure the actual materials 
themselves remained ‘under the reference limit.’ While choosing foods based on 
prefecture was a possibility when shopping for oneself, things became much more 
complicated when people ate out at restaurants, were hospitalized, or were trying to 
prevent their children from ingesting radionuclides in their school lunches.400 It was for 
this reason that many of my participants with school-aged children became extremely 
concerned about the food being served in school lunches. 
 
Hotaru again shares her experience, this time about how she worked through her 
concerns about school lunch at the outset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster while she and 
her children were still living in Yokohama City, Kanagawa Prefecture401—one of the 
prefectures mandated to test foods for radiation on June 27, 2011: 
You know, I was worried about school lunch. At the outset, first I 
thought milk was dangerous, so we stopped having milk. And then, 
my oldest child only, for the time being, from April stopped having 
milk. Then my younger child said he wanted to drink milk at school, 
so there was nothing I could do. I said I disagreed. As I continued to 
say, “It’s okay to just leave it on your plate,” I let him drink it. But, 
even my younger child stopped drinking milk in May. There was a lot 
                                                
400 According to my participants, at public schools it was often the case that city governments 
would post the prefecture of origin of the foods they served in school lunches—although 
sometime this was posted after the lunches were already eaten. Private schools had their own 
strategies for showing the place of origin of school lunch ingredients. For most restaurants and 
hospitals, my participants needed to ask about the place of origin of various foods, something 
most of them felt was a bit too uncomfortable as it made them appear pedantic or overly 
concerned. One of my participants who gave birth after TEPCO’s nuclear disaster described 
how she had her family bring her food at the hospital as it was not clear where the hospital food 
was being sourced from. The doctors and nurses she spoke to about her concerns told her not to 
worry about radiation. 
401 Yokohama City is located approximately 250 kilometers from TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
See Figure 9 for the location of Yokohama City. 
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of news circulating about contamination, so maybe he himself 
became aware that it might possibly be contaminated? After that, 
when I said, “It’s okay to stop drinking,” he said, “Ok.” So in May 
my younger child also stopped. And, um, fish. Even though at that 
time, there was no talk about fish being contaminated. Let’s see, at 
that time, [we avoided] things like mushrooms, bamboo shoots 
[takenoko] and whatnot. Well, we did avoid fish. At the time when 
there were deeply contaminated things from the Tōhoku region, I 
made side dishes at home and made my children bring them. Even 
though they ate school lunch. Well, I had my children leave behind 
foods in the school lunch that were dangerous and eat the side dishes 
they brought from home. 
I asked her how she communicated her concerns with her children’s teachers. 
First, I wrote a letter to the homeroom teacher who quickly said it 
was okay. […] The print from the school was a menu, but the place of 
production was not written. If I looked at that menu, there were lots 
of things, like if they were using sardines and whatnot. I would know 
if they were having mushroom spaghetti. Then, Yokohama City’s 
homepage published the place of production, so I checked that. Then, 
if on one day the main was a little scary and I did not want to let my 
children eat it, I would tell the school. 
Like many of my study participants with school-aged children, Hotaru spent a lot of 
time in the early days after TEPCO’s nuclear disaster trying to ensure her children did 
not consume high levels of radionuclides. While some of my other participants easily 
received permission to opt out of school lunch or negotiate days when their children 
would bring a bento, the pressure felt by others led them to claim their children had an 
allergy as a way out of school lunch—although this was not always successful as many 
schools asked parents to produce a doctor’s certificate. In other cases, schools asked 
parents to make the exact same lunch as the meal being served at school to ensure the 
children were eating according to strict nutritional guidelines. Regardless of the 
particular situated struggle, trying to protect one’s child from consuming radionuclides 
has not been an easy task for my participants, and news about foods ‘over the limit’ 
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being found in school lunches kept many of them vigilantly checking school menus and 
making bentos, even five years after TEPCO’s nuclear disaster.  
 
One of the earliet cases of food ‘over the limit’ that snuck through government 
screening processes in the summer of 2011 and caused a societal uproar has since 
become known as ‘cesium beef,’ instigator of the “cesium beef scandal.”402 One news 
article described the incident: “[b]eef from more than 1,000 cows, which ate feed 
contaminated with radioactive cesium, was shipped across the country. Some of the 
meat ended up being sold at supermarkets, served to children at nursery schools and to 
passengers on Japan's bullet trains” (Herman, 2011).403 
 
Tests conducted in July 2011 revealed that some of the beef—from cows which were 
said to have been fed rice straw left outdoors404—contained up to 4,350 Bq/kg of 
cesium-134 and cesium-137 (MHLW, 2012d: 111). These results are almost nine times 
higher than provisional reference limits in effect at the time, and 43.5 times higher than 
the new reference limits set for these radionuclides. In its coverage of the ‘scandal,’ the 
New York Times includes a quote from the then minister responsible for managing the 
nuclear disaster, Hosono Goshi, giving his take on the ‘safety’ of consuming beef much 
higher than the provisional reference limits: “If you eat it every day, it might be a 
problem. […] But if you eat just a little, there would be no big effect on your health” 
(Tabuchi, 2011). Here tensions arise between two different enactments of ‘safe food’: 
food ‘over the reference limit’ and ‘under the reference limit.’ If ‘safe food’ is food that 
is not ‘over the reference limit,’ then how is food found more than nine times over the 
reference limit ‘safe’ to consume, or at least expected to cause ‘no big effect on your 
health’? How to rectify the inconsistencies produced through these two conflicting 
enactments? The answer is by shifting the focus away from ‘reference limits’—the 
measured activity of radionuclides in food—to ‘estimated dose’—the calculated 
damage expected to occur once radionuclides enter a human body.  
 
                                                
402 The phrase is borrowed from Kimura (2016a: 48). 
403 Also see Tabuchi (2011) and “Beef containing radioactive cesium served” (2011). 
404 See Ministry of Health (2011l). 
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As the ‘cesium beef scandal’ took place when the provisional reference limits were 
coordinating activities among agrifood assemblage actors, the legally established 
effective dose from cesium-134 and cesium-137 was 5 mSv/year. As the ‘cesium beef 
scandal’ highlights, once foods ‘over provisional limits’ were circulated and ingested 
by bodies within the agrifood assemblage, these dose estimates were activated in 
attempts to enact these bodies—and others who notice the inconsistencies—as anshin 
through ‘unbiased’ and ‘neutral’ risk communication. Kimura (2017) points out one 
such example: an expert response to the ‘cesium beef scandal’ included in a newsletter 
designed as a tool for risk communication following the discovery of the ‘cesium beef’ 
in some school lunches in Yokohama City. The expert, Karaki Hideaki (2011) explains:  
the standard is not a clear boundary between safety and danger, so 
even people who temporarily ate the beef don’t have to worry about 
the emergence of health impacts. It is said that “radiation will damage 
genes, cause cancer. Therefore, it is best to avoid even small 
exposures.” However, the standards for radioactive cesium in food is 
not zero, but 5 mSv (millisieverts) a year. 
Karaki (2011) goes on to describe how even if someone did receive a dose of 5 
mSv/year “there will be almost no increase in the risk of cancer.” Looking to the 
colorful illustration of radiation doses to the right of Karaki’s article reveals that his 
confidence is drawn from his activation of another dose estimate: the ‘around 100 mSv 
threshold assumption’ often activated by the Food Safety Commission, the ICRP and 
various organizations active within in the transnational nuclear assemblage (see Figure 
11, Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.5).405  
 
Created by the National Institute for Radiological Sciences (NIRS) (2013), the 
illustration has appeared in a number of risk communication documents in Japan since 
the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. The illustration shows an inverted pyramid with 
doses of ‘artificial radiation’ on the left, ‘natural radiation’ (NORM)406 on the right, and 
descending dose levels. The colors start at red, blend into yellow and end in a soothing 
                                                
405 The illustration shown in Figure 11 is a newer version of the Dose Scale than was printed in 
the newletter, thus the arrow at 100 mSv is pointing up instead of down. These difference are 
described in this section.  
406 See Section 5.4.2. 
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hue of blue. At 100 mSv, a bold red line is drawn. In the Yokohama newsletter, which 
uses one of the earliest versions of the illustration, the pyramid is split in half, each half 
placed near an article written by a male described as an ‘expert.’ At the line there is a 
downward pointing arrow, next to which reads: “excess incidence of cancer is not 
confirmed” (T. Inoue, 2011; Karaki, 2011). Tsuda and colleagues (2017) explain how 
this illustration has been updated since its first deployment as a risk communication 
tool in April 2011, but any differences among its versions, or any inconsistent 
translations of what the authors term the “100 mSv threshold assumption,” are left 
unexplored and unexplained. In fact, Tsuda and colleagues (2017) point out that 
discussions about the assumed threshold are strictly kept out of scientific debates due to 
fear of causing “anxiety” (fuan) among members of the public. The authors explain:  
There is no discussion on the 100 mSv assumption in academic and 
medical societies in Japan. One reason for this is that it is regarded as 
‘unethical’ to debate this matter in public because it is thought to 
generate anxiety among residents in Fukushima Prefecture. The aim 
to ‘dispel anxiety’ is currently given top priority not only in 
Fukushima but also throughout Japan. This is an ethical problem. 
(Tsuda et al., 2017: 3) 
Due to the lack of discussion about the assumed ‘threshold’ and its various 
interpretations in risk communication texts and discourses, different versions of the 
illustration continue to circulate around the internet and can be found in government 
documents (Tsuda et al., 2017). Later versions—such as the version in Figure 11—
continue to include a bold red line at 100 mSv, but with an arrow pointing up and 
reading, “It has been found that the risk of cancer death will gradually increase with 
radiation dose” (CAA, 2017b; MHLW, 2013a).407 According to Tsuda and colleagues 
(2017), however, even this new portrayal is a misinterpretation of scientific studies on 
exposure to ionizing radiation. The red line seems to enact an image of certainty in the 
science of radiation protection, when vast uncertainty remains. That is, the line’s solid 
and bold figure superimposed onto the 100 mSv mark seems to smooth over any 
uncertainty in the science of radiation protection; its accompanying message enacting 
                                                
407 This is a direct quote from the English version depicted in Figure 11. 
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some estimated doses above the line as ‘possibly causing cancer,’ and those below it as 
‘not being proven to cause cancer.’ Even when the illustration is not presented, 
statements such as, “According to current scientific thinking, the effects of exposure to 
less than 100 millisieverts is so small that it cannot be confirmed” can be found in risk 
communication documents (CAA, 2017c: 5). Such statements can easily be 
misunderstood by readers to suggest doses under 100 mSv of ionizing radiation are 
scientifically proven to be ‘safe’ (Tsuda et al., 2017).  
 
While the Food Safety Commission has refused to refer to 100 mSv as a “threshold” as 
it is known in toxicology—that is, drawing a line between ‘toxic and ‘nontoxic’ 
(Koizumi, 2011b: 2)—it is clear that they and other government agencies continue to 
use the value of “around 100 mSv” to represent a threshold below which scientific 
studies have been able to ‘confirm’ damage to health—at least according to the 
scientific studies in the bibliographies of their reports.408  Here, the uncertainty 
                                                
408 See Section 5.5. 
Figure 11 Dose Scale illustration (in English) produced by the National Institute of Radiological 
Sciences (2013) in Japan. Because this is a 2013 version, the arrow at the 100 mSv line is pointing 
up, instead of down as in the newsletter. 
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stabilized within the textual complex of the transnational nuclear assemblage is able to 
assist in smoothing over inconsistencies among different enactments of government 
certified ‘safe food’ (Section 5.4.1). While food declared as ‘under the reference limit’ 
is easily enacted as ‘safe food’ in both discourse and legal texts, food ‘over the 
reference limit’ can also be enacted as ‘not necessarily unsafe’ since calculations of 
equivalent and/or effective doses—which provide the basis for calculations of reference 
limits—can be used to prove scientific uncertainty in detecting negative effects. Thus, 
through activating the transnational nuclear assemblage’s ‘100 mSv threshold 
assumption,’ foods ‘over the reference limit’ may not be directly referred to as ‘safe,’ 
but are enacted as ‘not necessarily unsafe’—an enactment which blends in well with 
other performances of ‘safe foods.’ The transition from ‘provisional’ to ‘new’ standards 
in 2012—and questions about how levels of cesium-134 and cesium-137 at 500 Bq/kg 
and 100 Bq/kg could both be enacted as ‘safe’—could also be smoothed over through 
the activation of the ‘100 mSv threshold assumption.’  
 
Thinking back to the concepts of effective versus equivalent dose used to enact ‘not 
necessarily unsafe food’ raises another question: what kinds of bodies are being enacted 
through activating these dose calculations? Essentially, they are bodies that interact 
with radionuclides in the same fashion as in the models that make up the ICRP’s 
Reference Person (Section 5.4.1). That is, bodies become a number of distinct ‘critical 
tissues’ that hang together through models and averaging. Within these bodies, unstable 
ionizing radionuclides are ingested and travel to different ‘critical tissues’ which may 
receive varying doses of exposure to radiation depending on the radionuclide.409 
According to Japan’s ‘provisional’ standards for iodine-131, bodies are enacted as 
thyroid glands. Standards for cesium-134 and cesium-137, on the other hand, enact 
bodies as a mix of ‘critical tissues’ held together through averaging of possible doses to 
each individual part. How to deal with difference among bodies with more breast 
tissue, or ovaries versus testes? The heterogeneity in these cases are also resolved 
through the technique of ‘sex-averaging.’ Again, autopoietic stories about ‘individual 
bodies’ and their various ‘units’ dominate models for estimating radiation ‘dose,’ 
pushing any questions about symbiotic or sympoietic relationality to the sidelines—
                                                
409 For example, iodine-131 mimics iodine so is expected to interact with the thyroid, cesium-
134 and cesium-134 mimic potassium so are expected to interact with the whole body, and 
strontium-90 mimics calcium so is expected to interact with bones (see Hirano et al., 2016). 
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ending up as stochastic ‘noise’ within the models designed within the transnational 
nuclear assemblage (Section 5.4.1). 
 
Overflows of foods ‘over the reference limit’ continue to appear and exacerbate 
tensions among various enactments of ‘safe food,’ even in 2016 and 2017. During my 
fieldwork in 2016, a case of fresh bamboo shoots (takenoko) being served in a school 
lunch in Utsunomiya City, Tochigi Prefecture was discussed by some of my 
participants.410 Bamboo shoots have been included in all revisions of the Concepts of 
Inspection since June 27, 2011, always falling into the first category of “items subject 
to inspection” which include foods from which levels of cesium-134 and cesium-137 
had been detected ‘over the reference limit’ in previous tests.411 Additionally, because 
takenoko are wild foods usually gathered seasonally from local forests, they are often 
left out of screening procedures. Thus, as Hotaru’s earlier comments about school lunch 
illustrate, alongside milk and mushrooms, bamboo shoots have been a food of concern 
for many people trying to avoid ingesting TEPCO’s radionuclides.  
 
The discussion about the bamboo shoots found ‘over the limit’ in Ustunomiya City 
came up during the CRMS-organized field trip to the tea farm in the Kansai region. I 
had noticed a news article circulating about the incident over social media the day 
before, and the topic was brought up by one woman on our drive to the farm. As all of 
the women in the car were mothers, they were horrified that children were involved in 
the incident. However, having lived through five years of TEPCO’s radiological 
overflow, they commented that there is no surprise in how it was handled. They noted 
how the activation of dose limits was always the way out of such a predicament. 
 
A May 11, 2016 NHK news article describes how a wholesaler in Utsunomiya City 
purchased the bamboo shoots—measuring 234 Bq/kg, more than two times the new 
reference limits—from a rogue “man” who did not know about the shipping restriction 
on the wild delicacies which were cooked into a delectable seasonal dish (bamboo 
shoots and rice) and served to the school children (“Radioactive material over the 
                                                
410 See Figure 9 for the location of Utsunomiya City. 
411 See Ministry of Health (2011k; 2011m; 2012e; 2013b; 2016b; 2014; 2015; 2017). 
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limit,” 2016). The city’s Health Department commented on the incident: “The amount 
of bamboo shoots [takenoko] consumed by each child was not a lot, so the values are 
not expected to pose any immediate health effects. However in order to provide a safe 
school lunch, we want to ensure a thorough investigation is carried out” (“Radioactive 
material over the limit,” 2016, emphasis added). The phrase ‘not expected to pose any 
immediate health effects’ was a favorite of the Japanese government following the 
nuclear disaster.412 While it struck a nerve  with many commentators (“The suspicious 
backdrop,” 2016), the women in the car seemed displeased, but used to the phrase as it 
had appeared each time a breakdown in the screening process was exposed. During our 
field trip, the farmer invited us to dig up bamboo shoots growing in a grove near where 
we at lunch. As I dug up a bamboo shoot to take home, I could not help thinking about 
the ‘man’ in the news article who had done the same not long before (Figure 12).413  
                                                
412 The phrase was also mentioned by Madoka in Chapter 4, where she described its 
deployment in the media from the very outset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, immediately after 
the first explosion at the power plant. Also see Webronza (2013). 
413 I had learned from my time at various CRMSs that while the Kansai region has not been 
affected greatly by TEPCO’s overflow, remanences of radionuclides from nuclear bomb tests in 
the Pacific and possibly even the Chernobyl disaster have been measured in foods throughout 
Figure 12 Bamboo shoots harvested by the author during a visit to a tea farm in the Kansai 
region. Photo taken by author. 
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In the case of the bamboo shoots in Tochigi Prefecture, once again food found ‘over the 
reference limit’ could be enacted as ‘not expected to pose any immediate health 
effects’—an enactment which seems to cause little inconsistencies with other 
enactments of ‘safe food.’ Also, because the incident was caused by a careless ‘man’ 
and not the school or the Japanese government, and because there were calls for an 
investigation, the multiplicity exposed through the controversy could be pressed back 
into singularity.  
 
In 2017, another rogue “man” in Tochigi Prefecture was seen to be instigating tensions 
in the enactment of mushrooms as ‘safe food.’ As mentioned in Chapter 4, mushrooms 
are efficient bioaccumulators of radionuclides and have been included in the Concepts 
of Inspection since June 27, 2011—specifically wild mushrooms which do not conform 
to parameters set out by the government.414 News reported on August 25, 2017 revealed 
that the mushroom Lactifluus volemus (chichitake) was measured at 720 Bq/kg, though 
this was only realized after the mushrooms were sold. In this case, because the 
radioactivity was discovered before consumption was recorded, instead of enacting 
these mushroom as ‘not necessarily unsafe’ the news article provides a phone number, 
relaying a request from the direct distribution outlet responsible for selling the items: 
“Along with the launch of a voluntary recall, the direct distribution outlet is requesting 
all purchasers of [the mushrooms] to refrain from eating and to return them” 
(“Radioactive material from direct distribution,” 2017). When cases of contamination 
are found before consumption is recorded, ‘safe food’ can remain stably and singularly 
as food that is ‘under the limit.’ To abide by the Food Sanitation Act, wholesalers must 
prevent bodies from ingesting mushrooms containing radioactivity 7.2 times higher 
than the reference limits as, at this point, the food would not be legally fit for sale. 
However, once bodies do ingest food with concentrations of radioactivity ‘over the 
reference limit’—as in the cases of ‘cesium beef’ and bamboo shoots in school 
                                                
western Japan. There were also cases of mushrooms being found with radionuclides, but in 
many of these cases the contamination was because the trees they grew on came from areas in 
north-eastern Japan where higher concentrations of TEPCO’s radionuclides were deposited. 
These were some of the many things I considered as I dug up that bamboo shoot, and will be 
discussed further in Chapter 7. 
414 See Ministry of Health (2011k; 2011m; 2012e; 2013b; 2016b; 2014; 2015; 2017). 
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lunches—these same foods that were once ‘not fit for sale’ can be enacted as ‘not 
necessarily unsafe’ by turning away from reference limits to a focus on estimated doses 
based on models involving the ICRP’s Reference Person. 
 
These examples highlight the difficulty of enacting the seemingly singular object of 
‘safe food’ when radionuclides are involved—their instability disrupting stories of 
‘control’ and ‘stability’ that are so necessary for the smooth circulation of economic 
markets.415 While the deployment ruling discourse is able to establish a structuration of 
perspectivalism which categorizes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ bodies according to their 
acceptance of the ‘single reality’ being deployed, numerical reference limits and 
estimated ‘safe’ doses of ionizing radiation borrowed and translated from the 
transnational nuclear assemblage assist in making sure enactments of ‘safe food’ hang 
together long enough to appear as solid and singular. It is these multiple enactments of 
‘safe food’ that my participants, and myself, interact with in our everyday lives. 
However, the multiplicity does not end with the activation of dose estimates. One final 
process for enacting ‘safe food’ that I would like to briefly address are the locally based 
measuring processes themselves—the relations among bodies, machines, foods, 
radionuclides and other situated actors which participate in the enactment of foods 




Into 2016 and 2017, media reports and various forms of risk communication continue 
to attempt to stabilize and contain the activity of radionuclides with statements about 
the number of foods found ‘under the reference limit.’ Newspaper headlines reading 
“Less Than 0.01% of Fukushima Products Over the Limit” (2016) and “Inspections for 
Radioactive Materials Show Fukushima Prefecture's Vegetables and Fruits All Fall 
Under the Reference Limit” (2016) continue to participate in enacting food that 
possibly contains TEPCO’s radionuclides as ‘safe’—with a large focus on food 
produced in Fukushima Prefecture. The Consumer Affairs Agency’s (2017c: 10) mini 
risk communication booklet also uses the test results to illustrate a ‘stable’ decrease in 
radioactivity: “Since the beginning of the fiscal year in 2013, test results have shown 
                                                
415 See, for example, Callon (1991). 
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that vegetables, fruits and tea have not exceeded reference limits. All livestock products 
have also been within the limits. Also, since 2015 rice and pulses have not been found 
over the reference limit (as of December 26, 2016).” Material semiotics and 
institutional ethnography teach us that beneath ruling texts and discourse always exist 
situated activities within tangles of human and more-than-human sympoietic 
sociomaterial entanglements. While efforts to manage the ‘safety’ of food circulating 
within the agrifood assemblage are able to frame all food as ‘safe,’ it is important to 
notice some of the heterogeneity that lies behind these enactments—the situated 
scientific practices behind the claims portrayed under the guise of a ‘neutral,’ 
‘unbiased’ and all-reverent ‘Science.’ Thus, in this final section, I will take a look 
deeper to explore how these measurements are enacted through locally situated 
performances among bodies, foods, machines and radionuclides. 
 
As previously mentioned, since the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster in 2011, 
government screening processes for measuring radionuclides have been evolving, with 
details on updates and amendments noted in the various versions of the Concepts of 
Inspection. By the time of my fieldwork in 2016, the “items subject to inspection” 
expanded to eleven categories which are “identified based on values detected in the 
past” (MHLW, 2016b: 6-8).416 That is, the data accumulated from the previous year is 
                                                
416 In 2016, the items on the list included: 1. Foods that tested ‘over the limit’ in the previous 
year (specifically mushrooms and wild plants including bamboo shoots, wild meat such as boar 
and deer, and buckwheat, among others); 2. Foods that tested at half of the reference limit (50 
Bq/kg) of cesium-134 and cesium-137 in the previous year (including broccoli, Japanese 
mustard spinach (komatsuna), Japanese apricot (ume), Japanese persimmon, log-grown 
shiitakei, rice, soybeans, and honey, among others); 3. Foods that serve as indicators of ‘safe’ 
feeding management for cattle (milk and beef in Iwate, Miyage, Fukushima, Tochigi and 
Gunma prefectures); 4. Fishery products that measured at half of the reference limit in the 
previous year (both marine and fresh water fish); 5. Food items that are consumed in high 
quantities by the population (according to the National Health and Nutrition Survey of 2013) 
and major agricultural or fishery products (after taking into consideration the “status of 
production”); 6. Foods with a restriction since April 1, 2015; 7. Foods circulating within the 
market (when information on processor and producer is identifiable); 8. Dried processed foods 
(except those that will be consumed after reconstitution with water); 9. Foods where half of the 
reference limit was measured in the previous year, but is assumed to be due to improper 
management techniques that led to contamination; 10. Foods that have not yet been inspected 
since the disaster (however, radiation levels in these products could also be estimated based on 
similar “benchmark items”); and 11. Other food items as specified by the government (MHLW, 
2016b: 6-8). By 2017, the number of categories decreased from eleven to nine (MHLW, 2017). 
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used to predict the necessity for the current year’s testing procedures. The Ministry of 
Health has been uploading hundreds to thousands of page-long spreadsheets listing test 
results gathered from testing centers around the country since the onset of the nuclear 
disaster (for example, MHLW, 2016a). The spreadsheets provide various bits of 
information that offer clues about sociomaterial relationality involved in enacting the 
test results at each location. The columns on the spreadsheet include: (1) the test 
number; (2) the reporting municipality; (3) the organization in charge of enforcement; 
(4) the prefecture where the food is from; (5) the local area where the food is from; (6) 
other information on the specifics of the food; (7) indication if the food is circulating in 
the agrifood assemblage or not; (8) the food category; (9) the food name; (10) other 
information on the food or its testing; (11) the name of the agency that conducted the 
test; (12) the type of machine used; (13) the harvest or purchase date; (14) the date the 
test results were attained; (15) the date the results were announced to the Ministry of 
Health; (16) the results for cesium-134 (17) the results for cesium-137 (18) the results 
for a combination of both cesium-134 and cesium-137—often indicated as a value less 
than (< ) the ‘minimum detection limit’ (kenshutsu kagenchi); and (19) a column to 
indicate (with a circle ◯) any test results that are over the reference limit (see Figure 
13). In the following section, I would like to briefly untangle some of the sociomaterial 
relations being stabilized within these spreadsheets, specifically relating to the results 
of cesium-134 and cesium-137 (column 18) and the types of machines used in enacting 
the results (column 12). 
 
While the International Atomic Energy Agency (2011: 41-9) lists over 300 measurable 
radionuclides in food and water following a nuclear disaster, in Japan—as in most 
countries—the activity concentrations of three radionuclides were chosen, at least 
initially, as indicators of radioactivity in food: cesium-134, cesium-137 and iodine-
131.417 The choice of indicators is practical: because all of these radionuclides emit  
                                                
417 See Steinhauser (2014: 4649) for an overview of the many disregarded radionuclides that 
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gamma rays, it makes them much more convenient and economical to measure.418 At 
the same time, however, difficult-to-measure alpha particle-emitting radionuclides 
(such as plutonium-239) and beta particle-emitting radionuclides (such as strontium-
90)419 are of particular concern when it comes to internal exposure due to the 
uncertainty of their behaviors and interactions upon entering human bodies. Unlike 
gamma rays which pass through the body, when ingested, alpha and beta particles may 
become lodged in the body and cause damage to nearby cells (see Section 5.2).  
 
Given the complexity of measuring radionuclides without gamma emissions, 
estimations on the possible presence of alpha and beta particle-emitting radionuclides 
are assumed based on calculations of ratios. For example, the ‘new’ numerical 
reference limits for the two indicator radionuclides cesium-134 and cesium-137420 are 
also intended to account for the possible presence of other alpha and beta particle-
emitting radionuclides through calculations of estimated proportionality.421 Thus, even 
if the Ministry of Health’s spreadsheet only indicates the ‘singular presence’ of 
radioactive cesium-134 and cesium-137, the ‘multiple absence’ of a number of other 
difficult-to-detect radionuclides are assumed to be present—at least according to 
documents describing the scientific principles behind the chosen ‘new reference limits.’ 
(see MHLW, 2011a).422 
 
While focusing on levels of cesium-134 and cesium-137 in food may be an economical 
and efficient way to screen for radionuclides, decreases in radioactive cesium may not 
always indicate a decrease in the other alpha- and beta-emitting radionuclides lurking 
beneath declining measurements. Take for example an article by the Fukushima Minpo 
titled: “All 2014 Fukushima Rice Cleared Radiation Tests, Thanks to Fertilizer” (2015). 
                                                
418 See Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (2004) for an overview of the 
different emission types of some of the radionuclides mentioned in this section. 
419 Cesium-134, cesium-137 and iodine-131 are also beta emitters. 
420 Again, iodine-131 is no longer measured due to its short half-life. 
421 According to the Ministry of Health (2011a: 3), strontium-90, plutonium-238, plutonium-
239, plutonium-240, plutonium-241, and ruthenium-106 are taken into consideration in the 
‘new reference limits’ for cesium-134 and cesium-137. That is, the reference limits chosen for 
cesium-134 and cesium-137 should ensure that exposure to all of these radionuclides do not 
result in an estimated dose of ionizing radiation from food of more than 1 mSv/year. 
422 See, for example, Ministry of Health (2011a; 2012b). 
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As previously mentioned, cesium is chemically similar to potassium, thus not only 
could it be mistaken for potassium once it enters active human bodies, but also the 
active bodies of plants and animals. Since early on in the disaster, many 
countermeasures have been applied to decrease levels of detectable cesium-134 and 
cesium-137 in food, the addition of copious amounts of potassium fertilizer being one 
of them (N. Kato et al., 2015).  
 
According to some studies, changes in on-the-ground practices—specifically adding 
potassium fertilizers to soils—have been able to decrease the amount of cesium being 
absorbed by many crops (Tsukada & Ohse, 2016). However, these practices are not 
visible within the data as presented in the spreadsheets. Thus, many questions remain 
about the other alpha and beta particles that may be hidden within these declining 
cesium-134 and cesium-137 measurements. In addition, without explanations about 
farming practices made clear in spreadsheets, the declining levels may be assumed to 
be ‘natural’ and not due to the persistent efforts of farmers on the ground. This includes 
the exposure of farmers to innumerous other radionuclides they are in relation with on a 
daily basis when working in the fields or with their livestock. Here I will turn back to 
my focus group session with three CRMS volunteers in the Kansai region—Daiki, 
Kazuki and Maiko—to illustrate how some of my participants were grappling with 
these less straightforward issues which take into consideration the messy sociomaterial 
entanglements of farmers living and working among large concentrations of TEPCO’s 
radionuclides. 
Karly: If you read the Fukushima Minpo, they say everything is 
‘under the limit.’ 
Daiki: Yeah, the reference limit is 100.  
Karly: They say because it’s ‘under the limit,’ you don’t need to 
worry. 
Kazuki: Because the limit is so high, that’s why they can say it’s 
okay. They purposefully made it high. 
Daiki: Well, now I feel there is certainly not much rice that is over 
100 Becquerels. Recently some rice from Fukushima was measured 
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[…], from a place that was really contaminated. […] It was an 
official evacuation zone. The evacuation order was cancelled in 
around May this year. A year before, they were trying to grow rice 
experimentally, but it wasn’t sold in the local market. They just 
wanted to try to grow it. They measured the rice, they measured 
brown rice. But there was not a lot of radiation found. There were 
just a few Becquerels. Why was that the case? […] A person from 
that place, people form Fukushima, they know that their rice paddies 
are contaminated, so there are various countermeasures they take. 
Well, they often spread potassium and whatnot. That and zeolite. 
Zeolite, which absorbs cesium, they spread large amounts of it. Well, 
by doing these things, through a lot of hard work, the radiation 
problem does not transfer to the rice. Beyond that, people in Ibaraki 
Prefecture, they are not doing these things. Earlier, someone in my 
neighborhood received some rice from Ibaraki Prefecture. So, they 
thought they would eat a little, but they were a little worried. When 
we measured it, we found 15 Becquerels. Well, it was produced using 
natural farming practices. Trying so hard, without using any 
chemicals or fertilizers, only using natural fertilizers. They were 
grown so consciously without using any pesticides. But regarding 
cesium, they had no countermeasures. That’s why, in the end, there 
was radiation. 
Kazuki: And now. Organic production is reversely more dangerous. 
Things like cow manure. […] 
Daiki: Things like manure. And mulch. […] 
Kazuki: Well, they are also giving [straw and such] to cows in 
western Japan. 
While food below 100 Bq/kg of cesium-134 and cesium-137 are legally allowed to 
circulate within the agrifood assemblage, the farmers are legally allowed to apply 
manure and other soils measuring up to 400 Bq/kg of these radioactive cesium isotopes 
(CAA, 2017b: 32). This scenario in which farmers are expected to work within 
potentially high levels of cesium-134 and cesium-137 brings up further questions about 
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the dispensability of farmer bodies at the expense of enacting ‘safe food.’423 If the 
cesium-134 and cesium-137 are not absorbed by these ‘safe foods,’ then they remain in 
the soil where they may enter the bodies of farmers, people that join farm tours as 
tourists, or during group planting activities (for example, “Kawauchi's rice,” 2012).424 
And what happens to the ecosystem when there are copious amounts of extra potassium 
fertilizer being added? Again, the ‘multiple absence’ behind the decrease in cesium-134 
and cesium-137 produces many questions. But before becoming too distracted by the 
multiplicity and heterogeneity,425 I would like to get back to the Ministry of Health’s 
spreadsheet. 
 
Before discussing how to understand results being presented on the spreadsheet, it 
might be useful to discuss the variation in machinery being used at each site. While in 
1954 Geiger counters were used to test for radioactivity emitting from the bodies of 
tuna fish possibly containing radionuclides from the United States’ nuclear bomb tests 
in the Pacific (see Section 5.3), laws for measuring radionuclides in food following 
TEPCO’s 2011 overflow required much more sophisticated—and much more 
expensive—machinery for measuring gamma-emitting radionuclides.  
                                                
423 While I am unable to go into the issue here, this does bring up further questions of the 
dispensability of bodies within capitalism as discussed by academics such as Neil Smith (2011) 
and Julie Guthman (2011). 
424 Farmers and their supporters in Japan’s Family Farmer’s Movement (Noumiren) have been 
petitioning the government to implement measures to decrease the amount of radiation 
exposure farmers are receiving. The group has also mentioned that there have been a number of 
cattle deaths linked to the ingestion of potassium fertilizers (see M. Honda, 2016). 
425 There are many more aspect that could be brought up here. For example, the further 
alienation of farmers from their own farming knowledge and practices. As mentioned, so-called 
‘plant farms’ are being proposed as one way to decrease levels of measurable cesium-134 and 
cesium-137 in foods (Sekine & Bonanno, 2016). Also, Yamaguchi (2016) points out that 
farmers in areas where there are countermeasures in place are required to use not only 
potassium fertilizers, but also zeolite on their fields if they want to receive any support. Those 
who disagree with these policies are left behind. Additionally, as mentioned by Daiki, most of 
the focus for these countermeasures and ‘revitalization’ projects are given to Fukushima 
Prefecture, abandoning many farmers living in various other radioactive hot-spots. With 
everyone’s focus on food from Fukushima Prefecture and so little known about the hard work 
farmers are putting into lowering the amount of measurable cesium-134 and cesium-137 in the 
animals and plants they raise, decreases in radionuclides in foods produced in the prefecture 
might lead others to incorrectly assume that these decreases are ‘natural.’ 
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Figure 14 Some of the measuring devices I saw during my fieldwork in 2016. Water bottles are 





There are two main classes of machinery used in Japan for testing gamma-emitting 
radionuclides: germanium semiconductors and scintillation detectors. While 
germanium semiconductors are much more precise and accurate than scintillation 
detectors, they are also much more expensive and therefore not an option for many 
local municipal governments.426 Along with the adoption of the ‘new reference limits’ 
in 2012 came some changes to screening procedures which are now designed to include 
both kinds of measuring devices (MHLW, 2012c). The Japan Radioisotope Association 
(2015) published a list of over fifty scintillation machines that could be used in 
government screening tests, including a number of thallium doped sodium iodide (NaI 
(TI)) scintillation detectors and cesium iodide (CsI) scintillation detectors, among 
others. Some of the detectors listed are conveyer belt models, often used in measuring 
rice in Fukushima Prefecture.427  During my fieldwork, I was able to see some of these 
recommended models at the various CRMSs I visited in the Kansai region (see Figure 
14).  
 
The risk communication booklet distributed by the Consumer Affairs Agency (CAA, 
2017b: 28, emphasis added) describes how tests results from these two classes of 
machines are intended to enact ‘safe food’:  
Tests are carried out as an association between the precise 
radionuclide analysis of tests conducted using germanium 
semiconductors and the efficient screening tests conducted with NaI 
(TI) scintillation detectors. […] Even though NaI scintillation 
detectors are inferior in precision and sensitivity to germanium 
semiconductors, they are able to carry out a large number of tests in a 
short period of time. The price is also much lower than germanium 
semiconductors. […] If the results of the screening tests are not 
                                                
426 While many of the machines used by my participants cost between ¥1,500,000 and 
¥2,000,000 JPY (approximately $14,000-$19,000 USD), a germanium semiconductor could 
cost between ¥10,000,000 and ¥20,000,000 JPY (approximately $90,000-$190,000 USD). 
These prices do not include the potentially high costs for maintenance. Also, because a stable 
temperature is necessary when using these devices, users must spend a lot on their electricity 
bills to maintain these machines.  
427 An article by Fukushima Minyu News ("How to convey 'food safety,'" 2016) shows a photo 
of one of these conveyer belt machines. 
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below the screening level, […] a definitive inspection will be made 
using a germanium semiconductor.  
Thus, the new screening method set forth in 2012 attempts to coordinate measuring 
activities in a way to allow for test results from various machines conducing 
measurements in various locations to be made comparable, all ‘efficiently’ or 
‘precisely’ enacting ‘safe food’—food that measures ‘under the reference limit’—that 
is legally permitted to circulate within the agrifood assemblage. 
 
While earlier tests often listed test results below the limit as ND (not detectable),428 the 
newest test results tend to present results as “< 25” if using a scintillation detector, or 
under a lower number if using a germanium semiconductor. How to understand these 
numbers? In 2012, the lowering of the reference limits also meant that testing 
procedures needed to test for lower levels of radioactivity than previously necessary in 
order to ensure the food being tested could be scientifically verified to be ‘under the 
reference limit.’ According to the Ministry of Health’s (2012c) Screening Method for 
Radioactive Cesium in Food, the ‘screening level’ was decreased from 250 Bq/kg to 50 
Bq/kg (half of the reference limit) and the ‘minimum detection limit’ (kenshutsu 
kagenchi)—also referred to as the ‘minimum measurement limit’ (sokutei kagenchi)—
was decreased from 50 Bq/kg to 25 Bq/kg (now one-fourth of the reference limit) (see 
MHLW, 2012a). The screening level has been described in risk communication 
documents as a scientifically established percentage, below which the activities of 
radionuclides can be ‘judged’ to be under the set reference limit. The Consumer Affairs 
Agency (2017b: 28) outlines the purpose of the screening level: “test results beneath 
this scientifically established level can be judged to be under the reference limit.” The 
Ministry of Health (2012c: 3 & 7) describes that setting the screening level at half of 
the reference limit is the most “statistically accurate” method of ensuring screened 
samples are ‘under the reference limit,’ with a “99% confidence interval.” The 
minimum detection limit is another tool in the government’s screening method, 
indicating the minimum amount of radioactivity, above background levels, the test will 
be detecting.  
 
                                                
428 See, for example, Ministry of Health (2011e). 
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Looking at the test results, most ‘screening’ tests present results found ‘under the 
reference limit’ as a combined measurement of cesium-134 and cesium-137 less than 
25 Bq/kg (“<25 Bq/kg”). While this number appears to indicate that the sample 
contains less than 25 Bq/kg of cesium-134 and cesium-137, this might not be the case. 
Instead, the number may simply be indicating the minimum detectable activity 
measured during the specific period of time it takes for the machine to determine that 
the sample is under the screening level (50 Bq/kg). Thus, while this technique may be 
useful for ensuring levels of cesium-134 and cesium-137 are under the 100 Bq/kg 
reference limit, they do not provide much information for people interested in knowing 
the actual activity of radionuclides in the foods being measured. This would involve 
much longer, and more careful forms of tinkering with these machines, something done 
at many CRMSs, but not often possible at government testing stations which must be 
expedient in order to keep up with the temporal pace of commerce. Instead of providing 
numbers for careful deliberation, government testing procedures serve to enact 
government certified ‘safe food’— food that is ‘under the reference limit’ and can, 
thus, legally circulate within the agrifood assemblage.429  
 
For most of my participants, the data produced by the Ministry of Health was not very 
useful as they were more interested in knowing the actual measurements of 
radionuclides found in food. During my fieldwork in 2016, I was able to visit a mixture 
of CRMSs, food cooperatives, cafés and restaurants that were testing food for 
radionuclides. It was at these places that I learned about how people were tinkering 
with their various machines in ways that produced numerical values they could trust. 
For example, one CRMS tested each of its samples for at least ten hours in order to 
ensure the results were valid. Others would have a set limit of about three hours, or 
would check in after one, two, or three hours to decide whether or not it would be 
useful to prolong the test. As was probably the case with all of the government 
personnel who needed to quickly obtain and master how to use these complex 
machines, I heard many stories from my study participants regarding their processes of 
obtaining and learning how to use their own machines—many of them spending long 
                                                
429 See Burch, Legun and Campbell (forthcoming) for more on the deliberation of numbers 
following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
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hours and sleepless nights tinkering with the various parts and accompanying computer 
software packages.  
 
In the days leading up TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, one of the food cooperatives in the 
Kansai region now testing for radionuclides in food had been active connecting with 
farmers in the Tōhoku region, collecting signatures to petition the government 
regarding the Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facility in Rokkasho-mura 
(Rokkasho-village), Aomori Prefecture, the most northern prefecture on the island of 
Honshu (see Figure 2). They submitted their petition to the government on the same 
day as the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. Imai Yukari (pseudonym), one of the 
volunteers at the cooperative, described how the cooperative worked through the 
konran that erupted following TEPCO’s overflow:  
Yukari: On March 11th we handed over the signatures. […] At that 
time, when we said, “Japan is a country with many earthquakes so it 
is dangerous,” they said something like, “We are working 
diligently.” 
Karly: So when you handed over the signatures, you said that nuclear 
power was dangerous? 
Yukari: We said it. But from their side we only heard the set phrases: 
“We are diligently following the provisions,” “There will not be an 
accident,” and “No radiation will be released into the environment.” 
Karly: And then the earthquake struck. 
Yukari: Yes. […] We had submitted the signatures and just after the 
earthquake began. […] We had a high awareness about nuclear 
power and radiation, a relatively good understanding, so after the 
accident we were quickly able to establish countermeasures.  
Karly: What did you decide? 
Yukari: We quickly spoke about measuring. But, at the beginning we 
didn’t have the best measuring device. […] There was one woman 
who quickly from the start, we really didn’t know any better, so we 
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measured vegetables with a Geiger counter. (Laughing at herself) 
[…] We didn’t know anything about how the readings are influenced 
by the surroundings. There were so many things we didn’t know. It 
took experience. 
Like many people in the aftermath of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, Yukari and many of 
my other participants learned about radiation through making many mistakes in real 
time.430 In fact, like Yukari, many of my participants laughed at themselves as they 
thought back to the ways that they initially thought Geiger counters were useful tools 
for measuring radiation in food. Because it took time to obtain a machine designed to 
measure food, Yukari explained that she and others in the cooperative spent a lot of 
money at the beginning sending food samples to a laboratory in Kyushu that had a 
germanium semiconductor. When I visited the cooperative’s measuring station in 2016, 
they had a full time staff testing a variety of foods. The cooperative includes this data in 
its weekly catalog.  
 
Almost all of my study participants had, at one point or another, joined a food 
cooperative that tested its food for radiation. In discussing these different cooperatives, 
it became clear that they each had their own reference limits, minimum detection limits, 
machines, measuring periods, and ways of sharing their data. Beyond choosing a 
reference limit they felt most comfortable with, one of the most important aspect for 
my participants was that the numerical measurements could be linked to a real food 
item they might purchase. Also, the ability to contact and ask questions about various 
foods also brought them a sense of comfort—though people working at the cooperative 
explained that this made work difficult for them as they received very specific 
questions about ingredients, particularly when it came to processed food items where 
the source of the various ingredients might change depending on season or price. 
 
While producing numbers for deliberation consumes a lot of time and money, I met 
many people who felt the practice of making radionuclides visible through numbers 
                                                
430 Each cooperative had its own processes for dealing with the overflow of TEPCO’s 
radionuclides. See Kimura (2012) for a description of how a different group, the Seikatsu Club 
Consumer Cooperative, worked through the konran they experienced in the aftermath of 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
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was of utmost importance, even five years after the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
Yanagiba Akira (pseudonym), a volunteer at one of the CRMSs I visited during my 
research, describes why he believes citizen-run, locally based measuring stations play 
an imperative role in helping people to stay attuned to the activity of TEPCO’s 
radionuclides, particularly within textually-mediated ruling relations which fervently 
work to silence both radionuclides and discussions about them. 
Karly: Does your measuring station have a goal? 
Akira: We don’t have a particular goal. 
Karly: You don’t? 
Akira: No, we don’t. It’s just to look. 
Karly: Just to look? 
Akira: Yes, that’s right. Therefore, we measure and show the results. 
The point is for the results to be seen. So, consumers, well, our 
members and whatnot can look at those measurement results, and 
they can decide for themselves whether to eat it. Is it good to eat? Is 
it best not to eat? If it is locally produced [in this prefecture], it’s 
maybe okay. But I should not feed this to my grandchild. Those kinds 
of decisions. […] After all, depending on the person it’s different. 
[…] The measuring station, well, we have various duties. One is to 
inform people about the dangers of exposure to low-doses of 
radiation. It is not simply saying that it would be best to have no 
radiation. There is pesticide residue, chemicals and whatnot, there 
are so many various things. What this means is it is important to 
think about food safety in its entirety. Another duty is to take back 
science. I’m more of a humanities person, someone with absolutely 
no relation to Becquerels, Sieverts. But, just like this through 
studying, we ourselves are one-by-one taking back science, so that we 
are not deceived by the government, various administrations, people 
referred to as experts and such. In other words, it’s a way of life 
where we ourselves protect our own lives, our own health, our own 
families and children’s futures. We have to keep doing it, if not we 
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may face big trouble. Well, it’s for that reason measuring stations, 
they are places with a lot of significance. 
Ultimately, standardized testing procedures conducted by the Japanese government and 
filtered into spreadsheets help to provide some stability and consistency in the face of 
heterogeneity in background radiation, measuring equipment and myriad other 
sociomaterial interactions within each specific testing location. However, in the same 
way that historical overflows of radionuclides were translated and contained within the 
vast textual complex of the transnational nuclear assemblage (Section 5.3), 
standardized testing procedures work to translate and contain the volatility and 
heterogeneity of ionizing radiation within an ever-expanding textual complex. That is, 
the multiplicity and heterogeneity of radionuclides are filtered back into a textual 
complex where their instability can be managed, and the vast data collected on their 
activities can be used in various attempts to predict future activities of these volatile 
isotopes in a way that aligns with the legal definition of ‘safe food.’ However, through 
tinkering with various machines within their own sociomaterial entanglements, many of 
my participants have been attuning to the heterogeneity that is left out of government 
spreadsheets. For many, continuing to measure and produce numbers has been the only 




In an interview with Asahi Shimbun ("I don't want," 2016), Tarukawa Kazuya, a 
Fukushima farmer living in the city of Sukagawa, approximately 60 kilometers from 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, was asked by a journalist about the fūhyōhigai he was 
facing.431 While it is clear that he himself experiences konran about his own everyday 
activities as a farmer and an ‘eating body’ in Fukushima Prefecture, his answer does 
not seem to enact a story which positions consumers as the enemy, perpetuating 
perspectival debates about radiation and food: 
                                                
431 As mentioned in Madoka’s story in Chapter 4, Tarukawa’s father had committed suicide 
after finding out his vegetables, which were measured to be over the reference limit following 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, were circulated in the agrifood assemblage. He and his mother 
became the focus of the documentary Inheritance (Daichi wo Uke Tsugu) (J. Inoue, 2015) that 
was screened in the Kansai region during my fieldwork in 2016. 
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Our rice, in 2011, radiation was at most around 30 Becquerels. The 
regulation level was under 500 Becquerels […] so the numbers were 
sufficiently okay, but, even still, it’s something you put in your 
mouth. Even I really didn’t want to eat it. Well, there is no reason to 
buy from somewhere else, so I ate it. Nevertheless, when I ship [my 
food], I get a kind of feeling that I’m doing something bad. I really 
understand the feeling of people in Tokyo who don’t want to eat food 
from Fukushima. There’s this crumbling nuclear power plant, who 
wants to go out of their way to buy and eat [the food from here]? This 
is not fūhyōhigai. Fūhyōhigai is when you can’t sell because there are 
unfounded [rootless and leafless, ne mo hapa mo nai] rumors 
spreading. It’s not that. Because there are both roots and leaves. 
Radiation is really falling. 
Through focusing on his own sociomaterial entanglements with TEPCO’s damaged 
nuclear reactors and their overflowing radionuclides, Tarukawa is able to break through 
perspectival debates about radionuclides, food and bodies to find some common ground 
with the people who, according to ruling texts and discourses, should be his enemies—
his object of blame for all of the hardship he and his family have faced since the onset 
of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. In this chapter, I have attempted a similar feat: attuning to 
the seemingly singular object of ‘safe food’ using sensibilities from the fields of 
institutional ethnography and material semiotics.  
 
Through examining the enactment of ‘safe food’ in discourse, through activating 
reference limits and making judgements, through activating dose estimates, and even 
through situated tinkering with various machines, I have attempted to illustrate the 
multiplicity of the seemingly singular object of ‘safe food,’ and how tensions and 
inconsistencies among multiple versions of this object clash and are smoothed over in 
practice. Through my analysis, ‘safe food’ is exposed as being multiple, no longer a 
‘matter of fact,’ but a ‘matter of concern.’ That is, the ‘safe food’ is not singular and 
stable, but an enactment that emerges from within heterogeneous sociomaterial 
entanglements. Throughout my analysis, the concept of ‘carefulness’ (yōjin) emerged 
as a way of thinking about carefully enacting one’s relations with radionuclides in the 
face of coordination efforts asking people to look away and ignore these very 
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entanglements. That is, instead of advocating the use of rational control to ‘Mind your 
plate!’, Japan’s food safety regulations enact bodies that are expected to use rationality 
to ascribe to opposing advice: Don’t mind your plate! 
 
However, the kanji characters that make up yōjin (⽤⼼, use and heart/mind) tell a 
different story. They point to a kind of vigilant heartful and mindful care that is 
essential for relating to imperceptible and potentially life threatening materials that 
have overflown into my participants’ sociomaterial entanglements. In exploring the 
ways my participants produce or deliberate radiation measurements, we see that ‘safe 
food’ is not only a ‘matter of concern,’ but also a ‘matter of care’ (de la Bellacasa, 
2011)—it takes a lot of time, money and energy to tinker with machines in ways to 
make visible levels of radionuclides, especially when using less precise scintillation 
detectors. 
 
Sensibilities from institutional ethnography have been useful in explicating how my 
participant’s experiences of konran related to eating in post 2011-Japan emerge from 
their entanglement within very complex tangles of textually-mediated ruling relations. 
In addition, by attuning to experiences of konran using material semiotic sensibilities, it 
becomes clear that konran emerges from and is exasperated by the clashing of multiple 
versions of ‘safe food’ in practice. My analysis has reveald how maintaining a focus on 
practices and ontonormative enactments within messy sociomaterial entanglements 
provides an opportunity to break free from the confines of perspectival debates—to 
take seriously heterogeneity and multiplicity, and all of the political and ethical 
implications that come from silencing various humans and more-than-humans through 
the deployment of an epistemologically normative ‘single’ reality. Thus, ontonorms 
have proven to be an extremely effective tool for thinking through the role of 
normativities in attempts to coordinate this ‘single reality.’  
 
In both Chapters 5 and 6, I have been explicating the ruling relations involved in 
coordinating everyday eating following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. As highlighted in 
my participants’ stories, producing numbers for deliberation has been one way for them 
to feel a sense of ease (anshin) in the years following TEPCO’s overflow. However, 
there are many other ways they carefully enact their lives within exceedingly 
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constrictive ruling relations; these are the experiences I will explore in my final 







One of the first events I attended during my fieldwork in 2016 was a talk by Professor 
Arakida Takeru of Fukushima University who was invited to the Kansai region by one 
of the radiation-measuring food cooperatives in the area. Professor Arakida—who had 
been living in Fukushima City at the time of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster and was very 
involved in personally helping with initial decontamination432 efforts—rose to the 
spotlight in 2014 when his name, face, and concerns on the futility of the 
decontamination process appeared in the popular comic strip Oishinbo (or ‘Gourmet 
Craze’).433 Given its mention of radiation-induced nosebleeds434 and comments about 
the futility of decontamination efforts, the comic’s authors and the real-life characters 
they depicted were immediately chastised in public discourse as being propagators of 
‘harmful rumors’ (fūhyōhigai). Not only was Professor Arakida accused of spreading 
                                                
432Some of Professor Arakida’s earliest experiences were published in a book chapter he 
authored (Arakida, 2013). The Japanese term for decontamination, josen (or jyosen) is another 
compound word made of the kanji characters for ‘remove’ (jyo, 除) and ‘dye’ or ‘stain’ (sen, 
染). The Japanese term for ‘pollution’ (osen, 汚染) contains the same kanji character sen and 
can be understood as a ‘dirty’ (o, 汚) ‘stain’ (sen, 染). While the term ‘decontamination’ may 
make sense when dealing with easily containable and controllable materials, the materiality of 
radionuclides—that is, the inability to remove or completely contain them once they have 
overflowed into the wild—has led Assistant Professor Koide Hiroaki to instead describe the 
process as isen (移染)—literally ‘move’ and ‘stain,’ which refers to the process as a 
‘relocation’ of ‘toxins’(Hirano et al., 2016: 15). On January 25, 2018 Japan’s Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority began discussing the possibility of again increasing the allowable 
estimated dose limits used to categorize areas that are ‘decontaminated’ and those that are not 
(“Decontamination standard,” 2018). The video accompanying the NHK news article shows 
workers using paper towels and spray bottles to decontaminate people’s homes.  
433 Written by Kariya Tetsu and illustrated by Hanasaki Akira, Oishinbo has been a popular 
comic in Japan since its debut in the 1980s. Professor Arakida appeared in an episodes titled 
“The Truth of Fukushima” first published in May 2014 in a weekly comic magazine. The 
comic was later published in an Oishinbo comic book (Kariya & Hanasaki, 2014). Also see 
Ochiai (2013).  
434 See Ochiai (2013) and Hirano et al. (2016: 11-2) for further discussion of the incident and 
the issue of radiation-induced nose bleeding. 
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fūhyōhigai by his university, but the comic book and its characters were also criticized 
by government officials from the Ministry of Environment, the Reconstruction Agency 
and Fukushima Prefecture (see Kimura, 2016a: 33-4). In fact, while the comic 
magazine was still on the shelves of convenience stores, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō 
was quoted in a Sankei Shimbun article as saying, “The state will respond to baseless 
rumors [konkyo no nai fūhyō] with full force" (“Prime Minister Abe,” 2014).435 
 
The event I attended in early 2016 was one of the first times Professor Arakida had 
spoken to a group since his public condemnation. He spoke about his experiences of 
decontaminating areas where children played following TEPCO’s radiological 
overflow, the role of ‘science’ and ‘objectivity’ in the aftermath of the disaster, as well 
as the process of enacting food safety standards. It wasn't until someone finally asked 
him about how he endured the public attack that he discussed his experience. ‘Isolation’ 
(koritsu, 孤⽴) was one of the terms he used in his response.  
 
Until this point, I have been using the term konran to describe the disjunctures and 
disorder experienced by my participants regarding everyday eating in the aftermath of 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. Here, I would like to introduce another Japanese word, 
kattō, which might be of use for imagining people’s embeddedness within twisted and 
troubling sociomaterial entanglements. Throughout my interviews and focus groups, 
some participants used the word kattō to describe instances of discord, when they found 
themselves entangled in uncomfortable, troubling relations.436 Kattō (葛藤) is another 
compound word made up of the kanji characters of two creeping and twining vines: 
kudzu (Japanese arrowroot, 葛) and fuji (wisteria, 藤). Both kudzu and fuji are 
leguminous woody vines which creep, crawl and twine through their situated, 
                                                
435 See Kimura (2016a: 33-4) and Hirano et al. (2016: 11-2) for more on the incident. 
436 For example, see Tomohisa’s story in Chapter 1 where he uses the term to describe he and 
his wife’s disagreements about bringing their children to Fukushima Prefecture. Kahoru 
(Chapter 1; Chapter 6) also used the term to describe the discomfort she felt discussing internal 
radiation with anti-nuclear activists who did not show much interest in it. Others used the term 
for describing the discomfort of discussing radiation with others. It was even used to describe 
the internal discord experienced by a father who did not want his family to live apart from each 
other. The important aspect about kattō is that it is an embodied discomfort that is physically 
uncomfortable and unsettling. One of my Japanese friends described it as a feeling that there 
was something twisting around and strangling her heart. 
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symbiotic relations with various rhizobial and non-rhizobial organisms (De Meyer et 
al., 2015; De Meyer et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2005). Described as “woody behemoths” 
(Doyle, 2003: 900) because of their monstrous abilities to use their symbiotic 
entanglements to rapidly expand in size and width, these vines are known for twining 
up trees at a rapid pace (Forseth & Innis, 2004). The image of my participants being 
entangled in complex twists and twines of creeping vines is both powerful and 
interesting when exploring their entanglement within toxins and texts as they live their 
lives in relation with TEPCO’s radionuclides. 
 
While my participants seemed to describe kattō as uncomfortable, heart-wrenching and 
troubling internal or inter-relational discord, I would also like to attend to the term 
using material-semiotic sensibilities. If we think beyond epistemological or perspectival 
debates, we see people simultaneously entwined within textually-mediated ruling 
relations and the material-semiotic entanglements of their everyday situated lives with 
family members, friends, school principals, doctors, supermarket food labels, TV 
commercials, mushrooms, milk and myriad other humans and more-than-humans. In 
the aftermath of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, radionuclides may make their way into 
people’s situated sociomaterial entanglements, leading to experiences of konran and 
kattō which are exacerbated by people’s entanglement within ruling relations that 
pressure them to ignore the possible presence of these imperceptible materials in their 
everyday lives. Thus, as textually-mediated ruling relations following TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster call on people to relinquish care to the authorities, to feel at ease (anshin), and 
to try their best (ganbarō) to roll forward with revitalization (fukkō) and business as 
usual, experiences of konran and kattō have been making it difficult for many of my 
participants to fall back in line—their experiences of disorder and discomfort were so 
overwhelming that they could no longer be easily suppressed. At the same time, 
however, speaking up is not always easy and can even make someone a target for being 
labeled as a propagator of ‘harmful rumors’ (fūhyōhigai), an obstructer of revitalization 
(fukkō) efforts—as Professor Arakida’s experience illustrates. How have people been 
able to work through troubling experiences of konran and kattō given their 
embeddedness within the extremely repressive ruling relations explored in Chapters 5 
and 6, ruling relations that discourage even uttering the word ‘radiation’? In the 
previous chapter, I focused on the role of producing and deliberating numbers as a way 
to work through experiences of konran and regain some sense of anshin—which, for 
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my participants, is a state of ease that emerges from activity and not passivity. In this 
final analysis chapter, I will provide a short reflection on the enactive qualities of the 
experiences of konran and kattō. In particular, I will provide a number of insights and 
reflections from my participants which highlight some of the ways people employed 
vigilant, heartful and mindful care (yōjin), creating spaces and opportunities to come 
together, think together, and discover how their individual experiences of konran and 
kattō are linked into much wider relations of ruling. 
 
7.2 Finding	a	place	for	the	heart	to	be	
As explored in Chapter 6, the Japanese government has been using perspectivalism as a 
strategy for attempting to coordinate how active human bodies ‘correctly’ relate to 
unstable radionuclides. By acknowledging only one, single, ‘correct’ way for humans 
to relate to TEPCO’s radionuclides, people who question the single reality or attempt to 
enact their relationship differently could be easily categorized away as ‘unscientific,’ 
‘irrational,’ ‘uneasy’ or even purveyors of ‘harmful rumors.’ While none of my 
participants were publicly attacked in the way Professor Arakida was, they were all 
extremely aware that speaking out about their concerns regarding radiation could make 
them a target. Or as the Japanese proverb warns, “the stake that sticks out gets 
hammered down [deru kui wa utareru, 出る杭は打たれる].” Thus, the activation of 
ruling discourses by the media and people around my participants contributed to 
enacting ‘the sensate’ (Harrison, 2000) in a way that felt very constrictive to my 
participants; they no longer felt comfortable discussing their concerns about radiation 
with many of the people around them. 437  
 
Mari—whose experience encountering discourses of tabete ōen at her local 
supermarket in the Kansai region were shared in Chapter 6—describes how this played 
out in her life: 
                                                
437 As discussed in Section 3.3.1.6, the constrictive nature of the sensate was also evident 
during my interviews.   
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With old friends it is totally okay [to talk about radiation], but it is 
difficult with new friends. They will probably think, “She’s a bit 
crazy.” 
Other participants explained that it was difficult to discuss their concerns about 
radiation even with their closest friends. The experience of Hisako—who described the 
fukkō corner in her local supermarket in the Kansai region in Chapter 6—illustrates this 
experience: 
I don’t think they are harmful rumors [fūhyōhigai]. I think the 
damage is real. But all of the people around me are saying they 
really feel bad for the people suffering from harmful rumors 
[fūhyōhigai]. They probably think I’m a really strange person. But 
for mothers with a child, I definitely at least once try to speak with 
them about radiation. That they have to be careful about food, well, 
about the place of production, about root vegetables, mushrooms, 
berries. […] For the most part, because [my husband and I] speak 
out about food additives, pesticides and radiation, people stop 
socializing with us. […] For the people we used to socialize with, 
those people we often hung out with, it was probably tiresome to 
listen to. […] We gradually stopped meeting. […] My husband and I 
were so tired. To hang out for one whole day and pretend you don’t 
know anything [about radiation]. We both said it wasn’t fun. […] It 
was like we were strange people. It felt as if we had joined some kind 
of new religion. Mmm. I started to feel hopeless. But once joining 
[the cooperative], there were so many people like us. And there were 
also many evacuees. These kinds of discussions were normal. There 
would be a time to meet with everyone. We could bring homemade 
food and gather together. I really started to feel at ease [anshin]. 
Before finding the radiation-testing food cooperative, Hisako described that her 
isolation was so distressing that she had even contemplated leaving the country; she 
wanted to find a place where she and her family could speak freely about their 
concerns. 
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If you go abroad, there are many people who know and don’t know. 
But in Japan even if you know, it is considered virtuous to say 
nothing. Instead of that, to be in an environment where you can 
speak. I know it’s strange, but that’s how it seems. It’s best to be able 
to speak, no? 
Hisako’s experience highlights a phenomenon that was apparent throughout all of my 
interviews. The difficulty in speaking out about one’s concerns about radiation left 
many of my participants feeling isolated. However, through attuning to the discomfort 
and noticing the activities of others around them, people were able to make new 
connections and together curate spaces of refuge—‘refugia’ for thinking together438—
where mutual and open discussion was possible. Food cooperatives that measured for 
radionuclides were just one of the many examples of these ‘refugia for thinking,’ where 
people could come together and think together as they discussed their concerns about 
radionuclides and nuclear power.  
 
For many nuclear refugees, however, it was not only difficult discussing radiation, but 
also sharing the fact that they uprooted themselves and their families, leaving behind 
their homes, their jobs, their spouses and all of their other sociomaterial entanglements 
because they did not want to live their lives alongside high concentrations of TEPCO’s 
radionuclides. During a focus group session, Asami—whose thoughts on the 
government’s role in enacting fūhyōhigai were shared in Chapter 6—spoke about the 
hostility she faced when she honestly told her family about her concerns regarding 
radiation. Asami had been learning about the Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing 
Facility in Aomori Prefecture,439 and knew about some of the dangers of exposure to 
ionizing radiation. After hearing about the first explosion at TEPCO’s nuclear power 
plant in March 2011, she wanted to get her children as far away from the Kantō region 
                                                
438 Again, Tsing (2017a: 54) uses the term “refugia” to describe the places of refuge—spaces 
where resurgence of life and lifeways can be cultivated—which, though abundant during the 
Holocene, are depleting at alarming rates in the Anthropocene. In this section, I will borrow the 
term to refer to ‘refugia for thinking’—places of refuge where my participants felt safe to share 
their concerns and think together—as well as ‘refugia for recuperation’—spaces of refuge from 
radionuclides where people usually living in areas of radioactive fallout, and the accompanying 
restrictive ruling relations, can find some physical and emotional reprieve. 
439 As with some of my other participants, her interest was sparked by the documentary 
Rokkasho Rhapsody (Kamanaka, 2006). 
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as possible until the extent of radioactive contamination was better known. Living in 
Chiba Prefecture at the time, Asami took time off work and drove her children down to 
the Kansai region.440 She had been living just next to her husband’s family and was 
very honest with them about her concerns regarding radiation. Their response to her 
honesty, however, was not what she had expected: 
My husband was okay, but his parents, my husband’s parents, his 
aunt and whatnot, they were living just next door and said really 
awful things. Something like, “Don’t come back! You’re a stranger 
now. Get out of here and live your life without any support from us!” 
She also explained the various judgements being made about nuclear refugees, 
particularly if people found out they had left their jobs and their hometowns, or that 
they had been exposed to radionuclides. 
Well, there are people who think about your work and whatnot, that 
you threw it all away and are an irresponsible person. Therefore, 
people from Fukushima and whatnot, parents and children, mothers 
and children who evacuate, you hear that they don’t tell people. In 
any case, if you say something, there are people who see you as 
someone who threw away your hometown, that is to say, someone 
with no feeling of responsibility. And there is also discrimination and 
whatnot. That’s, well, you can be discriminated against just for being 
hibakusha. Therefore, I think there are many people who just don’t 
say [they evacuated]. 
For Asami, the experience was extremely isolating. Relocating to the Kansai region 
after being renounced by her husband’s family, she found grappling with the possible 
presence of TEPCO’s radionuclides in the food to be extremely overwhelming. One of 
the only things that brought her ease in the early days of TEPCO’s overflow was 
finding a restaurant that tested its food for radionuclides. 
Before, at the beginning, it was really frightening. What? Where to 
eat? Where is this lettuce from? So, there were restaurants that 
                                                
440 Though she could not know it at the time, her home turned out to be in one of the many, 
patchy radiological hot-spots in Chiba Prefecture. 
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checked such things. […] I went to one and really felt at ease [anshin 
shite]. At that time, you know, I cried as I ate. Really. 
Similar to the radiation-measuring cooperative within which Hisako found community 
during a period of loneliness and isolation, restaurants that measured for radionuclides 
became a space for people to gather, feel somewhat at ease, and discuss their concerns 
about radiation. Aizawa Keisuke (pseudonym), the owner of a radiation-measuring 
restaurant I visited during my fieldwork in 2016, explained how the konran and kattō 
he experienced living in the Kansai region following the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster urged him to create a space where people could feel at ease (anshin) when 
eating out. He himself had two children, so was concerned about food and thought he 
could channel his concerns into something that could also benefit his community. 
During our interview, he described how his restaurant became a place not only where 
people could feel at ease about food, but where he could learn about the experiences 
and suffering of others, especially those people living in areas with high concentrations 
of TEPCO’s radionuclides. 
People who lived in eastern Japan and evacuees came. People who 
lived in eastern Japan, for example, people who came by car from 
Fukushima or Tokyo, there were many people who came from Tokyo. 
Therefore, every day in the parking lot, there were cars parked with 
license plates from eastern Japan. So, about one and a half years 
from the onset of the accident, for example, four customers would 
come. They would come as a family and order enough for eight 
people. And in silence, saying nothing, they would eat right away. 
Each person would eat the two portions. When they stopped eating, 
they were crying. Then, the first time I heard stories from my 
customers, I also couldn’t stop crying. […] To get to this. Is there 
another country that disregards their citizens to such an extent? Well, 
it’s said that North Korea and China most likely do. But I really felt 
that Japan would not also succumb to this. 
Haruo, whose thoughts on the terms anzen and anshin were shared in Chapter 6, once 
worked a preschool in the Kansai region which connected with a local CRMS to 
measure food served in its school lunches. During our interview he used the phrase 
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igokorochi ga ii (‘comfortable,’ 居⼼地が良い) to describe the feeling that emerges 
when people are given the opportunity to discuss their concerns and think together:  
There was someone who evacuated from Tokyo who entered the 
preschool. The reason they came to our place instead of another 
place, they said it was because at our place communication was 
easier. […] They were concerned about food and so were we. 
Because we took the approach of thinking together. It was 
comfortable [igokochi ga ii], you know? 
The term igokorochi is made up of the kanji characters for ‘residing’ or ‘being 
somewhere’ (i, 居), ‘heart’ or ‘mind’ (kokoro,⼼), and ‘ground’ or ‘place’ (chi, 地). 
Combined with the word for good (ii, 良い), igokorochi ga ii points to a type of 
comfort that is attained when there is a place for the heart to reside. That is, a place 
where people can feel comfortable sharing their true thoughts and concerns without 
feeling pressured to be otherwise. Thinking back to Chapter 6, the Japanese 
government has been asking people to feel anshin (安⼼), that is, to have a peaceful 
heart in the aftermath of TEPCO’s overflow. While the government expects the feeling 
of anshin to arise from people’s acceptance of scientific knowledge derived from the 
transnational nuclear assemblage and deployed through risk communication, the 
experiences of my participants reveal that it was not only the ability to make visible and 
deliberate radionuclide measurements that brought a sense of ease, but also the 
opportunity to discuss their concerns with others. Haruo’s curation of a comfortable 
(igokorochi ga ii) refugia where people could openly discuss their experiences and 
concerns related to radionuclides, and where solutions could emerge from these 
discussions again highlights how feelings of ease or comfort do not only come from 
inputs of scientific knowledge and the taking of a particular side in perspectival 
debates, but from opportunities for people with multiple experiences and various 
concerns to work and think together across all of their differences. Both Keisuke’s and 
Haruo’s experiences point to the ways in which these refugia for open discussion not 
only bring ease and comfort as people can openly acknowledge and speak about 
radionuclides, but also an opportunity to hear the experiences of people whose deep 
suffering following TEPCO’s nuclear disasters has been muted within ruling relations. 
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Particularly the experiences of nuclear refugees or people living within high 
concentrations of TEPCO’s radionuclides. 
 
Throughout my interviews it became clear that even though people living in the Kansai 
region found it difficult to discuss radiation, it was much more difficult the closer one 
moved to Fukushima Prefecture. Hashimoto Tetsu (pseudonym)—a volunteer at a 
CRMS in the Kansai region—describes his understanding of this reality and the 
important role of people in Kansai and other regions further away from TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster in supporting those people enacting their lives within these more 
restrictive ruling relations. During our interview, I asked Tetsu about the difficulty 
people have in discussing their concerns regarding radiation: 
About having an opinion, I think they have an opinion. Expressing 
that opinion, speaking up and saying it, there are some differences 
there. Therefore, people who live here [in the Kansai region] can 
talk. […] But Fukushima, in Fukushima City, in Fukushima 
Prefecture, if you try to talk like that, in any case, you will be put 
under a lot of pressure. That’s what I feel. But if you don’t say 
anything, before long, it will completely, it will surely gnaw away at 
your core, deplete your life-force. […] One has to raise their voice. 
That’s why, well, it’s said that things are not expressed because they 
are hard to say. But to have uneasiness [fuan] in your heart. To 
continuously carry it as you live your life. Realistically. How to say? 
To allow things to be open, to allow for things to be said, I feel that’s 
extremely important. […] That’s why with things like recuperation 
[hoyō], people who run things like recuperation camps [hoyō 
kyanpu]. You know, to receive people from those areas. Probably, 
when people come to [the camps], I think that together they mingle 
[kōuryū], and all of the things they are thinking about are vented 
before they go home. […] But there’s a lot that accumulates. It’s 
difficult because it doesn’t change instantly. 
During my fieldwork I was able to interview and chat with people who participated in 
organizing various recuperation camps in the Kansai region. These camps were 
modeled after those initiated following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. In fact, some of 
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the recuperation camps for children living in highly contaminated regions of Belarus 
were located in Japan (Takagi, 2016), so there were a number of people with 
experience working with children living and developing both within and with large 
concentrations of anthropogenic radionuclides. While the government in Belarus 
supports recuperation efforts for children living in areas of high nuclear fallout,441 the 
Japanese government has yet to support the recuperation camps throughout Japan. This 
means that in Japan all of the efforts to provide children living in radioactive hot-spots 
a chance to recuperate in areas with lower levels of external radiation are dependent 
purely on volunteer efforts.442 The importance of recuperation camps is not only in the 
ways they support children, but also the support they provide for parents. In fact, camps 
that invite both children and parents also offer an opportunity for parents to discuss the 
hardships they face. While I was unable to attend a recuperation camp during my 
fieldwork, I heard many stories of the hardships discussed by parents trying to raise 
their children in some of the most contaminated patches of TEPCO’s industrial ruins.443  
 
Each camp is organized differently, some spanning only one week, while others having 
more fluid enrolment over one or two months. There are camps organized during 
academic spring breaks and also summer breaks. Whatever the length or timing of a 
particular camp, food plays a major role in organizers’ planning processes. For many, 
recuperation should be a time for children to eat simple, healthy food that contains no 
trace of TEPCO’s radionuclides. However, without financial support it is sometimes a 
challenge to ensure children are getting radionuclide-free food, even when they are in 
the Kansai region. In some cases, camp organizers team up with local farmers and 
farmer groups who donate food and invite children to visit their farms. However, 
camps’ dependencies on food donations can also be problematic, particularly if 
companies drop off large cases of processed foods where the place of origin of 
ingredients is not known. Taking into consideration the fact that people may have 
radionuclides on their clothing and luggage is also a point of concern for some 
                                                
441 See, for example, Minsk Region Executive Committee (2009). 
442 In June 2017, mothers from Fukushima made an appeal to the Japanese government, asking 
them to provide public support for recuperation camps (OurPlanet-TV, 2017). So far, the 
government’s response is not clear. 
443 The film Little Voices from Fukushima directed by Kamanaka Hitomi (2015) also provides 
an intimate lens into the lives of people organizing and participating in recuperation camps in 
Belarus and Fukushima. 
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organizers. However, the issue is very sensitive to discuss, and especially difficult to 
resolve given the financial constraints on organizers—purchasing new clothes for 
everyone to wear during recuperation camps is not possible without more robust 
financial support. Regardless of all of the struggles, some of my participants continued 
to work arduously to organize recuperation camps; their experiences in previous years 
have shown them just how important these refugia for both physical and emotional 
reprieve are for people living both within higher concentrations of TEPCO’s 
radionuclides and stricter textually-mediated ruling relations asking them ignore their 
very real sociomaterial entanglements with these invisible isotopes. 
 
7.3 Leaning	in	
As many of the previous examples illustrate, spaces where people can gather and 
discuss their concerns about radionuclides offer temporary reprieve for many people 
who feel suffocated within Japan’s post-2011 ruling relations. Another thing these 
examples illustrate, however, is the importance of not only finding a place to discuss 
and work through one’s own experiences of konran and kattō, but to attune to the 
experiences of others—particularly those who have endured great suffering since the 
onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disasters. Here, another phrase containing the kanji character 
for heart/mind (⼼) helps to illuminate this point. 
 
During my fieldwork in 2016, I often visited an English class for nuclear refugees held 
in the Kansai region. The flier for the class invites “evacuees” and “kokoro wo yosete 
kudasaru [⼼を寄せてくださる] friends” to join in. The phrase kokoro wo yoseru 
combines the kanji character for heart/mind (kokoro, ⼼) with the verb meaning ‘to 
draw near’ or ‘to contribute’ (yoseru, 寄せる). Together, the phrase can refer to the act 
of drawing your heart near to something, or letting your heart go out to someone. While 
some dictionaries describe the phrase as a form of sympathy, I like to think of it as a 
form of empathy—the act of leaning in with an open heart (and mind), putting yourself 
in a position where you are able to notice, and possibly feel, the suffering of others.  
  
For some people, leaning in meant actually going to Fukushima and surrounding 
prefectures to bear witness and offer support to those people trying to carefully enact 
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their lives along with TEPCO’s radionuclides. Nagaoka Kumiko (pseudonym), a 
mother of two who had been living in the Kansai region since before the onset of 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, helped to organize a group of women who have been 
working together to not only support nuclear refugees, but also people struggling to live 
their everyday lives in Fukushima Prefecture. Like many of my participants, Kumiko’s 
first introduction to the nuclear disaster was through questions she had about the 
‘safety’ of food circulating in the agrifood assemblage. However, in working through 
her own, individual experiences of konran and kattō, she began attuning to the vastness 
of the trouble and, after connecting with a number of nuclear refugees, formed a group 
and began working tirelessly to provide support to people living in Fukushima 
Prefecture. Eventually, she traveled to Fukushima to meet some school teachers her 
group had been trying to support. During our interview, Kumiko described the constant 
oscillation between concerns of protecting oneself and being a part of a collective 
struggle, sharing her experience of leaning into the everyday sufferings of people she 
met in Fukushima Prefecture:  
My daughter said, “mom if you go you might get cancer, don’t go!” 
My husband also said something similar. […] He said I have to eat 
different food, he said something like that. Even for myself, before I 
went the first time, I was planning to throw my shoes away before 
coming home. Even a friend who came from Tokyo told me to throw 
things away. Even if I planned everything perfectly, there [in 
Fukushima], everyday life was flowing as normal. My friend was 
there. The preschool teachers and children were there. Not one 
person was wearing a mask. When I got there, I questioned. Was I 
caring too much? Everyone was living their life there. I couldn’t 
refuse the food they offered to me. Everyone would eat together. And 
for dinner, the preschool teachers all kindly cleared their schedules. 
At dinner, the head teacher said, “The food we prepared today, it is 
all from outside of the prefecture and it was all measured. So please 
feel at ease [anshin shite] and help yourself.” You know, it made me 
extremely sad. “In Fukushima we really have such beautiful things,” 
the head teacher said with utmost effort. It’s just. It’s just. Really, it’s 
just that. It’s just. What is it? It’s just so vexing. For this kind of 
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accident to occur. For the people of Fukushima, every day is difficult. 
With so many memories, they are made to suffer. When I came back 
to Kansai, their problems seem like someone else’s. For myself, if I 
wasn’t in [this group], I don’t think I would have known. That’s why 
I think it’s important to tell people about it. 
However, visiting Fukushima is not the only way to lean into these forms of everyday 
suffering. One way many of my participants were able to attune to wider, collective 
experiences of konran and kattō was through watching documentaries or reading books 
that depict the everyday experiences of nuclear refugees or people living in Fukushima 
and surrounding prefectures. For example, books written by nuclear refugees depicting 
their experiences were being read by a number of my participants (for example, 
Morimatsu, 2013; Sudou, 2015; C. Yoshida, 2016). In addition, documentaries such as 
Little Voices from Fukushima (Kamanaka, 2015), Inheritance (J. Inoue, 2015), Moms of 
Iitate Village: Together with the Soil (Hurui, 2016),444 and A2-B-C: Children and 
Radiation (Ash, 2013) were circulating at various screening events, all offering 
intimate views into the everyday lives of people living in Fukushima Prefecture. For 
others, leaning in meant volunteering at, working at or generally supporting 
recuperation camps, restaurants, cafés, food-cooperatives that test for radionuclides in 
food, and CRMSs that test not only food but soil and other goods. It also meant 
participating in café times at CRMSs or study sessions and events about TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster, or even supporting nuclear refuges who are fighting the Japanese 
government and TEPCO through the court system.  
 
In fact, for many of my participants, it was leaning into the experiences of nuclear 
refugees they met in the Kansai region that provided them with many insights into the 
how their own individual struggles were hooked-up into greater ruling relations. In 
revisiting the experiences of Aoi and Masami—two mothers who relocated from 
Fukushima Prefecture—we learn not only about the difficulty and discomfort they both 
faced after severing themselves from their local sociomaterial entanglements, but the 
amount of work it takes to be active in collective struggles. 
                                                
444 This film is reminiscent of the documentary The Babushkas of Chernobyl (Morris & Bogart, 
2015) which premiered just a year before. 
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Aoi:  But, in any case, no matter what we are connected to the state. 
We talk and talk and talk, but, in any case, how do you draw 
distinctions between it all? That’s difficult. 
Masami:  Activism also, it takes time, it takes economic resources, 
it’s hard. 
Aoi: But this administration, the way they direct people’s movement. 
[…] If you don’t have power, even if you raise your voice. 
Masami: It’s difficult, isn’t it? 
Aoi: The kind of atmosphere present, it’s like the state is a novelist. 
[…] 
Masami: But, that’s what we were really made to experience. For 
this kind of event to occur. You know, I thought Japan was one of the 
better countries. 
Aoi: I also thought so. […] Even if I feel that I want to lead a 
“normal life,” for myself, since coming here I feel like I am 
constantly aware. 
Masami: That’s why, it’s impossible to relax. 
Aoi: Yeah. And with people who are aware, you share, you exchange 
ideas like this. Then, even if you can probably feel at ease [anshin] 
about food, nevertheless my hometown’s air. If you ignore the 
radiation, the air was so clean. Since I came here, in any event, there 
are various… 
Masami: It’s dirty. 
Aoi: Reasnably… 
Masami: Because it’s a city. 
Aoi: Because it’s a city. Car exhaust and whatnot. […] The sky is a 
completely different color from Fukushima. 
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Masami: Different. Different. 
Aoi: It’s different. […] Also, Kansai dialect. 
Masami: Yeah! 
Aoi: Yeah. It’s agony! 
(Everyone laughs) 
Masami: There’s no way to escape being worn out. Words I am not 
familiar with, the landscape, the air. 
Aoi: In any case, it wears you out. 
Masami: I’m worn out, even if I don’t do anything, I’m worn out. […] 
Aoi: You know, ultimately, in the beginning I really thought it was 
exhausting. […] 
Masami: Right? I feel like there has not even been one day that I 
have felt relaxed. […] Always, there are always negotiations, you 
know. The week I don’t go to Tokyo, in Kyoto there is definitely 
something, I have also gone to other places. I have even gone [back] 
to Fukushima. You know, this is not anything a normal middle-aged 
woman would do. (Laughing) 
Aoi: Right. It has to be done. 
Masami: Things like directly meeting and talking with a member of 
the Diet. 
Aoi: It’s tiresome. […] That’s why, when I first got involved with the 
measuring station, it was about six months after I evacuated. Then we 
started [another group for evacuees]. So, in any event, it probably 
took a lot of time before I could make connections. But still, I had 
someone, one person. […] Then when I came here I could connect 
with a lot of people. Little by little, as far as my feelings went, I could 




These examples represent some of the many opportunities for people to lean in—an 
activity that opens up possibilities for noticing how very individual experiences of 
konran or kattō are actually hooked into greater ruling relations and collective 
sufferings. It is from this realization that feelings of complete isolation may begin to 
dissipate, instead of being a personal problem of a troubled ‘individual,’ it can be 
recognized as an experience shared by numerous people who are also feeling suffocated 
within post-2011 ruling relations. 
 
7.4 Opening	up	the	individual	
Unlike ruling discourses of fūhyōhigai or fukkō which create an abstracted and 
simplified version of people’s everyday experiences in the aftermath of TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster,445 attuning to experiences of konran and kattō, and leaning into the 
collective suffering unleashed by the disaster exposes the messy sociomaterial 
entanglements that people find themselves enmeshed within following this large-scale 
radiological overflow. At the same time, in attuning to situated sociomaterial 
entanglements, time is exposed as being much more folded than linear.446 That is, 
overflows remind and attune people to their sociomaterial entanglement with not only 
TEPCO’s radionuclides, but radionuclides released in other radiological overflows, 
whether it be from nuclear bomb testing, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the JCO 
nuclear criticality disaster, or one of the many others.  
 
                                                
445 Thinking back to Chapter 4, in some ways, the term kōgai is similar to fūhyōhigai in the way 
they both attempt to contain and define pollution problems—the terms share the character gai 
(‘injury’ or ‘damage’)—and bluntly divide people into groups of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators.’ 
Fūhyōhigai might be seen as a neoliberal variant of kōgai which pits ‘perpetrator-consumers’ 
against ‘victim-producers’ and attempts to coordinate private activities in order to serve the 
‘greater good.’ Fukkō, on the other hand, paints a picture as if all people in Fukushima and 
surrounding prefectures are excitedly engaging in economic projects of revitalization. The 
intensive focus on fukkō and the revitalization of economic projects mutes the vitality of 
radionuclides and the people who attempt to carefully enact their lives alongside these 
imperceptible materials, raising many question about what ‘vitality’ really entails. Is it the 
vitality of economic projects? Or the vitality of human and more-than-human life and lifeways? 
446 See Section 3.3.2.3. 
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During my focus group session with Goto Katsuo (pseudonym) and his wife Tsukiko 
(pseudonym), Katsuo remembered his mother’s warnings about touching or ingesting 
rain possibly containing radionuclides during the period of nuclear testing in the 
Pacific.  
When I was a child, there was hydrogen bomb testing. Even at home, 
my mom would say something like, “Don’t let the rain fall on you!” 
and “Don’t eat it!”  
Having lived through that experience, both Katsuo and Tsukiko said they found it eerie 
that no warnings were given to avoid rainfall after TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. In fact, it 
was wind and rain that transported many radionuclides from TEPCO’s damaged 
nuclear reactors to areas throughout the country and the world (Norman et al., 2011; 
Steinhauser et al., 2013; Thakur et al., 2013). Iodine-131 from TEPCO’s reactors was 
even found in rain that fell in Vienna, Austria, where I was living in March 2011 
(Steinhauser et al., 2012). 
 
Tinkering with measuring devices also led many of my participants to discover their 
very real and monstrous sociomaterial entanglements with both current and historical 
radiological overflows. Because cesium-134 has a half-life of two years, it will 
transform to a different isotope in approximately 20 to 40 years. Cesium-137, on the 
other hand, has a half-life of 30 years, so will take about 300 to 600 years to transform 
to a different isotope.447 Thus, at this point in time, when both cesium-134 and cesium-
137 are measured in a particular ratio, it can be assumed that these are TEPCO’s 
radionuclides. When only cesium-137 is found, it can be assumed that these are 
radionuclides from a previous radiological overflow. In the aftermath of TEPCO’s 
nuclear disaster, some people tinkering with measuring devices began picking up 
radioactive cesium not only in foods from north-eastern Japan, but also western 
Japan—particularly in the case of log-grown shiitake mushrooms. According to a 
number of my participants who measure radionuclides in food, in some cases, trees 
from north-eastern Japan were being used by mushroom growers in western Japan and, 
as a result, cesium-134 and cesium-137 from TEPCO’s disaster were being detected. In 
other cases, only cesium-137 was detected, suggesting that the radionuclides came from 
                                                
447 See Section 6.3. 
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earlier radiological overflows. Keisuke described his experience in discovering his own 
sociomaterial entanglement with historical radiological overflows while trying to find 
shiitake mushrooms to serve at his restaurant.  
Shiitake will concentrate [radiation] about ten-fold. So, for example, 
if the tree they are grown on has 0.1 Becquerels, the shiitake that 
grow on it will have about 1 Becquerel. And radiation is detected in 
most Japanese shiitake. But, for the ones in western Japan, it’s not 
because of Fukushima. I believe it is cesium-137 from the period of 
nuclear weapons testing. So for some time I tried not to use shiitake. 
[…] Now, I have tested shiitake from a place in Okayama and 
radiation was not detected. Finally, I am able to use them! 
Throughout my interviews and focus group sessions, it also became clear that the more 
people began attuning to their sociomaterial entanglements with radionuclides, the 
more aware they became about their simultaneous entanglement within textually-
mediated ruling relations. For Madoka—whose experience I shared in Chapter 4—it 
was her own embodied experiences of konran and kattō following TEPCO’s nuclear 
disaster that led her to not only seek refuge in the Kansai region, but to become active 
in one of the court cases seeking an admission of responsibility and reparations from 
the Japanese government and TEPCO for losses suffered due to TEPCO’s overflow. 
That is, she recognized that what seemed to be an individual experience of disorder and 
discomfort was actually pointing to greater, collective issues related to democracy.  
I have gone through this nuclear disaster. That somewhat “normal” 
way of things, I was always on that majority side. […] In a disaster, 
you enter an evacuation center. But usually you can return from the 
evacuation center and you can put your life back together. However, 
with something like a nuclear disaster, the term “nuclear refugee” it 
means you are in the minority. So many citizens of Fukushima 
Prefecture, there are so many people who remain living on 
contaminated lands. People like me who left, we are certainly the 
minority. […] One day, you’re suddenly a minority. And democracy. 
Its significance in protecting the fundamental human rights of the 
minority. […] [Before the disaster] I understood the concept in my 
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mind. But now, the fact that democracy is about protecting the human 
rights of the minority. Now I have finally come to know the true 
meaning of democracy. For the majority, for the most part without 
having to advocate for your rights, because you are on the side of the 
majority, things like security, the fact that you have rights. Life goes 
on without you having to think about it. But if you are forced to view 
it from the standpoint of someone who one day suddenly became a 
minority. Aha! I see! It’s just the natural right to protect life. […] If 
there is a fire, if nearby there is a fire, if a house is burning, you run 
away, right? And, isn’t that the same? However, running away from 
radiation, naturally feeling it is a danger and running away, that act 
is criticized. It’s completely strange, to be called a traitor 
[hikokumin]. […] We take to court battles to acquire rights for the 
minority. The fact that those battles are so necessary. Now, I am 
experiencing it firsthand. 
During my fieldwork in 2016, I had the opportunity to sit in on court cases being fought 
by nuclear refugees in three different prefectures in the Kansai region. At one court 
case in particular, lawyers presented the results of soil tests taken from the homes of the 
nuclear refugees they were representing. These lawyers had traveled with scientists to 
areas where the government’s measurements of estimated dose rates from radionuclides 
measured in the air ‘proved’ it was legally ‘safe’ for people to return. These ‘safe’ dose 
rates also became legal ‘proof’ that housing support for nuclear refugees could be 
discontinued; the areas themselves did not need to be treated as ‘radiation management 
areas,’ but could be places where people could ‘safely’ conduct their everyday lives—
having picnics under the cherry blossoms, gardening and playing with their children in 
local parks. Working together to tinker with measuring devices to make visible the 
actual concentration of cesium-134 and cesium-137 at the homes of nuclear refugees 
they represented, the plaintiff’s lawyers shocked everyone in the courtroom as they 
revealed that thirty-seven of the forty-one samples measured over 40,000 Becquerel per 
square meters (Bq/m2)—the clearance level set by the Japanese government to 
distinguish between a ‘radiation management area’ and an area where no management 
is necessary (Hirano et al., 2016: 7-8). More shocking was the fact that at least nineteen 
of the samples measured between 100,000 and 300,000 Bq/m2. 
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In the way that dose rates create an objectified version of the real activities of 
radionuclides, simplified categories that bluntly label people as ‘victim’ or ‘perpetrator’ 
of ‘harmful rumors,’ or ‘promoting’ or ‘obstructing’ economic ‘revitalization’ create an 
objectified version of people’s experiences which not only obfuscates sociomaterial 
entanglements, but creates a situation where people are discouraged from creatively 
working together to find solutions to problems they face. During our interview, Kudo 
Saburo (pseudonym)—a journalist who has been closely following the aftermath of 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster—argued that we need to be wary of objectifying ruling 
discourses such as fūhyōhigai, and need to creatively work together to support people in 
ways that foreground our very real entanglements with TEPCO’s radionuclides. 
Karly: When people don’t purchase food produced in Fukushima, 
they get accused of spreading fūhyōhigai. It’s as if they are 
personally destroying the livelihoods of the farmers of Fukushima.  
Saburo: Yeah, there’s that kind of campaign. From the side of the 
government. That kind of destruction, it’s not the fault of the people 
who don’t buy, it’s the fault of those who caused the contamination. 
Karly: Yes. But, within that term, there’s a sense that it’s the 
consumer’s fault.  
Saburo: Or better, there is a campaign from the side of the 
government saying that. […] Regarding that, from our side, I think 
we need an opposing campaign. Eat to support [tabete ōen], really 
supporting by eating. […] There has to be something beyond that. 
[…] It’s not eat to support [tabete ōen]. We have to support those 
people in securing their rights. Like their right to evacuate, the right 
to claim for damages for contaminated things. That’s why from the 
beginning the “under 100 Becquerels” is strange. In other words, 
even if you have things under 100 Becquerels, your field was polluted 
in such a way. I just can’t tolerate it.  […] And, in these laws. There 
are many tricks. […] For example, if normal trash is left on a field, 
you can tell the person who left it to take it home. […] Essentially 
there is an assumption that radiation will not flow out of the site of a 
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nuclear power plant. Therefore, in this country there was no law 
regarding what to do if radiation left the site of a nuclear power 
plant. It’s a pretty severe story, right? Therefore, 8,000 Becquerels. 
This only applies to [radionuclides] outside of a nuclear power plant. 
Inside a nuclear power plant, it’s 100 Becquerels. Yeah, that’s 
because they had that law. Nevertheless, the 100 Becquerels, they 
only spoke about things happening inside a nuclear power plant, so 
for a situation when [radionuclides] came out, there was no law. 
Hmm. It’s extremely severe. […] Regarding radiation, it’s a situation 
of lawlessness. So, you can’t tell the people who scattered radiation 
on your field to come and remove it. […] We have to create that kind 
of law. But the responsibility of a government that pushed nuclear 
power. It’s a very severe responsibility. Yes, all we can do is keep 
saying it. In no way can we accept this situation of contamination. 
But Japanese people, they are docile. In any case, I think there are a 
lot of people who are embarrassed to advocate for their rights. […] 
Well, many people don’t raise their voices. It’s because they are kind 
people. In that way, they are being taken advantage of. […] We need 
to form connections with real farmers. […] That’s the kind of thing 
we need to keep in view. 
 
7.5 Conclusion	
In this chapter, I have shared a number of examples of the various ways my participants 
have been working through the experiences of konran and kattō that have emerged in 
their everyday lives following the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. The experiences 
of my participants have highlighted the difficulty in discussing one’s concerns 
regarding radiation—those who do speak out are often left feeling isolated, criticized 
by friends, family members and others they may interact with. While some people may 
succumb to the pressure to remain silent, I have described how some of my participants 
have either curated or found refugia where they not only feel safe and comfortable 
discussing their concerns, but are able to grieve together about the various losses they 
have experienced since the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
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In her reflections on the cultivation of the “response-ability” necessary for enacting 
“conditions for ongoingness” in the turbulent times of the Anthropocene, Haraway 
(2016: 38) discusses the important role grief plays in these processes, particularly the 
act of grieving together. She explains: 
Grief is a path to understanding entangled shared living and dying; 
human beings must grieve with, because we are in and of this fabric 
of undoing. Without sustained remembrance, we cannot learn to live 
with ghosts and so cannot think. (Haraway, 2016: 39, original 
emphasis) 
There were tears shed at many of the events and meeting I attended during my 
fieldwork, and even in some of my interviews as people grieved the many losses they 
experienced or noticed others experiencing. As mentioned, for my participants, the 
opportunity to share one’s experiences and lean into the suffering of others helped to 
expose how their individual suffering was actually part of a larger, collective 
suffering—something that was not to be endured alone, but to be worked through 
together. This was not only the case for my participants, but for myself in writing this 
thesis. Starting with the very specific experiences of konran related to everyday eating, 
I was able to explore how these seeming individual experiences are actually hooked 
into many more complicated ruling relations which, though they appear in the 
coordination of everyday eating, infiltrate many other aspects of people’s everyday 
lives. 
 
Noticing the ways in which individual experiences of konran and kattō are connected to 
a wider collective suffering, many of my participants were also able to recognize their 
very real entanglements with historical radiological overflows, and how their 
experiences of disorder and discomfort are also tied into the experiences of previous 
generations who similarly struggled to notice these imperceptible materials—possibly 
within even more draconian ruling relations. Leaning in also allowed many of my 
participants to notice how some people in Japan are living within even stricter ruling 
relations than those active within the Kansai region. Thus, supporting people who are 
living under more restrictive ruling relations than oneself—particularly the people 
living in Fukushima Prefecture where the chants of ‘recovery,’ ‘reconstruction’ and 
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‘revitalization’ (fukkō) are the strongest—has provided an opportunity for many of my 
participants to channel their individual discomforts into work that supports others. 
 
While all of this sounds very hopeful, these refugia for thinking and recuperation are 
greatly under threat, particularly those which depend solely on donations and volunteer 
efforts. CRMSs are under particular pressure as electricity and rental fees are not easily 
paid by membership dues—which for many CRMSs are decreasing by the year. When 
saying my goodbye’s as I was leaving one of the CRMSs I visited during my fieldwork 
in November 2016, I was startled when the volunteer showing me out said, “I hope 
we’re still here when you come back.” In 2017, one of the most popular restaurants in 
the Kansai region that tested its food for radiation went out of business due to financial 
difficulties—it takes a lot of time and money to measure food, but the owner did not 
want to add a surcharge to food because it needed to be affordable for the many nuclear 
refugees that visited. At the same time, cuts in housing support for many nuclear 
refugees is forcing people to move back to places they do not feel comfortable living in, 
merely because they are unable to afford paying their mortgage while also renting a 
room in the Kansai region.  
 
It is with neither optimism nor despair, that I bear witness to the experiences of my 
participants, many of whom continue to struggle as they attempt to conduct their 
everyday lives within TEPCO’s industrial ruins. Working through their experiences of 
konran and kattō, they have begun attuning to their own entanglements with materials 
both vital and vicious—an attunement that become more and more muddled by the 
constant, deafening chorus of ‘revitalization’ and other ruling discourses reverberating 





In the months following the March 1954 Lucky Dragon incident—nine years after the 
dropping of US atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, during a period when 
radionuclides from nuclear bomb tests were swirling around and appearing on people’s 
dinner plates, and nuclear power plants were first being approved—a monstrous figure 
appeared on movie screens throughout Japan. Gojira (I. Honda, 1954)448 emerged from 
the depths of the Pacific Ocean, a monstrous, mountain-high radioactive beast awoken 
by US nuclear weapons tests. The film represented a serious attempt to weave together 
stories of modern progress, science, nuclear fallout and local storytelling practices449 in 
a country that was becoming more and more entangled with the US’s radionuclides.  
 
The original Gojira seemed to be asking audiences to notice, feel and think about the 
monstrosity of their ongoing entanglement with anthropogenic radionuclides, and the 
situated role of science and scientists in processes of life and death. The film ends with 
a sincere warning from the paleontologist Dr. Yamane, expressed just after Gojira was 
obliterated by a powerful ‘oxygen destroyer’: “If we continue conducting nuclear tests, 
well, it’s possible that another Gojira may again appear somewhere in the world.” 
However, in 1956, Americans dubbed and reshaped the film as Godzilla—King of the 
Monsters! (I. Honda & Morse, 1956) within which a white, American, male character, 
Mr. Martin, re-narrates the story. While both films portray Gojira as a monstrous, 
radioactive creature awoken by the US’s nuclear tests, the American version ends not 
with a warning, but with Mr. Martin’s sigh of relief: “The whole world could wake up 
and live again.”450  
 
The stark tensions between Dr. Yamane’s plea for people to notice their sociomaterial 
entanglements with radionuclides and Mr. Martin relief that the evaporation of Godzilla 
meant business as usual could continue unscathed is the same tension faced by my 
study participants in 2016, sixty-two years after the Lucky Dragon incident and five 
years after the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. Through borrowing sensibilities 
                                                
448 The name Gojira is a blending of the Japanese terms for gorilla (gorira) and whale (kujira). 
449 It was people in a small village who first named the monster; he was a character in one of 
their legends. 
450 The distinction between Dr. Yamane’s and Dr. Martin’s final thoughts is also discussed by 
Umayam (2013). 
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from both institutional ethnography and material semiotics to enact a ‘vital institutional 
ethnography,’ this thesis has been an attempt to attend to the materiality of both of 
these messages: the materiality of radionuclides that Dr. Yamane is gesturing toward, 
and the textually-mediated ruling relations that attempt to coordinate the business as 
usual that Mr. Martin seems most concerned with. In these concluding reflections, I 
will provide a brief overview of my research process, followed by insights into the 
importance of attuning to textual and non-textual forms of sociomaterial relationality 
when studying industrial ruination, and reflections on the need to think together in 
order to work through the monstrous troubles of the Anthropocene.  
 
8.1 Research	 overview:	 Vital	 institutional	 ethnography	 as	 a	 method	 for	
cultivating	‘response-ability’	in	the	Anthropocene	
This thesis represents my attempt to produce knowledge that will be useful for my 
participants in understanding how their experiences of konran related to everyday 
eating have emerged from their entanglement within messy heterogeneous 
sociomaterial relations. More than that, it represents my attempt to produce knowledge 
that will assist my participants in cultivating ‘response-ability,’ somehow ‘staying with 
the trouble’ (Haraway, 2016) while acting and being enacted within ruling relations 
pressuring them to forget these very real sociomaterial entanglements. Such a project 
required a deep and serious commitment to noticing the various sociomaterial 
entanglements that participated in enacting these unsettling experiences. Embodied 
experiences of konran and kattō hold many important clues to these entanglements, and 
provided an important entryway into the vast institutional complexes from which 
textually-mediated ruling relations emerge. However, noticing not only involved 
tracing the ruling texts that have been attempting to coordinate the everyday lives of my 
participants, but noticing the ways in which ruling relations of the Capitalocene 
actively work to silence humans and more-than-humans in order to perpetuate 
industrial progress projects, even in the face of industrial ruination. Attending to these 
silenced sociomaterial entanglements played an essential role in developing my 
understanding of how these processes of silencing and ignoring—which are so essential 
to the ruling relations in the Plantationocene, Capitalocene and Anthropocene—
appeared in the everyday lives of my participants. 
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A look back at historical industrial overflows in Chapter 4 illustrated some of these 
attempts to silence industrial toxins, as well as the humans who noticed them. In the 
case of the Ashio overflow, whole villages were erased, and the disruptive activities of 
trouble-making protesters were expunged from the Earth. In the case of Minamata, 
‘erasure’ of industrial overflows took a new form: a coordinated ‘rebirth’ of the humans 
and more-than-humans intra-acting within Chisso’s industrial ruins. The aftermath of 
TEPCO’s nuclear disaster reveals similar tactics of erasure and rebirth. However, 
unlike the ease of submerging trouble underground or underwater, enacting ‘rebirth’ 
and ‘revitalization’ involves wide-scale attempts to coordinate activities in a way that 
encourages people to follow in the newly-proposed project of economic ‘revitalization’ 
which, also blind to sympoietic sociomaterial entanglements, promotes further 
disregard and ignoring. 
 
My analyses have also uncovered how embodied experiences of konran and kattō make 
forgetting much more difficult for people, like my study participants, who feel 
suffocated within the ruling relations deployed to contain TEPCO’s industrial overflow 
(Chapter 7). Beginning with konran related to everyday eating experienced by my 
study’s participants provided me with a specific problematic, an entry point into the 
vast institutional complex from which post-nuclear disaster ruling relations emerge. 
Staying grounded in the situated standpoint of my participants was essential to this 
project, allowing me to follow various strings from their experiences into the greater 
institutional complex of post-2011 ruling relations, without becoming too overwhelmed 
or lost in its vastness. In Chapters 5 and 6, I focused on explicating (unfolding) some 
aspects of the apparatus from which Japan’s reference limits for radionuclides in food 
emerged, telling stories about the simplified, single reality (single fold) they attempt to 
coordinate regarding how human bodies should ‘correctly’ relate to TEPCO’s 
radionuclides. At the same time that I attempted to explicate textually mediated ruling 
relations my participants are bound and participate within, I also highlighted their 
precariousness—the multiplicity, monstrosity and ghostly ‘absent presence’ implicit in 
(folded within) ruling discourses and texts revealed the seemingly singular reality and 
the objects they enact to be multiple—not representing an established order or a 
harmonious ‘peaceful whole,’ but an explicitly contingent ‘established disorder.’ 
Ontonorms proved to be an extremely useful tool for exploring the normativities that 
participate in these coordination efforts (Mol, 2013). 
 320 
 
Thinking back to Deleuze and Guattari (2004), I have been explicating some traces of 
the trees sketched out by the transnational nuclear assemblage and the Japanese 
government, traces that tell stories of ‘progress,’ ‘safety’ and ‘control’ which 
participate in the enactment of linear-risk models that pave the textual-path forward for 
the proliferation of nuclear power and its companion, nuclear weaponry. While the tree 
depends on the complex relationality of the rhizome for its own vitality and 
enactments—just think of the myriad microbes, fungi, mycelia, rhizobia and 
mycorrhiza involved in plant nutrition451—its simplified, linear, and rational form does 
not explicitly allow for noticing its own entanglement within human and more-than-
human material semiotic, sympoietic relations. The term sōteigai (‘beyond 
expectation’) prolifically used by the Japanese government and TEPCO in the days and 
years following the nuclear disaster help to illustrate the single reality’s blindness to 
these entanglements.452 My analyses reveal how these tree-like ruling relations are not 
only blind to heterogeneous sociomateriality, but they explicitly attempt to coordinate 
activities so that people overlook and ignore their own situated entanglements with not 
only humans, but more-than-humans, ghostly ‘absent presences,’ and monstrosities of 
all sorts.  
 
Thinking back to Serres’ handkerchief (Section 3.3.2.3), linear timelines, metrics and 
risk assessments require an ironing-out of messy folds—multiple (many fold), 
complicated (entwined, folded together), complex (entangled) relationality—in order to 
pave the way for future industrial progress projects and manage any overflows that 
arise. This process of ironing pushes these entanglements into the shadows, as not to 
interfere with the ‘bright future’ promised by these stories. However, the process of 
ironing does not erase these relations. They lurk in the shadows, producing tensions 
                                                
451 See, for example, Philippot and colleagues (2013). 
452 The first paragraph of a Nihon Keizai Shimbun (known as The Nikkei) article describes the 
questionable use of the term sōteigai: “Was the accident really ‘beyond expectation’ 
[‘sōteigai’]? If Tokyo Electric had prepared by carefully [yōjin fukaku] assessing the nuclear 
power plant, there is a possibility that the accident’s large scale could have been prevented” 
(“Was Fukushima really,” 2016). The article points to documentation that TEPCO knew in 
2008 that a tsunami of over 15.7 meters was possible—a height similar to the waves that hit the 
plant in March 2011—but did nothing to augment its tsunami policies (see Ramseyer, 2012; 
“Tsunami predictions,” 2016). 
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that are not visible within the simplified (single fold) story offered by the projects 
themselves. And what happens to these tensions? They are absorbed by the everyday 
world-making projects of humans and more-than-humans. In the case of my 
participants, these tensions emerged as experiences of konran and kattō which needed 
to be worked out within their situated sociomaterial entanglements.453 In Chapter 7, I 
attend to the ways these tensions are worked out in practice. In focusing on my 
participants’ multiple embodied experiences of konran and kattō, I painted a picture of 
the ways in which they work together to cultivate places of refuge—‘refugia’ for 
thinking and for physical and emotional reprieve—attempting to ‘stay with the trouble’ 
and cultivate ‘response-ability’ even within extremely restrictive ruling relations. 
 
Returning to Haraway’s (2016) Chthulucene, my analyses of Japan’s post-2011 ruling 
relations reveal that industrial progress projects enacted within industrial ruins are 
coordinated in ways that explicitly ignore the heterogeneous human and more-than-
human sympoietic entanglements that make up the Chthulucene. Again, Haraway’s 
(2016) conceptualization of the Chthulucene invites scholars to attune to both vital and 
vicious material-semiotic entanglements, to ‘stay with the trouble’ of the messiness of 
these entanglements, even the most frightening and monstrous. Put differently, if ruling 
relations enacting the industrial progress projects of the Plantationocene, Capitalocene 
and Anthropocene are asking us to ignore messy and heterogeneous sociomateriality, 
the Chthulucene is an invitation to begin seriously paying attention to monstrous, 
“tentacular” sociomaterial entanglements (Haraway, 2016: 30-57). Vital institutional 
ethnography as a method of inquiry has not only allowed me to attune to the 
coordination of textually-mediated ruling relations, but to the vital and vicious 
entanglements that are obfuscated within the ruling relations themselves.  
 
                                                
453 As mentioned in Section 3.3.1.3, institutional ethnographers Campbell and Gregor (2004: 
72 , original emphasis) describe how inquiries into everyday practice expose “the tensions 
absorbed” in everyday work (broadly defined). 
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8.2 The	 necessity	 of	 noticing	 textual	 and	 non-textual	 sociomaterial	
entanglements:	 The	 potential	 dangers	 of	 ignoring	 ghosts	 and	 monsters	
when	studying	industrial	ruination	
In this thesis, it was my multiplicitous attempts to grapple with the monstrous 
materiality of radionuclides—their imperceptibility, the insidious ways they permeate 
all aspects of life, and their many ghostly hauntings connected to military and industry 
projects—that impelled me to blend institutional ethnography with sensibilities from 
the field of material semiotics. However, it was through the process of enacting this 
research project that I have come to realize the importance, if not the necessity, in 
attending to more-than-textual sociomateriality when studying cases of industrial 
pollution—happenings that arise from within the ruling relations of the Capitalocene 
which actively work to silence multiplicity of not only human, but more-than-human 
actors. 
 
My attention to historical industrial overflows and ghostly ‘absent presence’ throughout 
my analyses proved invaluable for attuning to how multiplicity and monstrosity are 
silenced within the ruling relations of the Capitalocene—highlighting how coordination 
efforts asking people to ignore sociomaterial entanglements not only participate in 
enacting industrial overflows, but in containing the overflows through coordinating 
further acts of ignoring once they do occur.  The overflow of radionuclides from 
TEPCO’s damaged reactors are just one of the many troubles we face in the 
Anthropocene. If the troubles being faced in the Anthropocene are due in some part to 
this coordination of the collective forgetting of monstrous and ghostly sociomaterial 
entanglements, then carefully paying attention to these monsters and ghosts would be 
essential to truly understanding how ruling relations work in practice. 
 
More importantly, without seriously attending to monstrous and ghostly sociomaterial 
entanglements, I as a researcher might actually perpetuate the very ruling relations I set 
out to study. In only tracing ruling texts as they relate to the experiences of my human 
participants, the various ruling relations involved in silencing the activity of 
anthropogenic radionuclides and other more-than-humans might be overlooked, and my 
analysis would confine my participants within the perspectival debates on radionuclides 
and human health, which themselves play a major role in the coordination of ruling 
relations. This is the danger, according to Deleuze and Guattari (2004), of focusing 
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only on tree traces without plugging them back into the rhizome. Here, I turn to an 
example from evolutionary biology to illustrate this point. 
 
In a paper discussing the need to pay more attention to the biological effects of 
exposure to low-doses of ionizing radiation, evolutionary biologists Møller and 
Mousseau (2013b) tell a poignant story on the importance of noticing sociomaterial 
entanglements within industrial ruins. They share a story of the vibrant birdsongs that 
can be heard throughout the most contaminated forests near the Chernobyl nuclear 
disaster. While many people would hear the songs and assume it was a sign of the 
flourishing of wildlife within abandoned industrial ruins, Møller and Mousseau (2013b) 
paint a very different picture of what is actually happening—a picture that arose from 
carefully noticing the monstrous sociomaterial entanglements from which these 
birdsongs emerge. The authors explain:  
There is a bias in sex ratio of birds at high levels of contamination in 
Chernobyl due to reproducing females being differentially 
susceptible to the negative effects of radiation, resulting in a greater 
female mortality rate and a greater number of unmated males. These 
males sing to attract a mate, and the proportion of singing males is 
consistently higher in more contaminated areas in Chernobyl. Such 
high frequency of birdsong may leave the false impression that nature 
is flourishing. A similar pattern was found in Fukushima, suggesting 
that similar mechanisms are at work in the two sites. (Møller & 
Mousseau, 2013b: 17) 
My participants’ multiple experiences of konran following TEPCO’s nuclear disaster 
share striking similarities to the story of the birds in Chernobyl. In the way the vibrant 
birdsongs enact an image of ‘revitalization’ and ‘rebirth’ which distract people from 
noticing the monstrous sociomaterial entanglements behind the noise, the progress-
oriented chorus of ‘rebirth’ and ‘revitalization’ encountered by my participants 
following the onset of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster enacts similar blindness to situated 
sociomaterial entanglements. That is, the chorus of ‘rebirth’ and ‘revitalization,’ which 
began roaring and reverberating almost immediately following the earthquake, tsunami 
and nuclear disaster in March 2011, makes noticing both vital and vicious 
entanglements difficult. Here, instead of stochastic realities creating noise—or 
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interference454—within statistical models and equations, the intense and unyielding 
clamor of the chorus of ‘rebirth’ and ‘revitalization’ interferes with attempts at noticing 
one’s own monstrous sociomaterial entanglements within TEPCO’s industrial ruins.  
 
Thus, while there have been valid concerns raised by institutional ethnographers about 
the dangers of blending institutional ethnography with material-semiotic attuned 
methods (Rankin, 2017), my thesis has revealed how studying ruling relations within 
industrial overflows benefits from tying a ‘promising knot’455 between these two fields 
of scholarship. Thus, in taking on the challenge by Deleuze and Guattari (2004) of 
plugging tree traces back into a rhizomatic map, this thesis represents an example of a 
method that takes seriously the “stochastic politics of life and death” (Bubandt, 2017: 
137), and may be useful for researchers grappling with troubles of the Anthropocene—
especially when those troubles are muddled by the pulsating drumbeats and harmonized 
choruses through which industrial progress projects actively attempt to silence situated, 
vital, viscous, monstrous and ghostly sociomateriality. 
 
In this way, the act of noticing ghostly and monstrous entanglements is itself a form of 
resistance within ruling relations that encourage people to ignore and forget. Unable to 
notice complex, stochastic, symbiotic, sympoietic, situated sociomaterial 
entanglements, the single reality deployed by purveyors of industrial progress projects 
bluntly categorizes bodies and objects into classifications that align with their own 
stories of progress. These categorizations—for example the ‘victim’-‘perpetrator’ 
binary enacted by kōgai (Chapter 4), or fūhyōhigai (Chapters 6 and 7)—can sometimes 
be used to pit people against each other in ways that obfuscate the responsibility of 
ruling elites or industries in the enactment of industrial ruination. In some cases, 
activating these ready-made categories may be useful. In other times, however, these 
categories entrap people within perspectival debates, or allow for categorizing people 
and their experiences away as ‘irrational’ or ‘anxious.’  In closing this section, I offer 
an example of how using material-semiotic sensibilities to attune to monstrous 
                                                
454 Michel Serres (1982: 66) defines ‘noise’ in the “scientific tradition” as a type of 
interference, specifically “the set of these phenomena of interference that become obstacles to 
communication.” 
455 Haraway (1994: 66) has encouraged scholars to “invent promising knots, and suggest other 
figures that will make us swerve from the established disorder of finished, deadly worlds.” 
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sociomaterial entanglements hidden within the Japanese government-prescribed 
category of ‘voluntary evacuee’ might interfere with the smooth enactment of projects 
of ‘rebirth’ and ‘revitalization’ which attempt to erase nuclear refugees from official 
ruling texts.456 
 
As previously mentioned, while the Japanese government officially refers to people 
who left areas contaminated with TEPCO’s radionuclides as ‘voluntary,’ or 
‘independent evacuees’ (jishu hinansha,⾃主避難者), I have been referring to them as 
‘nuclear refugees,’ because they are people seeking long-term refuge—not temporary 
evacuation—from TEPCO’s radionuclides—some of which will be active for hundreds, 
or even hundreds-of-thousands, of years.457 Revisiting the kanji characters that make up 
the Japanese word for evacuation—hinan (避難)—provides interesting insights as the 
word combines the character for ‘avoid’ (hi, 避) with a character that can be translated 
as ‘disaster,’ ‘danger’ or ‘trouble’ (nan, 難). Thus, beyond simply ‘evacuation,’ the 
term also seems to refer to the act of ‘taking refuge’ or ‘avoiding trouble’—a 
translation that fits better with the experience of my participants who sought refuge 
from TEPCO’s radionuclides. Exploring the Japanese word for refugee—nanmin (難
⺠)—opens up further possibilities for disrupting blunt categorizations. By combining 
the ‘trouble’ enfolded in the kanji character nan (難) with a character for ‘people’458 
(min, ⺠), a different translation emerges: ‘trouble people.’ Nuclear refugees are, in 
fact, trouble for business as usual, as their mere existence disrupts attempts to erase the 
industrial ruination from which they seek refuge. Differing greatly from the benign 
category of ‘voluntary evacuee’ offered as the only classification for refuge-seekers 
within government ruling texts, terms such as ‘nuclear refugee’ or ‘trouble people’ help 
to re-attune to the sociomaterial relations—precisely people’s entanglement with 
                                                
456 See Yoshida (2018) and Khan (2018) for further discussions on how ‘evacuees’ in the 
aftermath of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster have been treated within Japan’s legal system. 
457 See Section 6.3. 
458 This character is usually used to refer to a group or categorization of people, such as 
‘citizens’ of a nation (kokumin, 国⺠), ‘citizens’ or ‘residents’ of a city (shimin, 市⺠), or even 
‘abandoned people’ (kimin, 棄⺠)—a term that has been used since TEPCO’s nuclear disaster 
to describe the nuclear refugees (categorized as ‘voluntary evacuees’) left out of current 
government policies (see Hino, 2016; Kimura, 2016a: 146-7). 
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TEPCO’s radionuclides—that impelled them to seek refuge in the first place. Enacting 
a vital institutional ethnography has allowed me to notice the myriad humans and more-
than-humans, and their various ghostly and monstrous sociomaterial entanglements, 
active beneath the deafening chorus of ‘rebirth’ and ‘revitalization.’ This method will 
also provide me with an opportunity to share these insights with my study participants, 
attuning them to how texts, ghosts and monsters contribute to the experiences of konran 
we explored together in interviews and focus group sessions.  
 
8.3 Thinking	together	
As researchers, attuning to messy and monstrous sociomaterial relations within 
ceaselessly sprawling industrial ruins—and thus the destruction of ‘refugia’ needed to 
support life and resurgence on a damaged planet Earth—we are faced with a number of 
ethical considerations. Do we continue to participate in single-reality-wielding, 
autopoietic, tree-like ruling relations that are blind to sociomaterial entanglements and 
continue to participate in the enactment of industrial progress projects unable to notice 
their own destructive forces? Or do we take seriously the messy, monstrous 
heterogeneity referred to as stochastic “noise,” “scatter” or “trivial”459 forms of static 
that are silenced within statistical equations of institutions such as the transnational 
nuclear assemblage? 
 
Noticing means taking this ‘static’ seriously, staying with the trouble of the monstrous 
sociomaterial entanglements of Haraway’s (2016) Chthulucene, without attempting to 
smooth them over, or categorize them away. It means attending to the experiences of 
konran and suffering expressed by all people entangled within radiological overflows, 
such as Mrs. Lijon Eknilang—a woman from the Marshall Islands who stood before the 
International Court of Justice and shared some of the monstrous experiences of women 
living in the fallout of the United States’ sixty-seven nuclear bomb tests. In her 
testimony, she shared harrowing accounts of how women: 
give birth, not to children as we like to think of them, but to things 
we could only describe as “octopuses”, “apples”, “turtles”, and other 
things in our experience. We do not have Marshallese words for these 
                                                
459 See Section 5.4.1. 
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kinds of babies because they were never born before the radiation 
came.  
Women on Rongelap, Likiep, Ailuk and other atolls in the Marshall 
Islands have given birth to these “monster babies”. …One woman on 
Likiep gave birth to a child with two heads.… There is a young girl 
on Ailuk today with no knees, three toes on each foot and a missing 
arm…  
The most common birth defects on Rongelap and nearby islands have 
been “jellyfish” babies. These babies are born with no bones in their 
bodies and with transparent skin. We can see their brains and hearts 
beating…. Many women die from abnormal pregnancies and those 
who survive give birth to what looks like purple grapes which we 
quickly hide away and bury…. (quoted in Lauterpacht & Greenwood, 
1998: 412-3)460 
As researchers, how can we attend to monstrous entanglements, particularly when our 
objects of concern are difficult to understand without specific forms of scientific 
expertise? And when the scientific knowledge and expertise about these materials 
participate in oppressive ruling relations? In this thesis, I found myself as a social 
scientist struggling to learn about radionuclides, imperceptible materials whose 
activities have been contained within a vast textual complex that is blind to 
heterogeneity, sympoiesis and stochastic realities. Enacting my project required moving 
beyond my own disciplinary boundaries, reaching into other scientific fields which 
engage directly with environmental and scientific histories, radionuclides, human 
bodies and other shared objects of concern. While I tried my best to traverse trans-
                                                
460 The Marshallese poet Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner (2017b) wrote a poem titled “Monster” where she 
describes the suffering of women in the Marshall Islands who gave “birth to nightmares”—
“Sinister. Hideous. Monster. More jellyfish than child.” Her performance of the poem, which 
lays bare the ghosts of the transnational nuclear assemblage, was filmed just in front of the 
Hiroshima Peace Memorial in Japan and was posted to the International Campaign to Abolish 
Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) Facebook page in support of the negotiations to ban nuclear weapons 
taking place at the United Nations between February and July of 2017. ICAN was awarded a 
Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts in October 2017. The video of Kathy’s poem “Monster” can be 
viewed at: https://vimeo.com/224211868. See Jetnil-Kijiner (2017a) and 
https://www.kathyjetnilkijiner.com for more of Kathy’s poems. 
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disciplinary boundaries on my own, working alone is not only extremely difficult, but 
has its limits, especially when trying to address deeper questions regarding complex 
biological and physical processes. Therefore, I see much potential in transdisciplinary 
collaborations when dealing with the messiness and heterogeneity of toxic industrial 
overflows and other troubles of the Anthropocene. The editors of the book Arts of 
Living on a Damaged Planet provide an excellent example of a promising collaboration 
between a historian and a microbiologist regarding the effects of low-doses of ionizing 
radiation on human bodies (Swanson et al., 2017).  
 
At a conference in 2014, historian Kate Brown shared how she was faced with stories 
of monstrous sociomaterial entanglements during her fieldwork near a plutonium 
reprocessing plant in Russia.461 In her talk, she describes how many of her study 
participants, who were mostly women, wanted to talk about their bodies, sharing their 
medical records with Brown who instead wanted her participants to stay focused on the 
reprocessing facility. Eventually, Brown (2014b) was forced to notice what the women 
had been trying to show her: 
Finally one woman, her name was Kuzminova. She just put her 
papers down and she got up. And before I could stop her, she 
unbuttoned her shirt and she showed me her abdomen which was 
alive with scars from multiple surgeries. […] That really finally got 
me. Kuzminova forced me to see her body in a way that I had been 
refusing to see when I turned away these women’s medical papers. 
[…] I didn’t know if those many surgeries were caused from isotopes 
from the plutonium plant, but her pain recorded in her bodily etchings 
was simply, exhaustingly there. I could no longer doubt it, but I still 
wished it could go away. 
Brown (2014b) went on to describe a number of symptoms experienced by some of the 
people living near the plutonium reprocessing facility, which have been termed 
                                                
461 The fieldwork provided the basis for her book Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, 
and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters (K. Brown, 2013). Brown’s (2014b) 
talk contains excerpts from a forthcoming book chapter uploaded by the University of 
California, Davis’ Environments and Societies (see K. Brown, 2014a). 
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“Chronic Radiation Syndrome”—a diagnosis only found in the Ural region of Russia.462 
She describes the syndrome as: 
an illness caused by long-term exposure of low-doses of radiation 
[…] doctors […] have diagnosed it as a multiple assault of 
radioactive isotopes on multiple organs, producing a number of 
symptoms including chronic fatigue, weight loss, severe joint pain, 
disorders of the immune and circulation systems, the digestive track. 
All of these problems crop up long before a person gets radiation-
induced cancers. (Brown, 2014b) 
The editors of Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet point out that Margaret McFall-
Ngai, a microbiologist who studies relations among microbes and organisms and works 
within the paradigm of the postmodern synthesis, was listening to Brown’s talk 
(Swanson et al., 2017).463 The editors explain the insights McFall-Ngai offered to 
understanding the sufferings of Brown’s study participants:  
Rather than diffuse complaints, a product of bad living, as doctors 
had argued, McFall-Ngai thought all those ailments could easily arise 
from one cause: mutations in intestinal bacteria. Chronic doses of 
radiation that might not yet stimulate a human cell cancer could 
easily have caused bacterial mutations. […] Suffering from the ills of 
another species: this is the condition of the Anthropocene, for 
humans and nonhumans alike. (Swanson et al., 2017: M3-4) 
Such exchanges enact what Haraway (2017: M28) refers to as the “new new synthesis” 
or the “extended synthesis,” referring to the emerging transdisciplinary interchanges 
among biologists in the postmodern synthesis and social scientists and humanities 
(what she refers to as ‘humusities’) scholars—exchanges which have become 
                                                
462 She points out in her talk that US scientists—who were active in the development of the 
transnational nuclear assemblage (Chapter 5)—have refused to recognize this diagnosis. 
463 See McFall-Ngai (2014; 2017) and McFall-Ngai and colleagues (2013). The conference in 
2014 provided the basis for the book Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet: Ghosts and 
Monsters of the Anthropocene. 
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indispensable for thinking through some of the terrifying troubles of the 
Anthropocene.464  
 
My research into the transnational nuclear assemblage (Chapter 5) has illustrated that 
the biological insights produced and activated within this assemblage’s textual complex 
are much more in line with the modern synthesis in biology and its autopoietic, single-
reality-wielding stories where bodies are broken into units and analyzed in pieces 
before being put back together in statistical models. This explains why the experiences 
of Brown’s research participants could never be taken seriously by scientists activating 
scientific knowledge produced within the transnational nuclear assemblage—
knowledge based on theories and models that do not recognize the heterogeneity 
inherent in sympoietic and symbiopoietic sociomaterial relationality.   
 
Thus, insights from the postmodern synthesis in biology could prove useful for 
disrupting post-nuclear disaster ruling relations that are blind to multiplicity and 
heterogeneity: the postmodern turn in biology explicitly abandons tree-like 
conceptualizations of biological processes, recognizing them as instead being more 
web-like and rhizobial in nature (see Mcfall-Ngai, 2017). In addition, as Haraway 
(2017) points out, taking seriously our lichen-ness means embracing monstrosity, both 
vital and vicious.465 The work essential for seriously engaging with these monstrosities 
will necessarily involve not only attuning to sociomaterial entanglements, but ‘staying 
with the trouble’ and “become capable of thinking” (Pignarre et al., 2011: 107), not 
individually, but “thinking together” across disciplines (Haraway, 2016; Swanson et al., 
2017: M4). This is the hope these monstrous entanglements might bestow to the 
researchers and research participants able to notice them. 
 
                                                
464 Haraway (2017: M28) describes these hopeful scholarly cross-contaminations: “An 
emerging ‘new new synthesis’ (or ‘extended synthesis’) in transdisciplinary biologies and arts 
proposes string figures tying together human and nonhuman ecologies, evolution, development, 
history, affects, performances, technologies, and more.”  
465 Or, as the editors of Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet argue, “We need both senses of 
monstrosity: entanglement as life and as danger” (Swanson et al., 2017: M3). 
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8.4 Concluding	remarks	
During my fieldwork in 2016, Gojira appeared in Japanese theatres again, this time as 
Shin Gojira (Anno & Higuchi, 2016),466 a gruesome and frightening monster that 
emerged from Tokyo Bay, leaving large areas of Tokyo in ruins following its deadly 
rampage though the metropolis. In the way the 1954 film drew connections to the 
Lucky Dragon incident and bestowed a warning about nuclear weapons testing, the 
2016 film drew many connections to TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, providing an insider 
view of how this monstrous creature and the radioactivity it spread was handled by the 
Japanese government who considered the incident to be ‘beyond expectation’ 
(sōteigai). Similar to the aftermath of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster, ruling discourses such 
as anshin, sōteigai, fukkō, fūhyōhigai and josen (decontamination) could also be heard 
throughout the governments’ deliberations and public announcements.  
 
With the US planning to destroy Gojira with a nuclear weapon, one of the 
protagonists—the Japanese Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yaguchi Rando—banded 
together with his colleagues, employing much more creative strategies involving hoses, 
bullet trains and other public machines to ultimately freeze Gojira. The film ends with 
Secretary Yaguchi overlooking the Tokyo skyline from a rooftop, the frozen body of 
Gojira standing in place of demolished buildings as a reminder of the long-term trouble 
his awakening poses to the people of Japan and the world at large. In his final remarks, 
Secretary Yaguchi asserts the necessity for staying with the trouble of Gojira and the 
invisible threat of radiation the monster carries: “Japan, no, humans have no choice but 
to live alongside Gojira. […] However, now is not the time to quit. It will take long for 
this situation to be resolved.” 
 
This thesis emerged from the experiences of my participants who, like both Dr. 
Yamane and Secretary Yaguchi, have been trying stay with the monstrous trouble 
posed by the overflow of TEPCO’s radionuclides. However, staying with the trouble is 
not easy, particularly when acting within ruling relations aggressively working to 
sweep away such troubles in order pave the way for the smooth coordination of 
business as usual. Similar struggles can be found throughout the globe, as the 
                                                
466 Shin (新) is the Japanese word for ‘new,’ and, thus, the title can be translated as ‘New 
Godzilla.’ It is also sometimes referred to as Godzilla Resurgence. 
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monstrosity of industrial overflows, climate chaos and mass extinctions that 
characterize the Anthropocene are met with ruling relations of the Capitalocene that are 
blind to this very monstrosity—a blindness that participated in enacting these very 
troubles. Thus, staying with the trouble means attuning to the sociomateriality of ruling 
texts as well as the ghostly and monstrous entanglements being actively ignored and 
discounted by ruling texts and discourses. Better understanding our own sociomaterial 
entanglements and ways we participate in ruling relations could support the efforts of 
those people struggling to work together across difference, fighting to curate and 
protect refugia in the face of overflowing trouble.  
 
Here, I would like to give the last word to one of the ‘trouble people’ from Fukushima 
Prefecture who I interviewed 2016. As I was writing these reflections in January 2018, 
she shared her own reflection on a 2014 letter written by a woman living in Date City, 
Fukushima Prefecture. My hope is that the findings of this thesis will support her and 
my other participants in better understanding their sociomaterial entanglements with 
ruling texts, monsters and ghosts as they continue to struggle in their tireless efforts to 
stay with the trouble of TEPCO’s nuclear disaster. 
 “Don’t be deceived by terms like ‘fūhyōhigai’ and ‘fukkō.’” I was so 
surprised [she wrote this]! Today, I said the exact same thing when 
speaking before a group of elementary school teachers in Osaka. The 
difference was between being called foolish by others for 
decontaminating your garden “through your own efforts” and being 
called foolish by others for continuing to evacuate “through your 
own efforts.” That was the only difference [in our messages]. Beyond 
that, [for those] using terms like “fukkō [revitalization],” “kizuna 
[bonds],” “fūhyōhigai [harmful rumors],” have you completely 
forgotten that we need to start from our shared reality and the truth? 
For the past seven years was it the words of the perpetrators who 
hold power and political influence, or the voices of everyday citizens, 
the voices of the victims of the disaster that were listened to? Over 
the past seven years was it possible for the views of the victims to be 
heard? No system has been established to reflect the voices of victims 
of the nuclear calamity, has there? I believe these struggles will 
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accumulate as historical realities. It has been seven years since the 
disaster, not yet seven years. Please allow me to join others in 
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